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POLYBIUS

I

POLYBIUS

THE HISTORIES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

W. R. PATON

IN SIX VOLUMES


I



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Quare historiae huius non postrema haec laus est, quod in parte versetur rerum Romanarum longe nobilissima, sive virorum virtutem spectes, sive publica instituta aut mores, sive gestorum magnitudinem. Cum autem inter excellentis historiae condiciones doctissimi veterum hanc cum primis ponant, ut certi intervallo temporis circumscribatur, et a notabili principio ad notabilem finem perducatur, hanc historiae legem, ut quidem illis placet, a Polybio mirifice esse observatam invenimus.

CASABON.

INTRODUCTION

POLYBIUS was born about 208 B.C. at Megalopolis in Arcadia. His father, Lycortas, who spent the greater part of his life—more especially the years 181-168 B.C.—in the service of the Achaean League, was a friend and supporter of Philopoemen; he went as ambassador to Rome in 189, to Ptolemy Epiphanes, king of Egypt, in 186 and again in 181; and he was Strategus of the League in 184. In his youth Polybius began to take part in public affairs. He seems to have served with the Romans in the campaign of 189 against the Gauls in Asia Minor; he carried the urn of Philopoemen to burial in 183; he was associated with his father Lycortas in the embassy to Egypt in 181; and he was Hipparchus of the Achaean League for the year 169-8.

Throughout the period (181-168) of political association with his father Polybius consistently maintained the view that the supremacy of Rome in Greece must be accepted, and that the Greek states must conduct their affairs, whether singly or collectively, and preserve their freedom, without giving any offence, or cause of complaint, to the Roman republic. But there was much intriguing, in Greece and at Rome, against this policy of legal independence; and the suspicions of the Romans were so far aroused

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that they came to regard the independents with no less displeasure than the avowed enemies of the republic. Thus, though the Achaean League maintained correctly enough this policy of a strict legality during the third war between Rome and Macedon (172-168), its leaders were quickly brought to account after the defeat of King Perseus at Pydna (168 B.C.), and no less than a thousand Achaeans were transported to Italy to be tried for their alleged opposition to the sovereignty of Rome. Of this company was Polybius—we hear nothing more of his father Lycortas: he may have died about this time. Quartered in Italian cities, these Greeks waited for the trial which never came; and at last in 151 B.C., when after sixteen years liberty was given to them to return home, there were less than three hundred of the thousand left to go back.

Polybius was more fortunate than the rest. He had become acquainted with Aemilius Paulus and his two sons during the campaign against Perseus and afterwards in Macedonia, and now in 167 he was allowed to remain in Rome in the house of Aemilius, to act as tutor to the two boys. This was the beginning of that famous friendship between Polybius and the younger son, who became by adoption Publius Scipio Aemilianus. Panaetius, the Stoic philosopher, was also an inmate of Aemilius Paulus' house about this time, exercising—perhaps in rivalry with Polybius—a tutorial influence upon the sons. Polybius had access through Aemilius Paulus to the best of Roman society during those sixteen years of expatriation in Italy, and he made good use of his opportunities. He studied the history and institutions of Rome, doubtless with a view to

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the history that he meant to write himself; he observed Roman life and character, in the individual and in the state¹; he hunted the boar with the younger sportsmen.

The Romans appreciated the ability and the versatility of Polybius, and in 149 B.C.—less than two years after his return to Arcadia—invited his assistance in the diplomatic discussions that preceded the last Punic War. And when Publius Scipio rejoined the army before Carthage in 147 as commander-in-chief, Polybius was in close attendance, to advise on questions of siege operations, or to conduct explorations on the coast of Africa in ships officially supplied. He stood by Scipio's side while Carthage was burning (146 B.C.); and when that destruction was finished he returned to Greece, in time, if not to witness the sack of Corinth by Mummius, at any rate to modify the executions of the Romans and to rescue some of the treasures of art from destruction or deportation. And when the Roman commissioners withdrew from Greece, they left Polybius with authority to settle the details for the administration of each surviving city. Thus he came to be regarded as a public benefactor, for he had done his work well; and statues were raised to him in Megalopolis, Mantinea, Tegea, Olympia, and elsewhere.

Polybius lived for some twenty years after this work was done, but we know little or nothing about his employments. He may have joined Scipio during the siege of Numantia in Spain (134–132): he visited Egypt again: his travels in Europe, Asia, and perhaps in Africa, may have been continued and

¹ Cf. vi. 56, on the moral tone of the Romans.

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extended in this period; and his literary work—there were, in addition to the *History*, a *Life of Philopoemen* in three books, a *Treatise on Tactics*, and a *History of the Numantine War*—must have occupied much of his time. A sportsman to the last, he met his death at eighty-two by an accidental fall from his horse as he was returning from the country.

The project of writing a history of the age probably suggested itself to Polybius, and was certainly developed, during the years of his detention in Italy. Expatriation loosened the links with Greece, and tightened the connexion with Rome. His original scheme was to record the rise of Rome to supremacy over the Mediterranean states in the years 220–168 B.C., *i.e.* from the beginning of the Second Punic War to the end of the Third Macedonian War. He subsequently extended this scheme in order to include an account of events from the first expedition of the Romans outside Italy (*i.e.* from the beginning of the First Punic War, in 264 B.C., the point where the history of Timæus had ended) and to continue the record to the year (146 B.C.) which witnessed the destruction of Carthage and of Corinth. In the end the *History* consisted of forty books, of which the first two were introductory (*προκατασκευή*), the next thirty dealt with the main subject, and the last eight with the corollary. Of the forty books the first five only are preserved complete: of the rest there are only sections and fragments—numerous, it is true, but of varying length and importance—gathered from epitomes and excerpts.

Polybius was keenly alive to the greatness of his subject: he never forgot it himself, and he did

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not allow his readers to forget it. "Fruitful as Fortune is in change, and constantly as she is producing dramas in the life of men, yet assuredly never before this did she work such a marvel, or act such a drama, as that which we have witnessed."¹

"What man is so indifferent or so idle that he would not wish to know how and under what form of government almost all the inhabited world came under the single rule of the Romans in less than fifty-three years (220-168 B.C.)?"² Thus at the outset he stated the scheme of his work; several times in the earlier books³ he repeated the formula, for such it was, explaining in due course the extension of the scheme⁴ in order to provide a proper introduction and conclusion; and in the last surviving chapter of the last book⁵ he acknowledged the completion of his purpose. Careful to observe throughout the proportion and the continuity of things, he composed his treatise (πραγματεία) to be at once "catholic" (καθ' ὅλον) in its relation to the general history of the world, and "pragmatic" or "apodeictic" in its conscious demonstration of the principle of cause and effect.⁶ And so he made his work "perhaps the greatest *universal history*, or history of the civilized world, attempted in old times."⁷ Was there ever a book, indeed, written so strictly according to plan, by a person so well qualified?

For indeed it seemed that destiny itself had called and trained Polybius to this task. The son of a statesman, he spent the first forty years of his life in actual connexion with politics, diplomacy, and war;

¹ i. 4.

² i. 1.

³ e.g. iii. 1-3, 31, 32.

⁴ iii. 4.

⁵ xl. 14.

⁶ iii. 6-8.

⁷ Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, p. 556.

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and he naturally came to regard it as an indispensable qualification of a historian that he should be able to record his own experiences of peace and war, describing from his own knowledge men and circumstances, events and localities. As a man of action himself, he felt the necessity of first-hand evidence wherever it was obtainable, and spared no pains to obtain it ; and he had no opinion of stay-at-home historians (like Timæus) who lived in libraries and wrote as bookmen. Nevertheless, in the technical preparation of his work Polybius was cautious and painstaking beyond all others: he was a practical man, but he did not despise theory. So far and with his travels, extensive and systematic¹ as they were, he made a special study of geography—embodying many of his observations in Book xxxiv., which is almost entirely geographical ; and with his visits, official or unofficial, to various countries, he combined an examination of documents and records—and all, no doubt, to make his work correct, continuous, and complete. He may not have been a great general, or diplomat, or even topographer ; but he was always careful, and generally right in his conclusions. He was impelled and guided by a natural instinct for truth : “ For as a living creature is rendered wholly useless if deprived of its eyes, so if you take truth from history, what is left is but an idle unprofitable tale ? ”² Truth, he says elsewhere, is shown by nature to mankind as supreme in divinity and power : sooner or later, truth must prevail over all opposition.³

It is worth while to consider a little further what

¹ *e.g.* he crossed the Alps by the pass which Hannibal was believed to have used.

² i. 14.

³ xiii. 5.

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was the position of Polybius in Greece—for in a sense it was typical of his age—and what his point of view. He was a native of Megalopolis, a city whose very foundation in the fourth century had been an experiment in federal unity. By birth and instinct an aristocrat, he had no sympathy with democratic survivals or demagogic outbreaks. As a statesman he realized that the old Greek ideas of freedom and independence, centred in the city-state, were gone, nor ever likely to return, except so far as was possible under the suzerainty of Rome—or rather, in the reconciliation of Roman rule and Greek intellect. Early in his career he saw that the Roman power was inevitable and irresistible; and therefore he strove by skilful diplomacy to guide and keep the Achaean League, and the Greeks in general, in ways that were correct and unexceptionable. He was a Stoic, and he believed that the Roman order of things was part of a divine Providence that ruled the world. This belief, confirmed by his closer acquaintance with the Romans, and by their progress in conquest, he expounded in his *History*, with such detail of causes, circumstances, and consequences as to show that he understood the position and the prospects of the Romans in the Mediterranean world far more clearly than at that time they themselves were able to do.

Polybius lived in a self-conscious age, when criticism was mostly captious and destructive, and standards of right and wrong, of truth and falsehood, were unsteady and uncertain. In the *History* he himself criticizes other writers freely enough, often at great length¹, and with a severity that became

¹ *e.g.* Timaeus in Book xii.

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proverbial. Was he not nicknamed ἐπιτίματος for his treatment of Timaeus in particular? He divides historians into three classes: those who write for pay—to suit the pleasure or the plans of kings and states; those who write for rhetorical display; those who write for truth, and for the good of mankind.¹ He appreciates the power of rhetoric in history for good and ill; but he avoids such assistance in his own work, for fear that he may fail to tell “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” He employs the vocabulary of ordinary usage; and though his statements are always clear, and generally adequate, the style is seldom remarkable or attractive. Yet in the opinion of a great historian “the narrative is a model of completeness, simplicity, and clearness”²: it is the concentration of intellect upon a task—a vital century in the history of Rome—for which something besides intellect was needed, something of moral judgment, of spiritual understanding. In this respect—the larger humanity, where a sense of imagination joins with a sense of humour to modify the mechanism of intellect—Polybius is certainly lacking; and his narrative, for all its simplicity and clearness, fails often to interest just because it is so uniformly correct, so invariably instructive.

The work of Polybius was valued in ancient times, and not least by the Romans. Was his *History* intended primarily for Roman readers? Possibly: but at first it would scarcely be comprehended by more than a few of them, such as the Scipionic circle.

¹ xvi. 14.

² Mommsen, *History of Rome* (English Translation), vol. iii. p. 467.

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And to many, if not most, of the Greeks of his own day he must have seemed something of a suspect, and no proper patriot, who could devote forty books to an outspoken appreciation of all things Roman. Yet, save for his lack of rhetoric, he was thought to have exemplified every virtue of history: his opinions were frequently quoted, his works were compressed into epitomes and reproduced in excerpts. The pity is that by such abridged editions we have been deprived of the means of forming a just estimate of his work as a whole. For what was chosen for survival in epitome or excerpt, because it appeared most interesting or important in the generations that followed his own, cannot give us the whole story as Polybius told it—the σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος, we might almost say—nor reveal the whole mind of Polybius. Yet enough remains to establish his worth, as a historian who was generally right in point of fact and reasonable in point of view, who “accomplished what he had intended, a history to guide life, to proclaim truth, and in all sagacity to forecast the future from the past.”¹

For the books (i.-v.) which are still extant in complete form the best Manuscript is **A**, Codex Vaticanus 121, of the eleventh century. Fragments of the lost books are to be seen in **F**, Codex Urbinas 102, of the eleventh century, in the Constantine Excerpts, and in **M**, Codex Vaticanus 73, of the tenth century, a palimpsest containing excerpts. The Constantine Excerpts, so called because they

¹ Wytttenbach, *Praefatio ad selecta principum historicorum*.

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were made by direction of the Byzantine Emperor Constantine (A.D. 912-959) as part of an Encyclopaedia of History and Political Science, give passages of Polybius arranged under various headings according to the subject matter.

H. J. EDWARDS.

The Translator died suddenly in 1921. and the Editors have seen the work through the press. The Introduction has been supplied by Colonel Edwards, C.B.

THE HISTORIES OF
POLYBIUS

VOL. I

B

ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ ΠΡΩΤΗ

- 1 Εἰ μὲν τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν ἀναγράφουσι τὰς πράξεις παραλελείφθαι συνέβαινε τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς ἱστορίας ἔπαινον, ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τὸ προτρέπεσθαι πάντας πρὸς τὴν αἴρεσιν καὶ παραδοχὴν τῶν τοιούτων ὑπομνημάτων, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐτοιμοτέραν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διόρθωσιν τῆς τῶν
- 2 προγεγενημένων πράξεων ἐπιστήμης. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ τινὲς οὐδ' ἐπὶ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀρχῇ καὶ τέλει κέχρηται τούτῳ, φάσκοντες ἀληθινωτάτην μὲν εἶναι παιδείαν καὶ γυμνασίαν πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας μάθησιν, ἐναργεστάτην δὲ καὶ μόνην διδάσκαλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης μεταβολὰς γενναίως ὑποφέρειν τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν ὑπόμνησιν, δῆλον
- 3 ὡς οὐδενὶ μὲν ἂν δόξαι καθήκειν περὶ τῶν καλῶς καὶ πολλοῖς εἰρημένων ταυτολογεῖν, ἥκιστα δ' ἡμῖν.
- 4 αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν πράξεων, ὑπὲρ ὧν προηγήμεθα γράφειν, ἱκανόν ἐστι προκαλέσασθαι καὶ παρορμῆσαι πάντα καὶ νέον καὶ πρεσβύτερον
- 5 πρὸς τὴν ἐντευξιν τῆς πραγματείας. τίς γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ῥάθυμος ἀνθρώπων ὃς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιο γινῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπι-

THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

BOOK I

1. HAD previous chroniclers neglected to speak in praise of History in general, it might perhaps have been necessary for me to recommend everyone to choose for study and welcome such treatises as the present, since there is no more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past. But all historians, one may say without exception, and in no half-hearted manner, but making this the beginning and end of their labour, have impressed on us that the soundest education and training for a life of active politics is the study of History, and that the surest and indeed the only method of learning how to bear bravely the vicissitudes of fortune, is to recall the calamities of others. Evidently therefore no one, and least of all myself, would think it his duty at this day to repeat what has been so well and so often said. For the very element of unexpectedness in the events I have chosen as my theme will be sufficient to challenge and incite young and old alike to peruse these pages. For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what system of polity the Romans in

κρατηθέντα σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην
 ἐν οὐχ ὅλοις πενήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ
 μίαν ἀρχὴν ἔπεσε τὴν Ῥωμαίων, ὃ πρότερον οὐχ
 6 εὐρίσκεται γεγονός, τίς δὲ πάλιν οὕτως ἐκπαθὴς
 πρὸς τι τῶν ἄλλων θεαμάτων ἢ μαθημάτων
 ὃς προυργιαίτερον ἂν τι ποιήσαιτο τῆσδε τῆς
 ἐμπειρίας;

2 Ὡς δ' ἔστι παράδοξον καὶ μέγα τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡμε-
 τέραν ὑπόθεσιν θεώρημα γένοιτ' ἂν οὕτως μάλιστ'
 ἐμφανές, εἰ τὰς ἐλλογιμωτάτας τῶν προγεγενημένων
 δυναστειῶν, περὶ ἃς οἱ συγγραφεῖς τοὺς πλείστους
 διατέθεινται λόγους, παραβάλοιμεν καὶ συγκρίναι-
 2 μεν πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων ὑπεροχήν. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ τῆς
 παραβολῆς ἄξιοι καὶ συγκρίσεως αὐταί. Πέρσαι
 κατὰ τινας καιροὺς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν κατεκτήσαντο
 καὶ δυναστείαν· ἀλλ' ὅσάκις ἐτόλμησαν ὑπερβῆναι
 τοὺς τῆς Ἀσίας ὅρους, οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀρχῆς,
 3 ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ σφῶν ἐκινδύνευσαν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι
 πολλοὺς ἀμφισβητήσαντες χρόνους ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν
 Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας, ἐπειδὴ ποτ' ἐκράτησαν, μόλις
 4 ἔτη δώδεκα κατεῖχον αὐτὴν ἀδήριτον. Μακεδόνες
 τῆς μὲν Εὐρώπης ἤρξαν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν
 τόπων ἕως ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰστρον ποταμόν, ὃ βραχὺ παντε-
 5 λῶς ἂν φανεῖν μέρος τῆς προειρημένης χώρας. μετὰ
 δὲ ταῦτα προσέλαβον τὴν τῆς Ἀσίας ἀρχὴν, κατα-
 λύσαντες τὴν τῶν Περσῶν δυναστείαν. ἀλλ' ὁμως
 οὗτοι, πλείστων δόξαντες καὶ τόπων καὶ πραγμάτων
 γενέσθαι κύριοι, τὸ πολὺ μέρος ἀκμὴν ἀπέλιπον
 6 τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀλλότριον. Σικελίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ
 Σαρδοῦς καὶ Λιβύης οὐδ' ἐπεβάλοντο καθάπαξ ἀμ-
 φισβητεῖν, τῆς δ' Εὐρώπης τὰ μαχιμώτατα γένη
 τῶν προσεσπερίων ἐθνῶν ἰσχνῶς εἶπεῖν οὐδ' ἐγί-

BOOK I

less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government—a thing unique in history? Or who again is there so passionately devoted to other spectacles or studies as to regard anything as of greater moment than the acquisition of this knowledge?

2. How striking and grand is the spectacle presented by the period with which I purpose to deal, will be most clearly apparent if we set beside and compare with the Roman dominion the most famous empires of the past, those which have formed the chief theme of historians. Those worthy of being thus set beside it and compared are these. The Persians for a certain period possessed a great rule and dominion, but so often as they ventured to overstep the boundaries of Asia they imperilled not only the security of this empire, but their own existence. The Lacedaemonians, after having for many years disputed the hegemony of Greece, at length attained it but to hold it uncontested for scarce twelve years. The Macedonian rule in Europe extended but from the Adriatic to the Danube, which would appear a quite insignificant portion of the continent. Subsequently, by overthrowing the Persian empire they became supreme in Asia also. But though their empire was now regarded as the greatest in extent and power that had ever existed, they left the larger part of the inhabited world as yet outside it. For they never even made a single attempt on Sicily, Sardinia, or Africa, and the most warlike nations of Western Europe were, to speak the simple truth, unknown

- 7 νωσκον. Ῥωμαῖοί γε μὴν οὐ τινὰ μέρη, σχεδὸν δὲ
 πᾶσαν πεποιημένοι τὴν οἰκουμένην ὑπήκοον αὐτοῖς,
 . . . σιν, ἀνυπέκρβλητον δὲ καὶ > τοῖς ἐπιγι-
 < νομένοις ὑπερ>οχὴν κακτέχουσι τῆς αὐτῶν >
 8 δυναστείας . . . ἐκ τῆς γρα>φῆς.¹ ἐξέσται
 σαφέστερον κατανοεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ
 τοῦ πόσα καὶ πηλίκα συμβάλλεσθαι πέφυκε
 τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν ὁ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας
 τρόπος.
- 3 Ἄρξει δὲ τῆς πραγματείας ἡμῖν τῶν μὲν χρόνων
 ὀλυμπιάς ἑκατοστή καὶ τετταρακοστή, τῶν δὲ πρά-
 ξεων παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ὁ προσαγορευθεὶς συμ-
 μαχικὸς πόλεμος, ὃν πρῶτον ἐξήνεγκε μετ' Ἀχαιῶν
 πρὸς Αἰτωλοῦς Φίλιππος, Δημητρίου μὲν υἱός,
 πατὴρ δὲ Περσέως, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατ-
 οικοῦσιν ὁ περὶ Κοίλης Συρίας, ὃν Ἀντίοχος καὶ
 2 Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλή-
 λους· ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Λιβύην
 τόποις ὁ συστὰς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις, ὃν
 οἱ πλεῖστοι προσαγορεύουσιν Ἀννιβιακόν. ταῦτα
 δ' ἔστι συνεχῇ τοῖς τελευταίοις τῆς παρ' Ἀράτου
 3 Σικυνωνίου συντάξεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων
 χρόνοις ὥς ἂν εἰ σποράδας εἶναι συνέβαινε τὰς τῆς
 οἰκουμένης πράξεις, διὰ τὸ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολάς,
 ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς συντελείας αὐτῶν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ
 τοὺς τόπους ἀπέχειν ἕκαστα τῶν πεπραγμένων.
- 4 ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν οἶον εἰ σωματοειδῇ
 συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὴν ἱστορίαν, συμπλέκεσθαι τε
 τὰς Ἰταλικὰς καὶ Λιβυκὰς πράξεις ταῖς τε κατὰ τὴν

¹ In this passage the ms. A is partly illegible. The English is only meant to show the probable sense of what is missing.

BOOK I

to them. But the Romans have subjected to their rule not portions, but nearly the whole of the world, and possess an empire which is not only immeasurably greater than any which preceded it, but need not fear rivalry in the future. In the course of this work it will become more clearly intelligible by what steps this power was acquired, and it will also be seen how many and how great advantages accrue to the student from the systematic treatment of history.

3. The date from which I propose to begin is the 140th Olympiad [220–216 B.C.], and the events are the following: (1) in Greece the so-called Social War, the first waged against the Aetolians by the Achaeans in league with and under the leadership of Philip of Macedon, the son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, (2) in Asia the war for Coele-Syria between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator, (3) in Italy, Africa, and the adjacent regions, the war between Rome and Carthage, usually known as the Hannibalic War. These events immediately succeed those related at the end of the work of Aratus of Sicyon. Previously the doings of the world had been, so to say, dispersed, as they were held together by no unity of initiative, results, or locality; but ever since this date history has been an organic whole, and the affairs of Italy and Africa have been inter-

Ἀσίαν καὶ ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς καὶ πρὸς ἓν γίνεσθαι
 5 τέλος τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἀπάντων. διὸ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν
 τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας ἀπὸ τούτων πεποιήμεθα
 6 τῶν καιρῶν. τῷ γὰρ προειρημένῳ πολέμῳ κρατή-
 σαντες Ῥωμαῖοι Καρχηδονίων, καὶ νομίσαντες τὸ
 κυριώτατον καὶ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτοῖς ἡνύσθαι πρὸς
 τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολήν, οὕτως καὶ τότε πρῶτον
 ἐθάρσησαν ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰς χεῖρας ἐκτείνειν καὶ
 περαιούσθαι μετὰ δυνάμεως εἰς τε τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ
 τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν τόπους.

7 Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν ἦν συνήθη καὶ γνώριμα τὰ
 πολιτεύματα τὰ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβη-
 τήσαντα, ἴσως οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμᾶς ἔδει περὶ τῶν πρὸ
 τοῦ γράφειν, ἀπὸ ποίας προθέσεως ἢ δυνάμεως
 ὀρμηθέντες ἐνεχείρησαν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τηλι-
 8 κούτοις ἔργοις. ἐπεὶ δ' οὔτε τοῦ Ῥωμαίων οὔτε
 τοῦ Καρχηδονίων πολιτεύματος πρόχειρός ἐστι
 τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἢ προγεγενημένη
 δύναμις οὐδ' αἱ πράξεις αὐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ὑπ-
 ελάβομεν εἶναι συντάξασθαι ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἐξῆς
 9 βύβλον πρὸ τῆς ἱστορίας, ἵνα μηδεὶς ἐπιστὰς ἐπ'
 αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξήγησιν τότε διαπορῇ
 καὶ ζητῇ ποίοις διαβουλίαις ἢ ποίαις δυνάμεσι καὶ
 χορηγίαις χρησάμενοι Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς ταύτας ὤρμη-
 σαν τὰς ἐπιβολάς, δι' ὧν καὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῆς θα-
 λάττης τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο πάσης ἐγκρατεῖς,
 10 ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτων τῶν βύβλων καὶ τῆς ἐν ταύταις
 προκατασκευῆς δῆλον ἦ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ὅτι καὶ
 λίαν εὐλόγοις ἀφορμαῖς χρησάμενοι πρὸς τε τὴν
 ἐπίνοιαν ὤρμησαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν συντέλειαν ἐξ-
 4 ἴκοντο τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας. τὸ
 γὰρ τῆς ἡμετέρας πραγματείας ἴδιον καὶ τὸ θαυ-

BOOK I

linked with those of Greece and Asia, all leading up to one end. And this is my reason for beginning where I do. For it was owing to their defeat of the Carthaginians in the Hannibalic War that the Romans, feeling that the chief and most essential step in their scheme of universal aggression had now been taken, were first emboldened to reach out their hands to grasp the rest and to cross with an army to Greece and Asia.

Now were we Greeks well acquainted with the two states which disputed the empire of the world, it would not perhaps have been necessary for me to deal at all with their previous history, or to narrate what purpose guided them, and on what sources of strength they relied, in entering upon such a vast undertaking. But as neither the former power nor the earlier history of Rome and Carthage is familiar to most of us, I thought it necessary to prefix this Book and the next to the actual history, in order that no one after becoming engrossed in the narrative may find himself at a loss, and ask by what counsel and trusting to what power and resources the Romans embarked on that enterprise which has made them lords over our land and our seas, but that from these Books and the preliminary sketch in them it may be clear to readers that they had quite adequate grounds for conceiving the ambition of a world-empire and adequate means for achieving their purpose. 4. For what gives my work its peculiar quality, and what is most remarkable in the present

μάσιον τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς καιρῶν τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὅτι καθ-
 ἄπερ ἡ τύχη σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης
 πράγματα πρὸς ἓν ἔκλινε μέρος καὶ πάντα νεύειν
 ἠνάγκασε πρὸς ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπόν, οὕτως
 2 καὶ δεῖ διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ μίαν σύνοψιν ἀγαγεῖν
 τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὸν χειρισμὸν τῆς τύχης, ᾧ κέ-
 χρηται πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων συντέλειαν.
 καὶ γὰρ τὸ προκαλεσάμενον ἡμᾶς καὶ παρορμήσαν
 πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς ἱστορίας μάλιστα τοῦτο
 γέγονε· σὺν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ μηδένα τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς
 ἐπιβεβλήσθαι τῇ τῶν καθόλου πραγμάτων συντά-
 ξει· πολὺ γὰρ ἂν ἦττον ἔγωγε πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος
 3 ἐφιλοτιμήθην. νῦν δ' ὁρῶν τοὺς μὲν κατὰ μέρος
 πολέμους καὶ τινὰς τῶν ἅμα τούτοις πράξεων καὶ
 πλείους πραγματευομένους, τὴν δὲ καθόλου καὶ
 συλλήβδην οἰκονομίαν τῶν γεγονότων, πότε καὶ
 πόθεν ὠρμήθη καὶ πῶς ἔσχε τὴν συντέλειαν, ταύ-
 την οὐδ' ἐπιβαλλόμενον οὐδένα βασανίζειν, ὅσον γε
 4 καὶ ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι, παντελῶς ὑπέλαβον ἀναγκαῖον
 εἶναι τὸ μὴ παραλιπεῖν μηδ' εἶσαι παρελθεῖν ἀνεπι-
 στάτως τὸ κάλλιστον ἅμα κῶφελιμώτατον ἐπιτή-
 5 δευμα τῆς τύχης. πολλὰ γὰρ αὕτη καινοποιούσα
 καὶ συνεχῶς ἐναγωνιζομένη τοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 βίοις οὐδέπω τοιόνδ' ἀπλῶς οὔτ' εἰργάσατ' ἔργον
 οὔτ' ἠγωνίσατ' ἀγώνισμα, οἷον τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶς.
 6 ὅπερ ἐκ μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος γραφόντων τὰς ἱστο-
 ρίας οὐχ οἷόν τε συνιδεῖν, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰς ἐπιφα-
 νεστάτας πόλεις τις κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην ἐπελθὼν ἢ
 καὶ νῆ Δία γεγραμμένας χωρὶς ἀλλήλων θεασάμενος
 εὐθέως ὑπολαμβάνει κατανενοηκέναι καὶ τὸ τῆς
 ὅλης οἰκουμένης σχῆμα καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν αὐτῆς
 7 θέσιν καὶ τάξιν· ὅπερ ἔστιν οὐδαμῶς εἰκός. καθό-

BOOK I

age, is this. Fortune having guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and having forced them to incline towards one and the same end, a historian should bring before his readers under one synoptical view the operations by which she has accomplished her general purpose. Indeed it was this chiefly that invited and encouraged me to undertake my task ; and secondarily the fact that none of my contemporaries have undertaken to write a general history, in which case I should have been much less eager to take this in hand. As it is, I observe that while several modern writers deal with particular wars and certain matters connected with them, no one, as far as I am aware, has even attempted to inquire critically when and whence the general and comprehensive scheme of events originated and how it led up to the end. I therefore thought it quite necessary not to leave unnoticed or allow to pass into oblivion this the finest and most beneficent of the performances of Fortune. For though she is ever producing something new and ever playing a part in the lives of men, she has not in a single instance ever accomplished such a work, ever achieved such a triumph, as in our own times. We can no more hope to perceive this from histories dealing with particular events than to get at once a notion of the form of the whole world, its disposition and order, by visiting, each in turn, the most famous cities, or indeed by looking at separate plans of each : a result by no means likely. He indeed who believes

- λου μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οἱ πεπεισμένοι διὰ τῆς κατὰ μέρος ἱστορίας μετρίως συνόψεσθαι τὰ ὅλα παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχειν, ὥς ἂν εἴ τινες ἐμφύχου καὶ καλοῦ σώματος γεγονότος διερριμμένα τὰ μέρη θεώμενοι νομίζοιεν ἱκανῶς αὐτόπται γίνεσθαι
- 8 τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζώου καὶ καλλονῆς. εἰ γάρ τις αὐτίκα μάλα συνθεῖς καὶ τέλειον αὔθις ἀπεργασάμενος τὸ ζῶον τῷ τ' εἶδει καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς εὐπρεπείᾳ, κᾶπειτα πάλιν ἐπιδεικνύοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις, ταχέως ἂν οἶμαι πάντας αὐτοὺς ὁμολογήσειν διότι καὶ λίαν πολὺ τι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπελείποντο πρόσθεν καὶ παραπλήσιοι τοῖς ὀνει-
- 9 ρώπτουσιν ἦσαν. ἔννοιαν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν ὅλων δυνατόν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ γνώμην
- 10 ἀτρεκῇ σχεῖν ἀδύνατον. διὸ παντελῶς βραχὺ τι νομιστέον συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν κατὰ μέρος ἱστορίαν
- 11 πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐμπειρίαν καὶ πίστιν. ἐκ μέντοι γε τῆς ἀπάντων πρὸς ἀλλήλα συμπλοκῆς καὶ παραθέσεως, ἔτι δ' ὁμοιότητος καὶ διαφορᾶς, μόνως ἂν τις ἐφίκοιτο καὶ δυνηθείη κατοπτεύσας ἅμα καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ τερπνὸν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας ἀναλαβεῖν.
- 5 Ὑποθησόμεθα δὲ ταύτης ἀρχὴν τῆς βύβλου τὴν πρώτην διάβασιν ἐξ Ἰταλίας Ῥωμαίων. αὕτη δ' ἔστι συνεχῆς μὲν τοῖς ἀφ' ὧν Τίμαιος ἀπέλιπε, πίπτει δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ εἰκοστὴν πρὸς ταῖς
- 2 ἑκατὸν ὀλυμπιάδα. διὸ καὶ ῥητέον ἂν εἴη πῶς καὶ πότε συστησάμενοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ τίσιν ἀφορμαῖς μετὰ ταῦτα χρησάμενοι, διαβαίνειν ὤρμησαν εἰς Σικελίαν· ταύτῃ γὰρ τῇ γῇ πρῶτον ἐπέ-
- 3 βησαν τῶν ἐκτὸς τόπων τῆς Ἰταλίας. καὶ ῥητέον αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς διαβάσεως αἰτίαν ψιλῶς, ἵνα μὴ τῆς

BOOK I

that by studying isolated histories he can acquire a fairly just view of history as a whole, is, as it seems to me, much in the case of one, who, after having looked at the dissevered limbs of an animal once alive and beautiful, fancies he has been as good as an eye-witness of the creature itself in all its action and grace. For could anyone put the creature together on the spot, restoring its form and the comeliness of life, and then show it to the same man, I think he would quickly avow that he was formerly very far away from the truth and more like one in a dream. For we can get some idea of a whole from a part, but never knowledge or exact opinion. Special histories therefore contribute very little to the knowledge of the whole and conviction of its truth. It is only indeed by study of the interconnexion of all the particulars, their resemblances and differences, that we are enabled at least to make a general survey, and thus derive both benefit and pleasure from history.

5. I shall adopt as the starting-point of this book the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. This follows immediately on the close of Timæus' History and took place in the 129th Olympiad [264-261 B.C.]. Thus we must first state how and when the Romans established their position in Italy, and what prompted them afterwards to cross to Sicily, the first country outside Italy where they set foot. The actual cause of their crossing must be stated without comment; for if I were to seek the

αἰτίας αἰτίαν ἐπιζητούσης ἀνυπόστατος ἢ τῆς ὅλης
 4 ὑποθέσεως ἀρχὴ γένηται καὶ θεωρία. ληπτέον δὲ
 καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς ὁμολογουμένην καὶ γνωριζομένην
 ἀρχὴν παρ' ἅπασιν, καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι δυναμένην
 αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ δέη τοῖς χρόνοις
 βραχὺ προσαναδραμόντας κεφαλαιώδη τῶν μεταξὺ
 5 πράξεων ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀνάμνησιν. τῆς γὰρ
 ἀρχῆς ἀγνοουμένης ἢ καὶ νῆ Δί' ἀμφισβητου-
 μένης οὐδὲ τῶν ἐξῆς οὐδὲν οἶόν τε παραδοχῆς
 ἀξιοθῆναι καὶ πίστεως· ὅταν δ' ἡ περὶ ταύτης
 ὁμολογουμένη παρασκευασθῇ δόξα, τότε ἤδη καὶ
 πᾶς ὁ συνεχὴς λόγος ἀποδοχῆς τυγχάνει παρὰ
 τοῖς ἀκούουσιν.

6 Ἔτος μὲν οὖν ἐνειστήκει μετὰ μὲν τὴν ἐν Αἰ-
 γὸς ποταμοῖς ναυμαχίαν ἐννεακαιδέκατον, πρὸ δὲ
 2 τῆς ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχης ἐκκαιδέκατον, ἐν ᾧ Λα-
 κεδαιμόνιοι μὲν τὴν ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου λεγομένην
 εἰρήνην πρὸς βασιλέα τῶν Περσῶν ἐκύρωσαν καὶ
 πρεσβύτερος Διονύσιος τῇ περὶ τὸν Ἑλλέπορον
 ποταμὸν μάχῃ νενικηκὼς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν
 Ἕλληνας ἐπολιόρκει Ῥήγιον, Γαλάται δὲ κατὰ κρά-
 τος ἐλόντες αὐτὴν τὴν Ῥώμην κατεῖχον πλὴν τοῦ
 3 Καπετωλίου. πρὸς οὓς ποιησάμενοι Ῥωμαῖοι σπον-
 δὰς καὶ διαλύσεις εὐδοκουμένας Γαλάταις, καὶ γε-
 νόμενοι πάλιν ἀνελπίστως τῆς πατρίδος ἐγκρατεῖς,
 καὶ λαβόντες οἶον ἀρχὴν τῆς συναυξήσεως, ἐπολέ-
 μουν ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς χρόνοις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας.
 4 γενόμενοι δ' ἐγκρατεῖς ἀπάντων τῶν Λατίνων διὰ
 τε τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς μάχαῖς ἐπιτυχίαν,
 μετὰ ταῦτ' ἐπολέμουν Τυρρηνοῖς, ἔπειτα Κελτοῖς,
 ἐξῆς δὲ Σαυνίταις, τοῖς πρὸς τε τὰς ἀνατολὰς καὶ
 τὰς ἄρκτους συντερμονοῦσι τῇ τῶν Λατίνων χώρα.

BOOK I

cause of the cause and so on, my whole work would have no clear starting-point and principle. The starting-point must be an era generally agreed upon and recognized, and one self-apparent from the events, even if this involves my going back a little in point of date and giving a summary of intervening occurrences. For if readers are ignorant or indeed in any doubt as to what are the facts from which the work opens, it is impossible that what follows should meet with acceptance or credence; but once we produce in them a general agreement on this point they will give ear to all the subsequent narrative.

6. It was then the nineteenth year after the battle of Aegospotami and the sixteenth before that of Leuctra, the year in which the Spartans made the peace known as that of Antalcidas with the King of Persia, that in which also Dionysius the Elder, after defeating the Italiot Greeks in the battle at the river Elleporos, was besieging Rhegium, and that in which the Gauls, after taking Rome itself by assault, occupied the whole of that city except the Capitol. The Romans, after making a truce on conditions satisfactory to the Gauls and being thus contrary to their expectation reinstated in their home and as it were now started on the road of aggrandizement, continued in the following years to wage war on their neighbours. After subduing all the Latins by their valour and the fortune of war they fought first against the Etruscans, then against the Celts, and next against the Samnites, whose territory was conterminous with that of the Latins on the East

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- 5 μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον Ταραντίνων διὰ τὴν εἰς τοὺς
 πρεσβευτὰς Ῥωμαίων ἀσέλγειαν καὶ τὸν διὰ ταῦτα
 φόβον ἐπισπασαμένων Πύρρον τῷ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς
 τῶν Γαλατῶν ἐφόδου τῶν τε περὶ Δελφοὺς φθαρέν-
 6 των καὶ περαιωθέντων εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, Ῥωμαῖοι
 Τυρρηνοὺς μὲν καὶ Σαυνίτας ὑφ' αὐτοὺς πεποιοη-
 μένοι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν Κελτοὺς πολλαῖς
 μάχαις ἤδη νενικηκότες, τότε πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
 μέρη τῆς Ἰταλίας ὥρμησαν, οὐχ ὡς ὑπὲρ ὀθνείων,
 ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ πλεῖον ὡς ὑπὲρ ἰδίων ἤδη καὶ καθηκόν-
 των σφίσι πολεμήσοντες, ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες ἀληθινοὶ
 τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς
 7 Σαυνίτας καὶ Κελτοὺς ἀγώνων. ὑποστάντες δὲ
 γενναίως τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον
 τὰς τε δυνάμεις καὶ Πύρρον ἐκβαλόντες ἐκ τῆς
 Ἰταλίας, αὐτοὶς ἐπολέμουν καὶ κατεστρέφοντο τοὺς
 8 κοινωνήσαντας Πύρρῳ τῶν πραγμάτων. γενόμενοι
 δὲ παραδόξως ἀπάντων ἐγκρατεῖς, καὶ ποιησάμενοι
 τοὺς τὴν Ἰταλίαν οἰκοῦντας ὑφ' αὐτοὺς πλὴν Κελτῶν,
 μετὰ ταῦτα πολιορκεῖν ἐνεχείρησαν τοὺς τότε κατ-
 έχοντας τὸ Ῥήγιον Ῥωμαίους.
- 7 Ἴδιον γάρ τι συνέβη καὶ παραπλήσιον ἐκατέραις
 ταῖς περὶ τὸν πορθμὸν ἐκτισμέναις πόλεσιν· εἰσὶ δ'
 2 αὗται Μεσσήνη καὶ Ῥήγιον. Μεσσήνην μὲν γὰρ
 οὐ πολλοῖς ἀνώτερον χρόνοις τῶν νῦν λεγομένων
 καιρῶν Καμπανοὶ παρ' Ἀγαθοκλεῖ μισθοφοροῦντες,
 καὶ πάλαι περὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν τῆς πόλεως ὀφθαλμιῶντες, ἅμα τῷ λαβεῖν
 3 καιρὸν εὐθὺς ἐπεχείρησαν παρασπονδεῖν· παρ-
 εισελθόντες δ' ὡς φίλιοι, καὶ κατασχόντες τὴν
 πόλιν, οὓς μὲν ἐξέβαλον τῶν πολιτῶν, οὓς δ' ἀπ-
 4 ἐσφασαν. πράξαντες δὲ ταῦτα, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας

BOOK I

and North. After some time the Tarentines, fearing the consequences of their insolence to the Roman envoys, begged for the intervention of Pyrrhus. (This was in the year preceding the expedition of those Gauls who met with the reverse at Delphi and then crossed to Asia.) The Romans had ere this reduced the Etruscans and Samnites and had vanquished the Italian Celts in many battles, and they now for the first time attacked the rest of Italy not as if it were a foreign country, but as if it rightfully belonged to them. Their struggle with the Samnites and Celts had made them veritable masters in the art of war, and after bravely supporting this war with Pyrrhus and finally expelling himself and his army from Italy, they continued to fight with and subdue those who had sided with him. When, with extraordinary good fortune, they had reduced all these peoples and had made all the inhabitants of Italy their subjects excepting the Celts, they undertook the siege of Rhegium now held by certain of their compatriots. 280 B.C.

7. For very much the same fortune had befallen the two cities on the Straits, Messene and Rhegium. Certain Campanians serving under Agathocles had long cast covetous eyes on the beauty and prosperity of Messene; and not long before the events I am speaking of they availed themselves of the first opportunity to capture it by treachery. After being admitted as friends and occupying the city, they first expelled or massacred the citizens and took

- καὶ τὰ τέκνα τῶν ἡκληρηκότων, ὥς ποθ' ἡ τύχη
διένειμε παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς παρανομίας καιρὸν
ἐκάστοις, οὕτως ἔσχον· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς βίους καὶ
5 τὴν χώραν μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι κατεῖχον. ταχὺ
δὲ καὶ ῥαδίως καλῆς χώρας καὶ πόλεως ἐγκρατεῖς
γενόμενοι, παρὰ πόδας εὗρον μιμητὰς τῆς πράξεως.
6 Ῥηγῖνοι γάρ, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν Πύρρος εἰς Ἰταλίαν
ἐπεραιουῖτο, καταπλαγεῖς γενόμενοι τὴν ἔφοδον αὐ-
τοῦ, δεδιότες δὲ καὶ Καρχηδονίους θαλαττοκρα-
τοῦντας, ἐπεσπᾶσαντο φυλακὴν ἅμα καὶ βοήθειαν
7 παρὰ Ῥωμαίων. οἱ δ' εἰσελθόντες χρόνον μὲν τινα
διετήρουν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν πίστιν, ὄντες
τετρακισχίλιοι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Δέκιος Καμ-
8 πανός· τέλος δὲ ζηλώσαντες τοὺς Μαμερτίλους, ἅμα
δὲ καὶ συνεργοὺς λαβόντες αὐτοὺς, παρεσπόνδησαν
τοὺς Ῥηγίλους, ἐκπαθεῖς ὄντες ἐπὶ τε τῇ τῆς πόλεως
εὐκαιρίᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν Ῥηγίνων περὶ τοὺς ἰδίους
βίους εὐδαιμονίᾳ· καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκβαλόντες, τοὺς
δ' ἀποσφάζαντες τῶν πολιτῶν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
τοῖς Καμπανοῖς κατέσχον τὴν πόλιν. οἱ δὲ
9 Ῥωμαῖοι βαρέως μὲν ἔφερον τὸ γεγονός· οὐ μὲν
εἶχόν γε ποιεῖν οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ συνέχεσθαι τοῖς προ-
10 ειρημένοις πολέμοις. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀπὸ τούτων ἐγένοντο,
συγκλείσαντες αὐτοὺς ἐπολιόρκουν τὸ Ῥήγιον,
καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον. κρατήσαντες δὲ τοὺς
11 μὲν πλείστους ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ καταλήψει διέφθειραν,
ἐκθύμως ἀμυνομένους διὰ τὸ προορᾶσθαι τὸ μέλλον,
ζωγρίᾳ δ' ἐκυρίευσαν πλειόνων ἢ τριακοσίων. ὧν
12 ἀναπεμφθέντων εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, οἱ στρατηγοὶ
προαγαγόντες εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ μαστιγώσαντες
ἅπαντας κατὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἐπελέκισαν,
βουλόμενοι διὰ τῆς εἰς ἐκείνους τιμωρίας, καθ' ὅσον

BOOK I

possession of the wives and families of their unhappy victims, just as chance assigned them at the time of the outrage. They next divided among themselves the land and all other property. Having thus possessed themselves so quickly and easily of a fine city and territory, they were not long in finding imitators of their exploit. For the people of Rhegium, when Pyrrhus crossed to Italy, dreading an attack by him and fearing also the Carthaginians who commanded the sea, begged from the Romans a garrison and support. The force which was sent, four thousand in number and under the command of Decius, a Campanian, kept the city and their faith for some time, but at length, anxious to rival the Mamertines and with their co-operation, played the people of Rhegium false, and eagerly coveting a city so favourably situated and containing so much private wealth, expelled or massacred the citizens and possessed themselves of the city in the same manner as the Campanians had done. The Romans were highly displeased, yet could do nothing at the time, as they were occupied with the wars I have already mentioned. But when they had a free hand they shut up the culprits in the city and proceeded to lay siege to it as I have stated above. When Rhegium fell, most of the besieged were slain in the actual assault, having defended themselves desperately, as they knew what awaited them, but more than three hundred were captured. When they were sent to ^{271 B.C.} Rome the Consuls had them all conducted to the forum and there, according to the Roman custom, scourged and beheaded; their object being to recover as far as possible by this punishment their reputation

οἱοί τ' ἦσαν, διορθοῦσθαι παρὰ τοῖς συμμάχοις τὴν
 13 αὐτῶν πίστιν. τὴν δὲ χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν παρα-
 χρῆμα τοῖς Ῥηγίνοις ἀπέδωκαν.

8 Οἱ δὲ Μαμερτῖνοι, τοῦτο γὰρ τοῦνομα κυριεύ-
 σαντες οἱ Καμπανοὶ τῆς Μεσσήνης προσηγόρευσαν
 σφᾶς αὐτοὺς, ἕως μὲν συνεχρῶντο τῇ τῶν Ῥω-
 μαίων συμμαχίᾳ τῶν τὸ Ῥήγιον κατασχόντων, οὐ
 μόνον τῆς ἑαυτῶν πόλεως καὶ χώρας ἀσφαλῶς κατ-
 εκράτουν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς συνορούσης οὐχ ὥς
 ἔτυχε παρηνώχλουν τοῖς τε Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τοῖς
 2 Συρακοσίοις, καὶ πολλὰ μέρη τῆς Σικελίας ἐφορο-
 λόγουν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστερήθησαν τῆς προειρημένης
 ἐπικουρίας, συγκλεισθέντων τῶν τὸ Ῥήγιον κατ-
 εχόντων εἰς τὴν πολιορκίαν, παρὰ πόδας ὑπὸ τῶν
 Συρακοσίων αὐτοὶ πάλιν συνεδιώχθησαν εἰς τὴν
 3 πόλιν διὰ τινας τοιαύτας αἰτίας. χρόνοις οὐ πολλοῖς
 πρότερον αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν Συρακοσίων διενεχθεῖσαι
 πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ διατρίβουσαι περὶ τὴν
 Μεργάνην, κατέστησαν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄρχοντας, Ἀρτεμί-
 δωρόν τε καὶ τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα βασιλεύσαντα τῶν
 Συρακοσίων Ἰέρωνα, νέον μὲν ὄντα κομιδῇ, πρὸς
 δέ τι γένος εὐφυῇ βασιλικῆς καὶ πραγματικῆς οἰκο-
 4 νομίας. ὁ δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ παρεισελθὼν
 εἰς τὴν πόλιν διὰ τινων οἰκείων καὶ κύριος γενό-
 μενος τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων, οὕτως ἐχρήσατο
 πρᾶως καὶ μεγαλοψύχως τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τοὺς
 Συρακοσίους, καίπερ οὐδαμῶς εὐδοκουμένους ἐπὶ
 ταῖς τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀρχαιρεσίαις, τότε πάντας
 ὁμοθυμαδὸν εὐδοκῆσαι στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν
 5 Ἰέρωνα. ὃς ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐπινοημάτων εὐθέως
 δῆλος ἦν τοῖς ὀρθῶς σκοπομένοις μειζόνων ὀρεγό-
 μενος ἐλπίδων ἢ κατὰ τὴν στρατηγίαν. θεωρῶν
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for good faith with the allies. The city and territory of Rhegium they at once restored to the citizens.

8. The Mamertines (for this was the name adopted by the Campanians after their seizure of Messene), as long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Romans who had occupied Rhegium, not only remained in secure possession of their own city and territory but caused no little trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans about the adjacent territories, levying tribute from many parts of Sicily. When, however, they were deprived of this support, the captors of Rhegium being now closely invested, they were at once in their turn driven to take refuge in their city by the Syracusans owing to the following causes. Not many years before the Syracusan army had quarrelled with those in the city. They were then posted near Mergane and appointed two magistrates chosen from their own body, Artemidorus and Hiero, who was subsequently king of Syracuse. He was still quite young ^{275 B.C.} but naturally qualified to be a ruler and statesman of a kind. Having accepted the command, he gained admittance to the city through certain relatives, and after overpowering the opposite party, administered affairs with such mildness and magnanimity that the Syracusans, though by no means inclined to approve camp elections, on this occasion unanimously accepted him as their general. From his first measures it was evident at once to all capable of judging that his ambition was not limited to a mere command.

9 γὰρ τοὺς Συρακοσίους, ἐπειδὰν ἐκπέμψωσι τὰς δυνά-
 μεις καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, αὐτοὺς
 ἐν αὐτοῖς στασιάζοντας καὶ καινοτομοῦντας αἰεὶ τι,
 2 τὸν δὲ Λεπτίνην εἰδὼς καὶ τῇ προστασίᾳ καὶ τῇ
 πίστει πολὺ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, εὐδο-
 κимоῦντα δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλήθει διαφερόντως, συν-
 ἅπτεται κηδεῖαν πρὸς αὐτόν, βουλόμενος οἷον ἐφε-
 δρεῖαν ἀπολιπεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοῦτον, ὅτ' αὐτόν
 3 ἐξιέναι δέοι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις.
 γήμας δὲ τὴν θυγατέρα τοῦ προειρημένου, καὶ
 συνθεωρῶν τοὺς ἀρχαίους μισθοφόρους καχέκτας
 ὄντας καὶ κινητικούς, ἐξάγει στρατείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τοὺς
 4 βαρβάρους τοὺς τὴν Μεσσήνην κατασχόντας. ἀντι-
 στρατοπεδεύσας δὲ περὶ Κεντόριπα, καὶ παρα-
 ταξάμενος περὶ τὸν Κυαμόσωρον ποταμόν, τοὺς μὲν
 πολιτικούς ἵππεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς αὐτὸς ἐν ἀποστήματι
 συνεῖχεν, ὡς κατ' ἄλλον τόπον τοῖς πολεμίοις
 συμμίσγων, τοὺς δὲ ξένους προβαλόμενος εἴασε
 5 πάντας ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων διαφθαρῆναι· κατὰ δὲ
 τὸν τῆς ἐκείνων τροπῆς καιρὸν ἀσφαλῶς αὐτὸς
 6 ἀπεχώρησε μετὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας.
 συντελεσάμενος δὲ τὸ προκείμενον πραγματικῶς,
 καὶ παρηρηκῶς πᾶν τὸ κινητικὸν καὶ στασιῶδες
 τῆς δυνάμεως, ξενολογήσας δι' αὐτοῦ πλήθος
 ἱκανὸν μισθοφόρων, ἀσφαλῶς ἤδη τὰ κατὰ τὴν
 7 ἀρχὴν διεξῆγε. θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐκ τοῦ
 προτερήματος θρασέως καὶ προπετῶς ἀναστρεφο-
 μένους, καθοπλίσας καὶ γυμνάσας ἐνεργῶς τὰς
 πολιτικὰς δυνάμεις ἐξῆγε, καὶ συμβάλλει τοῖς
 πολεμίοις ἐν τῷ Μυλαίῳ πεδίῳ περὶ τὸν Λογγανὸν
 8 καλούμενον ποταμόν. τροπὴν δὲ ποιήσας αὐτῶν
 ἰσχυράν, καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος

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9. For observing that the Syracusans, every time they dispatch their forces on an expedition accompanied by their supreme magistrates, begin quarrelling among themselves and introducing continual changes, and knowing that Leptines had a wider circle of dependents and enjoyed more credit than any other burgher and had an especially high name among the common people, he allied himself with him by marriage, so that whenever he had to take the field himself he might leave him behind as a sort of reserve force. He married, then, the daughter of this Leptines, and finding that the veteran mercenaries were disaffected and turbulent, he marched out in force professedly against the foreigners who had occupied Messene. He met the enemy near Centuripa and offered battle near the river Cyamosorus. He held back the citizen cavalry and infantry at a distance under his personal command as if he meant to attack on another side, but advancing the mercenaries he allowed them all to be cut up by the Campanians. During their rout he himself retired safely to Syracuse with the citizens. Having thus efficiently accomplished his purpose and purged the army of its turbulent and seditious element, he himself enlisted a considerable number of mercenaries and henceforth continued to rule in safety. Observing that the Mamertines, owing to their success, were behaving in a bold and reckless manner, he efficiently armed and trained the urban levies and leading them out engaged the enemy in the Mylaean plain near the river Longanus, and inflicted a severe defeat on 268 B.C.

ζωγρία, τὴν μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων κατέπαυσε τόλμαν,
 αὐτὸς δὲ παραγενόμενος εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας
 βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ πάντων προσηγορεύθη τῶν συμμάχων.
 10 Οἱ δὲ Μαμερτῖνοι, πρότερον μὲν ἐστερημένοι
 τῆς ἐπικουρίας τῆς ἐκ τοῦ Ῥηγίου, καθάπερ ἀνώ-
 τερον εἶπον, τότε δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις πράγμασιν ἐπται-
 κότες ὀλοσχερῶς διὰ τὰς νῦν ῥηθείσας αἰτίας, οἱ
 μὲν ἐπὶ Καρχηδονίους κατέφευγον, καὶ τούτοις ἐν-
 2 εχειρίζον σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν ἄκραν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς
 Ῥωμαίους ἐπρέσβευον, παραδιδόντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ
 δεόμενοι βοηθήσειν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὁμοφύλοις ὑπάρ-
 3 χουσι. Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρησαν
 διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ἐξόφθαλμον εἶναι τὴν ἀλογίαν τῆς
 4 βοηθείας. τὸ γὰρ μικρῶ πρότερον τοὺς ἰδίους πο-
 λίτας μετὰ τῆς μεγίστης ἀνηρηκότας τιμωρίας, ὅτι
 Ῥηγίους παρεσπόνδησαν, παραχρῆμα Μαμερτῖνοις
 βοηθεῖν ζητεῖν τοῖς τὰ παραπλήσια πεποιηκόσιν οὐ
 μόνον εἰς τὴν Μεσσηνίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ῥηγίωνων
 5 πόλιν, δυσαπολόγητον εἶχε τὴν ἀμαρτίαν. οὐ μὴν
 ἀγνοοῦντές γε τούτων οὐδέν, θεωροῦντες δὲ τοὺς
 Καρχηδονίους οὐ μόνον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ὑπήκοα πολλὰ μέρη πεποιημένους,
 ἔτι δὲ τῶν νήσων ἀπασῶν ἐγκρατεῖς ὑπάρχοντας
 τῶν κατὰ τὸ Σαρδόνιον καὶ Τυρρηνικὸν πέλαγος,
 6 ἡγωνίων, εἰ Σικελίας ἔτι κυριεύσαιεν, μὴ λίαν βα-
 ρεῖς καὶ φοβεροὶ γείτονες αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχοιεν, κύκλῳ
 σφᾶς περιέχοντες καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς Ἰταλίας μέρεσιν
 7 ἐπικείμενοι. διότι δὲ ταχέως ὑφ' αὐτοὺς ποιή-
 σονται τὴν Σικελίαν, μὴ τυχόντων ἐπικουρίας τῶν
 8 Μαμερτῖνων, προφανὲς ἦν. κρατήσαντες γὰρ ἐγχει-
 ριζομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς Μεσσήνης ἔμελλον ἐν ὀλίγῳ
 χρόνῳ τὰς Συρακούσας ἐπανελέσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσης

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them, capturing their leaders. This put an end to the audacity of the Mamertines, and on his return to Syracuse he was with one voice proclaimed king by all the allies.

10. The Mamertines had previously, as I above narrated, lost their support from Rhegium and had now suffered complete disaster at home for the reasons I have just stated. Some of them appealed to the Carthaginians, proposing to put themselves and the citadel into their hands, while others sent an embassy to Rome, offering to surrender the city and begging for assistance as a kindred people. The Romans were long at a loss, the succour demanded being so obviously unjustifiable. For they had just inflicted on their own fellow-citizens the highest penalty for their treachery to the people of Rhegium, and now to try to help the Mamertines, who had been guilty of like offence not only at Messene but at Rhegium also, was a piece of injustice very difficult to excuse. But fully aware as they were of this, they yet saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides, and that they were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian Seas. They were therefore in great apprehension lest, if they also became masters of Sicily, they would be most troublesome and dangerous neighbours, hemming them in on all sides and threatening every part of Italy. That they would soon be supreme in Sicily, if the Mamertines were not helped, was evident; for once Messene had fallen into their hands, they would shortly subdue Syracuse also, as they were

- 9 σχεδὸν δεσπόζειν τῆς ἄλλης Σικελίας. ὁ προορώμενοι
 Ῥωμαῖοι, καὶ νομίζοντες ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σφίσι τὸ
 μὴ προέσθαι τὴν Μεσσήνην, μὴδ' ἐᾶσαι Καρχηδο-
 νίους οἷον εἰ γεφυρῶσαι τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν αὐτοῖς
- 11 διάβασιν, πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἐβουλεύσαντο, καὶ τὸ
 μὲν συνέδριον οὐδ' εἰς τέλος ἐκύρωσε τὴν γνώμην
 διὰ τὰς ἄρτι ρηθείσας αἰτίας. ἐδόκει γὰρ τὰ περὶ
 τὴν ἀλογίαν τῆς τοῖς Μαμερτίνοις ἐπικουρίας
- 2 ἰσορροπεῖν τοῖς ἐκ τῆς βοηθείας συμφέρουσιν. οἱ
 δὲ πολλοί, τετρυμένοι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν προγεγονότων
 πολέμων καὶ προσδεόμενοι παντοδαπῆς ἐπανορ-
 θώσεως, ἅμα δὲ τοῖς ἄρτι ρηθείσι περὶ τοῦ κοινῇ
 συμφέρειν τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστοις
 ὠφελείας προδῆλους καὶ μεγάλας ὑποδεικνύοντων
- 3 τῶν στρατηγῶν, ἔκριναν βοηθεῖν. κυρωθέντος δὲ
 τοῦ δόγματος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, προχειρισάμενοι τὸν
 ἕτερον τῶν ὑπάτων στρατηγὸν Ἀππιον Κλαύδιον
 ἐξαπέστειλαν, κελεύσαντες βοηθεῖν καὶ διαβαίνειν
- 4 εἰς Μεσσήνην. οἱ δὲ Μαμερτίνοι τὸν μὲν τῶν
 Καρχηδονίων στρατηγόν, ἥδη κατέχοντα τὴν ἄκραν,
 ἐξέβαλον, τὰ μὲν καταπληξάμενοι, τὰ δὲ παρα-
 λογισάμενοι· τὸν δ' Ἀππιον ἐπεσπῶντο, καὶ τούτῳ
- 5 τὴν πόλιν ἐνεχειρίζον. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τὸν μὲν
 στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν ἀνεσταύρωσαν, νομίσαντες αὐτὸν
 ἀβούλως, ἅμα δ' ἀνάνδρως, προέσθαι τὴν ἀκρόπολιν·
- 6 αὐτοὶ δὲ τῇ μὲν ναυτικῇ δυνάμει περὶ Πελωριάδα
 στρατοπεδεύσαντες, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ στρατεύματι περὶ
 τὰς Σύνεις καλουμένας, ἐνεργῶς προσέκειντο τῇ
- 7 Μεσσήνῃ. κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Ἰέρων,
 νομίσας εὐφυῶς ἔχειν τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὸ τοὺς
 βαρβάρους τοὺς τὴν Μεσσήνην κατέχοντας ὁλο-
 σχερῶς ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας, τίθεται πρὸς τοὺς

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absolute lords of almost all the rest of Sicily. The Romans, foreseeing this and viewing it as a necessity for themselves not to abandon Messene and thus allow the Carthaginians as it were to build a bridge over to Italy, debated the matter for long, (11) and, even at the end, the Senate did not sanction the proposal for the reason given above, considering that the objection on the score of inconsistency was equal in weight to the advantage to be derived from intervention. The commons however, worn out as they were by the recent wars and in need of any and every kind of restorative, listened readily to the military commanders, who, besides giving the reasons above stated for the general advantageousness of the war, pointed out the great benefit in the way of plunder which each and every one would evidently derive from it. They were therefore in favour of consenting; and when the measure had been passed by the people they appointed to the command one of the Consuls, Appius Claudius, who was ordered to cross to Messene. The Mamertines, partly by menace and partly by stratagem, dislodged the Carthaginian commander, who was already established in the citadel, and then invited Appius to enter, placing the city in his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their general, thinking him guilty of a lack both of judgement and of courage in abandoning the citadel. Acting for themselves they stationed their fleet in the neighbourhood of Cape Pelorias, and with their land forces pressed Messene close in the direction of Sunes. Hiero now, thinking that present circumstances were favourable for expelling from Sicily entirely the foreigners who occupied Messene, made

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- Καρχηδονίους συνθήκας. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἀναζεύξας
 8 ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὴν
 προειρημένην πόλιν· καταστρατοπεδεύσας δ' ἐκ
 θατέρου μέρους περὶ τὸ Χαλκιδικὸν ὄρος καλούμενον
 ἀπέκλεισε καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐξόδου τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει.
 9 ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων Ἄππιος νυκτὸς καὶ
 παραβόλως περαιωθεὶς τὸν πορθμὸν ἤκεν εἰς τὴν
 10 Μεσσήνην. ὁρῶν δὲ πανταχόθεν ἐνεργῶς προση-
 ρεικότας τοὺς πολεμίους, καὶ συλλογισάμενος ἅμα
 μὲν αἰσχυρὰν, ἅμα δ' ἐπισηφαλῇ γίνεσθαι τὴν πολιορ-
 11 κίαν αὐτῷ, τῆς τε γῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατούν-
 των καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διεπρε-
 σβεύετο πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους, βουλόμενος ἐξελέσθαι
 12 τοῦ πολέμου τοὺς Μαμερτίνους· οὐδενὸς δὲ
 προσέχοντος αὐτῷ, τέλος ἐπαναγκαζόμενος ἔκρινε
 13 διακινδυνεύειν καὶ πρῶτον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς Συρακο-
 σίοις. ἐξαγαγὼν δὲ τὴν δύναμιν παρέταξε πρὸς
 μάχην, ἐτοίμως εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα συγκαταβάντος
 14 αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ τῶν Συρακοσίων βασιλέως· ἐπὶ
 πολὺν δὲ χρόνον διαγωνισάμενος ἐπεκράτησε τῶν
 πολεμίων, καὶ κατεδίωξε τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἕως εἰς
 15 τὸν χάρακα πάντας. Ἄππιος μὲν οὖν σκυλεύσας
 : τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐπανῆλθε πάλιν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην.
 ὁ δ' Ἰέρων, ὅττευσάμενός τι περὶ τῶν ὅλων πραγμά-
 των, ἐπιγενομένης τῆς νυκτὸς ἀνεχώρησε κατὰ
 12 σπουδὴν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας. τῇ δὲ κατὰ πόδας
 ἡμέρα γνοὺς Ἄππιος τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῶν προειρη-
 μένων, καὶ γενόμενος εὐθαρσής, ἔκρινε μὴ μέλλειν,
 2 ἀλλ' ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. παραγγείλας
 οὖν τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐν ὄρᾳ γίνεσθαι τὴν θεραπείαν,
 3 ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ τὴν ἐξοδὸν ἐποιεῖτο. συμβαλὼν δὲ
 τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε,

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an alliance with the Carthaginians, and quitting Syracuse with his army marched towards that city. Pitching his camp near the Chalcidian mountain on the side opposite to the Carthaginians he cut off this means of exit from the city as well. Appius, the Roman consul, at the same time succeeded at great risk in crossing the Straits by night and entering the city. Finding that the enemy had strictly invested Messene on all sides and regarding it as both inglorious and perilous for himself to be besieged, as they commanded both land and sea, he at first tried to negotiate with both, desiring to deliver the Mamertines from the war. But when neither paid any attention to him, he decided perforce to risk an engagement and in the first place to attack the Syracusans. Leading out his forces he drew them up in order of battle, the king of Syracuse readily accepting the challenge. After a prolonged struggle Appius was victorious and drove the whole hostile force back to their camp. After despoiling the dead he returned to Messene. Hiero, divining the final issue of the whole conflict, retreated in haste after nightfall to Syracuse. 12. On the following day Appius, learning of his retirement and encouraged thereby, decided not to delay but to attack the Carthaginians. He ordered his troops to be in readiness early and sallied forth at break of day. Engaging the enemy he slew many of them and compelled the rest to

τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἠνάγκασε φυγεῖν προτροπάδην εἰς
 4 τὰς παρακειμένας πόλεις. χρησάμενος δὲ τοῖς
 εὐτυχήμασι τούτοις καὶ λύσας τὴν πολιορκίαν,
 λοιπὸν ἐπιπορευόμενος ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθει τὴν τε τῶν
 Συρακοσίων καὶ τὴν τῶν συμμαχούντων αὐτοῖς
 χώραν, οὐδενὸς ἀντιποιοιμένου τῶν ὑπαίθρων· τὸ
 δὲ τελευταῖον προσκαθίσας αὐτὰς ἐπεβάλετο πολιορ-
 κεῖν τὰς Συρακούσας.

5 Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη Ῥωμαίων ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας
 διάβασις μετὰ δυνάμεως ἦδε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ
 6 τούτους ἐγένετο τοὺς καιροὺς, ἦν οἰκειοτάτην κρί-
 ναντες ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῆς ὅλης προθέσεως, ἀπὸ ταύτης
 ἐποιησάμεθα τὴν ἐπίστασιν, ἀναδραμόντες ἔτι τοῖς
 χρόνοις, τοῦ μηδὲν ἀπόρημα καταλιπεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν
 7 κατὰ τὰς αἰτίας ἀποδείξεων. τῷ γὰρ πῶς καὶ πότε
 πταίσαντες αὐτῇ τῇ πατρίδι Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ
 βέλτιον ἤρξαντο προκοπῆς, καὶ πότε πάλιν καὶ πῶς
 κρατήσαντες τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐπι-
 χειρεῖν ἐπεβάλοντο πράγμασιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπελάβο-
 μεν εἶναι παρακολουθῆσαι τοῖς μέλλουσι καὶ τὸ
 κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν τῆς νῦν ὑπεροχῆς δεόντως συν-
 8 όψεσθαι. διόπερ οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς
 ἐξῆς, ἐάν που προσανατρέχωμεν τοῖς χρόνοις περὶ
 9 τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων πολιτευμάτων. τοῦτο γὰρ
 ποιήσομεν χάριν τοῦ λαμβάνειν ἀρχὰς τοιαύτας, ἐξ
 ὧν ἔσται σαφῶς κατανοεῖν ἐκ τίνων ἕκαστοι καὶ
 πότε καὶ πῶς ὀρμηθέντες εἰς ταύτας παρεγένοντο
 τὰς διαθέσεις, ἐν αἷς ὑπάρχουσι νῦν. ὃ δὴ καὶ περὶ
 Ῥωμαίων ἄρτι πεποιήκαμεν.

13 Ἀφεμένους δὲ τούτων λέγειν ὥρα περὶ τῶν
 προκειμένων, ἐπὶ βραχὺ καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς προεκ-
 2 θεμένους τὰς ἐν τῇ προκατασκευῇ πράξεις. ὧν εἰσι

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retreat in disorder to the neighbouring cities. Having raised the siege by these successes, he advanced fearlessly, devastating the territory of the Syracusans and of their allies, no one disputing the open country with him. Finally he sat down before Syracuse and commenced to besiege it.

Such then was the occasion and motive of this the first crossing of the Romans from Italy with an armed force, an event which I take to be the most natural starting-point of this whole work. I have therefore made it my serious base, but went also somewhat further back in order to leave no possible obscurity in my statements of general causes. To follow out this previous history—how and when the Romans after the disaster to Rome itself began their progress to better fortunes, and again how and when after conquering Italy they entered on the path of foreign enterprise—seems to me necessary for anyone who hopes to gain a proper general survey of their present supremacy. My readers need not therefore be surprised if, in the further course of this work, I occasionally give them in addition some of the earlier history of the most famous states; for I shall do so in order to establish such a fundamental view as will make it clear in the sequel starting from what origins and how and when they severally reached their present position. This is exactly what I have just done about the Romans.

13. Enough of such explanations. It is now time to come to my subject after a brief summary of the events included in these introductory Books. To

- πρῶται κατὰ τὴν τάξιν αἱ γενόμεναι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ
 3 Καρχηδονίοις ἐν τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ. ταύ-
 ταις συνεχῆς ὁ Λιβυκὸς πόλεμος· ᾧ συνάπτει τὰ
 κατ' Ἰβηρίαν Ἀμίλκα, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον Ἀσδρούβα
 4 πραχθέντα καὶ Καρχηδονίοις. οἷς ἐγένετο κατὰ τὸν
 αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἡ πρώτη Ῥωμαίων διάβασις εἰς τὴν
 Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Εὐρώπης, ἐπὶ δὲ
 τοῖς προειρημένοις οἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ Κελτοὺς
 5 ἀγῶνες. τούτοις δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν παρὰ
 τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁ Κλεομενικὸς καλούμενος ἐνηργεῖτο
 πόλεμος, εἰς ὃν καὶ τὴν καταστροφὴν ἐποιησάμεθα
 τῆς ὅλης κατασκευῆς καὶ τῆς δευτέρας βύβλου.
 6 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ μέρος ὑπὲρ
 τῶν προειρημένων πράξεων οὐδὲν οὔθ' ἡμῖν ἀναγ-
 7 καῖον οὔτε τοῖς ἀκούουσι χρήσιμον. οὐ γὰρ ἱστο-
 ρεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν προτιθέμεθα, μνησθῆναι δὲ κε-
 φαλαιωδῶς προαιρούμεθα χάριν τῆς προκατασκευῆς
 τῶν μελλουσῶν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἱστορεῖσθαι πράξεων.
 8 διόπερ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων ψαύοντες κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς
 τῶν προειρημένων πειρασόμεθα συνάψαι τὴν τε-
 λευτὴν τῆς προκατασκευῆς τῇ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστορίας
 9 ἀρχῇ καὶ προθέσει. τοῦτον γὰρ τὸν τρόπον συν-
 εχοῦς γινομένης τῆς διηγήσεως, ἡμεῖς τε δόξομεν
 εὐλόγως ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ἤδη προῖστορημένων ἐτέ-
 ροις, τοῖς τε φιλομαθοῦσιν ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης οἰκο-
 νομίας εὐμαθῇ καὶ ῥαδίαν ἐπὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ῥηθή-
 10 σεσθαι παρασκευάσομεν τὴν ἔφοδον. βραχὺ δ' ἐπι-
 μελέστερον πειρασόμεθα διελθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πρώτου
 συστάντος πολέμου Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις
 11 περὶ Σικελίας. οὔτε γὰρ πολυχρονιώτερον τούτου
 πόλεμον εὐρεῖν ῥάδιον οὔτε παρασκευὰς ὁλοσχερε-

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take them in order we have first the incidents of the war between Rome and Carthage for Sicily. Next follows the war in Libya and next the achievements of the Carthaginians in Spain under Hamilcar and afterwards under Hasdrubal. At the same time occurred the first crossing of the Romans to Illyria and these parts of Europe, and subsequently to the preceding events their struggle with the Italian Celts. Contemporary with this the so-called Cleonic war was proceeding in Greece, and with this war I wind up my Introduction as a whole and my second Book.

Now to recount all these events in detail is neither incumbent on me nor would it be useful to my readers; for it is not my purpose to write their history but to mention them summarily as introductory to the events which are my real theme. I shall therefore attempt by such summary treatment of them in their proper order to fit in the end of the Introduction to the beginning of the actual History. Thus there will be no break in the narrative and it will be seen that I have been justified in touching on events which have been previously narrated by others, while this arrangement will render the approach to what follows intelligible and easy for students. I shall, however, attempt to narrate somewhat more carefully the first war between Rome and Carthage for the possession of Sicily; since it is not easy to name any war which lasted longer, nor one which exhibited on both sides more extensive preparations,

- στέρας οὔτε συνεχεστέρας πράξεις οὔτε πλείους
 ἀγῶνας οὔτε περιπετείας μείζους τῶν ἐν τῷ προειρη-
 12 μένῳ πολέμῳ συμβάντων ἑκατέροις. αὐτά τε τὰ
 πολιτεύματα κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ἀκμὴν
 ἀκέραια μὲν ἦν τοῖς ἐθισμοῖς, μέτρια δὲ ταῖς τύχαις,
 13 πάρισα δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσι. διὸ καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις
 καλῶς συνθεάσασθαι τὴν ἑκατέρου τοῦ πολιτεύματος
 ιδιότητα καὶ δύναμιν οὐχ οὕτως ἐκ τῶν ἐπιγενομέ-
 νων πολέμων ὥς ἐκ τούτου ποιητέον τὴν σύγκρισιν.
- 14 Οὐχ ἥττον δὲ τῶν προειρημένων παρωξύνθην
 ἐπιστῆσαι τούτῳ τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐμπει-
 ρότατα δοκοῦντας γράφειν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Φιλῖνον καὶ
 Φάβιον, μὴ δεόντως ἡμῖν ἀπηγγελκέναι τὴν ἀλή-
 2 θειαν. ἐκόντας μὲν οὖν ἐψεῦσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐχ
 ὑπολαμβάνω, στοχαζόμενος ἐκ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς αἰ-
 ρέσεως αὐτῶν· δοκοῦσι δέ μοι πεπονθέναι τι παρα-
 3 πλῆσιον τοῖς ἑρῶσι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν
 ὅλην εὐνοίαν Φιλίνῳ μὲν πάντα δοκοῦσιν οἱ Καρ-
 χηδόνιοι πεπραῆχθαι φρονίμως, καλῶς, ἀνδρωδῶς,
 οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τάναντία, Φαβίῳ δὲ τοῦμπαλιν τού-
 4 των. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ λοιπῷ βίῳ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπι-
 εἰκειαν ἴσως οὐκ ἂν τις ἐκβάλλοι· καὶ γὰρ φιλό-
 φιλον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ φιλόπατριν καὶ
 συμμισεῖν τοῖς φίλοις τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ συναγαπᾶν
 5 τοὺς φίλους· ὅταν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἥθος ἀναλαμ-
 βάνῃ τις, ἐπιλαθέσθαι χρή πάντων τῶν τοιούτων,
 καὶ πολλάκις μὲν εὐλογεῖν καὶ κοσμεῖν τοῖς μεγί-
 στοις ἐπαίνοις τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, ὅταν αἱ πράξεις ἀπαι-
 τῶσι τοῦτο, πολλάκις δ' ἐλέγχειν καὶ ψέγειν ἐπονει-
 δίστως τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους, ὅταν αἱ τῶν ἐπιτη-
 6 δευμάτων ἀμαρτίαι τοῦθ' ὑποδεικνύωσιν. ὥσπερ
 γὰρ ζώου τῶν ὄψεων ἀφαιρεθεισῶν ἀχρειοῦται τὸ

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more unintermittent activity, more battles, and greater changes of fortune. The two states were also at this period still uncorrupted in principle, moderate in fortune, and equal in strength, so that a better estimate of the peculiar qualities and gifts of each can be formed by comparing their conduct in this war than in any subsequent one.

14. An equally powerful motive with me for paying particular attention to this war is that the truth has not been adequately stated by those historians who are reputed to be the best authorities on it, Philinus and Fabius. I do not indeed accuse them of intentional falsehood, in view of their character and principles, but they seem to me to have been much in the case of lovers; for owing to his convictions and constant partiality Philinus will have it that the Carthaginians in every case acted wisely, well, and bravely, and the Romans otherwise, whilst Fabius takes the precisely opposite view. In other relations of life we should not perhaps exclude all such favouritism; for a good man should love his friends and his country, he should share the hatreds and attachments of his friends; but he who assumes the character of a historian must ignore everything of the sort, and often, if their actions demand this, speak good of his enemies and honour them with the highest praises while criticizing and even reproaching roundly his closest friends, should the errors of their conduct impose this duty on him. For just as a living creature which has lost its

ὅλον, οὕτως ἐξ ἱστορίας ἀναιρεθείσης τῆς ἀληθείας
 τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀνωφελές γίνεται δι-
 7 ἡγημα. διόπερ οὔτε τῶν φίλων κατηγορεῖν οὔτε
 τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπαινεῖν ὀκνητέον, οὔτε δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς
 ψέγειν, ποτὲ δ' ἐγκωμιάζειν εὐλαβητέον, ἐπειδὴ τοὺς
 ἐν πράγμασιν ἀναστρεφομένους οὔτ' εὐστοχεῖν αἰεὶ
 8 δυνατὸν οὔθ' ἁμαρτάνειν συνεχῶς εἰκός. ἀποστάντας
 οὖν τῶν πραττόντων αὐτοῖς τοῖς πραττομένοις ἐφαρ-
 μοστέον τὰς πρεπούσας ἀποφάσεις καὶ διαλήψεις ἐν
 τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν.

- 15 Ὡς δ' ἔστιν ἀληθὴ τὰ νῦν ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἰρημένα
 σκοπεῖν ἐκ τούτων πάρεστιν. ὁ γὰρ Φιλῖνος
 ἀρχόμενος ἅμα τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς δευτέρας
 βύβλου φησὶ προσκαθῆσθαι τῇ Μεσσήνῃ πολεμοῦν-
 2 τας τοὺς τε Καρχηδονίους καὶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους,
 παραγενομένους δὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους κατὰ θάλατταν
 εἰς τὴν πόλιν εὐθύς ἐξελθεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους·
 λαβόντας δὲ πολλὰς πληγὰς ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὴν
 Μεσσήνην· αὐθις δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους
 ἐκπορευθέντας οὐ μόνον πληγὰς λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 3 ζωγρία τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἱκανοὺς ἀποβαλεῖν. ταῦτα
 δ' εἰπὼν τὸν μὲν Ἰέρωνά φησι μετὰ τὴν γενομένην
 συμπλοκὴν οὕτως ἔξω γενέσθαι τοῦ φρονεῖν ὥστε
 μὴ μόνον παραχρῆμα τὸν χάρακα καὶ τὰς σκηνὰς
 ἐμπρήσαντα φυγεῖν νυκτὸς εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ φρούρια πάντα καταλιπεῖν τὰ κείμενα
 κατὰ τῆς τῶν Μεσσηνίων χώρας· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 4 τοὺς Καρχηδονίους μετὰ τὴν μάχην εὐθέως ἐκλιπόν-
 τας τὸν χάρακα διελεῖν σφᾶς εἰς τὰς πόλεις, τῶν
 δ' ὑπαίθρων οὐδ' ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τολμᾶν ἔτι· διὸ
 καὶ συνθεωρήσαντας τοὺς ἡγουμένους αὐτῶν ἀπο-
 δεδειλιακότας τοὺς ὄχλους βουλεύσασθαι μὴ κρίνειν
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eyesight is wholly incapacitated, so if History is stripped of her truth all that is left is but an idle tale. We should therefore not shrink from accusing our friends or praising our enemies; nor need we be shy of sometimes praising and sometimes blaming the same people, since it is neither possible that men in the actual business of life should always be in the right, nor is it probable that they should be always mistaken. We must therefore disregard the actors in our narrative and apply to the actions such terms and such criticism as they deserve.

15. The truth of what I have just said is evident from what follows. Philinus, in commencing his narrative at the outset of his second Book, tells us that the Carthaginians and Syracusans were besieging Messene, that the Romans reaching the city by sea, at once marched out against the Syracusans, but after being severely handled returned to Messene. They next sallied out against the Carthaginians and were not only worsted but lost a considerable number of prisoners. After making these statements he says that Hiero after the engagement so far lost his wits as not only to burn his camp and tents and take flight to Syracuse the same night, but to withdraw all his garrisons from the forts which menaced the territory of Messene. The Carthaginians, likewise, he tells us, after the battle at once quitted their camp and distributed themselves among the towns, not even daring to dispute the open country further: their leaders, he says, seeing how dispirited the ranks were, resolved not to risk a

- 5 διὰ μάχης τὰ πράγματα· τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους
 ἐπομένους αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τὴν χώραν πορθεῖν
 τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ Συρακοσίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς
 Συρακούσας αὐτὰς προσκαθίσαντας ἐπιβαλέσθαι
 6 πολιορκεῖν. ταῦτα δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς πάσης
 ἐστὶν ἀλογίας πλήρη, καὶ διαστολῆς οὐ προσδεῖται
 7 τὸ παράπαν. οὓς μὲν γὰρ πολιορκοῦντας τὴν Μεσ-
 σήνην καὶ νικῶντας ἐν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς ὑπέθετο,
 τούτους φεύγοντας καὶ τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἐκχωροῦντας
 καὶ τέλος πολιορκουμένους καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀποδε-
 8 δειλιακότητας ἀπέφηνεν· οὓς δ' ἡττωμένους καὶ πο-
 λιορκουμένους ὑπεστήσατο, τούτους διώκοντας καὶ
 παραχρῆμα κρατοῦντας τῶν ὑπαίθρων καὶ τέλος
 9 πολιορκοῦντας τὰς Συρακούσας ἀπέδειξε. ταῦτα δὲ
 συνάδειν ἀλλήλοις οὐδαμῶς δύναται· πῶς γάρ;
 ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἶναι τὰς πρώτας
 ψευδεῖς ἢ τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀποφάσεις.
 10 εἰσὶ δ' αὐταὶ μὲν ἀληθεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἐξεχώρησαν οἱ
 Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Συρακόσιοι τῶν ὑπαίθρων, καὶ
 τὰς Συρακούσας ἐπολιόρκουν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι κατὰ
 πόδας, ὡς δ' οὗτός φησι, καὶ τὴν Ἐχέτλαν, ἐν μέσῃ
 κειμένην τῇ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων
 11 ἐπαρχίᾳ. λοιπὸν ἀνάγκη συγχωρεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ
 τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἶναι ψευδεῖς, καὶ νικῶντων εὐθέως
 τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὴν Μεσσήνην συμπλο-
 καῖς ἡττημένους αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ συγγραφέως
 ἀπηγγέλλθαι.
 12 Φιλῖνον μὲν οὖν παρ' ὅλην ἂν τις τὴν πραγ-
 ματείαν εὖροι τοιοῦτον ὄντα, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ
 Φάβιον, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτῶν δειχθήσεται τῶν καιρῶν.
 13 ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπειδὴ τοὺς ἀρμόζοντας πεποιήμεθα λόγους
 ὑπὲρ τῆς παρεκβάσεως, ἐπανελθόντες ἐπὶ τὰς πρά-

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decisive engagement, and the Romans following up the enemy not only laid waste the territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but sat down before Syracuse and undertook its siege. This account is, it seems to me, full of inconsistencies and does not require a lengthy discussion. For those whom he introduced as besieging Messene and victorious in the engagements, he now represents as in flight and abandoning the open country and finally besieged and dispirited, while those who were defeated and besieged are now stated to be in pursuit of their foes, and at once commanding the open country and finally besieging Syracuse. It is absolutely impossible to reconcile the two assertions, and either his initial statements or his account of what followed must be false. But the latter is true ; for as a fact the Carthaginians and Syracusans abandoned the open country, and the Romans at once began to lay siege to Syracuse and, as he says, even to Echetla too, which lies between the Syracusan and Carthaginian provinces. We must therefore concede that Philinus's initial statements are false, and that, while the Romans were victorious in the engagements before Messene, this author announces that they were worsted.

We can trace indeed the same fault throughout the whole work of Philinus and alike through that of Fabius, as I shall show when occasion arises. Now that I have said what is fitting on the subject of this digression, I will return to facts and attempt in a

ξεις πειρασόμεθα προστιθέντες αἰεὶ τὸν ἐξῆς λόγον εἰς ἀληθινὰς ἐννοίας ἄγειν διὰ βραχέων τοὺς ἐν-
τυγχάνοντας ὑπὲρ τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου.

- 16 Προσπεσόντων γὰρ εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀππίον καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα προτερημάτων, καταστήσαντες ὑπάτους Μάνιον Ὅτακίλιον καὶ Μάνιον Οὐαλέριον τὰς τε δυνάμεις ἀπάσας ἐξαπέστελλον καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀμφοτέρους εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν. ἔστι δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις τὰ πάντα τέτταρα στρατόπεδα Ῥωμαϊκὰ χωρὶς τῶν συμμάχων, ἃ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν προχειρίζονται· τούτων ἕκαστον ἀνὰ τετρακισχιλίους πεζοὺς, ἵππεῖς δὲ
- 2 τριακοσίους. ὧν παραγενομένων ἀπὸ τε τῶν Καρχηδονίων αἱ πλείους ἀφιστάμεναι πόλεις προσ-
4 ἐτίθεντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀπὸ τε τῶν Συρακοσίων. ὁ δ' Ἱέρων θεωρῶν τὴν διατροπὴν καὶ κατάπληξιν τῶν Σικελιωτῶν, ἅμα δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ βάρος τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν στρατοπέδων, ἐκ πάντων συνελογίζετο τούτων ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶναι τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων
- 5 ἢ τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐλπίδας. διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ὀρμήσας τοῖς λογισμοῖς διεπέμπετο πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ φιλίας ποιού-
6 μενος τοὺς λόγους. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι προσεδέξαντο, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὰς χορηγίας· θαλαττοκρατούντων γὰρ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐλαβοῦντο μὴ πανταχόθεν ἀποκλεισθῶσι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὸ καὶ περὶ τὰ πρὸ τοῦ διαβάντα στρατόπεδα πολλὴν ἔνδειαν γε-
8 γονέναι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. διόπερ ὑπολαβόντες τὸν Ἱέρωνα μεγάλην εἰς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὐτοῖς παρ-
9 ἔξεσθαι χρεῖαν ἀσμένως προσεδέξαντο τὴν φιλίαν. ποιησάμενοι δὲ συνθήκας ἐφ' ᾧ τὰ μὲν αἰχμάλωτα χωρὶς λύτρων ἀποδοῦναι τὸν βασιλέα Ῥωμαίοις,

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narrative that strictly follows the order of events to guide my readers by a short road to a true notion of this war.

16. When news of the successes of Appius and his legions reached Rome, they elected Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius Consuls, and dispatched their whole armed force and both commanders to Sicily. The Romans have four legions of Roman citizens in all apart from the allies. These they enrol annually, each legion comprising four thousand foot and three hundred horse. On their arrival in Sicily most of the cities revolted from the Carthaginians and Syracusans and joined the Romans. Hiero, observing both the confusion and consternation of the Sicilians, and at the same time the numbers and powerful nature of the Roman forces, reached from all this the conclusion that the prospects of the Romans were more brilliant than those of the Carthaginians. His conviction therefore impelling him to side with the Romans, he sent several messages to the Consuls with proposals for peace and alliance. The Romans accepted his overtures, especially for the sake of their supplies; for since the Carthaginians commanded the sea they were apprehensive lest they should be cut off on all sides from the necessities of life, in view of the fact that the armies which had previously crossed to Sicily had run very short of provisions. Therefore, supposing that Hiero would be of great service to them in this respect, they readily accepted his friendly advances. Having made a treaty by which the king bound himself to give up his prisoners to the Romans without ransom, and in addition to this

263 B.C.

- ἀργυρίου δὲ προσθεῖναι τάλαντα τούτοις ἑκατόν, λοιπὸν ἤδη Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν ὡς φίλοις καὶ συμμάχοις
 10 ἐχρῶντο τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἰέρων ὑποστείλας ἑαυτὸν ὑπὸ τὴν Ῥωμαίων σκέπην, καὶ χορηγῶν αἰεὶ τούτοις εἰς τὰ κατεπείγοντα τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀδεῶς ἐβασίλευε τῶν Συρακοσίων τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον, φιλοστεφανῶν καὶ φιλοδοξῶν
 11 εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. ἐπιφανέστατος γὰρ δὴ πάντων οὗτος δοκεῖ καὶ πλείστον χρόνον ἀπολελαυκέναι τῆς ἰδίας εὐβουλίας ἐν τε τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ τοῖς καθόλου πράγμασιν.
- 17 Ἐπανενεχθεισῶν δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, καὶ προσδεξαμένου τοῦ δήμου καὶ κυρώσαντος τὰς πρὸς Ἰέρωνα διαλύσεις, λοιπὸν οὐκέτι πάσας ἔκρινον ἑξαποστέλλειν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰς δυνά-
 2 μεις, ἀλλὰ δύο μόνον στρατόπεδα, νομίζοντες ἅμα μὲν κεκουφίσθαι τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς προσκεχωρηκότος τοῦ βασιλέως, ἅμα δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπολαμβάνοντες
 3 οὕτως εὐπορήσειν τὰς δυνάμεις τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, θεωροῦντες τὸν μὲν Ἰέρωνα πολέμιον αὐτοῖς γεγονότα, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους ὀλοσχερότερον ἐμπλεκομένους εἰς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν, ὑπέλαβον βαρυτέρας προσδεῖσθαι παρασκευῆς, δι'
 ἧς ἀντοφθαλμεῖν δυνήσονται τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ
 4 συνέχειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν. διὸ καὶ ξενολογήσαντες ἐκ τῆς ἀντιπέρας χώρας πολλοὺς μὲν Λιγυστίνοὺς καὶ Κελτούς, ἔτι δὲ πλείους τούτων
 5 Ἰβήρας, ἅπαντας εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ἀπέστειλαν. ὁρῶντες δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων πόλιν εὐφυστάτην οὖσαν πρὸς τὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ βαρυτάτην ἅμα τῆς αὐτῶν ἐπαρχίας, εἰς ταύτην συνήθροισαν τὰ τε χορήγια καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, ὀρμητηρίῳ

BOOK I

to pay them a hundred talents, the Romans henceforth treated the Syracusans as allies and friends. King Hiero having placed himself under the protection of the Romans, continued to furnish them with the resources of which they stood in urgent need, and ruled over Syracuse henceforth in security, treating the Greeks in such a way as to win from them crowns and other honours. We may, indeed, regard him as the most illustrious of princes and the one who reaped longest the fruits of his own wisdom in particular cases and in general policy.

17. When the terms of the treaty were referred to Rome, and when the people had accepted and ratified this agreement with Hiero, the Romans decided not to continue to employ all their forces in the expedition, but only two legions, thinking on the one hand that, now the king had joined them, the war had become a lighter task and calculating that their forces would thus be better off for supplies. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, when they saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that the Romans were becoming more deeply involved in the enterprise in Sicily, considered that they themselves required stronger forces in order to be able to confront their enemies and control Sicilian affairs. They therefore enlisted foreign mercenaries from the opposite coasts, many of them Ligurians, Celts, and still more Iberians, and dispatched them all to Sicily. Perceiving that the city of Agrigentum had the greatest natural advantages for making their preparations, it being also the most important city in their province, they collected their troops and

6 κρίνοντας χρῆσθαι ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον.

Τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὸν Ἰέρωνα ποιησά-
 μενοι στρατηγοὶ τὰς συνθήκας ἀνακεχωρήκεισαν· οἱ
 δὲ μετὰ τούτους κατασταθέντες Λεύκιος Ποστούμιος
 καὶ Κόιντος Μαμίλιος ἦκον εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν μετὰ
 7 τῶν στρατοπέδων. θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν Καρχη-
 δονίων ἐπιβολὴν καὶ τὰς περὶ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα παρα-
 σκευὰς ἔγνωσαν τολμηρότερον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς πράγ-
 8 μασι· διὸ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μέρη τοῦ πολέμου
 παρήκαν, φέροντες δὲ παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι πρὸς
 αὐτὸν Ἀκράγαντα προσήρεισαν· καὶ στρατοπεδεύ-
 σαντες ἐν ὀκτὼ σταδίοις ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως συνέκλει-
 9 σαν ἐντὸς τειχῶν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. ἀκμαζούσης
 δὲ τῆς τοῦ σίτου συναγωγῆς, καὶ προφαινομένης
 χρονίου πολιορκίας, ὥρμησαν ἐκθυμότερον τοῦ
 10 δέοντος οἱ στρατιῶται πρὸς τὸ σιτολογεῖν. οἱ δὲ
 Καρχηδόνιοι κατιδόντες τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσκεδασμέ-
 νους κατὰ τῆς χώρας, ἐξελθόντες ἐπέθεντο τοῖς σιτο-
 λογοῦσι. τρεψάμενοι δὲ τούτους ῥαδίως οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ
 τὴν τοῦ χάρακος ἀρπαγὴν ὥρμησαν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς
 11 ἐφεδρείας. ἀλλ' ἢ τῶν ἐθισμῶν διαφορὰ καὶ τότε
 καὶ πολλάκις ἦδη σέσωκε τὰ Ῥωμαίων πράγματα.
 τὸ γὰρ πρόστιμον παρ' αὐτοῖς θάνατός ἐστι τῷ προ-
 εμένῳ τὸν τόπον καὶ φυγόντι τὸ παράπαν ἐξ ἐφ-
 12 εδρείας. διὸ καὶ τότε πολλαπλασίους ὄντας τοὺς
 ὑπεναντίους ὑποστάντες γενναίως πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν
 ιδίων ἀπέβαλον, ἔτι δὲ πλείους τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀπ-
 13 ἐκτείναν. τέλος δὲ κυκλώσαντες τοὺς πολεμίους
 ὅσον οὔπω διασπῶντας τὸν χάρακα, τοὺς μὲν
 αὐτῶν διέφθειραν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐπικεῖμενοι καὶ
 φονεύοντες συνεδίωξαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

BOOK I

supplies there and decided to use it as a base in the war.

Meanwhile the Roman Consuls who had made 262 B.C. the treaty with Hiero had left, and their successors, Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, had arrived in Sicily with their legions. On taking note of the plan of the Carthaginians, and their activity at Agrigentum, they decided on a bolder initiative. Abandoning therefore other operations they brought all their forces to bear on Agrigentum itself, and encamping at a distance of eight stades from the city, shut the Carthaginians up within the walls. It was the height of the harvest, and as a long siege was anticipated, the soldiers began gathering corn with more venturesomeness than was advisable. The Carthaginians, observing that the enemy were dispersed about the country, made a sortie and attacked the foragers. Having easily put these to flight, some of them pressed on to plunder the fortified camp while others advanced on the covering force. But on this occasion and often on previous ones it is the excellence of their institutions which has saved the situation for the Romans; for with them death is the penalty incurred by a man who deserts the post or takes flight in any way from such a supporting force. Therefore on this occasion as on others they gallantly faced opponents who largely outnumbered them, and, though they suffered heavy loss, killed still more of the enemy. Finally surrounding them as they were on the point of tearing up the palisade, they dispatched some on the spot and pressing hard on the rest pursued them with slaughter to the city.

18 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβη τοὺς μὲν Καρχηδονίους
 εὐλαβέστερον διακεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθέσεις, τοὺς
 δὲ Ῥωμαίους φυλακτικώτερον χρῆσθαι ταῖς προ-
 2 νομαῖς. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἀντεξήρσαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι πλὴν
 ἕως ἀκροβολισμοῦ, διελόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ῥω-
 μαίων εἰς δύο μέρη τὴν δύναμιν τῷ μὲν ἐνὶ περὶ
 τὸ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως Ἀσκληπιεῖον ἔμενον, θατέρῳ δὲ
 κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς Ἡράκλειαν κεκλι-
 3 μένοις μέρεσι τῆς πόλεως. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν στρα-
 τοπέδων ἕξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους τῆς πόλεως ὠχυ-
 ρώσαντο, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐντὸς αὐτῶν τάφρον πρου-
 βάλοντο χάριν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἐξιόντας ἐκ τῆς
 πόλεως ἀσφαλείας, τὴν δ' ἐκτὸς αὐτῶν περιεβά-
 λοντο, φυλακὴν ποιούμενοι τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐπιθέσεων
 καὶ τῶν παρεισάγεσθαι καὶ παρεισπίπτειν εἰωθότων
 4 εἰς τὰς πολιορκουμένας πόλεις. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν
 τάφρων καὶ τῶν στρατοπέδων διαστήματα φυλακαῖς
 διέλαβον, ὀχυροποιησάμενοι τοὺς εὐκαίρους τῶν
 5 τόπων ἐν διαστάσει. τὰ δὲ χορήγια καὶ τὴν ἄλλην
 παρασκευὴν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι πάντες ἤθροίζον
 αὐτοῖς καὶ παρηῆγον εἰς Ἐρβησόν, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐκ ταύ-
 της τῆς πόλεως οὐ μακρὰν ὑπαρχούσης ἄγοντες καὶ
 φέροντες συνεχῶς τὰς ἀγορὰς δαιψιλὴ τὰναγκαῖα
 6 σφίσι παρεσκεύαζον. πέντε μὲν οὖν ἴσως μῆνας ἐπὶ
 τῶν αὐτῶν διέμενον, οὐδὲν ὀλοσχερὲς προτέρημα
 δυνάμενοι λαβεῖν κατ' ἀλλήλων πλὴν τῶν ἐν αὐ-
 7 τοῖς τοῖς ἀκροβολισμοῖς συμβαινόντων. συναγομέ-
 νων δὲ τῷ λιμῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων διὰ τὸ πλῆθος
 τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συγκεκλεισμένων ἀνδρῶν, οὐ γὰρ
 ἐλάττους πέντε μυριάδων ὑπῆρχον, δυσχρηστούμε-
 νος Ἀννίβας ἤδη τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ
 τῶν πολιορκουμένων δυνάμεων, διεπέμπετο συν-

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18. After this the Carthaginians were more inclined to be cautious in taking the offensive, while the Romans were more on their guard in foraging. As the Carthaginians did not advance beyond skirmishing range, the Roman generals divided their force into two bodies, remaining with one near the temple of Asclepius outside the walls and encamping with the other on that side of the city that is turned towards Heraclea. They fortified the ground between their camps on each side of the city, protecting themselves by the inner trench from sallies from within and encircling themselves with an outer one to guard against attacks from outside, and to prevent that secret introduction of supplies and men which is usual in the case of beleaguered cities. On the spaces between the trenches and their camps they placed pickets, fortifying suitable places at some distance from each other. Their supplies and other material were collected for them by all the other members of the alliance, and brought to Herbesus, and they themselves constantly fetching in live stock and provisions from this city which was at no great distance, kept themselves abundantly supplied with what they required. So for five months or so matters were at a standstill, neither side being able to score any decisive advantage, nothing in fact beyond incidental success in their exchange of shots; but when the Carthaginians began to be pressed by famine owing to the number of people cooped up in the city—fifty thousand at least in number—Hannibal, the commander of the besieged forces, found himself in a difficult situation and sent

- 8 εχῶς εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα τὴν τε περίστασιν δια-
 σαφῶν καὶ βοηθεῖν παρακαλῶν. οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Καρ-
 χηδόνι τῶν ἐπισυνηγμένων στρατιωτῶν καὶ θηρίων
 γεμίσαντες τὰς ναῦς ἐξέπεμψαν εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν
 9 πρὸς Ἀνωνα τὸν ἕτερον στρατηγόν. ὃς συναγα-
 γὼν τὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ δυνάμεις εἰς Ἡράκλειαν,
 πρῶτον μὲν πραξικοπήσας κατέσχε τὴν τῶν Ἐρβη-
 σέων πόλιν, καὶ παρείλετο τὰς ἀγορὰς καὶ τὴν τῶν
 ἀναγκαίων χορηγίαν τοῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων στρατο-
 10 πέδοις. ἐξ οὗ συνέβη τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐπ' ἴσου πο-
 λιορκεῖν καὶ πολιορκεῖσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. εἰς γὰρ
 τοῦτο συνήγοντο τῇ σιτοδείᾳ καὶ σπάνει τῶν ἀναγ-
 καίων ὥστε πολλάκις βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τοῦ λύειν
 11 τὴν πολιορκίαν. ὃ δὴ καὶ τέλος ἂν ἐποίησαν, εἰ
 μὴ πᾶσαν σπουδὴν καὶ μηχανὴν προσφερόμενος Ἱέρ-
 ρων τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα σφίσι παρεσκεύαζε
 19 τῶν χορηγίων. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα θεωρῶν ὁ προειρη-
 μένος ἀνὴρ τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους ὑπὸ τε τῆς νόσου
 καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας ἀσθενῶς διακειμένους διὰ τὸ λοι-
 μικὴν εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς κατάστασιν, τὰ δὲ σφέτερα
 στρατόπεδα νομίζων ἀξιόχρεα πρὸς μάχην ὑπάρχειν,
 2 ἀναλαβὼν τὰ τε θηρία περὶ πεντήκοντα τὸν ἀριθ-
 μὸν ὄντα καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἅπασαν προήγε
 κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἡρακλείας, παραγγείλας τοῖς
 Νομαδικοῖς ἵππευσι προπορεύεσθαι, καὶ συνεγγί-
 σασι τῷ χάρακι τῶν ἐναντίων ἐρεθίζειν καὶ πειρᾶ-
 σθαι τοὺς ἵππεῖς αὐτῶν ἐκκαλεῖσθαι, κᾗπειτα πά-
 λιν ἐκκλίνας ἀποχωρεῖν, ἕως ἂν αὐτῷ συμμίξωσι.
 3 πραξάντων δὲ τὸ συνταχθὲν τῶν Νομάδων καὶ
 προσμιζάντων θατέρῳ τῶν στρατοπέδων, εὐθὺς οἱ
 τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἵππεῖς ἐξεχέοντο καὶ θρασέως ἐπ-
 4 ἔκειντο τοῖς Νομάσιν. οἱ δὲ Λίβυες ὑπεχώρουν

BOOK 1

constant messages to Carthage explaining his position and begging for reinforcements. The Carthaginian government shipped the troops they had collected and their elephants and sent them to Sicily to Hanno their other general. Hanno concentrated his troops and material of war at Heraclea and in the first place surprised and occupied Herbesus, cutting off the enemy's camps from their provisions and necessary supplies. The result of this was that the Romans were as a fact both besieged and besiegers at the same time; for they were so hard pressed by want of food and scarcity of the necessities of life, that they often contemplated raising the siege, and would in the end have done so, had not Hiero, by using every effort and every device, provided them with a moderate amount of strictly necessary supplies. 19. In the next place Hanno, perceiving that the Romans were weakened by disease and privation, owing to an epidemic having broken out among them, and thinking that his own troops were in fit fighting condition, took with him all his elephants, about fifty in number, and all the rest of his force, and advanced rapidly from Heraclea. He had ordered the Numidian horse to precede him, and approaching the enemy's fortified camp to provoke him and attempt to draw his cavalry out, after which they were to give way and retire until they rejoined himself. The Numidians acting on these orders advanced up to one of the camps, and the Roman cavalry at once issued forth and boldly attacked them. The Africans retreated as they had been

κατὰ τὸ παράγγελμα, μέχρι συνέμιξαν τοῖς περὶ τὸν
 "Αννωνα· λοιπὸν τ' ἐκ μεταβολῆς περιχυθέντες ἐπ-
 ἔκειντο τοῖς πολεμίοις, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπ-
 ἔκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἕως εἰς τὸν χάρακα
 5 συνεδίωξαν. γενομένων δὲ τούτων ἐπεστρατοπέδευ-
 σαν οἱ περὶ τὸν "Αννωνα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, καταλαβό-
 μενοι τὸν λόφον τὸν καλούμενον Τόρον, ὡς δέκα
 6 σταδίου ἀπέχοντες τῶν ὑπεναντίων. καὶ δύο μὲν
 μῆνας ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, οὐδὲν ὁλο-
 σχερὲς πράττοντες πλὴν ἀκροβολιζόμενοι καθ' ἑκά-
 7 στην ἡμέραν. τοῦ δ' Ἀννίβου διαπυρσευομένου καὶ
 διαπεμπομένου συνεχῶς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν
 "Αννωνα, καὶ δηλούντος ὅτι τὰ πλήθη τὸν λιμὸν
 οὐχ ὑπομένει, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους
 αὐτομολοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν, ἔγνω διακινδυνεύειν
 ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός, οὐχ ἦττον ἐπὶ τοῦτο
 φερομένων καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων διὰ τὰς προειρημένας
 8 αἰτίας. διόπερ ἔξαγαγόντες ἀμφοτέρωι τὰς δυνά-
 μεις εἰς τὸν μεταξὺ τόπον τῶν στρατοπέδων συν-
 9 ἔβαλλον ἀλλήλοισι. ἐπὶ πολὺν δὲ χρόνον γενομένης
 τῆς μάχης τέλος ἐτρέψαντο τοὺς προκινδυνεύσαντας
 10 μισθοφόρους τῶν Καρχηδονίων οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι. τού-
 των δὲ πεσόντων εἰς τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς τάξεις
 τὰς ἐφεστηκυίας συνέβη πᾶν συνταραχθῆναι τὸ
 11 τῶν Φοινίκων στρατόπεδον. γενομένου δ' ἐγκλί-
 ματος ὁλοσχεροῦς οἱ μὲν πλείστοι διεφθάρησαν αὐ-
 τῶν, τινὲς δ' εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἀπεχώρησαν· οἱ δὲ
 Ῥωμαῖοι τῶν τε πλείστων ἐκυρίευσαν θηρίων καὶ
 12 τῆς ἐπισκευῆς ἀπάσης. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς νυκτός,
 καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων χαρὰν καὶ διὰ
 τὸν κόπον ῥαθυμότερον ταῖς φυλακαῖς αὐτῶν χρη-
 σαμένων, ἀπελπίσας Ἀννίβας τὰ πράγματα, καὶ νο-

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ordered until they joined Hanno's army and then, wheeling round and encircling the enemy, they attacked them, killing many and pursuing the rest as far as the camp. After this Hanno encamped opposite the Romans, occupying the hill called Torus, at a distance of about ten stades from the enemy. For two months they remained stationary, without any action more decisive than shooting at each other every day; but as Hannibal kept on announcing to Hanno by fire-signals and messengers that the population could not support the famine, and that deserters to the enemy were numerous owing to privation, the Carthaginian general decided to risk battle, the Romans being no less eager for this owing to the reasons I stated above. Both therefore led out their forces to the space between the camps and engaged. The battle lasted for long, but at the end the Romans put to flight the advanced line of Carthaginian mercenaries, and as the latter fell back on the elephants and the other divisions in their rear, the whole Phœnician army was thrown into disorder. A complete rout ensued, and most of them were put to the sword, some escaping to Heraclea. The Romans captured most of the elephants and all the baggage. But after nightfall, while the Romans, partly from joy at their success and partly from fatigue, had relaxed the vigilance of their watch, Hannibal, regarding his situation as desperate, and thinking for the above reasons that

- μίσας ἔχειν εὐφυῇ καιρὸν πρὸς σωτηρίαν διὰ τὰς
 προειρημένας αἰτίας, ὥρμησε περὶ μέσας νύκτας ἐκ
 13 τῆς πόλεως, ἔχων τὰς ξενικὰς δυνάμεις. χύσας δὲ
 φορμοῖς ἀχύρων σεσαγμένοις τὰς τάφρους ἔλαθε
 τοὺς πολεμίους ἀπαγαγὼν ἀσφαλῶς τὴν δύναμιν.
 14 οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπελθούσης συνέντες τὸ
 γεγονός, καὶ τῆς οὐραγίας τῆς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἄν-
 νίβαν ἐπὶ βραχὺ καθαψάμενοι, μετὰ ταῦτα πάντες
 15 ὥρμησαν πρὸς τὰς πύλας. οὐδενὸς δ' ἐμποδῶν
 αὐτοῖς ἱσταμένου παρεισπεσόντες διήρπασαν τὴν
 πόλιν, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν σωμάτων, πολλῆς δὲ καὶ
 παντοδαπῆς ἐγένοντο κατασκευῆς ἐγκρατεῖς.
 20 Τῆς δ' ἀγγελίας ἀφικομένης εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον
 τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα,
 περιχαρεῖς γενόμενοι καὶ ταῖς διανοαῖς ἐπαρθέντες
 οὐκ ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λογισμῶν, οὐδ' ἡρ-
 κοῦντο σεσωκέναι τοὺς Μαμερτίνους οὐδὲ ταῖς ἐξ
 2 αὐτοῦ τοῦ πολέμου γενομέναις ὠφελείαις, ἐλπίσαν-
 τες δὲ καθόλου δυνατὸν εἶναι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους
 ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς νήσου, τούτου δὲ γενομένου μεγάλην
 ἐπίδοσιν αὐτῶν λήψεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, πρὸς τού-
 τοις ἦσαν τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ ταῖς περὶ τοῦτο τὸ
 3 μέρος ἐπινοαῖαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πεζικὰς ду-
 4 νάμεις ἐώρων κατὰ λόγον σφίσι προχωροῦντα· μετὰ
 γὰρ τοὺς τὸν Ἀκράγαντα πολιορκήσαντας οἱ κατα-
 σταθέντες στρατηγοὶ Λεύκιος Οὐαλέριος καὶ Τίτος
 5 Ὀτακίλιος ἐδόκουν ἐνδεχομένως χειρίζειν τὰ κατὰ
 τὴν Σικελίαν. τῆς δὲ θαλάττης ἀκονιτὶ τῶν Καρ-
 χηδονίων ἐπικρατοῦντων ἐξυγοστατεῖτ' αὐτοῖς ὁ πό-
 6 λεμος· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἐξῆς χρόνοις, κατεχόντων αὐ-
 τῶν ἤδη τὸν Ἀκράγαντα, πολλαὶ μὲν πόλεις προσ-
 ἐτίθεντο τῶν μεσογαίων τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, ἀγωνιῶσαι

BOOK I

this was a fine opportunity for saving himself, broke out of the city about midnight with his mercenaries. By filling up the trenches with baskets packed tightly with straw he managed to withdraw his force in safety unperceived by the enemy. When day broke the Romans became aware of what had happened, and, after slightly molesting Hannibal's rear-guard, advanced with their whole force to the gates. Finding nobody to oppose them they entered the city and plundered it, possessing themselves of many slaves and a quantity of booty of every description.

20. When the news of what had occurred at Agrigentum reached the Roman Senate, in their joy and elation they no longer confined themselves to their original designs and were no longer satisfied with having saved the Mamertines and with what they had gained in the war itself, but, hoping that it would be possible to drive the Carthaginians entirely out of the island and that if this were done their own power would be much augmented, they directed their attention to this project and to plans that would serve their purpose. As regards their military force at least they noted that all progressed satisfactorily; for the Consuls appointed after those who had reduced Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, seemed to be managing Sicilian affairs as well as possible; but as the Carthaginians maintained without any trouble the command of the sea the fortunes of the war continued to hang in the balance. For in the 261 B.C. period that followed, now that Agrigentum was in their hands, while many inland cities joined the

τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ἀφίσταντο τῶν
 παραθαλαττίων, καταπεπληγμένοι τὸν τῶν Καρχη-
 7 δονίων στόλον. ὅθεν ὁρῶντες αἰεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον εἰς
 ἑκάτερα τὰ μέρη ῥοπὰς λαμβάνοντα τὸν πόλεμον
 διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας, ἔτι δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἰτα-
 λίαν πορθουμένην πολλάκις ὑπὸ τῆς ναυτικῆς ду-
 νάμεως, τὴν δὲ Λιβύην εἰς τέλος ἀβλαβῇ διαμένου-
 σαν, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ συνεμβαίνειν τοῖς Καρχηδο-
 8 νίοις εἰς τὴν θάλατταν. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος
 οὐχ ἥκιστα με παρώρμησε ποιήσασθαι μνήμην ἐπὶ
 πλεῖον τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου, χάριν τοῦ μηδὲ
 ταύτην ἀγνοεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν, πῶς καὶ πότε καὶ δι'
 αἷς αἰτίας πρῶτον ἐνέβησαν εἰς θάλατταν Ῥωμαῖοι.
 9 Θεωροῦντες δὲ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς τριβὴν λαμβά-
 νοντα, τότε πρῶτον ἐπεβάλοντο ναυπηγεῖσθαι σκά-
 10 φη, πεντηρικὰ μὲν ἑκατόν, εἴκοσι δὲ τριήρεις. τῶν
 δὲ ναυπηγῶν εἰς τέλος ἀπείρων ὄντων τῆς περὶ τὰς
 πεντήρεις ναυπηγίας διὰ τὸ μηδένα τότε τῶν κατὰ
 τὴν Ἰταλίαν κεχρηῖσθαι τοιούτοις σκάφεσι, πολλὴν
 11 αὐτοῖς παρεῖχε τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δυσχέρειαν. ἐξ ὧν
 καὶ μάλιστα συνίδοι τις ἂν τὸ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ
 12 παράβολον τῆς Ῥωμαίων αἰρέσεως. οὐ γὰρ οἶον
 εὐλόγους ἀφορμὰς ἔχοντες, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀφορμὰς
 καθάπαξ, οὐδ' ἐπίνοιαν οὐδέποτε ποιησάμενοι τῆς
 θαλάττης, τότε δὴ πρῶτον ἐν νῶ λαμβάνοντες
 οὕτως τολμηρῶς ἐνεχείρησαν ὥστε πρὶν ἢ πειραθῆ-
 ναι τοῦ πράγματος, εὐθὺς ἐπιβαλέσθαι Καρχηδονίοις
 ναυμαχεῖν τοῖς ἐκ προγόνων ἔχουσι τὴν κατὰ θάλατ-
 13 ταν ἡγεμονίαν ἀδύητον. μαρτυρίῳ δ' ἂν τις χρή-
 σαιτο πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν νῦν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγο-
 μένων καὶ πρὸς τὸ παράδοξον αὐτῶν τῆς τόλμης.
 ὅτε γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησαν διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν

BOOK I

Romans from dread of their military forces, still more seaboard cities deserted their cause in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. Hence when they saw that the balance of the war tended more and more to shift to this side or that for the above reason, and that while Italy was frequently ravaged by the fleet, Libya remained entirely free from damage, they took urgent steps to get on the sea like the Carthaginians. And one of the reasons which induced me to narrate the history of this war at some length is just this, that my readers should, in this case too, not be kept in ignorance of the beginning of how, when, and for what reasons the Romans first took to the sea.

When they saw that the war was dragging on, they undertook for the first time to build ships, a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. As their shipwrights were absolutely inexperienced in building quinqueremes, such ships never having been in use in Italy, the matter caused them much difficulty, and this fact shows us better than anything else how spirited and daring the Romans are when they are determined to do a thing. It was not that they had fairly good resources for it, but they had none whatever, nor had they ever given a thought to the sea; yet when they once had conceived the project, they took it in hand so boldly, that before gaining any experience in the matter they at once engaged the Carthaginians who had held for generations undisputed command of the sea. Evidence of the truth of what I am saying and of their incredible pluck is this. When they first undertook to send their

- Μεσσήνην τὰς δυνάμεις, οὐχ οἶον κατάφρακτος αὐ-
 τοῖς ὑπῆρχε ναῦς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ καθόλου μακρὸν πλοῖον
 14 οὐδὲ λέμβος οὐδ' εἷς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ Ταραντίνων καὶ
 Λοκρῶν ἔτι δ' Ἑλεατῶν καὶ Νεαπολιτῶν συγχρη-
 σάμενοι πεντηκοντόρους καὶ τριήρεις ἐπὶ τούτων
 15 παραβόλως διεκόμεσαν τοὺς ἄνδρας. ἐν ᾧ δὲ καιρῷ
 τῶν Καρχηδονίων κατὰ τὸν πορθμὸν ἐπαναχθέντων
 αὐτοῖς, καὶ μιᾶς νεὼς καταφράκτου διὰ τὴν προ-
 θυμίαν προπεσούσης, ὥστ' ἐποκείλασαν γενέσθαι
 τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὑποχείριον, ταύτη παραδείγματι
 χρώμενοι τότε πρὸς ταύτην ἐποιοῦντο τὴν τοῦ
 16 παντὸς στόλου ναυπηγίαν, ὥς εἰ μὴ τοῦτο συνέβη
 γενέσθαι, δῆλον ὥς διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν εἰς τέλος ἂν
 21 ἐκωλύθησαν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οἷς μὲν
 ἐπιμελὲς ἦν τῆς ναυπηγίας, ἐγίνοντο περὶ τὴν τῶν
 πλοίων κατασκευήν, οἱ δὲ τὰ πληρώματα συναθροί-
 σαντες ἐδίδασκον ἐν τῇ γῇ κωπηλατεῖν τὸν τρόπον
 2 τοῦτον. καθίσαντες ἐπὶ τῶν εἵρεσιῶν ἐν τῇ χέρσῳ
 τοὺς ἄνδρας τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχοντας τάξιν ταῖς ἐπ' αὐτῶν
 τῶν πλοίων καθέδραις, μέσον δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς στήσαντες
 τὸν κελευστήν, ἅμα πάντας ἀναπίπτειν ἐφ' αὐτοὺς
 ἄγοντας τὰς χεῖρας, καὶ πάλιν προνεύειν ἐξωθοῦν-
 τας ταύτας συνείθιζον ἄρχεσθαί τε καὶ λήγειν τῶν
 κινήσεων πρὸς τὰ τοῦ κελευστοῦ παραγγέλματα.
 3 προκατασκευασθέντων δὲ τούτων ἅμα τῷ συντελε-
 σθῆναι τὰς ναῦς καθελκύσαντες, καὶ βραχὺν χρό-
 νον ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν θαλάττῃ πειραθέν-
 τες, ἔπλεον παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα
 4 τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. ὁ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως

BOOK I

forces across to Messene not only had they not any decked ships, but no long ships at all, not even a single boat, and borrowing fifty-oared boats and triremes from the Tarentines and Locrians, and also from the people of Elea and Naples they took their troops across in these at great hazard. On this occasion the Carthaginians put to sea to attack them as they were crossing, and one of their decked ships advanced too far in its eagerness to overtake them and running aground fell into the hands of the Romans. This ship they now used as a model, and built their whole fleet on its pattern; so that it is evident that if this had not occurred they would have been entirely prevented from carrying out their design by lack of practical knowledge. 21. Now, however, those to whom the construction of the ships was committed were busy in getting them ready, and those who had collected the crews were teaching them to row on shore in the following fashion. Making the men sit on rowers' benches on dry land, in the same order as on the benches of the ships themselves, and stationing the fagle-man in the middle, they accustomed them to fall back all at once bringing their hands up to them, and again to come forward stretching out their hands, and to begin and finish these movements at the word of command of the fagle-man. When the crews had been trained, they launched the ships as soon as they were completed, and having practised for a brief time actual rowing at sea, they sailed^a along the coast of Italy as their commander had ordered. For the Consul appointed by the Romans to the command 260 B.C.

^a It is often necessary to use the word "sail," but it should be borne in mind that the ships were propelled chiefly by oars.

τεταγμένος τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις Γνάιος Κορνήλιος,
 ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις πρότερον, συντάξας τοῖς ναυάρχοις,
 ἐπειδὴν καταρτίσωσι τὸν στόλον, πλεῖν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸν
 πορθμόν, αὐτὸς ἀναθθεὶς μετὰ νεῶν ἑπτακαίδεκα
 προκατέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Μεσσήνην, σπουδάζων τὰ
 κατεπείγοντα πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν παρασκευάσαι τῷ
 5 στόλῳ. προσπεσούσης δ' αὐτῷ πράξεως ἐκεῖ περὶ
 τῆς τῶν Λιπαραίων πόλεως, δεξάμενος τὴν ἐλπίδα
 προχειρότερον τοῦ δέοντος ἔπλει ταῖς προειρημέναις
 6 ναυσὶ καὶ καθωρμίσθη πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. ὁ δὲ τῶν
 Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς Ἀννίβας, ἀκούσας ἐν τῷ
 Πανόρμῳ τὸ γεγονός, ἔξαποστέλλει Βοώδη τῆς γε-
 7 ρουσίας ὑπάρχοντα, ναὺς εἴκοσι δούς. ὃς ἐπιπλεύ-
 σας νυκτὸς ἐν τῷ λιμένι συνέκλεισε τοὺς περὶ τὸν
 Γνάιον. ἡμέρας δ' ἐπιγενομένης τὰ μὲν πληρώματα
 πρὸς φυγὴν ὥρμησεν εἰς τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ Γνάιος ἐκπλα-
 γῆς γενόμενος καὶ ποιεῖν ἔχων οὐδὲν τέλος παρέδω-
 8 κεν αὐτὸν τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὰς
 τε ναὺς καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὑποχεί-
 9 ριον ἔχοντες παραχρῆμα πρὸς τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἀπῆραν.
 μετ' οὐ πολλὰς δ' ἡμέρας, οὕτως ἐναργοῦς ὄντος καὶ
 προσφάτου τοῦ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον ἀτυχήματος, παρ'
 ὀλίγον αὐτὸς Ἀννίβας εἰς τὸ παραπλήσιον ἀμάρ-
 10 τημα προφανῶς ἐνέπεσεν. ἀκούσας γὰρ τὸν τῶν
 Ῥωμαίων στόλον κομιζόμενον παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν
 σύνεγγυς εἶναι, κατιδεῖν βουλόμενος τό τε πλῆθος
 καὶ τὴν ὅλην σύνταξιν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, λαβὼν πεν-
 11 τήκοντα ναὺς ἐπιπλεῖ. κάμπτων δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς
 Ἰταλίας ἀκρωτήριον ἐμπίπτει τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐν
 κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει ποιουμένοις τὸν πλοῦν, καὶ τὰς
 μὲν πλείους ἀπέβαλε τῶν νεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ τῶν
 ὑπολειφθεισῶν ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως διέφυγεν.

BOOK I

of their naval force, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, had a few days previously given orders to the captains to sail in the direction of the Straits whenever the fleet was ready, while he himself, putting to sea with seventeen ships, preceded them to Messene, being anxious to provide for all the urgent needs of the fleet. While there a proposal happened to be made to him with regard to the city of Lipara, and embracing the prospect with undue eagerness he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town. The Carthaginian general Hannibal, hearing at Panormus what had happened, sent off Boödes, a member of the Senate, giving him twenty ships. Boödes sailed up to Lipara at night and shut up Gnaeus in the harbour. When day dawned the Roman crews hastily took refuge on land, and Gnaeus, falling into a state of terror and being unable to do anything, finally surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians now set off at once to rejoin Hannibal with the captured ships and commander. But a few days later, though Gnaeus' disaster was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself came very near falling into the same error with his eyes open. For hearing that the Roman fleet which was sailing along the coast of Italy was near at hand, and wishing to get a glimpse of the numbers and general disposition of the enemy, he sailed towards them with fifty ships. As he was rounding the Cape of Italy he came upon the enemy sailing in good order and trim. He lost most of his ships and escaped himself with the remainder, which was more than he expected or hoped.

- 22 Οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι μετὰ ταῦτα συνεγγίσαντες τοῖς
κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τόποις, καὶ συνέντες τὸ γεγο-
νὸς σύμπτωμα περὶ τὸν Γναίον, παραυτίκα μὲν δι-
επέμποντο πρὸς Γάιον Βίλιον τὸν ἡγούμενον τῆς
2 πεζῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ τοῦτον ἀνέμενον, ἅμα δ'
ἀκούοντες οὐ μακρὰν εἶναι τὸν τῶν πολεμίων στό-
λον, ἐγίνοντο πρὸς παρασκευὴν τοῦ ναυμαχεῖν.
3 ὄντων δὲ τῶν πλοίων φάυλων ταῖς κατασκευαῖς καὶ
δυσκινήτων, ὑποτίθεται τις αὐτοῖς βοήθημα πρὸς
τὴν μάχην τοὺς ἐπικληθέντας μετὰ ταῦτα κόρακας
4 ὧν συνέβαινε τὴν κατασκευὴν εἶναι τοιαύτην. στῦ-
λος ἐν πρῶρρα στρογγύλος εἰστήκει, μῆκος μὲν ὀρ-
γυῶν τεττάρων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλάτος τριῶν παλαι-
5 στῶν ἔχων τὴν διάμετρον. οὗτος αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ
τῆς κορυφῆς τροχιλίαν εἶχε, περιετίθετο δ' αὐτῷ
κλίμαξ ἐπικαρσίαις σανίσιν καθηλωμένη, πλάτος μὲν
6 ποδῶν τεττάρων, τὸ δὲ μῆκος ἕξ ὀργυῶν. τὸ δὲ
τρῆμα τοῦ σανιδώματος ἦν παράμικτες καὶ περι-
έβαινε περὶ τὸν στῦλον μετὰ τὰς πρώτας εὐθέως τῆς
κλίμακος δὺ' ὀργυιάς. εἶχε δὲ καὶ δρύφακτον αὕτη
παρ' ἑκατέραν τὴν ἐπιμήκη πλευρὰν εἰς γόνυ τὸ
7 βάθος. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πέρατος αὐτοῦ προσήρμοστο
σιδηροῦν οἶον ὑπερον ἀπωξυσμένον, ἔχον δακτύλιον
ἐπὶ τῆς κορυφῆς, ὥς τὸ ὅλον φαίνεσθαι παραπλή-
8 σιον ταῖς σιτοποικαῖς μηχανήσεσιν. εἰς δὲ τοῦτον
τὸν δακτύλιον ἐνεδέδετο κάλως, ᾧ κατὰ τὰς ἐμβο-
λὰς τῶν πλοίων ἐξαίροντες τοὺς κόρακας διὰ τῆς
ἐν τῷ στύλῳ τροχιλίας ἀφίεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρωμα
τῆς ἀλλοτρίας νεὼς ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ πρῶρραν, ποτὲ
δ' ἀντιπεριάγοντες <εἰς>¹ τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων

¹ I insert εἰς.

BOOK I

22. After this the Romans approached the coast of Sicily and learning of the disaster that had befallen Gnaeus, at once communicated with Gaius Duilius, the commander of the land forces, and awaited his arrival. At the same time, hearing that the enemy's fleet was not far distant, they began to get ready for battle. As their ships were ill-built and slow in their movements, someone suggested to them as a help in fighting the engines which afterwards came to be called "ravens." They were constructed as follows: On the prow stood a round pole four fathoms in height and three palms in diameter. This pole had a pulley at the summit and round it was put a gangway made of cross planks attached by nails, four feet in width and six fathoms in length. In this gangway was an oblong hole,^a and it went round the pole at a distance of two fathoms from its near end. The gangway also had a railing on each of its long sides as high as a man's knee. At its extremity was fastened an iron object like a pestle pointed at one end and with a ring at the other end, so that the whole looked like the machine for pounding corn. To this ring was attached a rope with which, when the ship charged an enemy, they raised the ravens by means of the pulley on the pole and let them down on the enemy's deck, sometimes from the prow and sometimes bringing them round when the ships collided

^a The gangway (36 feet long) was composed of two parts united by a joint, the near part (12 feet long), which always remained horizontal, and the far part (24 feet long) which could be drawn up at right angles to the near part, thus reaching the top of the pole (also 24 feet long) and remaining vertical until lowered. The whole could be moved round the pole which pierced it at the junction of the two parts.

THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

- 9 προσπιπτούσας ἐμβολάς. ὅτε δὲ ταῖς σανίσιν τῶν
καταστρωμάτων ἐμπαγέντες οἱ κόρακες ὁμοῦ
συνδήσαιεν τὰς ναῦς, εἰ μὲν πλάγιοι παραβάλοιεν
ἀλλήλαις, πανταχόθεν ἐπεπήδων, εἰ δὲ κατὰ πρῶρ-
10 ραν, δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόρακος ἐπὶ δύο συνεχεῖς ἐποιοῦν-
το τὴν ἔφοδον· ὧν οἱ μὲν ἡγούμενοι τὴν κατὰ
πρόσωπον ἐπιφάνειαν ἐσκέπαζον ταῖς τῶν θυρεῶν
προβολαῖς, οἱ δ' ἐπόμενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων
ἡσφάλιζον πλευρὰς ὑπὲρ τὸν δρύφακτον ὑπερτιθέ-
11 μενοι τὰς ἴτυς τῶν ὅπλων. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη
κεκρημένοι παρασκευῇ καιρὸν ἐπετήρουν πρὸς
ναυμαχίαν.
- 23 'Ο δὲ Γάιος Βίλιος ὡς θᾶπτον ἔγνω τὴν περι-
πέτειαν τοῦ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἡγουμένου,
παραδοὺς τὰ πεζικὰ στρατόπεδα τοῖς χιλιάρχους
2 αὐτὸς διεκομίσθη πρὸς τὸν στόλον. πυθόμενος δὲ
τοὺς πολεμίους πορθεῖν τὴν Μυλαῖτιν χώραν, ἐπιπλεῖ
3 στόλῳ παντί. συνιδόντες δ' οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ
χαρᾶς καὶ σπουδῆς ἀνήγοντο ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν καὶ
τριάκοντα, καταφρονοῦντες τῆς ἀπειρίας τῶν Ῥω-
μαίων, καὶ πάντες ἔπλεον ἀντίπρωρροι τοῖς πολεμί-
οις, οὐδὲ τάξεως καταξιώσαντες τὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλ'
4 ὡς ἐπὶ λείαν τινὰ πρόδηλον. ἡγεῖτο δ' Ἀινίβας
αὐτῶν—οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκκλέψας νυκτὸς
ἐκ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων πόλεως—ἔχων ἐπτήρη
5 τὴν γενομένην Πύρρου τοῦ βασιλέως. ἅμα δὲ τῷ
πλησιάζειν συνθεωροῦντες ἀνανενευκότας τοὺς κό-
ρακας ἐν ταῖς ἐκάστων πρῶρραις, ἐπὶ ποσὸν μὲν
ἡπόρουν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, ξενιζόμενοι ταῖς τῶν
ὀργάνων κατασκευαῖς· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τελέως
κατεγνωκότες τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνέβαλον οἱ πρῶτοι
6 πλέοντες τετολημηκότως. τῶν δὲ συμπλεκομένων

BOOK I

broad-sides. Once the ravens were fixed in the planks of the enemy's deck and grappled the ships together, if they were broadside on, they boarded from all sides, but if they had charged with the prow, they attacked by passing over the gangway of the raven itself two abreast. The leading pair protected the front by holding up their shields, and those who followed secured the two flanks by resting the rims of their shields on the top of the railing. Having, then, adopted this device, they awaited an opportunity for going into action.

23. As for Gaius Duilius, no sooner had he learnt of the disaster which had befallen the commander of the naval forces than handing over his legions to the military tribunes he proceeded to the fleet. Learning that the enemy were ravaging the territory of Mylae, he sailed against them with his whole force. The Carthaginians on sighting him put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, quite overjoyed and eager, as they despised the inexperience of the Romans. They all sailed straight on the enemy, not even thinking it worth while to maintain order in the attack, but just as if they were falling on a prey that was obviously theirs. They were commanded by Hannibal—the same who stole out of Agrigentum by night with his army—in the seven-banked galley that was formerly King Pyrrhus'. On approaching and seeing the ravens hauled up on the prow of each ship, the Carthaginians were at first nonplussed, being surprised at the construction of the engines. However, as they entirely gave the enemy up for lost, the front ships attacked daringly. But when the ships that came into collision were in

- σκαφῶν ἀεὶ δεδεμένων τοῖς ὀργάνοις, καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐθὺς ἐπιπορευομένων δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόρακος καὶ συμπλεκομένων ἐπὶ τοῖς καταστρώμασιν, οἱ μὲν ἐφονεύοντο τῶν Καρχηδονίων, οἱ δὲ παρεδίδουσαν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκπληττόμενοι τὸ γινόμενον· παραπλήσιον
- 7 γὰρ πεζομαχίας συνέβαινε τὸν κίνδυνον ἀποτελεῖσθαι. διὸ καὶ τριάκοντα μὲν τὰς πρώτας συμβαλούσας ναῦς αὐτάνδρους ἀπέβαλον, σὺν αἷς ἐγένετ' αἰχμάλωτον καὶ τὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πλοῖον· Ἀινίβας δ' ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραβόλως αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ σκάφῃ
- 8 διέφυγε. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐποιεῖτο μὲν τὸν ἐπίπλουν ὥς εἰς ἐμβολήν, ἐν δὲ τῷ συνεγγίζειν θεωροῦντες τὸ συμβεβηκὸς περὶ τὰς προπλεύσας ναῦς, ἐξέκλινον καὶ διένευον τὰς τῶν
- 9 ὀργάνων ἐπιβολάς. πιστεύοντες δὲ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ πλαγίων, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πρύμναν ἐκπεριπλέοντες ἀσφαλῶς ἤλπιζον ποιήσασθαι τὰς ἐμβολάς.
- 10 πάντῃ δὲ καὶ πάντως ἀντιπερισταμένων καὶ συνδιανευόντων τῶν ὀργάνων οὕτως ὥστε κατ' ἀνάγκην τοὺς ἐγγίσαντας συνδεδέσθαι, τέλος ἐγκλίναντες ἔφυγον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, καταπλαγέντες τὴν καινοτομίαν τοῦ συμβαίνοντος, πεντήκοντα ναῦς ἀποβαλόντες.
- 24 Οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι παραδόξως ἀντιπεποιημένοι τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐλπίδος, διπλασίως ἐπερρώσθησαν
- 2 ταῖς ὁρμαῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. τότε μὲν οὖν προσσχόντες τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὴν τ' Αἰγεσταίων ἔλυσαν πολιορκίαν, ἐσχάτως αὐτῶν ἤδη διακειμένων, κατὰ τε τὴν ἐκ τῆς Αἰγέστης ἀναχώρησιν Μάκελλαν πόλιν κατὰ κράτος εἶλον.
- 3 Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν Ἀμίλκας ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῶν πεζικῶν

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every case held fast by the machines, and the Roman crews boarded by means of the ravens and attacked them hand to hand on deck, some of the Carthaginians were cut down and others surrendered from dismay at what was happening, the battle having become just like a fight on land. So the first thirty ships that engaged were taken with all their crews, including the commander's galley, Hannibal himself managing to escape beyond his hopes by a miracle in the jolly-boat. The rest of the Carthaginian force was bearing up as if to charge the enemy, but seeing, as they approached, the fate of the advanced ships they turned aside and avoided the blows of the engines. Trusting in their swiftness, they veered round the enemy in the hope of being able to strike him in safety either on the broadside or on the stern, but when the ravens swung round and shifted in all directions and in all manner of ways so that those who approached them were of necessity grappled, they finally gave way and took to flight, terror-stricken by this novel experience and with the loss of fifty ships.

24. When the Romans had thus, contrary to all expectation, gained the prospect of success at sea their determination to prosecute the war became twice as strong. On this occasion they put in on the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta which was in the last stage of distress, and in leaving Segesta took the city of Macella by assault.

After the battle at sea Hamilcar, the Carthaginian commander of their land forces, who was quartered

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- δυνάμεων, διατρίβων περὶ Πάνορμον, γνούς ἐν τοῖς
 Ῥωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδοις στασιάζοντας τοὺς συμμά-
 χους πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις
 4 πρωτείων, καὶ πυνθανόμενος στρατοπεδεύειν αὐτοὺς
 καθ' ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς συμμάχους μεταξὺ τοῦ Παρώπου
 καὶ τῶν Θερμῶν τῶν Ἱμεραίων, ἐπιπεσὼν αὐτοῖς
 αἰφνιδίως ἀναστρατοπεδεύουσι μετὰ πάσης τῆς
 δυνάμεως σχεδὸν εἰς τετρακισχιλίους ἀπέκτεινε.
 5 μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν ὁ μὲν Ἀννίβας ἔχων τὰς
 διασωθείσας ναῦς ἀπέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα,
 μετ' οὐ πολὺ δ' ἐκεῖθεν εἰς Σαρδόνα διῆρε, προσ-
 λαβὼν ναῦς καὶ τινὰς τῶν ἐνδόξων τριηράρχων.
 6 χρόνοις δ' οὐ πολλοῖς κατόπιν ἐν τῇ Σαρδόνι
 συγκλεισθεὶς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἐν τινι λιμένι καὶ πολ-
 λὰς ἀποβαλὼν τῶν νεῶν, παραυτίκα συλληφθεὶς
 ὑπὸ τῶν διασωθέντων Καρχηδονίων ἀνεσταυρώθη.
 7 Ῥωμαῖοι γὰρ ἅμα τῆς θαλάττης ἤψαντο καὶ τῶν
 κατὰ Σαρδόνα πραγμάτων εὐθέως ἀντείχοντο.
 8 Τὰ δ' ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ στρατόπεδα τῶν Ῥωμαίων
 259 B.C. κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἐξῆς ἐνιαυτὸν οὐδὲν ἄξιον ἔπραξαν
 9 λόγου, τότε δὲ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς ἐπικαθεσταμέ-
 258 B.C. νους ἄρχοντας Λύλον Ἀτίλιον καὶ Γάιον Σουλπί-
 κιον ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸν Πάνορμον διὰ τὸ τὰς τῶν
 10 Καρχηδονίων δυνάμεις ἐκεῖ παραχειμάζειν. οἱ δὲ
 στρατηγοὶ συνεγγίσαντες τῇ πόλει μετὰ πάσης τῆς
 δυνάμεως παρετάξαντο. τῶν δὲ πολεμίων οὐκ ἀντ-
 εξιόντων, πάλιν ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ
 11 πόλιν Ἰππάναν, καὶ ταύτην μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου κατὰ
 κράτος ἔλαβον, εἶλον δὲ καὶ τὸ Μυττίστρατον, πολ-
 λούς χρόνους ὑπομεμενηκὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν διὰ τὴν
 12 ὀχυρότητα τοῦ τόπου. τὴν δὲ Καμαριναίων πόλιν,
 μικρῷ πρότερον ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποστᾶσαν, τότε προσ-

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in the neighbourhood of Panormus, heard that in the Roman camp the allies and the Romans were at variance as to which had most distinguished themselves in the battles, and that the allies were encamped by themselves between the Paropus and the Hot Springs of Himera. Suddenly falling on them with his whole force as they were breaking up their camp he killed about four thousand. After this action Hannibal with the ships that escaped sailed away to Carthage and shortly after crossed from there to Sardinia, taking with him additional ships and some of the most celebrated naval officers. Not long afterwards he was blockaded in one of the harbours of Sardinia by the Romans and after losing many of his ships was summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. The Romans, I should explain, from the moment they concerned themselves with the sea, began to entertain designs on Sardinia.

The Roman troops in Sicily did nothing worthy of note during the following year; but at its close when they had received their new commanders the Consuls of that year, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus, because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. The Consuls, when they got close up to the city, offered battle with their whole forces, but as the enemy did not come out to meet them they left Panormus and went off to attack Hippana. This city they took by assault and they also took Myttistratum which withstood the siege for long owing to its strong situation. They then occupied Camarina which had lately deserted their cause, bringing up a siege battery and

258 B.C.

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ενέγκαντες ἔργα καὶ καταβαλόντες τὰ τεῖχη κατέσχον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἑνναν καὶ ἕτερα πλείω
13 πολισμάτια τῶν Καρχηδονίων. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων γενόμενοι Λιπαραίους ἐπεχείρησαν πολιορκεῖν.

25 Τῷ δ' ἐξῆς ἐνιαυτῷ Γάιος Ἀτίλιος ὁ στρατηγὸς
257 B.C. τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρὸς Τυνδαρίδα καθορμισθεὶς, καὶ
συνθεασάμενος ἀτάκτως παραπλέοντα τὸν τῶν
Καρχηδονίων στόλον, παραγγείλας τοῖς ἰδίοις
πληρώμασιν ἔπεσθαι τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, αὐτὸς ὥρμησε
2 πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔχων δέκα ναῦς ὁμοπλοούσας. οἱ
δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, συνιδόντες τῶν ὑπεναντίων τοὺς
μὲν ἀκμὴν ἐμβαίνοντας, τοὺς δ' ἀναγομένους, τοὺς
δὲ πρῶτους πολὺ προειληφότας τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπι-
3 στρέψαντες αὐτοῖς ἀπήντων. καὶ κυκλώσαντες τὰς
μὲν ἄλλας διέφθειραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ναῦν
παρ' ὀλίγον αὐτανδρον ἔλαβον. οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' αὕτη
μὲν ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις ἐξηρτυμένη καὶ ταχυναντουῖσα
4 διέφυγε παραδόξως τὸν κίνδυνον, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ
τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπιπλέουσαι κατὰ βραχὺ συνηθροί-
ζοντο. γενόμεναι δ' ἐν μετώπῳ συνέβαλλον τοῖς
πολεμίοις, καὶ δέκα μὲν αὐτάνδρους ναῦς ἔλαβον,
ὀκτὼ δὲ κατέδυσαν. αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων
ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς τὰς Λιπαραίας καλουμένας νήσους.
5 Ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀμφότεροι νομίζον-
τες ἐφάμιλλον πεποιῆσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, ὥρμησαν
ὁλοσχερέστερον ἐπὶ τὸ συνίστασθαι ναυτικὰς δυνά-
6 μεις καὶ τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν ἀντέχεσθαι πραγμάτων.
αἱ δὲ πεζικαὶ δυνάμεις ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ταῦτα καιροῖς
οὐδὲν ἔπραξαν ἄξιον μνήμης, ἀλλὰ περὶ μικρὰς καὶ
7 τὰς τυχούσας πράξεις κατέτρυφον τοὺς χρόνους.
256 B.C. διὸ παρασκευασάμενοι, καθάπερ εἶπον, εἰς τὴν
ἐπιφερομένην θερσίαν ἀνέχθησαν Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν
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making a breach in the wall. They similarly took Emma and several other small places belonging to the Carthaginians, and when they had finished with these operations they undertook the siege of Lipara.

25. Next year Gaius Atilius Regulus the Roman ^{257 B.C.} Consul, while anchored off Tyndaris, caught sight of the Carthaginian fleet sailing past in disorder. Ordering his crews to follow the leaders, he dashed out before the rest with ten ships sailing together. The Carthaginians, observing that some of the enemy were still embarking, and some just getting under weigh, while those in the van had much outstripped the others, turned and met them. Surrounding them they sunk the rest of the ten, and came very near to taking the admiral's ship with its crew. However, as it was well manned and swift, it foiled their expectation and got out of danger. The rest of the Roman fleet sailed up and gradually got into close order. As soon as they faced the enemy, they bore down on them and took ten ships with their crews, sinking eight. The rest of the Carthaginian fleet withdrew to the islands known as Liparaean.

The result of this battle was that both sides thought that they had fought now on equal terms, and both threw themselves more thoroughly into the task of organizing a navy and disputing the command of the sea, while in the mean time the land forces accomplished nothing worthy of mention, but spent their time in minor operations of no significance. The Romans, therefore, after making ^{256 B.C.} preparations for the coming summer, set to sea with

τριάκοντα καὶ τριακοσίαις μακραις ναυσὶ καταφρά-
 8 κτοῖς, καὶ κατέσχον εἰς Μεσσήνην. ὅθεν ἀναχθέντες
 ἔπλεον δεξιὰν ἔχοντες τὴν Σικελίαν, κάμψαντες δὲ
 τὸν Πάχυνον ὑπερῆραν εἰς Ἑκνομον διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸ
 9 πεζὸν στράτευμα περὶ τούτους αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς
 τόπους. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ πεντήκοντα καὶ τριακο-
 σίαις ναυσὶ καταφράκτοις ἀναπλεύσαντες Λιλυβαίῳ
 προσέσχον, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πρὸς Ἡράκλειαν τὴν
 26 Μινώαν καθωρμίσθησαν. ἦν δὲ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων
 πρόθεσις εἰς τὴν Λιβύην πλεῖν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκεῖ
 περισπᾶν, ἵνα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις μὴ περὶ Σικελίας,
 ἀλλὰ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἰδίας χώρας ὁ
 2 κίνδυνος γίνηται. τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις τάναντία
 τούτων ἐδόκει· συνιδόντες γὰρ ὡς εὐέφοδός ἐστιν
 ἡ Λιβύη καὶ πᾶς ὁ κατὰ τὴν χώραν λαὸς εὐχειρώτος
 τοῖς ἄπαξ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμβαλοῦσιν, οὐχ οἰοί τ' ἦσαν
 3 ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ διακινδυνεύειν καὶ ναυμαχεῖν
 ἔσπευδον. ὄντων δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ κωλύειν, τῶν
 δὲ πρὸς τὸ βιάζεσθαι, προφανῆς ἦν ὁ μέλλων ἀγὼν
 4 ἐκ τῆς ἐκατέρων συνίστασθαι φιλοτιμίας. οἱ μὲν
 οὖν Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα τὴν παρασκευὴν
 ἀρμόζουσιν ἐποιοῦντο, πρὸς τε τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν
 5 χρεῖαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόβασιν τὴν εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν.
 διόπερ ἐπιλέξαντες ἐκ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων
 τὰς ἀρίστας χεῖρας διεῖλον τὴν πᾶσαν δύναμιν, ἣν
 6 ἤμελλον ἀναλαμβάνειν, εἰς τέτταρα μέρη. τὸ δὲ
 μέρος ἕκαστον διττὰς εἶχε προσηγορίας· πρῶτον
 μὲν γὰρ ἐκαλεῖτο στρατόπεδον καὶ πρῶτος στόλος,
 καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κατὰ λόγον. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον καὶ τρίτην
 ἐπωνυμίαν ἔτι προσειλήφει· τριάριοι γὰρ ὠνομά-
 7 ζοντο κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πεζικοῖς στρατοπέδοις
 συνήθειαν. καὶ τὸ μὲν σύμπαν ἦν στράτευμα

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a fleet of three hundred and thirty decked ships of war and put in to Messene. Starting again from there they sailed with Sicily on their right hand, and doubling Cape Pachynus they came round to Ecnomus, because their land forces too happened to be just in that neighbourhood. The Carthaginians, setting sail with three hundred and fifty decked vessels, touched at Lilybæum, and proceeding thence came to anchor off Heraclea Minoa. 26. The plan of the Romans was to sail to Africa and deflect the war to that country, so that the Carthaginians might find no longer Sicily but themselves and their own territory in danger. The Carthaginians were resolved on just the opposite course, for, aware as they were that Africa is easily accessible, and that all the people in the country would be easily subdued by anyone who had once invaded it, they were unable to allow this, and were anxious to run the risk of a sea-battle. The object of the one side being to prevent and that of the other to force a crossing, it was clear that their rival aims would result in the struggle which followed. The Romans had made suitable preparations for both contingencies—for an action at sea and for a landing in the enemy's country. For the latter purpose, selecting the best men from their land forces, they divided into four corps the total force they were about to embark. Each corps had two names; it was called either the First Legion or the First Squadron, and the others accordingly. The fourth had a third name in addition; they were called *triarii* after the usage in the land forces. The whole body embarked on the ships numbered about a

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- τούτων τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως περὶ τέτταρας καὶ δέκα μυριάδας, ὥς ἂν ἐκάστης νεὼς λαμβανούσης
 8 ἐρέτας μὲν τριακοσίους, ἐπιβάτας δ' ἑκατὸν εἴκοσιν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸ μὲν πλεῖον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἡρμόζοντο πρὸς τὸν κατὰ θάλατταν κίνδυνον· τό γε μὴν πλῆθος αὐτῶν ἦν ὑπὲρ πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας κατὰ
 9 τὸν τῶν νεῶν λόγον. ἐφ' οἷς οὐχ οἷον ἂν τις παρὼν καὶ θεώμενος ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκούων καταπλαγείῃ τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος καὶ τὴν τῶν πολιτευμάτων ἀμφοτέρων μεγαλομερίαν καὶ δύναμιν, στοχαζόμενος ἕκ τε τοῦ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ τῶν νεῶν πλήθους.
- 10 Οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι συλλογιζόμενοι διότι τὸν μὲν πλοῦν εἶναι συμβαίνει πελάγιον, τοὺς δὲ πολεμίους ταχυναυτεῖν, πανταχόθεν ἐπειρῶντο ποιεῖσθαι τὴν
 11 τάξιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ δυσπρόσοδον. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἐξήρεις δὴ οὐσας, ἐφ' ὧν ἔπλεον οἱ στρατηγοὶ Μάρκος Ἀτίλιος καὶ Λεύκιος Μάλιος, πρῶτας ἐν μετώπῳ παραλλήλους ἔταξαν. τούτων δ' ἑκατέρα
 12 συνεχεῖς κατὰ μίαν ναῦν ἐπιτάττοντες τῇ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον, τῇ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον στόλον ἐπέστησαν, αἰεὶ καθ' ἐκάστην ναῦν ἑκατέρου τοῦ στόλου μεῖζον τὸ μεταξὺ ποιοῦντες διάστημα. ταῖς δὲ πρῶρραις
 13 ἔξω νεύοντα τὰ σκάφη τὴν ἐπίστασιν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις εἶχεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον στόλον ἀπλῶς εἰς ἔμβολον ἔταξαν, ἐπέβαλον τούτοις ἐπὶ μίαν ναῦν ἐν μετώπῳ τὸ τρίτον στρατόπεδον· ὧν
 14 ἐπιστάντων ἀπετελέσθη τρίγωνον τὸ πᾶν εἶδος τῆς τάξεως. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐπέστησαν τὰς ἱππηγούς, ρύματα δόντες ἐξ αὐτῶν ταῖς τοῦ τρίτου στόλου

^a This can only mean that the prow of each ship was

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hundred and forty thousand, each ship holding three hundred rowers and a hundred and twenty soldiers. The Carthaginians were chiefly or solely adapting their preparations to a maritime war, their numbers being, to reckon by the number of ships, actually above one hundred and fifty thousand. These are figures calculated to strike not only one present and with the forces under his eyes but even a hearer with amazement at the magnitude of the struggle and at that lavish outlay and vast power of the two states, which may be estimated from the number of men and ships.

The Romans taking into consideration that the voyage was across the open sea and that the enemy were their superiors in speed, tried by every means to range their fleet in an order which would render it secure and difficult to attack. Accordingly, they stationed their two six-banked galleys, on which the commanders, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius, were sailing, in front and in line with each other. Behind each of these they placed ships in single file, the first squadron behind the one and the second behind the other, so arranging them that the distance between each pair of ships in the two squadrons grew ever greater. The ships were stationed in column with their prows directed outwards.^a Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in the form of a simple wedge, they stationed the third in a single line at the base, so that when these ships had taken their places the resulting form of the whole was a triangle. Behind these ships at the base they stationed the horse- transports, attaching them by towing-lines to the directed to the open sea and not to the ship in front of it; *i.e.* they were in echelon.

- 15 ναυσί. ταύταις δὲ κατόπιν ἐπέβαλον τὸν τέταρτον
στόλον, τοὺς τριαρίους κληθέντας, ἐπὶ μίαν παρεκτεί-
ναντες ναῦν, ὡς ὑπερτείνειν ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους
- 16 τοὺς πρὸ ἑαυτῶν. καὶ συναρμοσθέντων πάντων
κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἀπετελέσθη
σχῆμα τῆς τάξεως ἔμβολον, οὗ τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν
κορυφὴν μέρος ἦν κοῖλον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῇ βάσει
στερεόν, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν ἐνεργὸν καὶ πρακτικόν, ἅμα
δὲ καὶ δυσδιάλυτον.
- 27 Οἱ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
καιρὸν παρακαλέσαντες τὰ πλήθη διὰ βραχείων, καὶ
συνυποδείξαντες αὐτοῖς ὅτι νικήσαντες μὲν τῇ ναυ-
μαχίᾳ περὶ Σικελίας ποιήσονται τὸν πόλεμον, ἡττη-
θέντες δὲ περὶ τῆς σφετέρας πατρίδος κινδυνεύουσιν
- 2 καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, οὕτως αὐτοῖς παρήγγειλαν
ἐμβαίνειν εἰς τὰς ναῦς. προθύμως δὲ πάντων ποιούν-
των τὸ παραγγελλόμενον διὰ τὸ προορᾶσθαι τὸ
μέλλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, εὐθαρσῶς ἀνήγοντο καὶ
- 3 καταπληκτικῶς. θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων
τάξιν οἱ στρατηγοί, καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ἀρμοζόμενοι, τὰ
μὲν τρία μέρη τῆς αὐτῶν δυνάμεως ἐπὶ μίαν ἔταττον
ναῦν, πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ἀνατείναντες τὸ δεξιὸν
κέραν, ὡς κυκλώσοντας τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, πάσας
ἰστάντες ἀντιπρώρρους τὰς ναῦς τοῖς πολεμίοις.
- 4 τὸ δὲ τέταρτον εὐώνυμον τῆς ὅλης τάξεως ἐποιοῦν,
5 ἐν ἐπικαμπίῳ νεῦον πρὸς τὴν γῆν. ἡγοῦντο δὲ τῶν
Καρχηδονίων, τοῦ μὲν δεξιοῦ κέρως, ἔχων ἐπίπλους
καὶ πεντήρεις τὰς μάλιστα ταχυναντούσας πρὸς τὴν
ὑπερκέρασιν, Ἄνων ὁ περὶ τὸν Ἀκράγαντα
- 6 λειφθεὶς τῇ παρατάξει· τῶν δ' εὐωνύμων εἶχε τὴν
ἐπιμέλειαν Ἀμίλκας ὁ περὶ τὴν Τυνδαρίδα ναυμα-
χήσας· ὅς τότε κατὰ μέσῃν τὴν τάξιν ποιούμενος

BOOK I

vessels of the third squadron. Finally, behind these they stationed the fourth squadron, known as *triarii*, placing each ship at a greater distance from the next so that the line overlapped that in front of it at each extremity. When all had been put together in the manner I have described, the whole arrangement had the form of a wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact, and the whole effective and practical, while also difficult to break up.

27. About the same time the Carthaginian commanders briefly addressed their forces. They pointed out to them that in the event of victory in the battle they would be fighting afterwards for Sicily, but that if defeated they would have to fight for their own country and their homes, and bade them take this to heart and embark. When all readily did as they were ordered, as their general's words had made clear to them the issues at stake, they set to sea in a confident and menacing spirit. The commanders when they saw the enemy's order adapted their own to it. Three-quarters of their force they drew up in a single line, extending their right wing to the open sea for the purpose of encircling the enemy and with all their ships facing the Romans. The remaining quarter of their force formed the left wing of their whole line, and reached shoreward at an angle with the rest. Their right wing was under the command of the same Hanno who had been worsted in the engagement near Agrigentum. He had vessels for charging and also the swiftest quinqueremes for the outflanking movement. The left wing was in charge of Hamilcar, the one who commanded in the sea-battle at Tyndaris, and he, fighting as he was in the centre of the whole line,

- 7 τὸν κίνδυνον ἐχρήσατό τινι στρατηγῆματι κατὰ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοιῶδε. τῶν γὰρ Ῥωμαίων συνθεασαμένων ἐπὶ λεπτὸν ἐκτεταμένους τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, καὶ ποιησαμένων τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ μέσους, τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν
- 8 ὁ κίνδυνος ἔλαβε τοιαύτην. ταχὺ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰ μέσα Καρχηδονίων ἐκ παραγγέλματος κλινάντων πρὸς φυγὴν χάριν τοῦ διασπάσαι τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων τάξιν, οὗτοι μὲν ὑπεχώρουν μετὰ σπουδῆς, οἱ δὲ
- 9 Ῥωμαῖοι κατόπιν ἠκολούθουν ἐκθύμως. ὁ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος καὶ δεύτερος στόλος ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσι, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον στρατόπεδον ἀπеспάτο, τῶν μὲν ῥυμουλκούντων τὰς ἱππηγοὺς
- 10 ναῦς, τῶν δὲ τριαρίων συμμενόντων καὶ συνεφεδρευόντων τούτοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον στόλον ἱκανὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐδόκουν ἀπеспακέναι τόπον οἱ Καρχηδόνοι, συνθήματος ἀρθέντος ἐκ τῆς Ἀμίλκου νεώς μετεβάλοντο πάντες ἅμα καὶ συνέβα-
- 11 λον τοῖς ἐπικειμένοις. ἀγῶνος δὲ συστάντος καρτεροῦ, τῷ μὲν ταχυνναυτεῖν ἐκπεριπλέοντες καὶ ῥαδίως μὲν προσιόντες, ὀξέως δ' ἀποχωροῦντες, πολὺ περι-
- 12 ἦσαν οἱ Καρχηδόνοι, τῷ δὲ βιαιομαχεῖν κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκάς καὶ συνδεῖν τοῖς κόραξι τοὺς ἅπαξ ἐγγίσαντας, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῷ συναγωνιζομένων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐν ὄψει τῶν ἡγουμένων ποιεῖσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, οὐχ ἦττον ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶχον οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τῶν Καρχηδονίων τὰς ἐλπίδας.
- 13 ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τούτους μάχῃ τοιαύτην εἶχε διάθεσιν.
- 28 κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχων Ἄνων, τὸ μεῖναν ἐν ἀποστάσει κατὰ τὴν πρώτην συμβολήν, τό τε πέλαγος ὑπεράρας ἐνέβαλε ταῖς τῶν τριαρίων ναυσὶ καὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχε
- 2 καὶ δυσχρηστίαν αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὴν γῆν

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made use of the following stratagem. The battle was begun by the Romans who, noticing that the Carthaginian line was thin owing to its great extent, delivered an attack on the centre. The Carthaginian centre had received Hamilcar's orders to fall back at once with the view of breaking the order of the Romans, and, as they hastily retreated, the Romans pursued them vigorously. While the first and second squadrons thus pressed on the flying enemy, the third and fourth were separated from them, the third squadron towing the horse-transports, and the *triarîi* remaining with them as a supporting force. When the Carthaginians thought they had drawn off the first and second squadrons far enough from the others, they all, on receiving a signal from Hamilcar's ship, turned simultaneously and attacked their pursuers. The engagement that followed was a very hot one, the superior speed of the Carthaginians enabling them to move round the enemy's flank as well as to approach easily and retire rapidly, while the Romans, relying on their sheer strength when they closed with the enemy, grappling with the ravens every ship as soon as it approached, fighting also, as they were, under the very eyes of both the Consuls, who were personally taking part in the combat, had no less high hopes of success. Such then was the state of the battle in this quarter.

28. At one and the same time Hanno with the right wing, which had held its distance in the first attack, sailed across the open sea and fell upon the ships of the *triarîi*, causing them great embarrassment and distress. Meanwhile that part of the Carthaginian

τεταγμένοι τῶν Καρχηδονίων, παραγεγονότες εἰς
 μέτωπον ἐκ τῆς προὑπαρχούσης τάξεως, καὶ
 ποιήσαντες ἀντιπρώρρους τὰς ναῦς, ἐνέβαλον τοῖς
 ῥυμουλκοῦσι τὰς ἱππηγούς· οἱ δ' ἀφέμενοι τὰ
 3 ῥύματα συνεπλέκοντο καὶ διηγωνίζοντο τοῖς πολε-
 μίοις. ἦν δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς ὅλης συμπλοκῆς καὶ
 4 τρεῖς ναυμαχίαι συνέστησαν πολὺ κεχωρισμένοι
 τοῖς τόποις ἀλλήλων· τῷ δ' ἐκατέρων πάρισα τὰ
 μέρη γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς χειρισμὸν
 ἐφάμιλλον εἶναι συνέβαινε καὶ τὸν κίνδυνον. οὐ
 5 μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ λόγον ἐν ἐκάστοις ἐπετελεῖτο
 περὶ τὴν μάχην, ὅπερ εἰκὸς ὅταν ἡ παραπλήσια
 6 πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων. οἱ γὰρ πρῶτοι <κιν-
 δυνεύσαντες πρῶτοι> καὶ διεκρίθησαν· τέλος γὰρ
 ἐκβιασθέντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀμίλκαν εἰς φυγὴν ὥρμη-
 7 σαν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Λεύκιος ἀνεδεῖτο τὰς αἰχμαλώτους
 ναῦς· ὁ δὲ Μάρκος, συνωρῶν τὸν περὶ τοὺς τριαρί-
 ους καὶ τὰς ἱππηγούς ἀγῶνα, κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐβοήθει
 τούτοις, ἔχων τοῦ δευτέρου στόλου τὰς ἀκεραίους
 8 ναῦς. συνάψαντος δὲ καὶ προσμίζαντος αὐτοῦ τοῖς
 περὶ τὸν Ἀννωνά, ταχέως ἀναθαρρήσαντες οἱ τριά-
 9 ριοι, καίπερ ἤδη κακῶς ἀπαλλάττοντες, πάλιν ἐπερ-
 τῶν μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτοῖς προσμαχομένων,
 τῶν δὲ κατὰ νώτου προσπιπτόντων, δυσχρηστού-
 μενοι, καὶ παραδόξως ὑπὸ τῶν βοηθησάντων κυ-
 κλούμενοι, κλίναντες πελαγίαν ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ὑπο-
 10 χώρησιν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ὃ τε Λεύκιος,
 ἐπαναπλέων ἤδη καὶ θεωρῶν συγκεκλεισμένον πρὸς
 τῇ γῇ τὸν τρίτον στόλον ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων
 εὐωνύμου κέρατος, ὃ τε Μάρκος, ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ κατα-
 λιπὼν τὰς ἱππηγούς καὶ τοὺς τριαρίους, ὥρμη-

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force which was posted near the shore, changing their former formation and deploying into line with their prows facing the enemy, attacked the vessels which were towing the horse-transports. Letting go their tow-lines this squadron met and engaged the enemy. Thus the whole conflict consisted of three parts, and three battles were going on at a wide distance from each other. As the respective forces were in each case of equal strength owing to their disposition at the outset, the battle also was fought on equal terms. However, in each case things fell out as one would expect, when the forces engaged are so equally matched. Those who had commenced the battle were the first to be separated, for Hamilcar's division was finally forced back and took to flight. Lucius was now occupied in taking the prizes in tow, and Marcus, observing the struggle in which the *triarii* and horse-transports were involved, hastened to their assistance with such of the ships of the second squadron as were undamaged. When he reached Hanno's division and came into conflict with it, the *triarii* at once took heart, though they had had much the worst of it, and recovered their fighting spirit. The Carthaginians, attacked both in front and in the rear, were in difficulties, finding themselves surrounded, to their surprise, by the relieving force, and giving way, they began to retreat out to sea. Meanwhile both Lucius, who was by this time sailing up and observed that the third squadron was shut in close to the shore by the Carthaginian left wing, and Marcus, who had now left the horse-transports and *triarii* in

- 11 σαν ἀμφοτέροι βοηθεῖν τοῖς κινδυνεύουσι. παρα-
πλήσιον γὰρ ἦν ἤδη τὸ γινόμενον πολιορκία· καὶ
πάντες ἂν ἀπολώλειςαν οὗτοί γε προφανῶς, εἰ μὴ
δεδιότες τοὺς κόρακας οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι περιφράξαντες
μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τῇ γῇ συνείχον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐμ-
βολὰς διὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν εὐλαβῶς ἔχοντες οὐ προσ-
12 ἦεσαν. ταχέως δ' ἐπιγενόμενοι καὶ κυκλώσαντες οἱ
στρατηγοὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους αὐτάνδρους μὲν ἔλα-
βον πεντήκοντα ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων, ὀλίγαι δέ τι-
13 νες παρὰ τὴν γῆν ἐξελίξασαι διέφυγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν
κατὰ μέρος κίνδυνος τοιαύτην ἔσχε τὴν διάθεσιν,
τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς συμπάσης ναυμαχίας ἐγένετο κατὰ
14 τοὺς Ῥωμαίους. διεφθάρη δὲ τούτων μὲν εἴκοσι
καὶ τέτταρα σκάφη, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ὑπὲρ τριά-
κοντα. ναῦς δὲ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων αὐτανδρος οὐ-
δεμία τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐγένεθ' ὑποχείριος, τῶν δὲ
Καρχηδονίων ἐξήκοντα καὶ τέτταρες.
- 29 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι προσεπισιτι-
σάμενοι καὶ τὰς αἰχμαλώτους ναῦς καταρτίσαντες,
ἔτι δὲ τὴν ἀρμόζουσαν τοῖς προτερήμασιν ἐπι-
μέλειαν ποιησάμενοι τῶν πληρωμάτων, ἀνήγοντο
2 ποιούμενοι τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Λιβύην. προσ-
σχόντες δὲ ταῖς πρώταις πλεούσαις ναυσὶν ὑπὸ τὴν
ἄκραν τὴν Ἑρμαίαν ἐπονομαζομένην, ἣ πρὸ παντὸς
τοῦ περὶ τὴν Καρχηδόνα κόλπου κειμένη προτείνει
πελάγιος ὡς πρὸς τὴν Σικελίαν, καὶ προσδεξάμενοι
τὰς ἐπιπλεύσας ἐνταῦθα ναῦς, καὶ πάντα συν-
αθροίσαντες τὸν στόλον, ἔπλεον παρὰ τὴν χώραν,
ἕως ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀσπίδα καλουμένην πόλιν ἀφίκοντο.
- 3 ποιησάμενοι δὲ τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ νεωλκή-
σαντες, ἔτι δὲ τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι περιλαβόντες τὰς
ναῦς, ἐγίνοντο πρὸς τὸ πολιορκεῖν αὐτήν, οὐ βου-

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safety, hastened together to the relief of this force which was in grave peril; for the state of matters now was just like a siege, and they all would evidently have been lost if the Carthaginians had not been afraid of the ravens and simply hedged them in and held them close to the land instead of charging, apprehensive as they were of coming to close quarters. The Consuls, coming up rapidly and surrounding the Carthaginians, captured fifty ships with their crews, a few managing to slip out along shore and escape. The separate encounters fell out as I have described, and the final result of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. The latter lost twenty-four sail sunk and the Carthaginians more than thirty. Not a single Roman ship with its crew fell into the enemy's hands, but sixty-four Carthaginian ships were so captured.

29. After this the Romans, laying in a further supply of provisions, repairing the captured ships, and bestowing on their men the attention which their success deserved, put to sea and sailed towards Africa, reaching the shore with their advanced ships under the promontory known as the Hermaeum which lies in front of the whole Gulf of Carthage and stretches out to sea in the direction of Sicily. Having waited there until their other ships came up, and having united their whole fleet, they sailed along the coast till they reached the city of Aspis. Landing there and beaching their ships, which they surrounded with a trench and palisade, they set themselves to lay siege to the town, the garrison of

λομένων ἐκουσίως σφίσι προσχωρήσαι τῶν κατ-
 4 ἐχόντων τὴν πόλιν. οἱ δὲ διαφυγόντες ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ
 τὴν ναυμαχίαν κινδύνου τῶν Καρχηδονίων κατα-
 πλεύσαντες, καὶ πεπεισμένοι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἐκ
 τοῦ γεγονότος προτερήματος ἐπαρθέντας εὐθέως
 ποιήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχη-
 δόνα, παρετήρουν ταῖς πεζικαῖς καὶ ναυτικαῖς δυνά-
 5 μεσι τοὺς προκειμένους τῆς πόλεως τόπους. ἐπι-
 γνόντες δὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἀσφαλῶς ἀποβεβηκότας
 καὶ πολιορκοῦντας τὴν Ἀσπίδα, τοῦ μὲν παρα-
 φυλάττειν τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἀπέγνωσαν, συνήθροισον δὲ
 τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ περὶ φυλακὴν ἐγίνοντο τῆς τε
 πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι κυριεύ-
 σαντες τῆς Ἀσπίδος καὶ φυλακὴν ἀπολιπόντες τῆς
 6 πόλεως καὶ χώρας, ἔτι δὲ πρεσβευτὰς εἰς τὴν
 Ῥώμην πέμψαντες τοὺς ἀπαγγελοῦντας μὲν περὶ
 τῶν γεγονότων, ἐρησομένους δὲ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων,
 τί δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ πῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι, μετὰ
 δὲ ταῦτα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει κατὰ σπουδὴν ἀναζεύ-
 7 ξαντες, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ πορθεῖν τὴν χώραν. οὐδενὸς
 δ' ἐμποδὼν ἵσταμένου, πολλὰς μὲν οἰκήσεις περιττῶς
 κατεσκευασμένας διέφθειραν, πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος τῆς
 τετραπόδου λείας περιεβάλλοντο· σώματα δὲ πλείω
 8 τῶν δισμυρίων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀνήγαγον. ἐν δὲ
 τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ παρήσαν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης οἱ διασα-
 φοῦντες ὅτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν ἓνα τῶν στρατηγῶν μένειν
 ἔχοντα δυνάμεις τὰς ἀρκούσας, τὸν δ' ἕτερον ἀπο-
 9 κομίζειν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην τὸν στόλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν
 Μάρκος ἔμεινεν, ὑπολειπόμενος ναῦς τετταράκοντα
 καὶ πεζοὺς μυρίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ
 10 πεντακοσίους· ὁ δὲ Λεύκιος ἀναλαβὼν τὰ πληρώ-
 ματα καὶ τὸ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων πλῆθος, καὶ κομι-

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which refused to surrender voluntarily. Those Carthaginians who made good their escape from the naval battle sailed home, and being convinced that the enemy, elated by their recent success, would at once attack Carthage itself from the sea, kept watch at different points over the approaches to the city with their land and sea forces. But when they learnt that the Romans had safely landed and were laying siege to Aspis, they abandoned the measures taken to guard against an attack from the sea, and uniting their forces devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs. The Romans, after making themselves masters of Aspis, where they left a garrison to hold the town and district, sent a mission to Rome to report on recent events, and to inquire what they should do in future and how they were to deal with the whole situation. They then hastily advanced with their whole force and set about plundering the country. As nobody tried to prevent them, they destroyed a number of handsome and luxuriously furnished dwelling-houses, possessed themselves of a quantity of cattle, and captured more than twenty thousand slaves, taking them back to their ships. Messengers from Rome now arrived with instructions for one of the Consuls to remain on the spot with an adequate force and for the other to bring the fleet back to Rome. Marcus Regulus, therefore, remained, retaining forty ships and a force of fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred horse, while Lucius, taking with him the ship's crews and all

σθεῖς παρὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ἀσφαλῶς, ἤκεν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην.

- 30 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὴν χρονιωτέραν οὖσαν, πρῶτον μὲν στρατηγούς ἑαυτῶν εἵλοντο δύο, τὸν τ' Ἀινωνος Ἀσδρούβαν καὶ Βώσταρον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν Ἀμίλκαν ἔπεμπον εἰς τὴν Ἡράκλειαν, καλοῦντες
 2 κατὰ τάχος αὐτόν. ὁ δ' ἀναλαβὼν ἱππεῖς πεντακοσίους καὶ πεζοὺς πεντακισχιλίους παρῆν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα· καὶ κατασταθεὶς στρατηγὸς τρίτος, ἐβουλεύετο μετὰ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν πῶς δεῖ
 3 χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν αὐτὴν ἀδεῶς πορθουμένην.
 4 ὁ δὲ Μάρκος μετὰ τινας ἡμέρας ἐπεπορεύετο, τὰ μὲν ἀτείχιστα τῶν ἐρυμάτων ἐξ ἐφόδου διαρ-
 5 πάζων, τὰ δὲ τετειχισμένα πολιορκῶν. ἀφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς πόλιν Ἀδὺν ἀξιόχρεω, περιστρατοπεδεύσας ταύτην συνίστατο μετὰ σπουδῆς ἔργα καὶ πολιορ-
 6 κίαν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τῇ τε πόλει σπουδάζοντες βοηθῆσαι καὶ τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀντιποιεῖσθαι κρί-
 7 νοντες ἐξῆγον τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ καταλαβόμενοι λόφον ὑπερδέξιον μὲν τῶν πολεμίων, ἀφυῇ δὲ ταῖς ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεσιν, ἐν τούτῳ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν.
 8 λοιπὸν ἔχοντες μὲν τὰς πλείστας ἐλπίδας ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀφέμενοι δὲ τῶν ἐπιπέδων χωρίων καὶ συγκλείσαντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἰς τόπους ἐρυμνοὺς καὶ δυσβάτους, ἔμελλον διδάξειν τοὺς πολεμίους ὃ δέον ἦν πράττειν κατ' αὐτῶν. ὃ
 9 δὴ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. συννοήσαντες γὰρ οἱ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμόνες ἐμπείρως ὅτι τὸ πρακτικώτατον καὶ φοβερώτατον τῆς τῶν ὑπεναντίων δυνάμεως

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the prisoners, passed safely along the coast of Sicily and reached Rome.

30. The Carthaginians, observing that the Romans ^{255 B.C.} were preparing for a long occupation, in the first place elected two generals from among themselves, Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno, and Bostarus, and next sent to Heraclea to Hamilcar, ordering him to return instantly. Taking with him five hundred horse and five thousand foot, he came to Carthage where, being appointed third general, he held a consultation with Hasdrubal and his staff as to what steps should be taken. They decided on marching to the assistance of the country and no longer looking on while it was plundered with immunity. A few days later Regulus began to advance, taking by assault and pillaging the un-walled places and laying siege to those which had walls. On reaching Adys, a town of some importance, he encamped about it and busied himself with raising works to besiege it. The Carthaginians, being anxious to relieve the town, and having decided to attempt to regain the command of the open country, led out their forces. They took possession of a hill which, while overlooking the enemy, was not a favourable position for their own army and there they encamped. In this manner, though their best hope lay in their cavalry and elephants, yet by quitting the level country and shutting themselves up in a precipitous place, difficult of access, they were sure to make it plain to their adversaries how best to attack them, and this is exactly what did happen. For the Roman commanders, perceiving from their experience of war that the most efficient and formidable part of the

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- ἡχρεΐωται διὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὐκ ἀνέμειναν ἕως ἐκεῖ-
 10 νοι καταβάντες εἰς τὰ πεδία παρετάξαντο, χρώμενοι
 δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις καιροῖς ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ προσέβαινον ἐξ
 11 ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὸν λόφον. οἱ μὲν οὖν
 ἱππεῖς καὶ τὰ θηρία τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἦν ἄχρηστα
 τελέως· οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι πάννυ γενναίως καὶ προ-
 θύμως ἐκβοηθήσαντες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον στρατόπεδον
 12 ἠνάγκασαν ἐκκλῖναι καὶ φυγεῖν· ἐπεὶ δὲ προπεσόν-
 τες καὶ κυκλωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ θατέρου μέρους
 προσβαινόντων ἐτράπησαν, μετὰ ταῦτα πάντες εὐ-
 13 θὺς ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας ἐξέπεσον. τὰ μὲν οὖν
 θηρία μετὰ τῶν ἱππέων, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα τῶν ὁμαλῶν
 ἦψατο, μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν·
 14 οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τοὺς πεζοὺς βραχὺν ἐπιδιώξαντες
 τόπον καὶ τὸν χάρακα διαρπάσαντες, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
 πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενοι τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰς πόλεις
 15 ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθουν. γενόμενοι δὲ τῆς προσαγορευο-
 μένης πόλεως Τύνητος ἐγκρατεῖς, εὐφυοὺς ὑπαρ-
 χούσης πρὸς τὰς προκειμένας ἐπιβολάς, ἔτι δὲ κει-
 μένης εὐκαίρως κατὰ τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς σύνεγ-
 γυς ταύτης χώρας, κατεστρατοπέδευσαν εἰς αὐτήν.
 31 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι μικρῷ μὲν πρότερον κατὰ
 θάλατταν, τότε δὲ κατὰ γῆν ἐπταικότες, οὐ διὰ τὴν
 τῶν πολλῶν ἀνανδρίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμέ-
 νων ἀβουλίαν, κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐνεπεπτώκεισαν
 2 εἰς δυσχερῆ διάθεσιν. ἅμα γὰρ τοῖς προειρημένοις
 καὶ τὸ τῶν Νομάδων ἔθνος συνεπιτιθέμενον αὐτοῖς
 οὐκ ἐλάττω, πλείω δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰργάζετο κακὰ
 3 τὴν χώραν. ἐξ ὧν διὰ τὸν φόβον συμφευγόντων
 εἰς τὴν πόλιν τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας δυσθυμία καὶ
 λιμὸς ἦν ὀλοσχερής, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ

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enemy's force was rendered unserviceable by their position, did not wait for the Carthaginians to come down and offer battle on the plain, but, seizing on their own opportunity, advanced at daybreak on the hill from both sides. And so their elephants and cavalry were absolutely useless to the Carthaginians, but their mercenaries sallying out with great gallantry and dash compelled the first legion to give way and take to flight; but on their advancing too far and being surrounded and driven back by the force that was attacking on the other side, the whole Carthaginian army abandoned their camp. The elephants and cavalry, as soon as they reached level ground, effected their retreat in safety, and the Romans, after pursuing the infantry for a short distance and destroying the camp, henceforth overran and plundered the country and its towns unmolested. Having made themselves masters of the town named Tunis, which was a suitable base for these raids, and also well situated for operations against the capital and its immediate environs, they established themselves there.

31. The Carthaginians, having thus been twice defeated, shortly before at sea and now on land, in both cases owing to no lack of bravery in their troops, but owing to the incompetence of their commanders, were now in a thoroughly difficult position. For, in addition to the misfortunes I have mentioned, the Numidians, attacking them at the same time as the Romans, inflicted not less but even more damage on the country than the latter. The terror-stricken inhabitants took refuge in the city of Carthage where utter despondency and extreme famine prevailed, the latter owing to overcrowding and the former

- 1 διὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῆς πολιορκίας. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος
 ὀρῶν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ
 θάλατταν ἐσφαλμένους, καὶ νομίζων ὅσον οὐπω
 κρατήσῃ τῆς πόλεως, ἀγωνιῶν δὲ μὴ συμβῇ τὸν
 ἐπιπαραγινόμενον στρατηγὸν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης φθά-
 5 σαντα τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν πραγμάτων λαβεῖν, προ-
 καλεῖτο τοὺς Καρχηδονίους εἰς διαλύσεις. οἱ δ'
 ἀσμένως ἀκούσαντες ἐξέπεμψαν αὐτῶν τοὺς πρῶ-
 τούς ἄνδρας· οἳ καὶ συμμίζαντες αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον
 ἀπέσχον τοῦ ῥέπειν ταῖς γνώμας ἐπὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τι
 τῶν λεγομένων ὥστ' οὐδ' ἀκούοντες ὑπομένειν ἐδύ-
 6 ναντο τὸ βάρος τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Μάρ-
 κος, ὡς ἤδη κεκρατηκὼς τῶν ὅλων, ὅ τι ποτὲ συν-
 εχῶρει, πᾶν ᾤετο δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐν χάριτι καὶ δωρεᾷ
 7 λαμβάνειν· οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες ὅτι καὶ
 γενομένοις αὐτοῖς ὑποχειρίοις οὐδὲν ἂν συνεξακο-
 λουθήσαι βαρύτερον τῶν τότε προσταγμάτων, οὐ
 μόνον δυσареστήσαντες τοῖς προτεινομένοις ἐπανήλ-
 θον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκόψαντες τῇ βαρύτητι τοῦ Μάρ-
 8 κου. τὸ δὲ συνέδριον τῶν Καρχηδονίων διακοῦσαν
 τὰ προτεινόμενα παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν Ῥωμαίων,
 καίπερ σχεδὸν ἀπεγνωκὸς τὰς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐλπί-
 δας, ὅμως οὕτως ἀνδρωδῶς ἔστη καὶ γενναίως ὥστε
 πᾶν ὑπομένειν εἴλετο καὶ παντὸς ἔργου καὶ καιροῦ
 πεῖραν λαμβάνειν, ἐφ' ᾧ μηδὲν ἀγεννὲς μηδ' ἀν-
 άξιον τῶν πρὸ τοῦ πράξεων ὑπομείναι.
- 32 Περὶ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους καταπλεῖ τις εἰς
 τὴν Καρχηδόνα ξενολόγος τῶν ἀπεσταλμένων εἰς
 τὴν Ἑλλάδα πρότερον [εἰς τὴν Καρχηδονίων], ἄγων
 στρατιώτας πλείστους, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ξάνθιππὸν τινα
 Λακεδαιμόνιον, ἄνδρα τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἀγωγῆς μετ-

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owing to the expectation of a siege. Regulus, perceiving that the Carthaginians were utterly worsted both by land and sea and expecting to capture the city in a very short time, was yet apprehensive lest his successor in the Consulate should arrive from Rome before Carthage fell and receive the credit of the success, and he therefore invited the enemy to enter into negotiations. The Carthaginians gave a ready ear to these advances, and sent out an embassy of their leading citizens. On meeting Regulus, however, the envoys were so far from being inclined to yield to the conditions he proposed that they could not even bear listening to the severity of his demands. For, imagining himself to be complete master of the situation, he considered they ought to regard any concessions on his part as gifts and acts of grace. As it was evident to the Carthaginians that even if they became subject to the Romans, they could be in no worse case than if they yielded to the present demands, they returned not only dissatisfied with the conditions proposed but offended by Regulus's harshness. The attitude of the Carthaginian Senate on hearing the Roman general's proposals was, although they had almost abandoned all hope of safety, yet one of such manly dignity that rather than submit to anything ignoble or unworthy of their past they were willing to suffer anything and to face every exertion and every extremity.

32. Just about this time there arrived at Carthage one of the recruiting-officers they had formerly dispatched to Greece, bringing a considerable number of soldiers and among them a certain Xanthippus of Lacedaemon, a man who had been

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εσχηκότα καὶ τριβὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἔχοντα
 2 σύμμετρον. ὃς διακούσας τὸ γεγονὸς ἐλάττωμα καὶ
 πῶς καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ γέγονε, καὶ συνθεωρήσας τὰς
 τε λοιπὰς παρασκευὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ
 πλῆθος τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν ἐλεφάντων, παραυτίκα
 συνελογίσατο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐνεφάνισε διότι
 συμβαίνει τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐχ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων,
 αὐτοὺς δ' ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν
 3 τῶν ἡγουμένων. ταχὺ δὲ διὰ τὴν περίστασιν τῶν
 τοῦ Ξανθίππου λόγων διαδοθέντων εἰς τὰ πλῆθη
 καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς, ἔγνωσαν οἱ προεστῶτες ἀνα-
 4 καλεῖσθαι καὶ πείραν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνειν. ὁ δὲ παρα-
 γενόμενος εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἔφερε τοῖς ἄρχουσι τοὺς
 ἀπολογισμοὺς καὶ παρὰ τί νῦν σφαλείησαν, καὶ
 διότι πεισθέντες αὐτῷ καὶ χρησάμενοι τοῖς ἐπιπέ-
 δοις τῶν τόπων ἐν τε ταῖς πορείαις καὶ στρατο-
 πεδείαις καὶ παρατάξεσιν εὐχερῶς ἑαυτοῖς τε τὴν
 ἀσφάλειαν δυνήσονται παρασκευάζειν καὶ τοὺς ὑπ-
 5 εναντίους νικᾶν. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ δεξάμενοι τὰ
 λεγόμενα καὶ πεισθέντες αὐτῷ παραχρῆμα τὰς δυ-
 6 νάμεις ἐνεχείρισαν. ἦν μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ ταύτην
 τὴν παρὰ τοῦ Ξανθίππου διαδιδομένην φωνὴν ὁ
 θροῦς καὶ λαλιά τις εὐελπὶς παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς·
 7 ὥς δ' ἐξαγαγὼν πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὴν δύναμιν ἐν
 κόσμῳ παρενέβαλε καὶ τι καὶ κινεῖν τῶν μερῶν ἐν
 τάξει καὶ παραγγέλλειν κατὰ νόμους ἤρξατο, τηλι-
 καύτην ἐποίει διαφορὰν παρὰ τὴν τῶν πρότερον
 στρατηγῶν ἀπειρίαν ὥστε μετὰ κραυγῆς ἐπιση-
 μαίνεσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ σπεύδειν ὥς τάχιστα
 συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, πεπεισμένους μηδὲν ἂν
 8 παθεῖν δεινὸν ἡγουμένου Ξανθίππου. τούτων δὲ

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brought up in the Spartan discipline, and had had a fair amount of military experience. On hearing of the recent reverse and how and in what way it occurred, and on taking a comprehensive view of the remaining resources of the Carthaginians and their strength in cavalry and elephants, he at once reached the conclusion and communicated it to friends that the Carthaginians owed their defeat not to the Romans but to themselves, through the inexperience of their generals. Owing to the critical situation Xanthippus's remarks soon got abroad and reached the ears of the generals, whereupon the government decided to summon him before them and examine him. He presented himself before them and communicated to them his estimate of the situation, pointing out why they were now being worsted, and urging that if they would take his advice and avail themselves of the level country for marching, encamping and offering battle they could easily not only secure their own safety, but defeat the enemy. The generals, accepting what he said and resolving to follow his advice, at once entrusted their forces to him. Now even when the original utterance of Xanthippus got abroad, it had caused considerable rumour and more or less sanguine talk among the populace, but on his leading the army out and drawing it up in good order before the city and even beginning to manœuvre some portions of it correctly and give the word of command in the orthodox military terms, the contrast to the incompetency of the former generals was so striking that the soldiery expressed their approval by cheers and were eager to engage the enemy, feeling sure that if Xanthippus was in command no disaster could

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γινομένων οἱ στρατηγοὶ συνιδόντες τοὺς ὄχλους ἀνατεθαρρηκότας παραδόξως ταῖς ψυχαῖς, παρακαλέσαντες αὐτοὺς τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ, μετ' ὀλίγας
 9 ἡμέρας ὥρμησαν ἀναλαμβάνοντες τὴν δύναμιν. αὕτη δ' ἦν πεζοὶ μὲν εἰς μυρίους καὶ δισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ τετρακισχίλιοι, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐλεφάντων πλῆθος ἔγγιστά που τῶν ἑκατόν.

33 Οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι θεωροῦντες τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τὰς τε πορείας ποιουμένους διὰ τῶν ὁμαλῶν τόπων καὶ τὰς στρατοπεδείας τιθέντας ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις τῶν χωρίων, κατ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο ξενιζόμενοι διετρέποντο, τοῖς γε μὴν ὅλοις ἔσπευδον ἐγγίσει τοῖς
 2 πολεμίοις. συνάψαντες δὲ τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἡμέραν κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ὡς δέκα σταδίου ἀποσχόντες
 3 τῶν ὑπεναντίων. τῇ δὲ κατὰ πόδας οἱ μὲν προεστῶτες τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐβουλεύοντο πῶς καὶ τί
 4 πρακτέον εἴη κατὰ τὸ παρόν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ προθύμως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, συστρεφόμενοι κατὰ μέρη καὶ κατ' ὄνομα τὸν Ξανθίππον ἀναβοῶν-
 5 τες ἐξάγειν σφᾶς ὥντο δεῖν τὴν ταχίστην. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ τὴν τε τῶν ὄχλων ὁρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν θεωροῦντες, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τοῦ Ξανθίππου διαμαρτυ-
 6 ρομένου μὴ παριέναι τὸν καιρόν, παρήγγειλαν τῷ μὲν πλήθει διασκευάζεσθαι, τῷ δὲ Ξανθίππῳ χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπέτρεψαν ὥς ποτ' αὐτῷ δοκεῖ
 7 συμφέρειν. ὁ δὲ λαβὼν τὴν ἐξουσίαν, τοὺς μὲν ἐλέφαντας ἐξαγαγὼν ἐφ' ἓνα πρὸ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως ἐν μετώπῳ κατέστησε, τὴν δὲ φάλαγγα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐν ἀποστήματι συμμέτρῳ τούτοις κατ-
 7 ὅπιν ἐπέστησε. τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας παρενέβαλε, τοὺς δ' εὐκινητοτάτους ὁμοῦ τοῖς ἵππεῦσιν ἑκατέρου τοῦ κέρατος προέστη-

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befall them. Upon this the generals, seeing the extraordinary recovery of courage among the troops, addressed them in words suitable to the occasion and after a few days took the field with their forces. These consisted of twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse and very nearly a hundred elephants.

33. When the Romans saw that the Carthaginians were marching through the flat country and pitching their camps on level ground, they were surprised indeed and somewhat disturbed by this in particular, but yet were anxious on the whole to get into contact with the enemy. On coming into touch they encamped on the first day at a distance of about ten stades from him. On the following day the Carthaginian government held a council to discuss what should be done for the present and the means thereto. But the troops, eager as they were for a battle, collecting in groups and calling on Xanthippus by name, clearly indicated their opinion that he should lead them forward at once. The generals when they saw the enthusiasm and keenness of the soldiers, Xanthippus at the same time imploring them not to let the opportunity slip, ordered the troops to get ready and gave Xanthippus authority to conduct operations as he himself thought most advantageous. Acting on this authority he sent the elephants forward and drew them up in a single line in front of the whole force, placing the Carthaginian phalanx at a suitable distance behind them. Some of the mercenaries he stationed on the right wing, while the most active he placed together with the cavalry in front of both wings. The Romans, seeing

- 8 σεν. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι συνιδόντες παραταττομένους
 9 τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἀντεξήεσαν ἐτοίμως. καταπλητ-
 τόμενοι δὲ καὶ προορώμενοι τὴν τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἔφ-
 οδον, προθέμενοι τοὺς γροσφομάχους πολλὰς ἐπ’
 ἀλλήλαις κατόπιν ἵστασαν σημείας, τοὺς δ’ ἵππεῖς
 10 ἐμέρισαν ἐφ’ ἐκάτερον τὸ κέρας. τὴν δὲ σύμπασαν
 τάξιν βραχυτέραν μὲν ἢ πρόσθεν, βαθυτέραν δὲ
 ποιήσαντες, τῆς μὲν πρὸς τὰ θηρία μάχης δεόντως
 ἦσαν ἐστοχασμένοι, τῆς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἵππεῖς, πολ-
 λαπλασίους ὄντας τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς, ὁλοσχερῶς ἡστό-
 11 χησαν. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀμφοτέρωτεροι κατὰ τὰς ἐαυτῶν προ-
 αιρέσεις καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκάστους ἔθη-
 καν εἰς τὰς ἀρμοζούσας τάξεις, ἔμενον ἐν κόσμῳ,
 караδοκοῦντες τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ἀλλήλων ἐπιθέσεως.
 34 ἅμα δὲ τῷ τὸν Ξάνθιππον τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν θη-
 ρίων παραγγεῖλαι προάγειν καὶ διασπᾶν τὰς τῶν
 ὑπεναντίων τάξεις, τοῖς δ’ ἵππεῦσιν ἐφ’ ἐκατέρου
 τοῦ κέρατος κυκλοῦν καὶ προσβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμί-
 2 οῖς, τότε δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατόπεδον κατὰ
 τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἔθῃ συνεψόφησαν τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ
 3 συναλαλάξαντες ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους. οἱ
 μὲν οὖν ἵππεῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ταχέως ἀφ’ ἐκατέρων
 τῶν κεράτων ἔφυγον, διὰ τὸ πολλαπλασίους εἶναι
 4 τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. τῶν δὲ πεζῶν οἱ ταχθέντες ἐπὶ
 τοῦ λαιοῦ κέρως, ἅμα μὲν ἐκκλίνοντες τὴν τῶν θηρί-
 ων ἔφοδον, ἅμα δὲ καταφρονοῦντες τῶν μισθοφόρων,
 ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Καρχηδονίων·
 τρεψάμενοι δὲ τούτους ἐπέκειντο καὶ κατεδίωκον
 5 αὐτοὺς ἕως εἰς τὸν χάρακα. τῶν δὲ κατὰ τοὺς
 ἐλέφαντας ταχθέντων οἱ μὲν πρῶτοι συμπεσόντες
 ὑπὸ τῆς βίας τῶν ζώων ἐξωθούμενοι καὶ καταπα-
 τούμενοι σωρηδὸν ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ διεφθείροντο,
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the enemy drawn up to offer battle, issued forth to meet them with alacrity. Alarmed at the prospect of the elephants' charge, they stationed the *velites* in the van and behind them the legions many maniples deep, dividing the cavalry between the two wings. In thus making their whole line shorter and deeper than before they had been correct enough in so far as concerned the coming encounter with the elephants, but as to that with the cavalry, which largely outnumbered theirs, they were very wide of the mark. When both sides had made that general and detailed disposition of their forces that best suited their plan, they remained drawn up in order, each awaiting a favourable opportunity to attack. 34. No sooner had Xanthippus ordered the elephant-drivers to advance and break the enemy's line and the cavalry on each wing to execute a turning movement and charge, than the Roman army, clashing their shields and spears together, as is their custom, and uttering their battle-cry, advanced to the attack. As for the Roman cavalry on both wings it was speedily put to flight owing to the superior numbers of the Carthaginians; while of the infantry, the left wing, partly to avoid the onset of the elephants, and partly owing to the contempt they felt for the mercenary force, fell upon the Carthaginian right wing, and having broken it, pressed on and pursued it as far as the camp. But the first ranks of those who were stationed opposite the elephants, pushed back when they encountered them and trodden under foot by the strength of the animals, fell in heaps in the *mêlée*, while the formation of the

- τῆς γε μὴν ὅλης τάξεως τὸ σύστημα διὰ τὸ βάθος τῶν ἐφεστώτων ἕως τινὸς ἀδιάσπαστον ἔμεινεν.
- 6 ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ μὲν τὰς ἐσχάτας ἔχοντες τάξεις κυκλούμενοι πανταχόθεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἠναγκάζοντο πρὸς τούτους στρεφόμενοι κινδυνεύειν, οἱ δὲ διὰ μέσων τῶν ἐλεφάντων εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἐκβιαζόμενοι καὶ κατὰ νώτου παριστάμενοι τῶν θηρίων εἰς ἀκέραιον καὶ συντεταγμένην ἐμπίπτοντες τὴν τῶν Καρ-
- 7 χηδονίων φάλαγγα διεφθείροντο, τότε δὴ πανταχόθεν πονοῦντες, οἱ μὲν πλείστοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων συνεπατήθησαν ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερφυοῦς βίας τῶν ζώων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ συνηκοντίσθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἱππέων ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς παρατάξεως τόπῳ, τελέως
- 8 δέ τινες ὀλίγοι πρὸς φυγὴν ὤρμησαν. οὐσῶν δὲ πεδινῶν τῶν ὑποχωρήσεων, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων καὶ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπώλλυντο, πεντακόσιοι δ' ἴσως οἱ μετὰ Μάρκου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ φυγόντες μετ' ὀλίγον ὑποχείριοι γενόμενοι σὺν αὐτῷ
- 9 'κείνῳ πάντες ἐζωγρήθησαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις μισθοφόρων ἔπεσον εἰς ὀκτακοσίους οἱ κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ταχθέντες, τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων ἐσώθησαν μὲν εἰς δισχιλίους οἱ κατὰ τὸ δίωγμα τῶν προειρημένων ἐκτὸς γενόμενοι
- 10 τοῦ κινδύνου, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλήθος διεφθάρη πλὴν Μάρκου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν ἅμα τούτῳ φυγόν-
- 11 των. αἱ μὲν οὖν σημαῖαι τῶν Ῥωμαίων αἱ σωθεῖ-
- 12 σαι διέπεσον εἰς τὴν Ἀσπίδα παραδόξως· οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τοὺς νεκροὺς σκυλεύσαντες καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἅμα μετὰ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἄγοντες ἐπανῆλθον περιχαρεῖς τοῖς παροῦσιν εἰς τὴν πόλιν.
- 35 Ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ πολλά τις ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐπισημαινόμενος εὖροι πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων

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main body, owing to the depths of the ranks behind, remained for a time unbroken. At length, however, those in the rear were surrounded on all sides by the cavalry and obliged to face round and fight them, while those who had managed to force a passage through the elephants and collect in the rear of those beasts, encountered the Carthaginian phalanx quite fresh and in good order and were cut to pieces. Henceforth the Romans were in sore straits on all sides, the greater number were trampled to death by the vast weight of the elephants, while the remainder were shot down by the numerous cavalry in their ranks as they stood. Only quite a small body tried to effect their escape, and of these, as their line of retreat was over level ground, some were dispatched by the elephants and cavalry, and about five hundred who got away with their general Regulus shortly afterwards fell into the enemy's hands and were made prisoners, himself included. It resulted that in this battle the Carthaginians lost about eight hundred of the mercenaries, who had faced the Roman left wing, while of the Romans there were saved but about two thousand, whom the pursuit of the mercenaries I mentioned above carried out of the main battle. All the rest perished with the exception of the general Regulus and those who took to flight together with him. The maniples which escaped got through by extraordinary luck to Aspis. The Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Consul and the other captives, returned to the city in high glee at the turn of affairs.

35. In these events there will be found by one who notes them aright much to contribute to

- 2 βίου συντελεσθέντα. καὶ γὰρ τὸ διαπιστεῖν τῇ τύχῃ,
 καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὰς εὐπραγίας, ἐναργέστατον
 ἐφάνη πᾶσι τότε διὰ τῶν Μάρκου συμπτωμάτων.
 3 ὁ γὰρ μικρῷ πρότερον οὐ διδοὺς ἔλεον οὐδὲ συγ-
 γνώμην τοῖς πταίουσι παρὰ πόδας αὐτὸς ἤγετο δεη-
 4 σόμενος τούτων περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίας. καὶ
 μὴν τὸ παρ' Εὐριπίδῃ πάλαι καλῶς εἰρησθαι δο-
 κοῦν ὥς “ἐν σοφὸν βούλευμα τὰς πολλὰς χέρας
 νικᾷ” τότε δι' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἔλαβε τὴν πίστιν.
 5 εἷς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ μία γνώμη τὰ μὲν ἀήττητα
 πλήθη καὶ πραγματικὰ δοκοῦντ' εἶναι καθεῖλε, τὸ
 δὲ προφανῶς πεπτωκὸς ἄρδην πολίτευμα καὶ τὰς
 ἀπηλλαγκυίας ψυχὰς τῶν δυνάμεων ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον
 6 ἤγαγεν. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ἐπεμνήσθην χάριν τῆς τῶν
 7 ἐντυγχανόντων τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διορθώσεως. δυεῖν
 γὰρ ὄντων τρόπων πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ
 βέλτιον μεταθέσεως, τοῦ τε διὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμπτω-
 μάτων καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἐναργέστερον
 μὲν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὸν διὰ τῶν οἰκείων περι-
 πετειῶν, ἀβλαβέστερον δὲ τὸν διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων.
 8 διὸ τὸν μὲν οὐδέποθ' ἐκουσίως αἰρετέον, ἐπεὶ μετὰ
 μεγάλων πόνων καὶ κινδύνων ποιεῖ τὴν διόρθωσιν,
 τὸν δ' αἰεὶ θηρευτέον, ἐπεὶ χωρὶς βλάβης ἔστι συν-
 9 ιδεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιον. ἐξ ὧν συνιδόντι καλλί-
 στην παιδείαν ἡγητέον πρὸς ἀληθινὸν βίον τὴν ἐκ
 τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας περιγινομένην ἐμπειρίαν.
 10 μόνη γὰρ αὕτη χωρὶς βλάβης ἐπὶ παντὸς καιροῦ
 καὶ περιστάσεως κριτὰς ἀληθινούς ἀποτελεῖ τοῦ
 βελτίονος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
 εἰρήσθω.
- 36 Καρχηδόνιοι δέ, κατὰ νοῦν ἀπάντων σφίσι κε-
 χωρηκότων, ὑπερβολὴν χαρᾶς οὐκ ἀπέλιπον διὰ τε

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the better conduct of life. For the precept to distrust Fortune, and especially when we are enjoying success, was most clearly enforced on all by Regulus's misfortunes. He who so short a time previously had refused to pity or take mercy on those in distress was now, almost immediately afterwards, being led captive to implore pity and mercy in order to save his own life. And again Euripides' words, so long recognized as just, that "one wise counsel conquers many hands" were then confirmed by the actual facts. For one man and one brain laid low that host which seemed so invincible and efficient, and restored the fortunes of a state which in the eyes of all was utterly fallen and the deadened spirit of its soldiers. This I mention for the sake of the improvement of the readers of this history. For there are two ways by which all men can reform themselves, the one through their own mischances, the other through those of others, and of these the former is the more impressive, but the latter the less hurtful. Therefore we should never choose the first method if we can help it, as it corrects by means of great pain and peril, but ever pursue the other, since by it we can discern what is best without suffering hurt. Reflecting on this we should regard as the best discipline for actual life the experience that accrues from serious history; for this alone makes us, without inflicting any harm on us, the most competent judges of what is best at every time and in every circumstance. Well, on this subject I have said enough.

36. All having now fallen out with the Carthaginians as they could best desire, there was no extravagance of rejoicing in which they did not

- τῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐχαριστίας καὶ διὰ τῆς μετ'
 2 ἀλλήλων φιλοφροσύνης. Ξάνθιππος δὲ τηλικαύτην
 ἐπίδοσιν καὶ ῥοπὴν ποιήσας τοῖς Καρχηδονίων πράγ-
 3 μασιν μετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἀπέπλευσε πάλιν, φρο-
 νίμως καὶ συνετῶς βουλευσάμενος. αἱ γὰρ ἐπιφα-
 νεῖς καὶ παράδοξοι πράξεις βαρεῖς μὲν τοὺς φθό-
 νους, ὀξείας δὲ τὰς διαβολὰς γεννῶσιν· ἃς οἱ μὲν
 ἐγχώριοι διὰ τε τὰς συγγενείας καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων
 πλῆθος οἰοί τ' ἂν <εἶεν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον> ἀνα-
 4 φέρειν, οἱ δὲ ξένοι ταχέως ὑφ' ἑκατέρων τούτων
 ἡττῶνται καὶ κινδυνεύουσι. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἕτερος
 ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τῆς Ξανθίππου λόγος, ὃν πει-
 ρασόμεθα διασαφεῖν οἰκειότερον λαβόντες τοῦ παρ-
 ὄντος καιρόν.
- 5 'Ρωμαῖοι δέ, προσπεσόντων σφίσι παρ' ἐλπίδα
 τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ συμβεβηκότων, εὐθέως ἐγίνοντο πρὸς
 τὸ καταρτίζειν τὸν στόλον καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξαι-
 6 ρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ διασεσωσμένους. οἱ δὲ
 Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ ταῦτα στρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐπο-
 λιόρκουν τὴν Ἀσπίδα, σπουδάζοντες ἐγκρατεῖς γε-
 7 νέσθαι τῶν ἐκ τῆς μάχης διαφυγόντων. διὰ δὲ
 τὴν γενναιότητα καὶ τόλμαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐδαμῶς
 ἐλεῖν δυνάμενοι τέλος ἀπέστησαν τῆς πολιορκίας.
- 8 προσπεσόντος δ' αὐτοῖς ἐξαρτύειν τὸν στόλον τοὺς
 'Ρωμαίους, καὶ μέλλειν αὐθις ἐπὶ τὴν Λιβύην ποι-
 εῖσθαι τὸν πλοῦν, τὰ μὲν ἐπεσκεύαζον σκάφη, τὰ
 9 δ' ἐκ καταβολῆς ἐναυπηγοῦντο. ταχὺ δὲ συμπλη-
 ρώσαντες ναῦς διακοσίας ἀνήχθησαν καὶ παρεφύ-
 λαττον τὸν ἐπίπλου τῶν ὑπειναντίων.
- 10 Οἱ δὲ 'Ρωμαῖοι τῆς θερείας ἀρχομένης καθελκύ-
 σαντες τριακόσια καὶ πεντήκοντα σκάφη, καὶ
 στρατηγούς ἐπιστήσαντες Μάρκον Λιμίλιον καὶ

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indulge, paying thank-offerings to the gods and giving congratulatory entertainments. But Xanthippus, to whom this revolution and notable advance in the fortunes of Carthage was due, after a little time left again for home, and this was a very prudent and sensible decision on his part; for brilliant and exceptional achievements are wont to breed the deepest jealousy and most bitter slander. Natives of a place, supported as they are by their kinsmen and having many friends, may possibly be able to hold their own against those for some time, but foreigners when exposed to either speedily succumb and find themselves in peril. There is another account given of Xanthippus's departure which I will endeavour to set forth on an occasion more suitable than the present.

The Romans, who had never expected to receive such bad news from Africa, at once directed their efforts to fitting out their fleet and rescuing their surviving troops there. The Carthaginians after the battle encamped before Aspis and laid siege to it with the object of capturing these survivors, but as they had no success owing to the gallantry and daring of the defenders they at length abandoned the siege. When news reached them that the Romans were preparing their fleet and were about to sail again for Africa, they set to repairing the ships they had and building other entirely new ones, and having soon manned a fleet of two hundred sail, they put to sea and remained on the watch for the enemy.

In the early summer the Romans, having launched 255 B.C. three hundred and fifty ships, sent them off under the command of Marcus Aemilius and Servius

- Σερούιον Φόλουιον ἑξαπέστελλον. οἱ δ' ἀναχθέντες
 11 ἔπλεον παρὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς Λιβύης.
 συμμίζαντες δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἑρμαίαν τῷ τῶν Καρχη-
 δονίων στόλῳ, τούτους μὲν ἕξ ἐφόδου καὶ ῥαδίως
 12 τρεψάμενοι ναῦς ἔλαβον αὐτάνδρους ἑκατὸν δεκα-
 τέτταρας· τοὺς δ' ἐν Λιβύῃ διαμείναντας νεανίσκους
 ἀναλαβόντες ἐκ τῆς Ἀσπίδος ἔπλεον αὖθις ἐπὶ τῆς
 37 Σικελίας. διάραντες δὲ τὸν πόρον ἀσφαλῶς καὶ
 προσμίζαντες τῇ τῶν Καμαριναίων χώρα, τηλικούτῳ
 περιέπεσον χειμῶνι καὶ τηλικαύταις συμφοραῖς
 ὥστε μηδ' ἂν εἰπεῖν ἀξίως δύνασθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερ-
 2 βολὴν τοῦ συμβάντος. τῶν γὰρ ἐξήκοντα καὶ
 τεττάρων πρὸς ταῖς τριακοσίαις ναυσὶν ὀγδοήκοιτα
 μόνον συνέβη περिलειφθῆναι σκάφη, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν
 τὰ μὲν ὑποβρύχια γενέσθαι, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ῥαχίας
 πρὸς ταῖς σπιλάσι καὶ τοῖς ἀκρωτηρίοις καταγνύ-
 3 μενα πλήρη ποιῆσαι σωμάτων τὴν παραλίαν καὶ
 ναυαγίων. ταύτης δὲ μείζω περιπέτειαν ἐν ἐνὶ
 καιρῷ κατὰ θάλατταν οὐδ' ἰστορηῆσθαι συμβέβηκεν.
 4 ἥς τὴν αἰτίαν οὐχ οὕτως εἰς τὴν τύχην ὡς εἰς τοὺς
 ἡγεμόνας ἐπανοιστέον· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν κυβερνητῶν
 διαμαρτυραμένων μὴ πλεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἕξω πλευρὰν
 τῆς Σικελίας τὴν πρὸς τὸ Λιβυκὸν πέλαγος ἐστραμ-
 μένην, διὰ τὸ τραχεῖαν εἶναι καὶ δυσπροσόρμιστον,
 ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὴν μὲν οὐδέπω καταλήγειν ἐπισημασίαν,
 τὴν δ' ἐπιφέρεισθαι· μεταξὺ γὰρ ἐποιοῦντο τὸν πλοῦν
 5 τῆς Ὠρίωνος καὶ κυνὸς ἐπιτολῆς· οὐθενὶ προσσχόν-
 τες τῶν λεγομένων ἔπλεον ἕξω πελάγιοι, σπουδάζον-
 τές τινας τῶν ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ πόλεις τῇ τοῦ γε-
 6 γονότος εὐτυχήματος φαντασίᾳ καταπληξάμενοι
 προσλαβέσθαι. πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν μικρῶν ἐλπίδων
 ἕνεκα μεγάλοις περιτυχόντες ἀτυχήμασι τότε τὴν

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Fulvius, who proceeded along the coast of Sicily making for Africa. Encountering the Carthaginian fleet near the Hermaeum they fell on them and easily routed them, capturing one hundred and fourteen ships with their crews. Then having taken on board at Aspis the lads who remained in Africa they set sail again for Sicily. 37. They had crossed the strait in safety and were off the territory of Camarina when they were overtaken by so fierce a storm and so terrible a disaster that it is difficult adequately to describe it owing to its surpassing magnitude. For of their three hundred and sixty-four ships only eighty were saved; the rest either foundered or were dashed by the waves against the rocks and headlands and broken to pieces, covering the shore with corpses and wreckage. History tells of no greater catastrophe at sea taking place at one time. The blame must be laid not so much on ill-fortune as on the commanders; for the captains had repeatedly urged them not to sail along the outer coast of Sicily, that turned towards the Libyan sea, as it was very rugged and had few safe anchorages: they also warned them that one of the dangerous astral periods was not over and another just approaching (for it was between the rising of Orion and that of Sirius^a that they undertook the voyage). The commanders, however, paid no attention to a single word they said, and there they were in the open sea thinking to strike terror into some of the cities they passed by the brilliancy of their recent success and thus win them over. But now, all for the sake of such meagre expectations, they exposed themselves to this great disaster, and were obliged

^a Sirius rises in July, Orion early in December.

- 7 αὐτῶν ἀβουλίαν ἔγνωσαν. καθόλου δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι
 πρὸς πάντα χρώμενοι τῇ βίᾳ, καὶ τὸ προτεθὲν
 οἰόμενοι δεῖν κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐπιτελεῖν καὶ μηδὲν
 ἀδύνατον εἶναι σφίσι τῶν ἅπαξ δοξάντων, ἐν πολλοῖς
 μὲν κατορθοῦσι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁρμήν, ἐν τισὶ δὲ
 8 προφανῶς σφάλλονται, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς κατὰ
 θάλατταν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς γῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους
 καὶ τὰ τούτων ἔργα ποιούμενοι τὰς ἐπιβολὰς τὰ μὲν
 πολλὰ κατορθοῦσι διὰ τὸ πρὸς παραπλησίους δυνά-
 μεις χρῆσθαι τῇ βίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ σπανίως ἀπο-
 9 τυγχάνουσι· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θάλατταν καὶ πρὸς τὸ
 περιέχον ὅταν παραβάλλωνται καὶ βιαιομαχώσι,
 10 μεγάλοις ἐλαττώμασι περιπίπτουσιν. ὃ καὶ τότε
 καὶ πλεονάκις αὐτοῖς ἤδη συνέβη καὶ συμβήσεται
 πάσχειν, ἕως ἂν ποτε διορθώσωνται τὴν τοιαύτην
 τόλμαν καὶ βίαν, καθ' ἣν οἴονται δεῖν αὐτοῖς πάντα
 καιρὸν εἶναι πλωτὸν καὶ πορευτόν.
- 38 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, συνέντες τὸν γεγονότα φθό-
 ρον τοῦ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στόλου, καὶ νομίσαντες κατὰ
 μὲν γῆν ἀξιόχρεως σφᾶς εἶναι διὰ τὸ προγεγονὸς
 εὐτύχημα, κατὰ δὲ θάλατταν διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην τῶν
 Ῥωμαίων περιπέτειαν, ὥρμησαν προθυμότερον ἐπὶ
 2 τε τὰς ναυτικὰς καὶ πεζικὰς παρασκευάς. καὶ τὸν
 μὲν Ἀσδρούβαν εὐθὺς ἐξαπέστελλον εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν,
 δόντες αὐτῷ τοὺς τε προϋπάρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ
 τῆς Ἡρακλείας παραγεγονότας στρατιώτας, ἅμα δὲ
 3 τούτοις ἐλέφαντας ἑκατὸν καὶ τετταράκοντα. τοῦτον
 δ' ἐκπέμφσαντες διακοσίας κατεσκευάζοντο ναῦς καὶ
 4 τᾶλλα τὰ πρὸς τὸν πλοῦν ἡτοίμαζον. ὃ δ' Ἀσδρού-
 βας διακομισθεὶς εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον ἀσφαλῶς τά

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to acknowledge their lack of judgement. The Romans, to speak generally, rely on force in all their enterprises, and think it is incumbent on them to carry out their projects in spite of all, and that nothing is impossible when they have once decided on it. They owe their success in many cases to this spirit, but sometimes they conspicuously fail by reason of it and especially at sea. For on land they are attacking men and the works of man and are usually successful, as there they are employing force against forces of the same nature, although even here they have in some rare instances failed. But when they come to encounter the sea and the atmosphere and choose to fight them by force they meet with signal defeats. It was so on this occasion and on many others, and it will always continue to be so, until they correct this fault of daring and violence which makes them think they can sail and travel where they will at no matter what season.

38. The Carthaginians, on hearing of the destruction of the Roman fleet, conceiving themselves to be now a match for the Romans both on land owing to their recent success and at sea owing to this disaster, were encouraged to make more extensive military and naval preparations. They at once dispatched Hasdrubal to Sicily, giving him the troops they previously had and a force which had joined them from Heraclea, together with a hundred and forty elephants. After dispatching him they began to get ready for sea two hundred ships and to make all other preparations for a naval expedition. Hasdrubal having crossed in safety to Lilybaeum occupied himself in drilling unopposed

τε θηρία καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐγύμναζε, καὶ δηλὸς ἦν
5 ἀντιποιησόμενος τῶν ὑπαίθρων.

Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ναυαγίας ἀνακομισθέντων
διακούσαντες τὸ κατὰ μέρος, βαρέως μὲν ἤνεγκαν τὸ
γεγονός· οὐ βουλόμενοι δὲ καθάπαξ εἶκειν, αὐθις
ἔγνωσαν ἐκ δρυόχων εἴκοσι καὶ διακόσια ναυπηγεῖ-
6 σθαι σκάφη. τούτων δὲ τὴν συντέλειαν ἐν τριμήνῳ
λαβόντων, ὅπερ οὐδὲ πιστεῦσαι ῥάδιον, εὐθέως οἱ
κατασταθέντες ἄρχοντες Αὐλὸς Ἀτίλιος καὶ Γνάιος
7 Κορνήλιος καταρτίσαντες τὸν στόλον ἀνήχθησαν,
καὶ πλεύσαντες διὰ πορθμοῦ προσέλαβον ἐκ τῆς
Μεσσήνης τὰ διασωθέντα τῶν πλοίων ἐκ τῆς ναυα-
γίας, καὶ κατάραντες εἰς Πάνορμον τῆς Σικελίας
τριακοσίαις ναυσίν, ἥπερ ἦν βαρυτάτη πόλις τῆς
8 Καρχηδονίων ἐπαρχίας, ἐνεχείρησαν αὐτὴν πολιορ-
κεῖν. συστησάμενοι δὲ κατὰ διπτοὺς τόπους ἔργα
9 καὶ τᾶλλα παρασκευασάμενοι, προσήγαγον τὰς
μηχανάς. ῥαδίως δὲ τοῦ παρὰ θάλατταν πύργου
πεσόντος, καὶ βιασαμένων ταύτῃ τῶν στρατιωτῶν,
ἡ μὲν καλουμένη Νέα πόλις ἐαλώκει κατὰ κράτος·
ἡ δὲ Παλαιὰ προσαγορευομένη τούτου συμβάντος
10 ἐκινδύνευσε. διὸ καὶ ταχέως ἐνέδωκαν αὐτὴν οἱ
κατοικοῦντες, γενόμενοι δ' ἐγκρατεῖς οὗτοι μὲν
ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἀπολιπόντες φυλακὴν
τῆς πόλεως.

39 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς θερείας ἐπιγενομένης οἱ
κατασταθέντες ἄρχοντες Γνάιος Σερουίλιος καὶ
Γάιος Σεμπρόνιος ἀνέπλευσαν παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ, καὶ
2 διὰραντες εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ἀφώρμησαν ἐντεῦθεν
εἰς τὴν Λιβύην. κομιζόμενοι δὲ παρὰ τὴν χώραν
ἐποιοῦντο καὶ πλείστας ἀποβάσεις. ἐν αἷς οὐδὲν
ἀξιόλογον πράττοντες παρεγίνοντο πρὸς τὴν τῶν

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his elephants and the rest of his force, and plainly intended to dispute the possession of the open country.

The Romans, on receiving full information about the disaster from the survivors of the shipwreck, were deeply grieved, but being resolved on no account to give in, they decided to put on the stocks a fresh fleet of two hundred and twenty ships. In three months they were completed—a thing difficult to believe—and the new Consuls, Aulus ^{254 B.C.} Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius, having fitted out the fleet, put to sea, and passing the straits picked up at Messene the ships that had escaped shipwreck. Descending with their total fleet of three hundred sail on Panormus, the most important city in the Carthaginian province, they undertook its siege. They threw up works in two places and after making the other necessary preparations brought up their battering-rams. The tower on the sea shore was easily knocked down, and, the soldiers pressing in through this breach, the so-called New Town was stormed, and the part known as the Old Town being now in imminent danger, its inhabitants surrendered it. Having taken possession of it the Consuls sailed back to Rome leaving a garrison in the town.

39. Their successors, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius ^{253 B.C.} Sempronius, put to sea with their whole fleet as soon as it was summer and after crossing to Sicily proceeded thence to Africa, and sailing along the coast, made a number of descents in which they accomplished nothing of importance, and finally

Λωτοφάγων νῆσον, ἣ καλεῖται μὲν Μῆνιγξ, οὐ
 3 μακρὰν δ' ἀπέχει τῆς μικρᾶς Σύρτεως. ἐν ἣ προσπε-
 σόντες εἰς τινα βραχέα διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, γενομένης
 4 ἀμπώτεως καὶ καθισάντων τῶν πλοίων εἰς πᾶσαν
 ἦλθον ἀπορίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἀνελπίστως
 μετὰ τινα χρόνον ἐπενεχθείσης τῆς θαλάττης,
 ἐκρίψαντες ἐκ τῶν πλοίων πάντα τὰ βάρη μόλις
 5 ἐκούφισαν τὰς ναῦς. οὗ γενομένου φυγῇ παρα-
 πλήσιον ἐποιήσαντο τὸν ἀπόπλουν. ἀψάμενοι δὲ
 6 τῆς Σικελίας καὶ κάμψαντες τὸ Λιλύβαιον καθωρ-
 μίσθησαν εἰς Πάνορμον. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ποιούμενοι
 παραβόλως καὶ διὰ πόρου τὸν πλοῦν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην
 πάλιν περιέπεσον χειμῶνι τηλικούτῳ τὸ μέγεθος
 ὥστε πλείω τῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ πεντήκοντα πλοίων
 ἀποβαλεῖν.

7 Οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ τούτων συμβάντων, καίπερ ὄν-
 τες ἐν παντὶ φιλότιμοι διαφερόντως, ὅμως τότε διὰ
 τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων τοῦ
 μὲν ἔτι στόλον ἀθροίζειν ἀναγκασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν
 8 πραγμάτων ἀπέστησαν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πεζικαῖς δυνάμεσι
 τὰς ὑπολοίπους ἔχοντες ἐλπίδας, τοὺς μὲν στρατη-
 γοὺς ἀπέστελλον Λεύκιον Καικέλιον καὶ Γάιον Φού-
 ριον καὶ στρατόπεδα μετὰ τούτων εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν,
 ἐξήκοντα δὲ μόνον ἐπλήρωσαν ναῦς χάριν τοῦ τὰς
 9 ἀγορὰς κομίζειν τοῖς στρατοπέδοις. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρη-
 μένων περιπετειῶν συνέβη πάλιν ἐπικυδέστερα γενέ-
 10 σθαι τὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων πράγματα. τῆς μὲν γὰρ
 θαλάττης ἀδεῶς ἐπεκράτουν ἐκκεχωρηκότων τῶν
 Ῥωμαίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πεζικαῖς δυνάμεσι μεγάλας
 11 εἶχον ἐλπίδας. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔπασχον οὐκ ἀλόγως· οἱ
 γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι, διαδοθείσης φήμης περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ
 Λιβύῃ μάχης ὅτι τὰ θηρία τὰς τε τάξεις αὐτῶν

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reached the isle of the lotos-eaters, which is called Menix and is not far distant from the lesser Syrtis. Here, owing to their ignorance of these seas, they ran on to some shoals, and, on the tide retreating and the ships grounding fast, they were in a most difficult position. However, as the tide unexpectedly rose again after some time, they managed with difficulty to lighten their ships by throwing overboard all heavy objects. Their departure now was so hasty as to resemble a flight, and having made Sicily and rounded Cape Lilybaeum they anchored at Panormus. As they were rashly crossing the open sea on the way hence to Rome they again encountered such a terrific storm that they lost more than a hundred and fifty ships.

The Roman Government upon this, although in all matters they are exceedingly ambitious of success, still on the present occasion, owing to the magnitude and frequency of the disasters they met with, were obliged by the force of circumstances to renounce the project of getting another fleet together. Relying now solely on their military forces, they ^{251 B.C.} dispatched to Sicily with some legions the Consuls Lucius Caccilius and Gaius Furius and only manned sixty ships to revictual the legions. The above disasters resulted in the prospects of the Carthaginians becoming once more brighter; for they had now undisturbed command of the sea, the Romans having retired from it, and they had great hopes of their army. These hopes were not unjustified, for the Romans, when the report circulated regarding the battle in Africa that their ranks were broken and

- διασπάσαι καὶ τοὺς πλείστους διαφθεῖραι τῶν ἀν-
 12 δρῶν, οὕτως ἦσαν κατάφοβοι τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ὥς
 ἐπὶ δὴ ἑναιατοὺς τοὺς ἐξῆς τῶν προειρημένων και-
 ρῶν πολλάκις μὲν ἐν τῇ Λιλυβαίτιδι χώρα, πολλάκις
 δ' ἐν τῇ Σελινουντίᾳ παραταττόμενοι τοῖς πολεμίοις
 ἐν ἑξ καὶ πέντε σταδίοις οὐκ ἐθάρρησαν οὐδέποτε
 κατάρξαι τῆς μάχης οὐδ' εἰς τοὺς ὁμαλοὺς καθόλου
 συγκαταβῆναι τόπους, δεδιότες τὴν τῶν ἐλεφάντων
 13 ἔφοδον. Θέρμαν δὲ μόνον καὶ Λιπάραν ἐξεπολιόρ-
 κησαν ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καιροῖς, ἀντεχόμενοι τῶν
 14 ὀρεινῶν καὶ δυσδιαβάτων τόπων. διὸ καὶ θεωροῦν-
 τες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν ἐν τοῖς πεζικοῖς στρατοπέδοις
 πτοίαν καὶ δυσελπιστίαν, αὐθις ἔγνωσαν ἐκ μετα-
 15 μελείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς θαλάττης. καὶ κατα-
 στήσαντες στρατηγούς Γάιον Ἀτίλιον καὶ Λεύκιον
 Μάλιον ναυπηγοῦνται πεντήκοντα σκάφη, καὶ κατ-
 ἔγραφον καὶ συνήθροίζον στόλον ἐνεργῶς.
- 40 Ὁ δὲ προεστὼς τῶν Καρχηδονίων Ἀσδρούβας,
 ὁρῶν ἀποδειλιῶντας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐν ταῖς προγε-
 γενημέναις παρατάξεσι, πυθόμενος τὸν μὲν ἓνα τῶν
 στρατηγῶν μετὰ τῆς ἡμισείας δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Ἰτα-
 λίαν ἀπηλλάχθαι, τὸν δὲ Καικέλιον ἐν τῷ Πανόρμῳ
 διατρίβειν τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος ἔχοντα τῆς στρατιᾶς,
 βουλούμενον ἐφεδρεῦσαι τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων καρ-
 2 ποῖς, ἀκμαζούσης τῆς συγκομιδῆς, ἀναλαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ
 Λιλυβαίου τὴν δύναμιν ὥρμησε καὶ κατεστρατοπέ-
 δευσε πρὸς τοῖς ὄροις τῆς χώρας τῆς Πανοριμίτιδος.
- 3 ὁ δὲ Καικέλιος, θεωρῶν αὐτὸν κατατεθαρρηκότα,
 καὶ σπουδάζων ἐκκαλεῖσθαι τὴν ὀρμὴν αὐτοῦ, συν-
 4 εἶχε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐντὸς τῶν πυλῶν. οἷς ἐπαι-
 ρόμενος Ἀσδρούβας, ὥς οὐ τολμῶντος ἀντεξίεναι
 τοῦ Καικελίου, θρασέως ὀρμήσας παντὶ τῷ στρα-

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the most of those who fell killed by the elephants, grew so afraid of these that for the two following years, though often both in the district of Lilybaeum and in that of Selinus they were drawn up at a distance of five or six stades from the enemy, they never began to attack, and in fact never would come down at all to meet the enemy on flat ground, so much did they dread a charge of the elephants. During this period all they accomplished was the reduction by siege of Therma and Lipara, keeping as they did to mountainous and difficult country. Consequently the Government, observing the timidity and despondency that prevailed in their land forces, changed their minds and decided to try their fortunes at sea again. In the consulship of Gaius Atilius and Lucius Manlius we find them building fifty ships and actively enrolling sailors and getting a fleet together. 250 B.C.

40. The Carthaginian commander-in-chief, Hasdrubal, had noted the lack of courage which the Romans exhibited, on the occasions when they were in presence of the enemy, and when he learnt that while one of the Consuls with half the whole force had left for Italy, Caecilius and the rest of the army remained at Panormus with the object of protecting the corn of the allies—it now being the height of the harvest—removed his forces from Lilybaeum and encamped on the frontier of the territory of Panormus. Caecilius, observing Hasdrubal's aggressive spirit and wishing to provoke him to attack, kept his own soldiers within the gates. Hasdrubal gained fresh confidence from this, thinking that Caecilius did not venture to come out, and boldly advancing with his

- τεύματι κατῆρε διὰ τῶν στενῶν εἰς τὴν Πανορ-
 5 μίτιν. φθείροντος δὲ τοὺς καρποὺς αὐτοῦ μέχρι
 τῆς πόλεως, ἔμενεν ἐπὶ τῆς ὑποκειμένης γνώμης ὁ
 Καικέλιος, ἕως αὐτὸν ἐξεκαλέσατο διαβῆναι τὸν πρὸ
 6 τῆς πόλεως ποταμόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ θηρία διεβίβασαν
 οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, τὸ τηνικαῦτα δὲ
 τοὺς εὐζώνους ἐξαποστέλλων ἠρέθιζε, μέχρι πᾶν
 7 αὐτοὺς ἐκτάξαι τὸ στρατόπεδον ἠνάγκασε. συνθεα-
 σάμενος δὲ γινόμενον ὃ προύθετο, τινὰς μὲν τῶν
 εὐκινήτων πρὸ τοῦ τείχους καὶ τάφρου παρεν-
 ἔβαλε, προστάξας, ἂν ἐγγίξῃ τὰ θηρία πρὸς αὐτούς,
 8 χρῆσθαι τοῖς βέλεσιν ἀφθόνως, ὅταν δ' ἐκπιέζων-
 ται, καταφεύγειν εἰς τὴν τάφρον, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ ταύ-
 τῆς ὀρμωμένους εἰσακοντίζειν εἰς τὰ προσπίπτοντα
 9 τῶν ζώων· τοῖς δ' ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς βαναύσοις φέ-
 ρειν προσέταξε τὰ βέλη, καὶ παραβάλλειν ἔξω παρὰ
 10 τὸν θεμέλιον τοῦ τείχους. αὐτὸς δὲ τὰς σημαίας
 ἔχων ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν κέρας τῶν ὑπεναντίων
 κειμένης πύλης ἐφειστήκει, πλείους αἰὶ καὶ πλείους
 11 ἐπαποστέλλων τοῖς ἀκροβολιζομένοις. ἅμα δὲ τῷ
 τούτων ὀλοσχερεστέραν γενέσθαι τὴν συμπλοκὴν
 ἀντιφιλοδοξοῦντες οἱ τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἐπιστάται πρὸς
 τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν, καὶ βουλόμενοι δι' αὐτῶν ποιῆσαι
 τὸ προτέρημα, πάντες ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς προκινδυ-
 νεύοντας· τρεψάμενοι δὲ τούτους ῥαδίως συνεδίω-
 12 ξαν εἰς τὴν τάφρον. προσπεσόντων δὲ τῶν θη-
 ρίων, καὶ τιτρωσκομένων μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεί-
 χους τοξευόντων, συνακοντιζομένων δ' ἐνεργοῖς καὶ
 πυκνοῖς τοῖς ὕσσοις καὶ τοῖς γρόσφοις ὑπ' ἀκεραίων
 13 τῶν πρὸ τῆς τάφρου διατεταγμένων, συμβελῇ γινό-
 μενα καὶ κατατραυματιζόμενα ταχέως διαταράχθη,
 καὶ στραφέντα κατὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἐφέρετο, τοὺς μὲν

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whole force, descended through the pass on the territory of Panormus. Cæcilius, adhering to his original plan, let him ravage the crops up to the walls, until he had led him on to cross the river that runs in front of the town. Once the Carthaginians had got their elephants and other forces across, he kept sending out light-armed troops to molest them, until he had compelled them to deploy their whole force. When he saw that what he had designed was taking place he stationed some of his light troops before the wall and the trench, ordering them, if the elephants approached, not to spare their missiles, and when driven from their position, they were to take refuge in the trench and sallying from it again shoot at those elephants they met. Ordering the lower classes of the civil population to bring the missiles and arrange them outside at the foot of the wall, he himself with his maniples took up his position at the gate which faced the enemy's left wing and kept sending constant reinforcements to those engaged in shooting. When this latter force more generally engaged with the enemy, the drivers of the elephants, anxious to exhibit their prowess to Hasdrubal and wishing the victory to be due to themselves, all charged those of the enemy who were in advance and putting them easily to flight pursued them to the trench. When the elephants reached the trench and began to be wounded by those who were shooting from the wall, while at the same time a rapid shower of javelins and darts fell on them from the fresh troops drawn up before the trench, they very soon, finding themselves hit and hurt in many places, were thrown into confusion and turned on their own troops,

- ἄνδρας καταπατοῦντα καὶ διαφθείροντα, τὰς δὲ τά-
 14 ξεις συγχέοντα καὶ κατασπῶντα τὰς αὐτῶν. ἃ καὶ
 κατιδὼν ὁ Καικέλιος ἐξῆγε τὴν δύναμιν ἐνεργῶς·
 καὶ συμπεσὼν ἐκ πλαγίου κατὰ κέρας τεταραγμέ-
 νοις τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀκεραίους ἔχων καὶ συντεταγ-
 μένους, τροπὴν ἐποίει τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἰσχυράν,
 καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς
 15 ἠνάγκασε φεύγειν προτροπάδην. θηρία δὲ σὺν αὐ-
 τοῖς μὲν Ἰνδοῖς ἔλαβε δέκα, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τοὺς
 Ἰνδοὺς ἀπερριφόντων, μετὰ τὴν μάχην περιελασάμε-
 16 νος ἐκυρίευσεν πάντων. ταῦτα δ' ἐπιτελεσάμενος
 ὁμολογουμένως αἴτιος ἐδόκει γεγονέναι τοῖς Ῥω-
 μαίων πράγμασι τοῦ πάλιν ἀναθαρρῆσαι τὰς πεζικὰς
 δυνάμεις καὶ κρατῆσαι τῶν ὑπαίθρων.
- 41 Τοῦ δὲ προτερήματος τούτου προσπεσόντος εἰς
 τὴν Ῥώμην, περιχαρεῖς ἦσαν οὐχ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς
 πολεμίους ἡλαττώσθαι τῶν θηρίων ἐστερημένους,
 ὥς ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς ἰδίους τεθαρρηκέναι τῶν ἐλεφάν-
 2 των κεκρατηκότας. διὸ καὶ πάλιν ἐπερρώσθησαν
 διὰ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν εἰς τὸ μετὰ
 στόλου καὶ ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ
 τὰς πράξεις ἐκπέμπειν, σπουδάζοντες εἰς δύναμιν
 3 πέραν ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ πολέμῳ. παρασκευασθέντων δὲ
 τῶν ἐπιτηδείων πρὸς τὴν ἐξαποστολὴν ἔπλεον οἱ
 στρατηγοὶ διακοσίαις ναυσὶν ὥς ἐπὶ τῆς Σικελίας.
- 4 ἔτος δ' ἦν τῷ πολέμῳ τετταρεσκαιδέκατον. καθορ-
 μισθέντες δὲ πρὸς τὸ Λιλύβαιον, ἅμα καὶ τῶν πε-
 ζικῶν ἐκεῖ στρατοπέδων αὐτοῖς ἀπηντηκότων, ἐνεχεί-
 ρουν πολιορκεῖν, ὅτι κρατήσαντες ταύτης ῥαδίως
 5 μεταβιβάσουσι τὸν πόλεμον εἰς τὴν Λιβύην. σχε-
 δὸν δὲ περὶ γε τούτου τοῦ μέρους καὶ τῶν Καρ-
 χηδονίων οἱ προεστώτες ὠμοδόξουν καὶ τοὺς αὐ-

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trampling down and killing the men and disturbing and breaking the ranks. Cæcilius, on seeing this, made a vigorous sally and falling on the flank of the enemy, who were now in disorder, with his own fresh and well-ordered troops inflicted a severe defeat on them, killing many and compelling the rest to quit the field in headlong flight. He took ten elephants with their mahouts, and after the battle, having penned up the others who had thrown their mahouts, he captured them all. By this exploit he was universally acknowledged to have caused the Roman land forces to pluck up courage again and gain the command of the open country.

41. When news of this success reached Rome it caused great rejoicing, not so much because of the enemy being weakened by the loss of their elephants as because of the confidence which the capture of these gave to their own troops. They were consequently encouraged to revert to their original plan of sending out the Consuls to the campaign with a fleet and naval force: for they were eager by all means in their power to put an end to the war. When all that was required for the expedition was ready, the Consuls set sail for Sicily with two hundred ships. This was in the fourteenth year of the war. Anchoring off Lilybæum, where they were joined by their land forces, they undertook its siege, thinking that if it fell into their possession it would be easy for them to transfer the war to Africa. On this matter at least the Carthaginian Government agreed more

250 B.C.

6 τοὺς εἶχον λογισμοὺς τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. διὸ καὶ τᾶλλα
 πάρεργα ποιησάμενοι περὶ τὸ βοηθεῖν ἐγίνοντο καὶ
 παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ πᾶν ὑπομένειν ὑπὲρ τῆς προ-
 ειρημένης πόλεως διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀφορμὴν κατα-
 λείπεσθαι σφίσι, πάσης δὲ τῆς ἄλλης Σικελίας ἐπι-
 κρατεῖν Ῥωμαίους πλὴν Δρεπάνων.

Ἵνα δὲ μὴ τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσι τοὺς τόπους ἀσαφῆ τὰ
 λεγόμενα γίνηται, πειρασόμεθα διὰ βραχέων ἀγα-
 γεῖν εἰς ἔννοιαν τῆς εὐκαιρίας καὶ θέσεως αὐτῶν
 42 τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας. τὴν μὲν οὖν σύμπασαν Σικε-
 λίαν τῇ θέσει τετάχθαι συμβαίνει πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν
 καὶ τὰκείνης πέρατα παραπλησίως τῇ τῆς Πελοπον-
 2 νήσου θέσει πρὸς τὴν λοιπὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὰ
 ταύτης ἄκρα, τούτῳ δ' αὐτῷ διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων,
 ἥ ἢ κείνη μὲν χερρόνησός ἐστιν, αὕτη δὲ νῆσος·
 ἥς μὲν γὰρ ὁ μεταξὺ τόπος ἐστὶ πορευτός, ἥς δὲ
 3 πλωτός. τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς Σικελίας ἐστὶ μὲν
 τρίγωνον, αἱ δὲ κορυφαὶ τῶν γωνιῶν ἐκάστης
 4 ἀκρωτηρίων λαμβάνουσι τάξεις, ὧν τὸ μὲν πρὸς
 μεσημβρίαν νεῦον, εἰς δὲ τὸ Σικελικὸν πέλαγος
 5 ἀνατεῖνον, Πάχυνος καλεῖται, τὸ δ' εἰς τὰς ἄρκτους
 κεκλιμένον ὀρίζει μὲν τοῦ πορθμοῦ τὸ πρὸς δύσεις
 μέρος, ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς Ἰταλίας ὡς δεκαδύο στάδια,
 6 προσαγορεύεται δὲ Πελωριάς. τὸ δὲ τρίτον τέτρα-
 πται μὲν εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν Λιβύην, ἐπίκειται δὲ τοῖς
 προκειμένοις τῆς Καρχηδόνης ἀκρωτηρίοις εὐκαί-
 ρως, διέχον ὡς χιλίους σταδίους, νεύει δ' εἰς χει-
 μερινὰς δύσεις, διαιρεῖ δὲ τὸ Λιβυκὸν καὶ τὸ Σαρ-
 7 δῶον πέλαγος, προσαγορεύεται δὲ Λιλύβαιον. ἐπὶ
 δὲ τούτῳ πόλις ὁμώνυμος κεῖται τῷ τόπῳ, περὶ ἣν
 τότε συνέβαινε τοὺς Ῥωμαίους συνίστασθαι τὴν πο-
 λιορκίαν, τείχεσί τε διαφερόντως ἡσφαλισμένην καὶ

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or less with the Romans, sharing their estimate of the place's value : so that, shelving all other projects, they devoted their whole attention to the relief of this city and were ready to undertake every risk and burden for this purpose ; for if it fell, no base was left for them, as the Romans were masters of all the rest of Sicily except Drepana.

To prevent my narrative from being obscure to readers owing to their ignorance of the geography, I will try to convey briefly to them an idea of the natural advantages and exact position of the places referred to. 42. Sicily, then, as a whole occupies the same position with regard to Italy and its extremity that the Peloponnese occupies with regard to the rest of Greece and its extremity, the difference lying in this, that the Peloponnese is a peninsula whereas Sicily is an island, the communication being in the one case by land and in the other by sea. Sicily is triangular in shape, the apices of all three angles being formed by capes. The cape that looks to the south and stretches out into the Sicilian Sea is called Pachynus, that on the north forms the extremity of the western coast of the Strait ; it is about twelve stades distant from Italy and is called Pelorias. The third looks towards Africa itself, and is favourably situated as a base for attacking the promontories in front of Carthage, from which it is distant about one thousand stades. It is turned to the south-west, separating the Libyan from the Sardinian Sea, and its name is Lilybæum. On the cape stands the city of the same name, of which the Romans were now opening the siege. It is excellently defended both by walls and by a deep moat all round, and on the

πέριξ τάφρῳ βαθείᾳ καὶ τενάγεσιν ἐκ θαλάττης, δι' ὧν ἔστιν εἰς τοὺς λιμένας εἴσπλους πολλῆς δεόμενος ἐμπειρίας καὶ συνηθείας.

- 8 Ταύτῃ δὲ προσστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐξ ἑκατέρου μέρους οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι καὶ τείχει διαλαβόντες, ἤρξαντο προσάγειν ἔργα κατὰ τὸν ἔγγιστα κείμενον
- 9 τῆς θαλάττης πύργον ὡς πρὸς τὸ Λιβυκὸν πέλαγος. προσκατασκευάζοντες δ' αἰεὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις καὶ παρεκτείνοντες τῶν ἔργων τὰς κατασκευάς, τέλος ἐξ πύργους τοὺς συνεχεῖς τῷ προειρημένῳ κατ-
- 10 ἔβαλον, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς πάντας ἅμα κριοκοπεῖν ἐνεχείρησαν. γινομένης δ' ἐνεργοῦ καὶ καταπληκτικῆς τῆς πολιορκίας, καὶ τῶν πύργων τῶν μὲν πονούντων ἀν' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν, τῶν δ' ἐρειπομένων, ἅμα δὲ
- 11 καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἐπιβαινόντων αἰεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐντὸς τῆς πόλεως, ἣν ἰσχυρὰ διατροπὴ καὶ κατάπληξις παρὰ τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις, καίπερ ὄντων ἐν τῇ πόλει χωρὶς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν τῶν
- 12 μισθοφόρων εἰς μυρίους. οὐ μὲν ἄλλ' ὃ γε στρατηγὸς αὐτῶν Ἰμίλκων οὐδὲν παρέλειπε τῶν δυνατῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀντοικοδομῶν, τὰ δ' ἀντιμεταλλεύων οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἀπορίαν παρείχε τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.
- 13 ἔτι δὲ καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἐπιπορευόμενος καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐγχειρῶν, εἴ πως δύναίτο πῦρ ἐμβαλεῖν, πολλοὺς ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ μέρους καὶ παραβόλους ἀγῶνας δὴ συνίστατο καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτωρ, ὥστε πλείους ἐνίοτε γίνεσθαι νεκροὺς ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συμπλοκαῖς τῶν εἰωθότων πίπτειν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσι.
- 43 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς τῶν τὰς μεγίστας χώρας ἐχόντων ἐν τοῖς μι-

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side facing the sea by shoaly water, the passage through which into the harbour requires great skill and practice.

The Romans encamped on either side of the city, fortifying the space between their camps with a trench, a stockade, and a wall. They then began to throw up works against the tower that lay nearest the sea on the Libyan side, and, gradually advancing from the base thus acquired and extending their works, they succeeded at last in knocking down the six adjacent towers, and attacked all the others at once with battering rams. The siege was now so vigorously pursued and so terrifying, each day seeing some of the towers shaken or demolished and the enemy's works advancing further and further into the city, that the besieged were thrown into a state of utter confusion and panic, although, besides the civil population, there were nearly ten thousand mercenaries in the town. Their general, Himilco, however, omitted no means of resistance in his power, and by counter-building and counter-mining caused the enemy no little difficulty. Every day he would advance and make attempts on the siege works, trying to succeed in setting them on fire, and with this object was indeed engaged by night and day in combats of so desperate a character, that at times more men fell in these encounters than usually fall in a pitched battle.

43. About this time some of the superior officers in the mercenary force, after talking the

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σθοφόροις, συλλαλήσαντες ἑαυτοῖς ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὴν
 πόλιν ἐνδοῦναι τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις καὶ πεπεισμένοι πειθ-
 αρχήσῃν σφίσι τοὺς ὑποτεταγμένους, ἐξεπήδησαν
 νυκτὸς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ
 διελέγοντο τῷ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγῷ περὶ τού-
 2 των. ὁ δ' Ἀχαιοὺς Ἀλέξων, ὁ καὶ τοῖς Ἀκραγαντί-
 νοις κατὰ τοὺς ἐπάνω χρόνους αἴτιος γενόμενος τῆς
 σωτηρίας, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ἐπεβάλοντο παρασπον-
 δεῖν αὐτοὺς οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων μισθοφόροι, καὶ
 τότε πρῶτος συνεῖς τὴν πρᾶξιν ἀνήγγειλε τῷ στρα-
 3 τηγῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. ὁ δὲ διακούσας παρα-
 χρῆμα συνῆγε τοὺς καταλειπομένους τῶν ἡγεμόνων,
 καὶ παρεκάλει μετὰ δεήσεως, μεγάλας δωρεὰς καὶ
 χάριτας ὑπισχνούμενος, εἰ μὴ ἐμμείνωσι τῇ πρὸς αὐ-
 τὸν πίστει καὶ μὴ κοινωνήσωσι τοῖς ἐξεληλυθόσι
 4 τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. δεχομένων δὲ προθύμως τοὺς λό-
 γους, εὐθέως μετ' αὐτῶν ἀπέστειλε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς
 Κελτοὺς Ἀννίβαν τὸν υἱὸν τὸν Ἀννίβου τοῦ μετ-
 ἀλλάξαντος ἐν Σαρδόνι διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην ἐν
 τῇ στρατείᾳ πρὸς αὐτοὺς συνήθειαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς
 ἄλλους μισθοφόρους Ἀλέξωνα διὰ τὴν παρ' ἐκεί-
 5 νοις ἀποδοχὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ πίστιν· οἱ καὶ συναγα-
 γόντες τὰ πλήθη καὶ παρακαλέσαντες, ἔτι δὲ πι-
 στωσάμενοι τὰς προτεινομένας ἐκάστοις δωρεὰς ὑπὸ
 τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ῥαδίως ἔπεισαν αὐτοὺς μένειν ἐπὶ
 6 τῶν ὑποκειμένων. διὸ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, τῶν ἐκπη-
 δησάντων < ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐρχομένων > πρὸς τὰ
 τεῖχη, καὶ βουλομένων παρακαλεῖν καὶ λέγειν τι περὶ
 τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπαγγελίας, οὐχ οἶον προσεῖχον
 αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς οὐδ' ἀκούειν ἤξιουν, βάλλοντες
 δὲ τοῖς λίθοις καὶ συνακοντίζοντες ἀπεδίωξαν ἀπὸ
 7 τοῦ τεύχους. Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν οὖν διὰ τὰς προειρη-

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matter over among themselves and in the full conviction that their subordinates would obey them, escaped from the town by night to the Roman camp and made proposals to the Consul for the surrender of the city. But the Achaean Alexon, who had on a former occasion saved the Agrigentines, when the Syracusan mercenaries had formed a project of breaking faith with them, was now too the first to get wind of what was going on and informed the Carthaginian general. Himilco on hearing of it at once summoned the remaining officers and urgently implored their aid, promising them lavish gifts and favours if they remained loyal to him and refused to participate in the plot of those who had left the city. On their readily consenting, he bade them return at once to their troops, sending with them to the Celts Hannibal, the son of that Hannibal who died in Sardinia, as they had served under him and were well acquainted with him, while to the other mercenaries he sent Alexon, owing to his popularity and credit with them. They called a meeting of the soldiery and partly by entreating them, partly moreover by assuring them that each man would receive the bounty the general had offered, easily persuaded them to bide by their engagements. So, afterwards, when the officers who had quitted the city advanced openly to the walls and attempted to entreat them and tell them of the promises made by the Romans, not only did they pay no attention but would not lend ear to them at all, and chased them away from the wall with stones and other missiles. The Carthaginians, then, for the above reasons very

μένας αἰτίας παρὰ μικρὸν ἦλθον ἀπολέσαι τὰ πράγ-
 8 ματα, παρασπονδηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων.
 Ἀλέξων δὲ πρότερον Ἀκραγαντίνοις ἔσωσε διὰ τὴν
 πίστιν οὐ μόνον τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, τότε δὲ
 Καρχηδονίοις αἴτιος ἐγένετο τοῦ μὴ σφαλῆναι τοῖς
 ὅλοις.

- 44 Οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Καρχηδόνι τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν εἰ-
 δότες, συλλογιζόμενοι δὲ τὰς ἐν ταῖς πολιορκίαις
 χρείας, πληρώσαντες στρατιωτῶν πεντήκοντα ναῦς,
 καὶ παρακαλέσαντες τοῖς ἀρμόζουσι λόγοις τῆς πρά-
 ξεως, τὸν ἐπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένον Ἀννίβαν, ὃς ἦν
 Ἀμίλκου μὲν υἱός, τριήραρχος δὲ καὶ φίλος Ἀτάρ-
 βου πρῶτος, ἐξαπέστειλαν κατὰ σπουδὴν, ἐντειλά-
 μενοι μὴ καταμελλῆσαι, χρησάμενον δὲ σὺν καιρῷ
 2 τῇ τόλμῃ βοηθῆσαι τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις. ὁ δ' ἀν-
 αχθεὶς μετὰ μυρίων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ καθορμισθεὶς
 ἐν ταῖς καλουμέναις Αἰγούσσαις, μεταξὺ δὲ κειμέ-
 ναις Λιλυβαίου καὶ Καρχηδόνας, ἐπετῆρει τὸν πλοῦν.
 3 λαβὼν δ' οὖριον καὶ λαμπρὸν ἄνεμον, ἐκπετάσας
 πᾶσι τοῖς ἀρμένοις καὶ κατοურώσας ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ
 στόμα τοῦ λιμένος ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν, ἔχων καθ-
 ωπλισμένους καὶ πρὸς μάχην ἐτοίμους τοὺς ἄνδρας
 4 ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, τὰ μὲν
 αἰφνιδίου γενομένης τῆς ἐπιφανείας, τὰ δὲ φο-
 βούμενοι μὴ σὺν τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑπὸ τῆς βίας τοῦ
 πνεύματος συγκατενεχθῶσιν εἰς τὸν λιμένα τῶν
 ὑπεναντίων, τὸ μὲν διακωλύειν τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῆς
 βοηθείας ἀπέγνωσαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θαλάττης ἔστησαν
 5 καταπεπληγμένοι τὴν τῶν πολεμίων τόλμαν. τὸ δ'
 ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πλήθος ἡθροισμένον ἐπὶ τὰ τεῖχη
 πᾶν ἅμα μὲν ἡγωνία τὸ συμβησόμενον, ἅμα δ' ἐπὶ

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narrowly escaped a complete disaster due to the treachery of their mercenaries, and Alexon, who had previously saved by his loyalty not only the city and district but the laws and liberties of Agrigentum, now was the cause of the Carthaginians being saved from total ruin.

44. The Carthaginian government knew nothing of all this, but calculating the requirements of a besieged town, they filled fifty ships with troops. After addressing the soldiers in terms befitting the enterprise, they sent them off at once under the command of Hannibal, the son of Hamilear, trierarch and most intimate friend of Adherbal, with orders not to delay, but at the first opportunity to make a bold attempt to relieve the besieged. Setting sail with ten thousand troops on board, he came to anchor off the islands called Aegusae, which lie between Lilybaeum and Carthage, and there awaited favourable weather. As soon as he had a fine stern breeze he hoisted all sail and running before the wind sailed straight for the mouth of the harbour, his men drawn up on deck armed ready for action. The Romans, partly owing to the suddenness of the fleet's appearance and partly because they feared being carried into the hostile harbour by the force of the wind together with their enemies, made no effort to prevent the entrance of the relieving force, but stood out at sea amazed at the audacity of the Carthaginians. The whole population had assembled on the walls in an agony of suspense on the one hand as to what would happen, and at the same time so overjoyed at the unexpected prospect of

τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς ἐλπίδος ὑπερχαρὲς ὑπάρχον μετὰ κρότου καὶ κραυγῆς παρεκάλει τοὺς εἰσπλέοντας.

6 Ἀννίβας δὲ παραβόλως καὶ τεθαρρηκότως εἰσδραμὼν καὶ καθορμισθεὶς εἰς τὸν λιμένα μετ' ἄσφα-
7 λείας ἀπεβίβασε τοὺς στρατιώτας. οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ πόλει πάντες οὐχ οὕτως ἦσαν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς βοηθείας παρουσίᾳ περιχαρεῖς, καίπερ μεγάλην ἐλπίδα καὶ χεῖρα προσειληφότες, ὥς ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ τετολμηκέναι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους κωλύσαι τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

45 Ἰμίλκων δ' ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως στρατηγός, θεωρῶν τὴν ὀρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν τῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει διὰ τὴν παρουσίαν τῆς βοηθείας, τῶν δὲ παραγεγονότων διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν περιεστώ-
2 των κακῶν, βουλόμενος ἀκεραίοις ἀποχρήσασθαι ταῖς ἐκατέρων ὀρμαῖς πρὸς τὴν διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐπιθεσιν τοῖς ἔργοις, συνῆγε πάντας εἰς ἐκκλησίαν.
3 παρακαλέσας δὲ τῷ καιρῷ τὰ πρόποντα διὰ πλειόνων, καὶ παραστήσας ὀρμὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν τοῖς κατ' ἰδίαν ἀνδραγαθήσασι καὶ τὰς κατὰ κοινὸν ἔσομένας χάριτας
4 αὐτοῖς καὶ δωρεὰς παρὰ Καρχηδονίων, ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐπισημαινομένων καὶ βοώντων μὴ μέλλειν, ἀλλ' ἄγειν αὐτούς, τότε μὲν ἐπαινέσας καὶ δεξάμενος τὴν προθυμίαν ἀφῆκε, παραγγείλας ἀναπαύεσθαι
5 καθ' ὥραν καὶ πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἡγουμένοις· μετ' οὐ πολὺ δὲ συγκαλέσας τοὺς προεστῶτας αὐτῶν διένειμε τοὺς ἀρμόζοντας πρὸς τὴν ἐπίθεσιν ἐκάστοις τόπους, καὶ τὸ σύνθημα καὶ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ἐπιθέσεως ἐδήλωσε, καὶ παρήγγειλε τοῖς ἡγεμόσι μετὰ πάντων τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ἐπὶ τοῖς τόποις

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succour that they kept on encouraging the fleet as it sailed in by cheers and clapping of hands. Hannibal, having entered the harbour in this hazardous and daring manner, anchored and disembarked his troops in security. All those in the city were delighted not so much at the arrival of the relief, although their prospects were much improved and their force increased thereby, as at the fact that the Romans had not ventured to try to prevent the Carthaginians from sailing in.

45. Himilco, the commander of the garrison, seeing that all were full of spirit and confidence, the original garrison owing to the arrival of relief, and the newcomers owing to their ignorance as yet of the perilous situation, desired to avail himself of this fresh spirit in the ranks and make another attempt to fire the enemy's works. He therefore summoned the soldiers to a general assembly, and addressing them at some length in words suitable to the occasion, roused them to great enthusiasm by his lavish promises of reward to those who distinguished themselves personally, and his assurance that the force as a whole would be duly recompensed by the Government. On their all applauding him and shouting to him not to delay but to lead them on at once, he dismissed them for the present after praising them and expressing his pleasure at their eagerness, ordering them to retire to rest early and obey their officers. Soon afterwards he summoned the commanding officers and assigned to each his proper place in the assault, giving them the watchword and informing them of the hour. He ordered all the commanders with the whole of their forces to be on the spot at the morning

- 6 ἐωθινῆς εἶναι φυλακῆς. τῶν δὲ πειθαρχησάντων, ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ κατὰ πλείους
7 τόπους ἐνεχείρει τοῖς ἔργοις. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι διὰ τὸ προορᾶσθαι τὸ μέλλον οὐκ ἀργῶς οὐδ' ἀπαρασκεύως εἶχον, ἀλλ' ἐτοίμως ἐβοήθουν πρὸς τὸ δεόμενον καὶ διεμάχοντο τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐρρωμένως.
8 πάντων δ' ἐν βραχεὶ χρόνῳ συμπεσόντων ἀλλήλοις ἦν ἀγὼν παράβολος πέριξ τοῦ τείχους· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἦσαν οὐκ ἐλάττους δισμυρίων, οἱ
9 δ' ἐξῴθεν ἔτι πλείους τούτων. ὅσω δὲ συνέβαινε τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐκτὸς τάξεως ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην ἀναμιξ κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν προαιρέσεις, τοσούτῳ λαμπρότερος ἦν ὁ κίνδυνος, ὥς ἂν ἐκ τοσούτου πλήθους κατ' ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ ζυγὸν οἶον εἰ μονομαχικῆς συνεστώσης περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους τῆς φιλοτιμίας.
10 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἥ τε κραυγὴ καὶ τὸ σύστρεμμα δια-
11 φέρον ἦν πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔργοις. οἱ γὰρ ἀρχῆθεν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ παρ' ἀμφοῖν ταχθέντες, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ τρέψασθαι τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ προέσθαι ταῦτα, τηλικαύτην ἐποιοῦντο φιλοτιμίαν καὶ σπουδὴν, οἱ μὲν ἐξῴσαι σπεύδοντες, οἱ δ' οὐδαμῶς εἶξαι τούτοις τολμῶντες, <ὥστε> διὰ τὴν
12 προθυμίαν τέλος ἐν αὐταῖς μένοντες ταῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς χώραις ἀπέθνησκον. οἱ γὰρ μὴν ἅμα τούτοις ἀναμεμιγμένοι, δᾶδα καὶ στυππίον καὶ πῦρ ἔχοντες, οὕτω τολμηρῶς καὶ πανταχόθεν ἅμα προσπίπτοντες ἐνέβαλλον ταῖς μηχαναῖς ὥστε τοὺς Ῥωμαίους εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον παραγενέσθαι κίνδυνον, μὴ δυναμέ-
13 νους κατακρατῆσαι τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιβολῆς. ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός, θεωρῶν ἐν μὲν τῷ κινδύνῳ πολλοὺς ἀποθνήσκοντας, οὐ δ' ἕνεκα ταύτ'

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watch, and his orders having been executed, he led the whole force out as it was getting light and attacked the works in several places. The Romans, who had foreseen what was coming, were not idle or unprepared, but promptly ran to defend the threatened points and opposed a vigorous resistance to the enemy. Soon the whole of both forces were engaged, and a desperate fight was going on all round the walls, the salliers numbering not less than twenty thousand and the force outside being rather more numerous. Inasmuch as they were fighting confusedly and in no order, each man as he thought best, the battle was all the more fierce, such a large force being engaged man to man and company to company, so that there was something of the keenness of single combat in the whole contest. It was, however, particularly at the siege-works themselves that there was most shouting and pressure. For those on both sides whose task from the outset was on the one hand to drive the defenders from the works, and on the other not to abandon them, exhibited such emulation and resolution, the assailants doing their very best to turn the Romans out, and the latter refusing to give way, that at last owing to this resolute spirit the men remained and fell on the spot where they had first stood. Yet, in spite of all, the bearers of pine-branches, tow, and fire intermingled with the combatants, attacked the engines from every side, hurling the burning matter at them with such pluck that the Romans were in the utmost peril, being unable to master the onset of the enemy. But the Carthaginian general, observing that many were falling in the battle, and that his object of

- ἔπραττεν, οὐ δυναμένους κρατῆσαι τῶν ἔργων,
 14 ἀνακαλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παρήγγειλε τοῖς σαλπισταῖς. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι παρ' οὐδὲν ἐλθόντες τοῦ πάσας ἀποβαλεῖν τὰς παρασκευάς, τέλος ἐκράτησαν τῶν ἔργων καὶ πάντα διετήρησαν ἀσφαλῶς. ὁ
 46 μὲν οὖν Ἀννίβας μετὰ τὴν χρεῖαν ταύτην ἐξέπλευσε νύκτωρ ἔτι μετὰ τῶν νεῶν λαθὼν τοὺς πολεμίους εἰς τὰ Δρέπανα πρὸς Ἀτάρβαν τὸν τῶν
 2 Καρχηδονίων στρατηγόν. διὰ γὰρ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τοῦ τόπου καὶ τὸ κάλλος τοῦ περὶ τὰ Δρέπανα λιμένος αἰεὶ μεγάλην ἐποιοῦντο σπουδὴν οἱ Καρχηδό-
 3 νιοι περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν αὐτοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦ Λιλυβαίου τοῦτον ἀπέχειν τὸν τόπον ὥς ἂν ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι στάδια.
 4 Τοῖς δ' ἐν τῇ Καρχηδόνι βουλομένοις μὲν εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον, οὐ δυναμένοις δὲ διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν συγκεκλείσθαι, τοὺς δὲ παραφυλάττεσθαι φιλοτίμως, ἐπηγγείλατό τις ἀνὴρ τῶν ἐνδόξων, Ἀννίβας ἐπικαλούμενος Ῥόδιος, εἰσπλεύσας εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον καὶ γενόμενος αὐτόπτης ἅπαντα
 5 διασαφήσειν. οἱ δὲ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας μὲν ἀσμένως ἤκουσαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπίστευόν γε διὰ τὸ τῷ στόλῳ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν εἴσπλουν στόμα-
 6 τος ἐφορμεῖν. ὁ δὲ καταρτίσας τὴν ἰδίαν ναὺν ἀνήχθη· καὶ διάρας εἰς τινα τῶν πρὸ τοῦ Λιλυβαίου κειμένων νήσων, τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ λαβὼν εὐκαίρως ἄνεμον οὐριον περὶ τετάρτην ὥραν ἅπαν-
 7 τῶν τῶν πολεμίων ὁρώντων καὶ καταπεπληγμένων τὴν τόλμαν εἰσέπλευσε. καὶ τὴν κατόπιν εὐθέως
 8 ἐγένετο περὶ ἀναγωγὴν. ὁ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς βουλόμενος ἐπιμελέστερον τὸν κατὰ τὸν εἴσπλουν τόπον τηρεῖν, ἐξηρτυκὼς ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ δέκα

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taking the works was not being attained, ordered his trumpeters to sound the retreat. Thus the Romans who had come very near losing all their siege-material, at length were masters of their works, and remained in secure possession of them.

46. As for Hannibal he sailed out after the action while it was still night, unobserved by the enemy, and proceeded to Drepana to meet the Carthaginian commander there, Adherbal. Owing to the convenient situation of Drepana and the excellency of its harbour, the Carthaginians had always given great attention to its protection. The place lies at a distance of about a hundred and twenty stades from Lilybaeum.

The Carthaginians at home wishing to know what was happening at Lilybaeum, but being unable to do so as their own forces were shut up in the town and the Romans were active in their vigilance, one of their leading citizens, Hannibal, surnamed the Rhodian, offered to sail into Lilybaeum and make a full report from personal observation. They listened to his offer eagerly, but did not believe he could do this, as the Romans were anchored outside the mouth of the port. But after fitting out his own ship, he set sail, and crossed to one of the islands that lie before Lilybaeum, and next day finding the wind happily favourable, sailed in at about ten o'clock in the morning in full sight of the enemy who were thunderstruck by his audacity. Next day he at once made preparations for departure, but the Roman general, with the view of guarding the entrance more carefully, had fitted out in the night

- ναῦς τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ λι-
 μένος ἐστὼς ἐθεώρει τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 9 πᾶν τὸ στρατόπεδον· αἱ δὲ νῆες τοῦ στόματος ἐξ
 ἀμφοῖν τοῖν μεροῖν, ἐφ' ὅσον ἦν δυνατόν ἔγγιστα
 τοῖς τενάγεσι προσάγειν, ἐπεῖχον, ἐπτερωκυῖαι πρὸς
 τὴν ἐμβολὴν καὶ σύλληψιν τῆς ἐκπλεῖν μελλούσης
 10 νεώς. ὁ δὲ Ῥόδιος ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς τὴν ἀναγω-
 γὴν ποιησάμενος οὕτως κατανέστη τῶν πολεμίων
 τῇ τε τόλμῃ καὶ τῷ ταχυνναυτεῖν ὥστ' οὐ μόνον
 ἄτρωτον ἐξέπλευσε τὴν ναῦν ἔχων καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας,
 οἷον ἐστῶτα παραδραμῶν τὰ σκάφη τῶν ὑπ-
 11 ἐναντίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ βραχὺ προπλεύσας ἐπέστη πτε-
 ρώσας τὴν ναῦν, ὡς ἂν εἰ προκαλούμενος τοὺς
 12 πολεμίους. οὐδενὸς δὲ τολμῶντος ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἀνταν-
 ἀγεσθαι διὰ τὸ τάχος τῆς εἰρεσίας, ἀπέπλευσε κατ-
 αναστὰς μιᾷ νηὶ παντὸς τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων στόλου.
 13 καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη πλεονάκεις ποιῶν ταῦτ' οὗτο
 μεγάλην χρεῖαν παρείχετο, τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις
 αἰεὶ τὰ κατεπείγοντα διασαφῶν, τοὺς δὲ πολιορκου-
 μένους εὐθαρσεῖς παρασκευάζων, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους
 47 καταπληττόμενος τῷ παραβόλῳ. μέγιστα δὲ συν-
 εβάλλετο πρὸς τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ τὸ διὰ τῶν προβρα-
 χέων ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἀκριβῶς σεσημειῶσθαι τὸν
 2 εἴσπλουν· ὑπεράρας γὰρ καὶ φαινόμενος ἔπειτ' ἂν
 ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν μερῶν ἐλάμβανε τὸν ἐπὶ
 τῆς θαλάττης πύργον κατὰ πρῶρραν οὕτως ὥστε
 τοῖς πρὸς τὴν Λιβύην τετραμιμένοις πύργοις τῆς πό-
 λεως ἐπιπροσθεῖν ἅπασιν· δι' οὗ τρόπου μόνως ἐστὶ
 δυνατόν ἐξ οὐρίας τοῦ κατὰ τὸν εἴσπλουν στόματος
 3 εὐστοχεῖν. τῇ δὲ τοῦ Ῥοδίου τόλμῃ πιστεύσαντες
 καὶ πλείους ἀπεθάρρηνσαν τῶν εἰδότην τοὺς τόπους
 τὸ παραπλήσιον ποιεῖν· ἐξ ὧν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι δυσχρη-

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ten of his fastest ships, and now he himself and his whole army stood by the harbour waiting to see what would happen. The ships were waiting on either side of the entrance as near as the shoals would allow them to approach, their oars out and ready to charge and capture the ship that was about to sail out. But the "Rhodian," getting under weigh in the sight of all, so far outbraved the Romans by his audacity and speed that not only did he bring his ship and her whole crew out unhurt, passing the enemy's ships just as if they were motionless, but after sailing on a short way, he pulled up without shipping his oars as if to challenge the enemy, and no one venturing to come out against him owing to the speed of his rowing, he sailed off, after thus having with one ship successfully defied the whole Roman fleet. After this he several times performed the same feat and was of great service by continuing to report at Carthage the news of most urgent importance, while at the same time he kept up the spirits of the besieged and struck terror into the Romans by his venturesomeness. 47. What tended most to give him confidence was that from experience he had accurately noted the course to be followed through the shoals in entering. For as soon as he had crossed and come into view, he would get the sea-tower on the Italian side on his bows so that it covered the whole line of towers turned towards Africa; and this is the only way that a vessel running before the wind can hit the mouth of the harbour in entering. Several others who had local knowledge, gaining confidence from the "Rhodian's" audacity, undertook to do the same, and in consequence the Romans, to whom this was a

- στούμενοι τῷ συμβαίνοντι χωννύειν τὸ στόμα τοῦ
 4 λιμένος ἐπεχείρησαν. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ πλεῖστον
 μέρος τῆς ἐπιβολῆς οὐδὲν ἦννον διὰ τὸ βάθος τῆς
 θαλάττης καὶ διὰ τὸ μηθὲν δύνασθαι τῶν ἐμβαλλο-
 μένων στήναι μηδὲ συμμείναι τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ'
 ὑπὸ τε τοῦ κλύδωνος καὶ τῆς τοῦ ῥοῦ βίας τὸ
 5 ριπτούμενον εὐθέως ἐν τῇ καταφορᾷ παρωθεῖσθαι
 καὶ διασκορπίζεσθαι, κατὰ δέ τινα τόπον ἔχοντα
 βραχέα συνέστη χῶμα μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας,
 ἐφ' ᾧ τετρήρης ἐκτρέχουσα νυκτὸς ἐκάθισε καὶ τοῖς
 6 πολεμίοις ὑποχείριος ἐγένετο, διαφέρουσα τῇ κατα-
 σκευῇ τῆς ναυπηγίας. ἥς οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι κρατήσαντες
 καὶ πληρώματι καταρτίσαντες ἐπιλέκτω, πάντας
 7 τοὺς εἰσπλέοντας, μάλιστα δὲ τὸν Ῥόδιον, ἐπετή-
 ρουν. ὁ δὲ κατὰ τύχην εἰσπλεύσας νυκτὸς μετὰ
 ταῦτα πάλιν ἀνῆγετο φανερώς. θεωρῶν δ' ἐκ
 καταβολῆς αὐτῷ τὴν τετρήρη συνεξορμήσασαν,
 8 γνούς τὴν ναῦν διετράπη. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον
 ὤρμησεν ὡς καταταχίσων· τῇ δὲ τοῦ πληρώματος
 παρασκευῇ καταλαμβανόμενος, τέλος ἐπιστρέψας
 9 ἠναγκάσθη συμβαλεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις. καταπροτε-
 ρούμενος δὲ τοῖς ἐπιβατικοῖς διὰ τε τὸ πλῆθος καὶ
 διὰ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐχθροῖς
 10 ὑποχείριος. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, κυριεύσαντες καὶ
 ταύτης τῆς νεὸς εὖ κατεσκευασμένης, καὶ καταρτί-
 σαντες αὐτὴν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν, οὕτως ἐκώλυσαν
 τοὺς κατατολμῶντας καὶ πλέοντας εἰς τὸ Λιλύ-
 βαιον.
 48 Τῶν δὲ πολιορκουμένων ταῖς μὲν ἀντοικοδομίαις
 ἐνεργῶς χρωμένων, τοῦ δὲ λυμαίνεσθαι καὶ δια-
 φθεῖρειν τὰς τῶν ὑπεναντίων παρασκευὰς ἀπεγνω-
 2 κότων, γίνεται τις ἀνέμου στάσις ἔχουσα τηλικαύτην

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great annoyance, tried to fill up the mouth of the harbour. For the most part indeed their attempt was resultless, both owing to the depth of the sea, and because none of the stuff that they threw in would remain in its place or hold together in the least, but all they shot in used to be at once shifted and scattered as it was sinking to the bottom, by the surge and the force of the current. However, in one place where there were shoals a solid bank was formed at the cost of infinite pains, and on this a four-banked ship which was coming out at night grounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. This ship was of remarkably fine build, and the Romans, after capturing it and manning it with a select crew, kept watch for all the blockade-runners and especially for the "Rhodian." It so happened that he had sailed in that very night, and was afterwards sailing out quite openly, but, on seeing the four-banked vessel putting out to sea again together with himself and recognizing it, he was alarmed. At first he made a spurt to get away from it, but finding himself overhauled owing to the good oarsmanship of its crew he had at length to turn and engage the enemy. Being no match for the boarders, who were numerous and all picked men, he fell into the enemy's hands. His ship was, like the other, very well built, and the Romans when they were in possession of her fitted her out too for this special service and so put a stop to all this venturesome blockade-running at Lilybaeum.

48. The besieged were still counterbuilding energetically though they had renounced their effort to spoil or destroy the enemy's works, when there arose a turbulent storm of wind, blowing with

βίαν καὶ φορὰν εἰς αὐτὰς τὰς τῶν μηχανημάτων
 προσαγωγὰς ὥστε καὶ τὰς στοὰς διασαλεύειν καὶ
 τοὺς προκειμένους τούτων πύργους τῇ βίᾳ βαστά-
 3 ζειν. ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ συννοήσαντές τινες τῶν Ἑλλη-
 νικῶν μισθοφόρων τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα τῆς περιστά-
 σεως πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἔργων διαφθορὰν προσφέρουσι
 4 τῷ στρατηγῷ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν. τοῦ δὲ δεξαμένου καὶ
 ταχέως ἐτοιμάσαντος πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἀρμό-
 ζον, συστραφέντες οἱ νεανίσκοι κατὰ τριττοὺς τό-
 5 πους ἐνέβαλον πῦρ τοῖς ἔργοις. ὥς δ' ἂν τῶν μὲν
 κατασκευασμάτων διὰ τὸν χρόνον εὖ παρεσκευα-
 σμένων πρὸς τὸ ῥαδίως ἐμπρησθῆναι, τῆς δὲ τοῦ
 πνεύματος βίας φυσώσης κατ' αὐτῶν τῶν πύργων
 καὶ μηχανημάτων, τὴν μὲν νομὴν τοῦ πυρὸς ἐνερ-
 γὸν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι καὶ πρακτικὴν, τὴν δ' ἐπάρ-
 κειαν καὶ βοήθειαν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις εἰς τέλος ἄπρα-
 6 κτον καὶ δυσχερῇ. τοιαύτην γὰρ ἔκπληξιν παρίστα
 τὸ συμβαῖνον τοῖς βοηθοῦσιν ὥστε μήτε συννοῆσαι
 μήτε συνιδεῖν δύνασθαι τὸ γινόμενον, ἀλλ' ἀπο-
 σκοτουμένους ὑπὸ τῆς εἰς αὐτοὺς φερομένης λιγνύος
 καὶ τῶν φεψαλύγων, ἔτι δὲ τῆς τοῦ καπνοῦ πολυ-
 πληθίας, οὐκ ὀλίγους ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ πίπτειν, μὴ
 δυναμένους ἐγγίσει πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς βοή-
 7 θειαν. ὅσῳ δὲ μείζω συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν δυσ-
 χρηστίαν περὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους διὰ τὰς προειρη-
 μένας αἰτίας, τοσοῦτῳ πλείων εὐχρηστία περὶ τοὺς
 8 ἐνιέντας ἦν τὸ πῦρ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπισκοτοῦν καὶ
 βλάπτειν δυνάμενον πᾶν ἐξεφυσᾶτο καὶ προωθεῖτο
 κατὰ τῶν ὑπεναντίων, τὸ δὲ βαλλόμενον ἢ ριπτού-
 μενον ἐπὶ τε τοὺς βοηθοῦντας καὶ τὴν τῶν ἔργων
 διαφθορὰν εὖστοχον μὲν ἐπεγίνετο διὰ τὸ συννορᾶν
 τοὺς ἀφιέντας τὸν πρὸ αὐτῶν τόπον, πρακτικὸν δὲ

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such violence and fury on the actual apparatus for advancing the engines, that it shook the protecting sheds from their foundations and carried away the wooden towers in front of these by its force. During the gale it struck some of the Greek mercenaries that here was an admirable opportunity for destroying the works, and they communicated their notion to the general, who approved it and made all suitable preparations for the enterprise. The soldiers in several bodies threw fire on the works at three separate points. The whole apparatus being old and readily inflammable, and the wind blowing very strongly on the actual towers and engines, the action of the flames as they spread was most effective, whereas the efforts of the Romans to succour and save the works were quite the reverse, the task being most difficult. The defenders were indeed so terrified by the outbreak that they could neither realize nor understand what was happening, but half blinded by the flames and sparks that flew in their faces and by the dense smoke, many of them succumbed and fell, unable even to get near enough to combat the actual conflagration. The difficulties that the enemy encountered for these various reasons were immense, while the exertions of the incendiaries were correspondingly facilitated. Everything that could blind or injure the enemy was blown into flame and pushed at them, missiles and other objects hurled or discharged to wound the rescuers or to destroy the works being easily aimed because the throwers could see in front

- διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι σφοδρὰν τὴν πληγὴν, συνεργούσης
 9 τοῖς βάλλουσι τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος βίας. τὸ δὲ πέρας
 τοιαύτην συνέβη γενέσθαι τὴν παντέλειαν τῆς κατα-
 φθορᾶς ὥστε καὶ τὰς βάσεις τῶν πύργων καὶ τὰ
 10 στύπη τῶν κριῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἀχρειωθῆναι. τού-
 των δὲ συμβάντων, τὸ μὲν ἔτι διὰ τῶν ἔργων πο-
 λιορκεῖν ἀπέγνωσαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι· περιταφρεύσαντες
 δὲ καὶ χάρακι περιλαβόντες κύκλῳ τὴν πόλιν, ἔτι
 δὲ τῆς ἰδίας στρατοπεδείας τεῖχος προβαλόμενοι, τῷ
 11 χρόνῳ παρέδωκαν τὴν πράξιν. οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ Λιλυ-
 βαίῳ τὸ πεπτωκὸς ἐξοικοδομησάμενοι τεῖχος εὐθαρ-
 σῶς ὑπέμενον ἤδη τὴν πολιορκίαν.
- 49 Εἰς δὲ τὴν Ῥώμην προσπεσόντων τούτων, καὶ
 μετὰ ταῦτα πλειόνων ἀναγγελλόντων διότι συμβαί-
 νει τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου πληρωμάτων τὸ πλεῖστον
 μέρος ἐν τε τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τῇ καθόλου πολιορκίᾳ
 2 διεφθάρθαι, σπουδῇ κατέγραφον ναύτας, καὶ συνα-
 θροίσαντες εἰς μυρίους ἐξέπεμψαν εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν.
 3 ὧν διὰ τοῦ πορθμοῦ περαιωθέντων καὶ πεζῇ παρα-
 γενομένων εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, συναγαγὼν τοὺς
 χιλιάρχους ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων Πόπλιος
 Κλαύδιος ἔφη καιρὸν εἶναι πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ Δρέπανα
 4 παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ. τὸν γὰρ στρατηγὸν τῶν Καρχη-
 δονίων Ἀτάρβαν τὸν τεταγμένον ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἀπαρά-
 σκευον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ἀγνοοῦντα μὲν τὴν
 παρουσίαν τῶν πληρωμάτων, πεπεισμένον δὲ μὴ
 δύνασθαι πλεῖν τὸν αὐτῶν στόλον διὰ τὴν γεγενημέ-
 νην ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ καταφθορὰν τῶν ἀνδρῶν. προ-
 5 χείρως δ' αὐτῶν συγκατατιθεμένων, εὐθέως ἐνεβί-
 βαζε τά τε προϋπάρχοντα καὶ τὰ προσφάτως παρα-
 γεγονότα πληρώματα, τοὺς δ' ἐπιβάτας ἐκ παντὸς
 ἐπέλεξε τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐθελοντὴν τοὺς ἀρίστους,

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of them, while the blows were most effective as the strong wind gave them additional force. At the end the completeness of the destruction was such that the bases of the towers and the posts that supported the battering-rams were rendered useless by the fire. After this the Romans gave up the attempt to conduct the siege by works, and digging a trench and erecting a stockade all round the city, at the same time building a wall round their own encampment, they left the result to time. But the garrison of Lilybaeum rebuilt the fallen portions of the wall and now confidently awaited the issue of the siege.

49. On the news reaching Rome, and on it being reported from various quarters that the greater part of the crews of their fleet had perished in the works or in the siege operations in general, they set about actively enlisting sailors, and when they had collected about ten thousand dispatched them to Sicily. These reinforcements were ferried over the straits and thence proceeded on foot to the camp, where on their arrival the Roman Consul, Publius Claudius ^{249 B.C.} Pulcher, called a meeting of the Tribunes and told them that now was the time to attack Drepana with the whole fleet. The Carthaginian general Adherbal who commanded there was, he said, unprepared for such a contingency, as he was ignorant of the arrival of the crews, and convinced that their fleet was unable to take the sea owing to the heavy loss of men in the siege. On the Tribunes readily consenting, he at once embarked the former crews and the new arrivals, and chose for marines the best men in the whole army, who readily volunteered as the

ἄτε δὴ τοῦ μὲν πλοῦ σύνεγγυς ὄντος, τῆς δ' ὥφε-
 6 λείας ἐτοίμου προφαινομένης. ταῦτα δὲ παρα-
 σκευασάμενος ἀνήχθη περὶ μέσας νύκτας, λαθὼν τοὺς
 πολεμίους. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἄθρους ἔπλει, δεξιὰν
 7 ἔχων τὴν γῆν. ἅμα δὲ τῷ φωτὶ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ
 τὰ Δρέπανα νεῶν ἐπιφαινομένων, κατιδὼν Ἀτάρ-
 βας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐξενίσθη διὰ τὸ παράδοξον.
 8 ταχὺ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος, καὶ νοήσας τὸν ἐπί-
 πλουν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἔκρινε παντὸς ἔργου πεῖ-
 ραν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν ὑπομένειν χάριν τοῦ μὴ
 περιδεῖν σφᾶς εἰς πρόδηλον συγκλεισθέντας πο-
 9 λιορκίαν. διόπερ εὐθέως τὰ μὲν πληρώματα συν-
 10 ἦγε πρὸς τὸν αἰγιαλόν, τοὺς δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
 μισθοφόρους ἤθροιζε μετὰ κηρύγματος. τῶν δὲ
 συλλεχθέντων, ἐπεβάλετο διὰ βραχέων εἰς ἔννοιαν
 αὐτοὺς ἄγειν τῆς τε τοῦ νικᾶν ἐλπίδος, ἐὰν τολμή-
 σωσι ναυμαχεῖν, καὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ πολιορκίᾳ δυσχρη-
 11 στίας, ἐὰν καταμελλήσωσι προϋδόμενοι τὸν κίνδυ-
 νον. ἐτοίμως δ' αὐτῶν παρορμηθέντων πρὸς τὴν
 ναυμαχίαν, καὶ βοῶντων ἄγειν καὶ μὴ μέλλειν,
 ἐπαινέσας καὶ δεξάμενος τὴν ὁρμὴν παρήγγειλε κατὰ
 12 τάχος ἐμβαίνειν, καὶ βλέποντας πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ
 ναῦν ἔπεσθαι ταύτῃ κατὰ πρύμναν. διασαφήςας
 δὲ τὰ προειρημένα κατὰ σπουδὴν πρῶτος ἐποιεῖτο
 τὸν ἀνάπλουν, ὑπ' αὐτὰς τὰς πέτρας ἐπὶ θάτερα
 50 μέρη τοῦ λιμένος ἐξάγων τοῦ τῶν πολεμίων εἰς-
 πλου. Πόπλιος δ' ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγός, θεω-
 ρῶν τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν οὕτ'
 2 εἰκοντας οὔτε καταπεπληγμένους τὸν ἐπίπλουν, ἀλλὰ
 πρὸς τῷ ναυμαχεῖν ὄντας, τῶν δὲ σφετέρων νεῶν
 τὰς μὲν ἐντὸς ἤδη τοῦ λιμένος οὔσας, τὰς δ' ἐν
 αὐτῷ τῷ στόματι, τὰς δὲ φερομένας ἐπὶ τὸν εἰς-

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voyage was but a short one and the prospect of booty seemed certain. After making these preparations he put to sea about midnight unobserved by the enemy, and at first sailed in close order with the land on his right. At daybreak when the leading ships came into view sailing on Drepana, Adherbal was at first taken by surprise at the unexpected sight, but soon recovering his composure and understanding that the enemy had come to attack, he decided to make every effort and incur every sacrifice rather than expose himself to the certitude of a blockade. He therefore at once collected the crews on the beach and summoned by crier the mercenaries from the city. On all being assembled he tried in a few words to impress on their minds the prospect of victory if they risked a battle, and the hardships of a siege should they delay now that they clearly foresaw the danger. Their spirit for the fight was readily aroused, and on their calling on him to lead them on and not delay, he thanked them, praised their zeal, and then ordered them to get on board at once, and keeping their eyes on his ship, to follow in his wake. Having made these orders quite clear to them he quickly got under weigh and took the lead, making his exit close under the rocks on the opposite side of the harbour from that on which the Romans were entering. 50. Publius, the Roman commander, had expected that the enemy would give way and would be intimidated by his attack, but when he saw that on the contrary they intended to fight him, and that his own fleet was partly inside the harbour, partly at the very mouth, and partly still sailing up to enter,

- 3 πλουν, πάσαις ἀναστρέφειν παρήγγειλε καὶ ποιεῖ-
σθαι τὸν πλοῦν ἔξω πάλιν. ἔνθα δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐν
τῷ λιμένι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὸν εἴσπλουν ἐκ τῆς
μεταβολῆς συμπιπτουσῶν, οὐ μόνον θόρυβος ἦν ἐκ
4 τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄπλετος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ταρσοὺς ἐθραύ-
ονθ' αἱ νῆες ἀλλήλαις συγκρούουσαι. ὅμως δ' οὖν
αἰεὶ τοὺς ἀνατρέχοντας ἐκτάττοντες οἱ τριήραρχοι
παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν γῆν ταχέως ἐποίουν ἀντιπρώρρους
5 τοῖς πολεμίοις. ὁ δὲ Πόπλιος αὐτὸς ἐπέπλει μὲν
ἀρχῆθεν κατόπιον ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ, τότε δ' ἐπι-
στρέψας κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος
6 ἔλαβε τὴν εὐώνυμον τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως τάξιν.
Ἀτάρβας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ὑπεράρας τὸ
λαιὸν τῶν πολεμίων [Ῥωμαίων], ἔχων πέντε ναῦς
ἐπίπλους, ὑπέστησε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ναὺν ἀντίπρωρρον
7 τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ πέλαγος μέρους.
ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων αἰεὶ τοῖς συνάπτουσι
8 προσεπιταττομένοις ταῦτ' οἰεῖν παραγγείλας διὰ
τῶν ὑπηρετῶν, καταστάντων δὲ πάντων εἰς μέτω-
πον σημήνας διὰ τῶν συνθημάτων, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς
ἐποιεῖτο τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἐν τάξει, μενόντων πρὸς τῇ
9 γῇ τῶν Ῥωμαίων διὰ τὸ προσδέχεσθαι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ
λιμένος ἀνατρεχούσας ναῦς. ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε με-
51 γάλα τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐλαττωθῆναι πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ γῇ
ποιησαμένους τὴν συμπλοκὴν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύνεγγυς
2 αὐτῶν ἦσαν, ἀρθέντων τῶν συνθημάτων ἐφ' ἑκα-
τέρας τῆς ναυαρχίδος, συνέβαλλον ἀλλήλοις. τὸ
μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἰσόρροπος ἦν ὁ κίνδυνος, ὥς ἂν
3 ἀμφοτέρων τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἐκ τῆς πεζικῆς δυνάμεως
ἐπιβάταις χρωμένων. αἰεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπερεῖχον οἱ
4 Καρχηδόνιοι διὰ τὸ πολλὰ προτερήματα παρ' ὅλον
ἔχειν τὸν ἀγῶνα. τῷ τε γὰρ ταχυναυτεῖν πολὺ

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he gave orders for them all to put about and sail out again. On the ships already in the harbour fouling those which were entering owing to their sudden turn there was not only great confusion among the men but the ships had the blades of their oars broken as they came into collision. The captains, however, bringing the ships as they cleared the harbour into line, soon drew them up close to the shore with their prows to the enemy. Publius himself from the start had been bringing up the rear of the entire fleet, and now veering out to sea without stopping his course, took up a position on the extreme left. At the same time Adherbal, outflanking the enemy's left with five beaked ships, placed his own ship facing the enemy from the direction of the open sea. As the other ships came up and joined getting into line, he ordered them by his staff officers to place themselves in the same position as his own, and when they all presented a united front he gave the signal to advance that had been agreed upon and at first bore down in line on the Romans, who kept close to the shore awaiting those of their ships that were returning from the harbour. This position close inshore placed them at a great disadvantage in the engagement. 51. When the two fleets approached each other, the signals for battle were raised on both the admirals, and they closed. At first the battle was equally balanced, as the marines in both fleets were the very best men of their land forces; but the Carthaginians gradually began to get the best of it as they had many advantages throughout the whole struggle. They

- περιῆσαν διὰ τὴν διαφορὰν τῆς ναυπηγίας καὶ τὴν
 τῶν πληρωμάτων ἕξιν, ἥ τε χώρα μεγάλη συνεβάλ-
 5 λετ' αὐτοῖς, ἅτε πεποιημένων τὴν ἕκταξιν ἀπὸ τῶν
 κατὰ τὸ πέλαγος τόπων. εἴτε γὰρ πιέζουσιν τινες
 ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, κατόπιν ἀνεχώρουν ἀσφαλῶς
 6 διὰ τὸ ταχυναυτεῖν εἰς τὸν ἀναπεπταμένον τόπον·
 κᾶπειτ' ἐκ μεταβολῆς τοῖς προπίπτουσι τῶν διω-
 κόντων, τοτὲ μὲν περιπλέοντες, τοτὲ δὲ πλάγιοι
 προσπίπτοντες στρεφομένοις καὶ δυσχρηστοῦσι διὰ
 τὸ βάρος τῶν πλοίων καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν
 7 πληρωμάτων ἐμβολάς τε συνεχεῖς ἐδίδουσαν καὶ
 πολλὰ τῶν σκαφῶν ἐβάπτιζον· εἴτε κινδυνεύοι τις
 τῶν συμμάχων, ἐτοίμως παρεβόηθουν ἔξω τοῦ δει-
 νοῦ καὶ μετ' ἀσφαλείας, παρὰ τὰς πρύμνας κατὰ
 8 τὸ πέλαγος ποιούμενοι τὸν πλοῦν. τοῖς γε μὴν
 Ῥωμαίοις τάναντία τούτων συνέβαινε· τοῖς τε γὰρ
 πιεζομένοις οὐκ ἦν εἰς τοῦπισθεν δυνατόν ἀποχω-
 ρεῖν, πρὸς τῇ γῇ ποιουμένοις τὸν κίνδυνον, αἰεὶ δὲ
 τὸ θλιβόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ πρόσωπον σκάφος ἢ
 τοῖς βραχέσι περιπίπτον ἐκάθιζε κατὰ πρύμναν ἢ
 9 πρὸς τὴν γῆν φερόμενον ἐπώκελλε. διεκπλεῖν μὲν
 οὖν διὰ τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν καὶ κατόπιν ἐπιφαί-
 νεσθαι τοῖς ἤδη πρὸς ἑτέρους διαμαχομένοις, ὅπερ
 ἐν τῷ ναυμαχεῖν ἐστὶ πρακτικώτατον, ἀδυνάτως
 εἶχον, διὰ τε τὴν βαρύτητα τῶν πλοίων, προσέτι
 10 δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν πληρωμάτων. οὐδὲ μὴν
 ἐπιβοηθεῖν τοῖς δεομένοις κατὰ πρύμναν ἐδύναντο
 διὰ τὸ συγκεκλειῆσθαι πρὸς τῇ γῇ καὶ μηδὲ μικρὸν
 ἀπολείπεσθαι τόπον τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπαρκεῖν τῷ
 11 δεομένῳ. τοιαύτης δὲ δυσχρηστίας ὑπαρχούσης περὶ

BOOK I

much surpassed the Romans in speed, owing to the superior build of their ships and the better training of the rowers, and their position was very favourable to them, as they had freely developed their line in the open sea. For if any ships found themselves hard pressed by the enemy it was easy for them owing to their speed to retreat safely to the open water and from thence, fetching round on the ships that pursued and fell on them, they either got in their rear or attacked them on the flank, and as the enemy then had to turn round and found themselves in difficulty owing to the weight of the hulls and the poor oarsmanship of the crews, they rammed them repeatedly and sunk many. Again if any other of their own ships were in peril they were ready to render assistance with perfect security to themselves, as they were out of immediate danger and could sail in open water past the sterns of their own line. It was, however, just the opposite with the Romans. Those in distress could not retire backwards, as they were fighting close to the land, and the ships, hard pressed by the enemy in front, either ran on the shallows stern foremost or made for the shore and grounded. To sail on the one hand through the enemy's line and then appear on the stern of such of his ships as were engaged with others (one of the most effective manœuvres in naval warfare) was impossible owing to the weight of the vessels and their crews' lack of skill. Nor again could they give assistance where it was required from astern, as they were hemmed in close to the shore, and there was not even a small space left for those who wished to come to the rescue of their comrades in distress. Such being their difficult

- τὸν ὅλον ἀγῶνα, καὶ τῶν μὲν καθιζόντων ἐν τοῖς βραχέσι, τῶν δ' ἐκπιπτόντων σκαφῶν, κατιδὺν ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὥρμησε πρὸς φυγὴν, ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων παρὰ τὴν γῆν ἐξελίξας, καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ περὶ τριάκοντα νῆες, αἵπερ
- 12 ἔτυχον ἐγγὺς οὔσαι. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν σκαφῶν, ὄντων ἐνενήκοντα καὶ τριῶν, ἐκυρίευσαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων, ὅσοι μὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰς ναῦς εἰς τὴν γῆν ἐκβαλόντες ἀπεχώρησαν.
- 52 Γενομένης δὲ τῆς ναυμαχίας τοιαύτης, Ἀτάρβας μὲν εὐδοκίμει παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις, ὡς δι' αὐτὸν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν πρόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν κατωρθώ-
- 2 κῶς, Πόπλιος δὲ παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἠδόξει καὶ διεβέβλητο μέγας, ὡς εἰκῇ κάλογίστως τοῖς πράγμασι κεχρημένος, καὶ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν οὐ μικροῖς
- 3 ἐλαττώμασι περιβεβληκῶς τὴν Ῥώμην· διὸ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα μέγαις ζημίαις καὶ κινδύνους κριθεὶς περιέπεσεν.
- 4 Οὐ μὴν οἷ γε Ῥωμαῖοι, καίπερ τοιούτων συμβεβηκότων, διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων φιλοτιμίαν οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἀλλ' εἶχοντο τῶν
- 5 ἐξῆς πραγμάτων. διὸ καὶ συνάψαντος τοῦ κατὰ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας χρόνου, στρατηγοὺς ὑπάτους κατστήσαντες παρατίκα τὸν ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἐξέπεμπον Λεύκιον Ἰούνιον, τὰς τε σιταρχίας παρακομίζοντα τοῖς τὸ Λιλύβαιον πολιορκοῦσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀγορὰς καὶ χορηγίας τῷ στρατοπέδῳ· πρὸς δὲ καὶ παραπομποὺς τούτοις ἐπλήρωσαν ἐξήκοντα ναῦς.
- 6 ὁ δ' Ἰούνιος ἀφικόμενος εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην, καὶ προσλαβὼν τὰ συνηντηκότα τῶν πλοίων ἀπὸ τε τοῦ στρατοπέδου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Σικελίας, παρεκομίσθη κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἔχων ἑκατὸν

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position in every part of the battle, and some of the ships grounding on the shallows while others ran ashore, the Roman commander, when he saw what was happening, took to flight, slipping out on the left along shore, accompanied by about thirty of the ships nearest to him. The remainder, ninety-three in number, were captured by the Carthaginians, including their crews, with the exception of those men who ran their ships ashore and made off.

52. The battle having resulted so, Adherbal gained a high reputation at Carthage, the success being regarded as due to his foresight and boldness. Publius, on the contrary, fell into ill repute among the Romans, and there was a great outcry against him for having acted rashly and inconsiderately and done all a single man could to bring a great disaster on Rome. He was accordingly brought to trial afterwards, condemned to a heavy fine, and narrowly escaped with his life.

Yet so determined were the Romans to bring the whole struggle to a successful issue, that, notwithstanding this reverse, they left undone nothing that was in their power, and prepared to continue the campaign. The time for the elections was now at hand, and accordingly when the new Consuls were appointed they dispatched one of them, Lucius Junius Pullus,^a with corn for the besiegers of Lilybaeum and such other provisions and supplies as the army required, manning sixty ships to act as a convoy to him. Junius, on arriving at Messene and being joined by the ships from Lilybaeum and the rest of Sicily, coasted along with all speed to Syracuse,

^a This is a mistake ; L. Junius was one of the consuls of 249 B.C., the colleague of Publius.

εἴκοσι σκάφη καὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν σχεδὸν ἐν ὀκτακο-
 7 σίαις ναυσὶ φορτηγοῖς. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ παραδοὺς τοῖς
 ταμίαις τὰς ἡμισείας φορτηγοὺς καὶ τινα τῶν μα-
 κρῶν πλοίων ἐξαπέστειλε, διακομισθῆναι σπουδά-
 8 ζων τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν. αὐτὸς
 δ' ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ὑπέμενε, τοὺς τε κατὰ
 πλοῦν ἀφυστεροῦντας ἐκ τῆς Μεσσήνης ἀναδεχό-
 μενος καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς μεσογαίου συμμαχῶν
 σῆτον προσαναλαμβάνων.

53 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Ἀτάρβας μὲν ἄν-
 δρας τοὺς ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ ληφθέντας καὶ τὰς αἰ-
 χμαλώτους νῆας ἐξαπέστειλεν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα,
 2 Καρθάλωνα δὲ τὸν συνάρχοντα δούς τριάκοντα ναῦς
 ἐξέπεμψε πρὸς αἷς ἔχων αὐτὸς ἑβδομήκοντα κατ-
 3 ἐπλευσε, προστάξας ἄφνω προσπεσόντα ταῖς ὁρμού-
 σαις παρὰ τὸ Λιλύβαιον τῶν πολεμίων ναυσίν, ὧν
 μὲν ἂν δυνατὸς ἦ κυριεῦσαι, ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς πῦρ
 4 ἐμβαλεῖν. πεισθέντος δὲ τοῦ Καρθάλωνος καὶ
 ποιησαμένου τὸν ἐπίπλουν ὑπὸ τὴν ἑωθινήν, καὶ τὰ
 μὲν ἐμπιπρῶντος, τὰ δ' ἀποσπῶντος τῶν πλοίων,
 μεγάλην συνέπεσε γενέσθαι ταραχὴν περὶ τὸ τῶν
 5 Ῥωμαίων στρατόπεδον. προσβοηθούντων γὰρ αὐ-
 τῶν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ γινομένης κραυγῆς, συν-
 νοήσας Ἰμίλκων ὁ τὸ Λιλύβαιον τηρῶν, καὶ θεωρῶν
 ἤδη τῆς ἡμέρας ὑποφαιούσης τὸ συμβαῖνον, ἐπ-
 6 αποστέλλει τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως μισθοφόρους. οἱ δὲ
 Ῥωμαῖοι, τοῦ δεινοῦ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς περιστάν-
 τος, οὐκ εἰς μικρὰν οὐδ' εἰς τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἦλθον
 7 διατροπὴν. ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος, ὀλίγα
 τῶν σκαφῶν τὰ μὲν ἀποσπάσας, τὰ δὲ συντρίψας,
 μετὰ ταῦτα μικρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ Λιλυβαίου παρακομι-
 σθεὶς ὡς ἐφ' Ἡρακλείας ἐτήρει, βουλόμενος διακω-

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having now a hundred and twenty ships and the supplies in about eight hundred transports. There he entrusted half the transports and a few of the war-ships to the Quaestors and sent them on, as he was anxious to have what the troops required conveyed to them at once. He himself remained in Syracuse waiting for the ships that were left behind on the voyage from Messene and procuring additional supplies and corn from the allies in the interior.

53. At about the same time Adherbal sent the prisoners from the naval battle and the captured ships to Carthage, and giving Carthalo his colleague thirty vessels in addition to the seventy with which he had arrived, dispatched him with orders to make a sudden descent on the enemy's ships that were moored near Lilybaeum, capture all he could and set fire to the rest. When Carthalo acting on these orders made the attack at dawn and began to burn some of the ships and carry off others, there was a great commotion in the Roman camp. For as they rushed to rescue the ships with loud cries, Himilco, the commander of the garrison, heard them, and as day was just beginning to break, he saw what was happening, and sent out the mercenaries from the town to attack the Romans also. The Romans were now in danger from all sides and in no little or ordinary distress. The Carthaginian admiral, having made off with a few ships and broken up others, shortly afterwards left Lilybaeum, and after coasting along for some distance in the direction of Heraclea remained on the watch, as his design was to intercept

- 8 λύειν τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον πλέοντας. προσαγ-
 γελάντων δὲ τῶν σκοπῶν πλήθος ἱκανὸν πλοίων
 προσφέρεσθαι παντοδαπῶν καὶ συνεγγίζειν, ἀν-
 αχθεῖς ἔπλει, συμμιῖξαι σπεύδων διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν
 τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐκ τοῦ προγεγενημένου προτερήμα-
 9 τος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν προ-
 απεσταλμένοις ταμίαις ἀνήγγειλαν οἱ προπλεῖν εἰ-
 10 θισμένοι λέμβοι τὸν ἐπίπλου τῶν ὑπεναντίων. οἱ δὲ
 νομίσαντες οὐκ ἀξιόχρεως σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι πρὸς
 ναυμαχίαν, καθωρμίσθησαν πρὸς τι πολισμάτιον
 τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοὺς ταττομένων, ἀλίμενον μὲν, σάλους
 δ' ἔχον καὶ προβολὰς περικλειούσας ἐκ τῆς γῆς
 11 εὐφυεῖς. οὗ ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἀπόβασιν, καὶ τοὺς
 τε καταπέλτας καὶ τοὺς πετροβόλους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς
 πόλεως ἐπιστήσαντες, προσεδόκων τὸν ἐπίπλου
 12 τῶν ὑπεναντίων. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι συνεγγίσαν-
 τες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλλοντο πολιορκεῖν τούτους,
 ὑπολαβόντες τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας καταπλαγέντας εἰς τὸ
 πολισμάτιον ἀποχωρήσειν, τῶν δὲ πλοίων ἀσφαλῶς
 13 κυριεύσειν· οὐ προχωρούσης δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος, ἀλλὰ
 τοῦναντίον ἀμυνομένων γενναίως, καὶ τοῦ τόπου
 πολλὰς ἔχοντος καὶ παντοδαπὰς δυσχρηστίας, ὀλίγα
 τῶν τὰς ἀγορὰς ἐχόντων πλοίων ἀποσπάσαντες ἀπ-
 ἐπλευσαν πρὸς τινα ποταμόν, ἐν ᾧ καθορμισθέντες
 ἐπετήρουν τὸν ἀνάπλου αὐτῶν.
- 54 Ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ὑπολειφθεὶς στρατη-
 γός, ἐπεὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐπετέλεσε, κάμψας
 τὸν Πάχυνον ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ Λιλύ-
 βαιον, οὐδὲν εἰδὼς τῶν περὶ τοὺς προπλέοντας συμ-
 2 βεβηκότων. ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος, ση-

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the ships that were on their way to join the army. When his look-out men reported that a considerable number of ships of every variety were approaching and at no great distance, he got under weigh and sailed towards them eager to engage them, as after the recent success he had great contempt for the Romans. The approach of the enemy was also announced by the light boats that usually sail in front of a fleet to the Quaestors who had been sent on in advance from Syracuse. Considering themselves not strong enough to accept a battle, they anchored off a certain small fortified town subject to the Romans, which had indeed no harbour, but a roadstead shut in by headlands projecting from the land in a manner that made it a more or less secure anchorage. Here they disembarked, and setting up the catapults and mangonels procured from the fortress, awaited the enemy's attack. The Carthaginians on their approach at first thought of besieging them, supposing that the crews would be afraid and retreat to the city, and that they would then easily possess themselves of the ships; but when their hopes were not realized, the enemy on the contrary making a gallant defence, and the situation of the place presenting many difficulties of every kind, they carried off a few of the ships laden with provisions and sailed away to a certain river where they anchored, and waited for the Romans to put out to sea again.

54. The Consul, who had remained in Syracuse, when he had concluded his business there, rounded Cape Pachynus and sailed in the direction of Lilybaeum in entire ignorance of what had befallen the advance force. The Carthaginian admiral, when his

- μηνάντων τῶν σκοπῶν αὐτῷ πάλιν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν
 τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀναχθεὶς ἔπλει μετὰ σπουδῆς,
 βουλόμενος αὐτοῖς ὡς πλείστον ἀπέχουσι τῶν οἰ-
 3 κείων νεῶν συμβαλεῖν. ὁ δ' Ἰούνιος κατιδὼν ἐκ
 πολλοῦ τὸν στόλον τὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ
 πλῆθος τῶν σκαφῶν, οὔτε συμβαλεῖν τολμῶν οὔτ'
 ἐκφυγεῖν ἔτι δυνατὸς ὢν διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τοὺς
 4 πολεμίους, ἐγκλίνας εἰς τόπους τραχεῖς καὶ κατὰ
 πάντα τρόπον ἐπισφαλεῖς καθωρμίσθη, κρίνων αἰ-
 ρετώτερον ὑπάρχειν ὅ τι δέοι παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς
 πολεμίους αὐτάνδρον τὸ σφέτερον στρατόπεδον ὑπο-
 5 χεῖριον ποιῆσαι. συνιδὼν δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τούτου
 γεγονὸς ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος, τὸ μὲν παρα-
 βάλλεσθαι καὶ προσάγειν τοιοῦτοῖς τόποις ἀπεδο-
 κίμασε, λαβὼν δ' ἄκραν τινὰ καὶ προσορμισθεὶς
 ταύτῃ, μεταξὺ τῶν στόλων ἐτήρει καὶ προσεῖχε τὸν
 6 νοῦν ἀμφοτέροις. ἐπιγενομένου δὲ χειμῶνος καὶ
 περιστάσεως προφαινομένης ἐκ τοῦ πελάγους ὁλο-
 σχερεστέρας, οἱ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων κυβερνῆται
 διὰ τε τὴν τῶν τόπων καὶ τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἐμ-
 πειρίαν προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον καὶ προλέγοντες
 τὸ συμβησόμενον, ἔπεισαν τὸν Καρθάλωνα φυ-
 γεῖν τὸν χειμῶνα καὶ κάμψαι τὴν ἄκραν τοῦ Πα-
 7 χύνου. πεισθέντος δὲ νουνεχῶς, οὔτοι μὲν πολλὰ
 μοχθήσαντες καὶ μόλις ὑπεράραντες τὴν ἄκραν ἐν
 8 ἀσφαλεῖ καθωρμίσθησαν, οἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στό-
 λοι, τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐπιγενομένου καὶ τῶν τόπων εἰς
 τέλος ὑπαρχόντων ἀλιμένων, οὕτως διεφθάρησαν
 ὥστε μηδὲ τῶν ναυαγίων μηδὲν γενέσθαι χρήσιμον,
 ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοὺς ἄρδην καὶ παραλόγως
 ἀχρειωθῆναι.
- 55 Τούτου δὲ συμβάντος, τὰ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδο-

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look-outs again reported that the enemy were in sight, put to sea and sailed with all haste, as he wished to engage them at as great a distance as possible from their own ships. Junius had sighted the Carthaginian fleet for some time, and noticed the number of their ships, but he neither dared to engage them nor could he now escape them, as they were so near. He therefore diverted his course to a rugged and in every way perilous part of the coast and anchored there, thinking that, no matter what happened to him, it would be preferable to his whole force of ships and men falling into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral, on seeing what Junius had done, decided not to incur the risk of approaching such a dangerous shore, but, gaining a certain cape and anchoring off it, remained on the alert between the two fleets, keeping his eye on both. When the weather now became stormy, and they were threatened with a heavy gale from the open sea, the Carthaginian captains who were acquainted with the locality and with the weather signs, and foresaw and prophesied what was about to happen, persuaded Carthalo to escape the tempest by rounding Cape Pachynus. He very wisely consented, and with great labour they just managed to get round the cape and anchor in a safe position. But the two Roman fleets, caught by the tempest, and the coast affording no shelter at all, were so completely destroyed that not even the wrecks were good for anything. In this unlooked for manner, then, the Romans had both their fleets annihilated.

55. Owing to this occurrence the hopes of the

νίων αὐθις ἀνέκυψε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιρρεπεστέρας εἶχε
 2 τὰς ἐλπίδας, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, πρότερον μὲν ἐπὶ πο-
 σὸν ἡτυχηκότες, τότε δ' ὀλοσχερῶς, ἐκ μὲν τῆς θα-
 λάττης ἐξέβησαν, τῶν δ' ὑπαίθρων ἐπεκράτουν.
 Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τῆς μὲν θαλάττης ἐκυρίευν, τῆς δὲ
 3 γῆς οὐχ ὅλως ἀπήλπιζον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντες
 ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσχετλίαζον, οἳ τ' ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ
 καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον στρατόπεδα, διὰ τὰ προ-
 4 ειρημένα συμπτώματα· τῆς γε μὴν προθέσεως οὐκ
 ἀφίσταντο τῆς κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν
 ἐχορήγουν κατὰ γῆν ἀπροφασίστως, οἱ δὲ προσ-
 5 εκαρτέρουν ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ὁ δ' Ἰούνιος,
 ἀνακομισθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐκ τῆς ναυαγίας
 καὶ περιπαθῆς ὢν, ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸ καινοτομῆσαι
 τι καὶ πράξαι τῶν δεόντων, σπουδάζων ἀναμαχέ-
 6 σασθαι τὴν γεγεννημένην περιπέτειαν. διὸ καὶ βρα-
 χείας αὐτῷ παραπεσούσης ἀφορμῆς, καταλαμβάνει
 πραξικοπήσας τὸν Ἑρκα, καὶ γίνεται τοῦ τε τῆς
 7 Ἀφροδίτης ἱεροῦ καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐγκρατῆς. ὁ δ'
 Ἑρυξ ἔστι μὲν ὄρος παρὰ θάλατταν τῆς Σικελίας
 ἐν τῇ παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κειμένη πλευρᾷ μεταξὺ
 Δρεπάνων καὶ Πανόρμου, μᾶλλον δ' ὁμορον καὶ
 συνάπτον πρὸς τὰ Δρέπανα, μεγέθει δὲ παρὰ πολὺ
 διαφέρον τῶν κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν ὄρων πλην τῆς
 8 Αἴτνης. τούτου δ' ἐπ' αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς κορυφῆς, οὐ-
 σης ἐπιπέδου, κεῖται τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τῆς Ἑρυ-
 κίνης ἱερόν, ὅπερ ὁμολογουμένως ἐπιφανέστατόν ἐστι
 τῷ τε πλούτῳ καὶ τῇ λοιπῇ προστασίᾳ τῶν κατὰ
 9 τὴν Σικελίαν ἱερῶν· ἡ δὲ πόλις ὑπ' αὐτὴν τὴν κο-
 ρυφὴν τέταται, πάνυ μακρὰν ἔχουσα καὶ προσάντη
 10 πανταχόθεν τὴν ἀνάβασιν. ἐπὶ τε δὴ τὴν κορυφὴν
 ἐπιστήσας φυλακὴν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ Δρεπά-

BOOK I

Carthaginians rose again, and it seemed to them that the fortune of war was inclining in their favour, while the Romans, on the contrary, who had been previously to a certain extent unlucky but never had met with so complete a disaster, relinquished the sea, while continuing to maintain their hold on the country. The Carthaginians were now masters of the sea and were not hopeless of regaining their position on land. Subsequently, though all, both at Rome and in the army at Lilybaeum, continued to lament their whole situation after these recent defeats, yet they did not abandon their purpose of pursuing the siege, the government not hesitating to send supplies over land, and the besiegers keeping up the investment as strictly as they could. Junius, returning to the army after the shipwreck in a state of great affliction, set himself to devise some novel and original step that would be of service, being most anxious to make good the loss inflicted by the disaster. Therefore on some slight pretext offering itself, he surprised and occupied Eryx, possessing himself both of the temple of Venus and of the town. Eryx is a mountain near the sea on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy. It is situated between Drepana and Panormus, or rather it is adjacent to Drepana, on the borders, and is much the biggest mountain in Sicily after Etna.^a On its summit, which is flat, stands the temple of Venus Erycina, which is indisputably the first in wealth and general magnificence of all the Sicilian holy places. The city extends along the hill under the actual summit, the ascent to it being very long and steep on all sides. He garrisoned the summit and also the approach from Drepana, and

^a This is not a fact.

νων πρόσβασιν, ἐτήρει φιλοτίμως ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς τόπους, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τὸν τῆς ἀναβολῆς, πεπεισμένος οὕτως καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τὸ σύμπαν ὅρος ὑφ' αὐτὸν ἔξειν.

- 56 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες αὐτῶν Ἀμίλκαν τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπικαλούμενον, τούτῳ τὰ κατὰ τὸν στόλον ἐνεχείρισαν· ὃς παραλαβὼν τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις ὥρμησε πορθήσων τὴν Ἰταλίαν. ἔτος δ' ἦν ὀκτωκαιδέκατον τῷ πολέμῳ. κατασύρας δὲ τὴν Λοκρίδα καὶ τὴν Βρεττιανὴν χώραν, ἀποπλέων ἐντεῦθεν κατῆρε παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ πρὸς τὴν Πανορμίτιν, καὶ καταλαμβάνει τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς Εἰρκτῆς λεγόμενον τόπον, ὃς κεῖται μὲν Ἔρυκος καὶ Πανόρμου μεταξὺ πρὸς θαλάττῃ, πολὺ δέ τι τῶν ἄλλων δοκεῖ διαφέρειν τόπων ἐπιτηδειότητι πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν στρατοπέδων καὶ χρονισμόν.
- 4 ἔστι γὰρ ὅρος περίτομον ἕξανεστηκὸς ἐκ τῆς περικειμένης χώρας εἰς ὕψος ἰκανόν. τούτου δ' ἡ περίμετρος τῆς ἄνω στεφάνης οὐ λείπει τῶν ἑκατὸν σταδίων, ὑφ' ἧς ὁ περιεχόμενος τόπος εὐβότος ὑπάρχει καὶ γεωργήσιμος, πρὸς μὲν τὰς πελαγίους πνοιὰς εὐφυῶς κείμενος, θανασίμων δὲ θηρίων εἰς
- 5 τέλος ἄμιοιρος. περιέχεται δὲ κρημνοῖς ἀπροσίτοις ἐκ τε τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν μέρους καὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὴν μεσόγαιαν παρήκοντος, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων
- 6 ἔστιν ὀλίγης καὶ βραχείας δεόμενα κατασκευῆς. ἔχει δ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ μαστόν, ὃς ἅμα μὲν ἀκροπόλεως, ἅμα δὲ σκοπῆς εὐφυοῦς λαμβάνει τάξιν κατὰ τῆς
- 7 ὑποκειμένης χώρας. κρατεῖ δὲ καὶ λιμένος εὐκαίρου πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ Δρεπάνων καὶ Λιλυβαίου δρόμον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἐν ᾧ πλῆθος ὕδατος ἀφθονον ὑπάρχει.
- 8 προσόδους δὲ τὰς πάσας ἔχει τριττὰς δυσχερεῖς,

jealously guarded both these positions, especially the latter, in the conviction that by this means he would securely hold the city and the whole mountain.

56. The Carthaginians shortly afterwards appointed ^{247 B.C.} Hamilcar surnamed Barcas to the command and entrusted naval operations to him. He started with the fleet to ravage the Italian coast (this, I should say, was in the eighteenth year of the war) and after laying waste Locris and Bruttium quitted those parts and descended with his whole fleet on the territory of Panormus. Here he seized on a place called Herete ^a lying near the sea between Eryx and Panormus, and thought to possess peculiar advantages for the safe and prolonged stay of an army. It is an abrupt hill rising to a considerable height from the surrounding flat country. The circumference of its brow is not less than a hundred stades and the plateau within affords good pasturage and is suitable for cultivation, being also favourably exposed to the sea-breeze and quite free of animals dangerous to life. On the side looking to the sea and on that which faces the interior of the island, this plateau is surrounded by inaccessible cliffs, while the parts between require only a little slight strengthening. There is also a knoll on it which serves for an acropolis as well as for an excellent post of observation over the country at the foot of the hill. Besides this Herete commands a harbour very well situated for ships making the voyage from Drepana and Lilybaeum to Italy to put in at, and with an abundant supply of water.^b The hill has only three approaches,

^a Now Monte Pellegrino.

^b This cannot be the harbour of Palermo, which was in the hands of the Romans, and must be looked for on the opposite side of Monte Pellegrino.

- δύο μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας, μίαν δ' ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης.
 9 ἐν ᾧ καταστρατοπεδεύσας παραβόλως Ἀμίλκας, ὡς
 ἂν μήτε πόλεως οἰκείας μήτ' ἄλλης ἐλπίδος μηδε-
 μιᾶς ἀντεχόμενος, εἰς μέσους δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους
 ἑαυτὸν δεδωκώς, ὅμως οὐ μικροὺς οὐδὲ τοὺς τυχόν-
 τας Ῥωμαίοις ἀγῶνας καὶ κινδύνους παρεσκεύασε.
 10 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν ὀρμώμενος κατὰ θάλατ-
 ταν τὴν παραλίαν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπόρθει μέχρι τῆς
 11 Κυμαίων χώρας, δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ γῆν παραστρα-
 τοπεδευσάντων αὐτῷ Ῥωμαίων πρὸ τῆς Πανορμι-
 τῶν πόλεως ἐν ἴσως πέντε σταδίοις, πολλοὺς καὶ
 ποικίλους ἀγῶνας συνεστήσατο κατὰ γῆν σχεδὸν ἐπὶ
 57 τρεῖς ἐνιαυτοὺς. περὶ ὧν οὐχ οἶόν τε διὰ τῆς γρα-
 φῆς τὸν κατὰ μέρος ἀποδοῦναι λόγον· καθάπερ
 γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν διαφερόντων πυκτῶν καὶ ταῖς γενναιό-
 τησι καὶ ταῖς εὐεξίαις, ὅταν εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ
 τοῦ στεφάνου συγκαταστάντες καιρὸν διαμάχωνται
 πληγὴν ἐπὶ πληγῇ τιθέντες ἀδιαπαύστως, λόγον μὲν
 ἢ πρόνοιαν ἔχειν ὑπὲρ ἐκάστης ἐπιβολῆς καὶ πλη-
 γῆς οὔτε τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις οὔτε τοῖς θεωμένοις
 2 ἐστὶ δυνατόν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς καθόλου τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐνερ-
 γείας καὶ τῆς ἐκατέρου φιλοτιμίας ἔστι καὶ τῆς ἐμ-
 πειρίας αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τῆς
 εὐψυχίας, ἱκανὴν ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ περὶ
 3 τῶν νῦν λεγομένων στρατηγῶν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ αἰ-
 τίας ἢ τοὺς τρόπους, δι' ὧν ἀν' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν
 ἐποιοῦντο κατ' ἀλλήλων ἐνέδρας, ἀντενέδρας, ἐπι-
 θέσεις, προσβολάς, οὗτ' ἂν ὁ γράφων ἐξαριθμού-
 μενος ἐφίκοιτο, τοῖς τ' ἀκούουσιν ἀπέραντος ἅμα
 δ' ἀνωφελὲς ἂν ἐκ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως γίνοιτο χρεία·
 4 ἐκ δὲ τῆς καθολικῆς ἀποφάσεως περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ
 τέλους τῆς φιλοτιμίας μᾶλλον ἂν τις εἰς ἔννοιαν ἔλ-

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all difficult, two on the land side and one from the sea. Here Hamilcar established his quarters, at great risk indeed, since he had neither the support of any of their own towns nor any prospect of support from elsewhere, but had thrown himself into the midst of the enemy. Notwithstanding this, the peril to which he put the Romans, and the combats to which he forced them, were by no means slight or insignificant. For in the first place he would sally out with his fleet from this place, and devastate the coast of Italy as far as Cyne, and next, after the Romans had taken up a position on land in front of the city of Panormus and at a distance of about five stades from his own camp, he harassed them by delivering during almost three years constant and variously contrived attacks by land. These combats I am unable to describe in detail here. 57. For as in a boxing-match when two champions, both distinguished for pluck and both in perfect training, meet in the decisive contest for the prize, continually delivering blow for blow, neither the combatants themselves nor the spectators can note or anticipate every attack or every blow, but it is possible, from the general action of each, and the determination that each displays, to get a fair idea of their respective skill, strength, and courage, so it was with these two generals. The causes or the modes of their daily ambuscades, counter-ambuscades, attempts, and assaults were so numerous that no writer could properly describe them, while at the same time the narrative would be most tedious as well as unprofitable to the reader. It is rather by a general pronouncement about the two men and the result of their rival efforts that a notion of the facts

- 5 θοι τῶν προειρημένων. οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἱστορίας
στρατηγημάτων οὔτε τῶν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ τῆς
ὑποκειμένης περιστάσεως ἐπινοημάτων οὔτε τῶν εἰς
6 παράβολον καὶ βίαιον ἀνηκόντων τόλμαν οὐδὲν παρ-
ελείφθη. κρίσιν γε μὴν ὀλοσχερῇ γενέσθαι διὰ πλεί-
ους αἰτίας οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἦν· αἷ τε γὰρ δυνάμεις ἀμ-
φοτέρων ἦσαν ἐφάμιλλοι, τά τε κατὰ τοὺς χάρακας
ὁμοίως ἀπρόσιτα διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα, τό τε διάστημα
7 τῶν στρατοπέδων βραχὺ παντελῶς. ὅπερ αἷτιον ἦν
μάλιστα τοῦ τὰς μὲν κατὰ μέρος συμπτώσεις ἀπαύ-
στους γίνεσθαι καθ' ἡμέραν, ὀλοσχερὲς δὲ συν-
8 τελεῖσθαι μηδέν. τούτους γὰρ αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ συνέβαινε
διαφθεῖρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκάς, τοὺς ἐν χειρῶν
νόμῳ περιπεσόντας· οἱ δ' ἅπαξ ἐγκλίναντες εὐθέως
ἐκτὸς τοῦ δεινοῦ πάντες ἦσαν ὑπὸ ταῖς αὐτῶν
ἀσφαλείαις, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐκινδύνευον.
- 58 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς βραβευτὴς ἢ τύχη
μεταβιβάσασα παραβόλως αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ προειρη-
μένου τόπου καὶ τοῦ προϋπάρχοντος ἀθλήματος εἰς
παραβολώτερον ἀγώνισμα καὶ τόπον ἐλάττω συν-
2 ἐκλείσεν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀμίλκας, τῶν Ῥωμαίων τὸν Ἑρκα-
τηρούντων ἐπὶ τε τῆς κορυφῆς καὶ παρὰ τὴν ρίζαν,
καθάπερ εἵπομεν, κατελάβετο τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἑρυ-
κίων, ἥτις ἦν μεταξὺ τῆς τε κορυφῆς καὶ τῶν πρὸς
3 τῇ ρίζῃ στρατοπεδευσάντων. ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε παρα-
βόλως μὲν ὑπομένειν καὶ διακινδυνεύειν πολιορ-
κουμένους τοὺς τὴν κορυφὴν κατέχοντας τῶν Ῥω-
μαίων, ἀπίστως δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀντέχειν, τῶν
τε πολεμίων πανταχόθεν προσκειμένων καὶ τῶν χο-
ρηγιῶν οὐ ῥαδίως αὐτοῖς παρακοιμιζομένων, ὥς ἂν
τῆς θαλάττης καθ' ἓνα τόπον καὶ μίαν πρόσοδον
ἀντεχομένοις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐνταῦθα πάσαις

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can be conveyed. Nothing was neglected; neither traditional tactics nor plans suggested by the occasion and by actual pressure of circumstances, nor those strokes which depend on a bold and strong initiative. Yet there were several reasons why no decisive success could be obtained. For the forces on each side were evenly matched; their trenches were so strong as to be equally unapproachable, and they were at a quite small distance from each other, this being the chief reason why there were daily conflicts at certain points, but no decisive engagement. The losses in these combats consisted only of those who fell in the hand-to-hand fighting, while the side which once gave way used to get out of danger at once behind their defences, from whence they would issue again and resume the fight.

58. But Fortune, however, like a good umpire, unexpectedly shifted the scene and changed the nature of the contest, confining both in a narrower field, where the struggle grew even more desperate. The Romans, as I said, had garrisons at Eryx on the summit of the mountain and at the foot. Hamilear now seized the town which lies between 244 B.C. the summit and the spot at the foot where the garrison was. The consequence of this was that the Romans on the summit—a thing they had never expected—remained besieged and in considerable peril, and that the Carthaginians, though it is scarcely credible, maintained their position though the enemy were pressing on them from all sides and the conveyance of supplies was not easy, as they only held one place on the sea and one single road connecting with it. However, here again both sides employed

- 4 μὲν ἀμφοτέροι ταῖς πολιορκητικαῖς ἐπινοίαις καὶ βί-
 αῖς χρησάμενοι κατ' ἀλλήλων, πᾶν δὲ γένος ἐνδείας
 ἀνασχόμενοι, πάσης δ' ἐπιθέσεως καὶ μάχης πείραν
 5 λαβόντες, τέλος οὐχ, ὥς Φάβιός φησιν, ἐξαδυνα-
 τοῦντες καὶ περικακοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν ἀπαθεῖς
 καήττητοί τινες ἄνδρες, ἱερὸν ἐποίησαν τὸν στέφα-
 6 νον. πρότερον γὰρ ἢ 'κείνους ἀλλήλων ἐπικρατῆ-
 σαι, καίπερ δὴ ἔτη πάλιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ δι-
 αγωνισαμένους, δι' ἄλλου τρόπου συνέβη λαβεῖν τὸν
 πόλεμον τὴν κρίσιν.
- 7 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Ἑρυν καὶ τὰς πεζικὰς
 δυνάμεις τοιαύτην ἔσχε διάθεσιν. τὰ δὲ πολιτεύ-
 ματ' ἦν ἀμφοτέρων παραπλήσια τοῖς ψυχομαχοῦσι
 8 τῶν εὐγενῶν ὀρνίθων. ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ πολλάκις
 ἀπολωλεκότες τὰς πτέρυγας διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν,
 αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ μένοντες ἐκβάλλουσι τὰς πληγὰς,
 ἕως ἂν αὐτομάτως ποτὲ περιπεσόντες αὐτοῖς και-
 ρίως ἀλλήλων διαδράξωνται, καίπειτα τούτου γενο-
 9 μένου συμβῇ τὸν ἕτερον αὐτῶν προπεσεῖν· οἳ τε
 Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι κάμνοντες ἤδη τοῖς πό-
 νοις διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν κινδύνων εἰς τέλος
 ἀπήλγουν, τὴν τε δύναμιν παρελέλυντο καὶ παρῆντο
 59 διὰ τὰς πολυχρονίους εἰσφοράς καὶ δαπάνας. ὁμῶς
 δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι ψυχομαχοῦντες, καίπερ ἔτη σχεδὸν ἤδη
 πέντε τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν πραγμάτων ὅλοσχερῶς
 ἀφεστηκότες διὰ τε τὰς περιπετείας καὶ διὰ τὸ πε-
 πείσθαι δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πεζικῶν δυνάμεων κρινεῖν
 2 τὸν πόλεμον, τότε συνορῶντες οὐ προχωροῦν αὐτοῖς
 τοῦργον κατὰ τοὺς ἐκλογισμοὺς καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν
 τόλμην τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡγεμόνος, ἔκριναι τὸ
 τρίτον ἀντιποιήσασθαι τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυτικαῖς δυνά-
 3 μεσιν ἐλπίδων, ὑπολαμβάνοντες διὰ τῆς ἐπινοίας

every device and effort that the siege demanded: both endured every kind of privation and both essayed every means of attack and every variety of action. At length not, as Fabius Pictor says, owing to their exhaustion and sufferings, but like two uninjured and invincible champions, they left the contest drawn. For before either could get the better of the other, though the struggle in this place lasted for another two years, the war had been decided by other means. 243-242
B.C.

Such then was the condition of affairs at Eryx and as far as regarded the land forces. We may compare the spirit displayed by both states to that of game cocks engaged in a death-struggle. For we often see that when these birds have lost the use of their wings from exhaustion, their courage remains as high as ever and they continue to strike blow upon blow, until closing involuntarily they get a deadly hold of each other, and as soon as this happens one or other of the two will soon fall dead. 59. So the Romans and Carthaginians, worn out by their exertions owing to the continual fighting, at length began to be apathetic, their strength paralysed and their resources exhausted by protracted taxation and expense. But, in spite of all, the Romans, as if fighting for their lives, although they had for nearly five years utterly withdrawn from the sea owing to their disasters and their belief that they would be able to decide the war by the aid of their land forces alone, now, when they saw that chiefly owing to the bold action of the Carthaginian general they were not making the progress on which they had reckoned, decided again for the third time to court the prospect of success at sea. They thought that this course, if they could

ταύτης, εἰ καιρίως ἄψαιντο τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, μόνως ἂν
 οὕτως πέρας ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ πολέμῳ συμφέρον. ὃ
 4 καὶ τέλος ἐποίησαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐξεχώρη-
 σαν τῆς θαλάττης εἴξαντες τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης συμ-
 πτώμασι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐλαττωθέντες τῇ περὶ τὰ
 5 Δρέπανα ναυμαχίᾳ· τότε δὲ τρίτην ἐποιοῦντο ταύ-
 την τὴν ἐπιβολήν, δι' ἧς νικήσαντες καὶ τὰ περὶ
 τὸν Ἑρκα στρατόπεδα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀποκλεί-
 σαντες τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν χορηγίας τέλος ἐπέθηκαν
 6 τοῖς ὅλοις. ἦν δὲ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τὸ πλεῖον ψυχο-
 μαχία. χορηγία μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπῆρχε πρὸς τὴν πρό-
 θεσιν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς· οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν
 προεστώτων ἀνδρῶν εἰς τὰ κοινὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ
 7 γενναιότητα προσευρέθη πρὸς τὴν συντέλειαν. κατὰ
 γὰρ τὰς τῶν βίων εὐκαιρίας καθ' ἓνα καὶ δύο καὶ
 τρεῖς ὑφίσταντο παρέξειν πεντῆρη κατηρτισμένην,
 ἐφ' ᾧ τὴν δαπάνην κομιοῦνται, κατὰ λόγον τῶν
 8 πραγμάτων προχωρησάντων. τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ
 ταχέως ἐτοιμασθέντων διακοσίων πλοίων πεντηρι-
 κῶν, ὧν ἐποίησαντο τὴν ναυπηγίαν πρὸς [παρά-
 δειγμα] τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδίου ναῦν, μετὰ ταῦτα στρατη-
 γὸν καταστήσαντες Γάϊον Λυτάτιον ἐξέπεμψαν ἀρ-
 9 χομένης τῆς θερείας. ὃς καὶ παραδόξως ἐπιφανεῖς
 τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τόποις τὸν τε περὶ τὰ Δρέ-
 πανα λιμένα κατέσχε καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον
 ὄρμους, παντὸς ἀνακεχωρηκότος εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ
 10 τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναυτικοῦ. συστησάμενος δὲ περὶ
 τὴν ἐν τοῖς Δρεπάνοις πόλιν ἔργα καὶ τᾶλλα πρὸς
 τὴν πολιορκίαν παρασκευασάμενος, ἅμα μὲν ταύτῃ
 11 προσεκαρτέρει τὰ δυνατὰ ποιῶν, ἅμα δὲ προορώ-
 μενος τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Καρχηδονίων στόλου, καὶ
 μνημονεύων τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς προθέσεως ὅτι μόνως

but strike a deadly blow, was the only way of bringing the war to a favourable conclusion. And this they finally accomplished. It was yielding to the blows of Fortune that they had retired from the sea on the first occasion; the second time it was owing to their defeat at Drepana, but now they made this third attempt, and through it, by gaining a victory and cutting off the supplies from the sea of the Carthaginian army at Eryx, they put an end to the whole war. The attempt was indeed of the nature of a struggle for existence. For there were no funds in the public treasury for this purpose; but yet, owing to the patriotic and generous spirit of the leading citizens, enough was found to carry out the project; as either one, two, or three of them, according to their means, undertook to provide a quinquereme fully equipped on the understanding that they would be repaid if all went well. In this way a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes was rapidly got ready, all built on the the model of the "Rhodian's" ship. They then appointed Gaius Lutatius to the 242 B.C. command and dispatched him at the beginning of summer. Suddenly appearing off the coast of Sicily, he seized on the harbour of Drepana and the roadsteads near Lilybæum, the whole Carthaginian navy having retired to their own country. First of all he constructed works round the city of Drepana and made all preparations for its siege, but while continuing to prosecute this by every means in his power, he foresaw that the Carthaginian fleet would arrive, and was not forgetful of the original motive of the expedi-

- δύναται διὰ τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν κινδύνου κρίσεως
τὰ ὅλα τυχεῖν, οὐκ ἀχρεῖον οὐδ' ἄργον εἶα γίνε-
12 σθαι τὸν χρόνον, ἀλλ' ἀν' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἀναπείρας
καὶ μελέτας ποιῶν τοῖς πληρώμασιν οἰκείως τῆς
ἐπιβολῆς, τῇ τε λοιπῇ τῇ κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν ἐπι-
μελεῖα προσκαρτερῶν, ἀθλητὰς ἀπετέλεσε πρὸς τὸ
προκείμενον ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ τοὺς ναύτας.
- 60 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, παρὰ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν προσ-
πεσόντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πεπλευκέναι στόλῳ τοὺς Ῥω-
μαίους καὶ πάλιν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῆς θαλάττης, παρ-
2 αὐτίκα κατήρτιζον τὰς ναῦς, καὶ πληρώσαντες σί-
του καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, ἐξέπεμπον τὸν στό-
λον, βουλόμενοι μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἑρκα
3 στρατόπεδα τῶν ἀναγκαίων. κατέστησαν δὲ καὶ
στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως Ἄννωνα· ὃς
ἀναχθεὶς καὶ κατάρας ἐπὶ τὴν Ἱερὰν καλουμένην
νῆσον ἔσπευδε τοὺς πολεμίους λαθὼν διακομισθῆ-
ναι πρὸς τὸν Ἑρκα, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀγορὰς ἀποθέ-
σθαι καὶ κουφίσαι τὰς ναῦς, προσλαβὼν δ' ἐπιβά-
τας ἐκ τῶν μισθοφόρων τοὺς ἐπιτηδέους καὶ Βάρ-
καν μετ' αὐτῶν, οὕτως συμμίσγειν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.
- 4 ὁ δὲ Λυτάτιος συνεῖς τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν
Ἄννωνα, καὶ συλλογισάμενος τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν,
ἀναλαβὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατεύματος τοὺς ἀρί-
στους ἄνδρας ἔπλευσε πρὸς τὴν Αἰγοῦσσαν νῆσον
5 τὴν πρὸ τοῦ Αἰλυβαίου κειμένην. κἀνταῦθα παρα-
καλέσας τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ τὰς δυνάμεις δι-
εσύφει τοῖς κυβερνήταις ὡς ἐσομένης εἰς τὴν αὖριον
6 ναυμαχίας. ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑωθινήν, ἥδη τῆς ἡμέρας
ὑποφαινούσης, ὄρων τοῖς μὲν ἐναντίοις φορὸν ἄνε-
μιον καταρρέοντα καὶ λαμπρόν, σφίσι δὲ δυσχερῇ
γινόμενον τὸν ἀνάπλουν πρὸς ἀντίον τὸ πνεῦμα,

tion, the belief that it was only by a sea battle that the war could be decisively finished. He did not, then, allow the time to pass uselessly and idly, but every day was spent in exercising and practising the crews properly for this purpose. He also paid unremitting attention to the matter of training, so that in a very short time he got his sailors into perfect condition for the anticipated battle.

60. When the unexpected news reached Carthage that the Romans were at sea with a fleet and were again disputing the naval supremacy, they at once got their ships ready, and filling them with corn and other provisions, dispatched their fleet on its errand, desiring that the troops at Eryx should be in no need 241 B.C. of necessary supplies. Hanno, whom they had appointed to the command, set sail and reached the so-called Holy Isle from whence he designed to cross as soon as possible to Eryx, unobserved by the enemy, and, after lightening the ships by disembarking the supplies, to take on board as marines the best qualified mercenaries together with Barcas himself and then engage the enemy. Lutatius, learning of Hanno's arrival and divining his intentions, took on board a picked force from the army and sailed to the island of Aegusa which lies off Lilybaeum. There, after exhorting his troops as became the occasion, he informed the captains that the battle would take place next day. In the early morning, just as day was breaking, he saw that a brisk breeze was coming down favourable to the enemy, but that it had become difficult for himself to sail up against the wind, the

κοίλης καὶ τραχείας οὔσης τῆς θαλάττης, τὸ μὲν
7 πρῶτον διηπόρει τί δεῖ χρήσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι. συλ-
λογιζόμενος δ' ὥς ἐὰν μὲν παραβάλληται χειμῶνος
ὄντος, πρὸς Ἀννωνα ποιήσεται τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ πρὸς
αὐτὰς τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ πρὸς ἔτι γέμοντα
8 τὰ σκάφη, ἐὰν δὲ τηρῶν εὐδίαν καὶ καταμέλλων
ἑάσῃ διαῖραι καὶ συμμῖξαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοὺς
πολεμίους, πρὸς τε τὰς ναῦς εὐκινήτους καὶ κεκου-
φισμένας ἀγωνιεῖται πρὸς τε τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας
τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατευμάτων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον
πρὸς τὴν Ἀμίλκου τόλμαν, ἧς οὐδὲν ἦν τότε φο-
9 βερώτερον· διόπερ ἔκρινε μὴ παρεῖναι τὸν ἐνεστῶτα
καιρόν· συνιδὼν δὲ τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς ἰστιο-
δρομούσας, ἀνήγετο μετὰ σπουδῆς. τῶν δὲ πλη-
ρωμάτων εὐχερῶς ἀναφερόντων τὸν κλύδωνα ταῖς
εὐεξίαις, ταχέως ἐπὶ μίαν ἐκτείνας ναῦν ἀντίπρωρ-
61 ρον κατέστησε τοῖς πολεμίοις τὸν στόλον. οἱ δὲ
Καρχηδόνιοι κατιδόντες τὸν διάπλουν αὐτῶν προ-
κατέχοντας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, καθελόμενοι τοὺς ἰστούς
καὶ παρακαλέσαντες κατὰ ναῦν σφᾶς αὐτούς, συν-
2 ἔβαλλον τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. τῆς δ' ἑκατέρων παρα-
σκευῆς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐχούσης διάθεσιν τῇ περὶ τὰ
Δρέπανα γενομένη ναυμαχίᾳ, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἑκατέροις
3 τῆς μάχης εἰκότως ἐναντίον ἀπέβη. οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι
μὲν γὰρ τὴν τε ναυπηγίαν μετειλήφεσαν, καὶ τὰ βάρη
πάντα χωρὶς τῶν πρὸς τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἐπιτηδείων
ἐξετέθειντο· τὰ τε πληρώματα συγκεκροτημένα δια-
φέρουσάν αὐτοῖς τὴν χρεῖαν παρείχετο, τοὺς τ'
ἐπιβάτας κατ' ἐκλογὴν ἄνδρας ἀπαραχωρήτους ἐκ
4 τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων εἶχον. περὶ δὲ τοὺς
Καρχηδονίους τὰναντία τούτοις ὑπῆρχεν. αἱ μὲν
γὰρ νῆες γέμουσαι δυσχρήστως διέκειντο πρὸς τὸν

sea too being heavy and rough. At first he hesitated much what to do under the circumstances, but reflected that if he risked an attack now that the weather was stormy, he would be fighting against Hanno and the naval forces alone and also against heavily laden ships, whereas if he waited for calm weather and by his delay allowed the enemy to cross and join the army, he would have to face ships now lightened and manageable as well as the pick of the land forces and above all the bravery of Hamilcar which was what they dreaded most at that time. He therefore decided not to let the present opportunity slip. When he saw the Carthaginian ships under full sail he at once got under weigh. As his crews easily mastered the waves owing to their good training, he soon brought his fleet into a single line with their prows to the enemy. 61. The Carthaginians, seeing that the Romans were intercepting their crossing, lowered their masts and cheering each other on in each ship closed with the enemy. As the condition of each force was just the reverse of what it had been at the battle of Drepana, the result also was naturally the reverse for each. The Romans had reformed their system of shipbuilding and had also put ashore all heavy material except what was required for the battle; their crews rendered excellent service, as their training had got them well together, and the marines they had were men selected from the army for their steadfastness. With the Carthaginians it was just the opposite. Their ships, being loaded, were not in a serviceable condition for battle, while

κίνδυνον, τὰ δὲ πληρώματα τελέως ἦν ἀνάσκητα καὶ πρὸς καιρὸν ἐμβεβλημένα, τὰ δ' ἐπιβατικά νεοσύλλογα καὶ πρωτόπειρα πάσης κακοπαθείας καὶ
 5 παντὸς δεινοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἂν ἔτι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐλπίσαι τῆς θαλάττης ἀντιποιήσασθαι καταφρονήσαντες ὀλιγώρουν τῶν ναυτικῶν δυνά-
 6 μεων. τοιγαροῦν ἅμα τῷ συμβαλεῖν κατὰ πολλὰ μέρη τῆς μάχης ἐλαττούμενοι ταχέως ἐλείφθησαν, καὶ πεντήκοντα μὲν αὐτῶν ναῦς κατέδυσαν, ἑβδο-
 7 μήκοντα δ' ἐάλωσαν αὐτανδροί. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος ἐπαράμενον τοὺς ἰστοὺς καὶ κατουρῶσαν αὐθις ἀπεχώρει πρὸς τὴν Ἰερὰν νῆσον, εὐτυχῶς καὶ παρα-
 8 ρὸν τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργήσαντος. ὁ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς ἀποπλεύσας πρὸς τὸ Λιλύβαιο καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰχμαλώτων πλοίων καὶ τῶν σωμάτων οἰκονομίαν ἐγίνετο, μεγάλην οὖσαν. οὐ γὰρ πολὺ τῶν μυρίων ἔλειπε σωμάτων τὰ ληφθέντα ζωγρία κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον.

62 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, προσπεσούσης αὐτοῖς ἀπροσδοκῆτως τῆς ἡττης, ταῖς μὲν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ταῖς φιλοτιμίαις ἀκμὴν ἔτοιμοι πολεμεῖν ἦσαν, τοῖς δὲ λογισμοῖς ἐξηπόρουν. οὐτε γὰρ χορηγεῖν ἔτι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ δυνάμεσιν οἰοί τ' ἦσαν, κρατούντων τῆς θαλάττης τῶν ὑπεναντίων. ἀπογνόντες δὲ ταύτας, καὶ προδόται τρόπον τινὰ γερόμενοι, ποίαις χερσὶν
 3 ἢ ποίοις ἡγεμόσι πολεμήσειαν οὐκ εἶχον. διόπερ ὀξέως διαπεμφάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπέτρεψαν ἐκείνῳ περὶ τῶν ὄλων. ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἐποίησεν
 4 ἔργον ἡγεμόνος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φρονίμου. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἦν τις ἐλπίς ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, οὐδὲν τῶν παραβόλων ἢ δεινῶν δοκούντων

the crews were quite untrained, and had been put on board for the emergency, and their marines were recent levies whose first experience of the least hardship and danger this was. The fact is that, owing to their never having expected the Romans to dispute the sea with them again, they had, in contempt for them, neglected their navy. So that immediately on engaging they had the worst in many parts of the battle and were soon routed, fifty ships being sunk and seventy captured with their crews. The remainder raising their masts and finding a fair wind got back to Holy Isle, very fortunate in the wind having unexpectedly gone round and helping them just when they required it. As for the Roman Consul he sailed away to Lilybaeum and the legions, and there occupied himself with the disposal of the captured ships and men, a business of some magnitude, as the prisoners made in the battle numbered very nearly ten thousand.

62. Even on hearing of this unexpected defeat the Carthaginians, had they let themselves be guided by passion and ambition, would readily have continued the war, but when it came to a matter of cool calculation they were quite at a loss. For one thing they were no longer able to send supplies to their forces in Sicily as the enemy commanded the sea, and if they abandoned and in a manner betrayed them, they had neither other men nor other leaders with whom to pursue the war. They therefore at once sent a message to Barcas giving him full powers to deal with the situation. Hamilcar acted thoroughly like the good and prudent leader he was. As long as there had been some reasonable hope in the situation he had left no means, however perilous and

εἶναι παρέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ πάσας τὰς τοῦ νικᾶν ἐν τῷ
 πολεμεῖν ἐλπίδας, εἰ καὶ τις ἄλλος ἡγεμόνων, ἐξ-
 5 ἤλεγξεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ περιέστη τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῶν
 κατὰ λόγον οὐδὲν ἔτι κατελείπετο πρὸς τὸ σῶζειν
 τοὺς ὑποταττομένους, πάνυ νουνεχῶς καὶ πραγμα-
 τικῶς εἷξας τοῖς παροῦσιν ὑπὲρ σπονδῶν καὶ δια-
 6 λύσεων ἐξαπέστελλε πρεσβευτάς. τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ
 νομιστέον ἡγεμόνος εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι βλέπειν τὸν τε
 7 τοῦ νικᾶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ λείπεσθαι καιρόν.
 τοῦ δὲ Λυτατίου προθύμως δεξαμένου τὰ παρακα-
 λούμενα διὰ τὸ συνειδέναι τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι
 τετρυμένοις καὶ κάμνουσιν ἤδη τῷ πολέμῳ, συνέβη
 τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῇ διαφορᾷ τοιούτων τινῶν συνθη-
 8 κῶν διαγραφεισῶν. “ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Καρ-
 χηδονίοις καὶ Ῥωμαίοις, εἰ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ τῶν
 Ῥωμαίων συνδοκῇ. ἐκχωρεῖν Σικελίας ἀπάσης
 Καρχηδονίους καὶ μὴ πολεμεῖν Ἰέρωνι μηδ’ ἐπι-
 φέρειν ὅπλα Συρακοσίοις μηδὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων
 9 συμμάχοις. ἀποδοῦναι Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις
 χωρὶς λύτρων ἅπαντας τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους. ἀρ-
 γυρίου κατενεγκεῖν Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις ἐν
 ἔτεσιν εἴκοσι δισχίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντ’
 63 Εὐβοϊκά.” τούτων δ’ ἐπανενεχθέντων εἰς τὴν
 Ῥώμην, οὐ προσεδέξατο τὰς συνθήκας ὁ δῆμος, ἀλλ’
 ἐξαπέστειλεν ἄνδρας δέκα τοὺς ἐπισκεψομένους
 2 ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων. οἳ καὶ παραγενόμενοι τῶν
 μὲν ὅλων οὐδὲν ἔτι μετέθηκαν, βραχέα δὲ προσεπέτει-
 3 ναν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. τὸν τε γὰρ χρόνον τῶν
 φόρων ἐποίησαν ἡμισυν, χίλια τάλαντα προσθέντες,
 τῶν τε νήσων ἐκχωρεῖν Καρχηδονίους προσεπέτα-
 ξαν, ὅσαι μεταξὺ τῆς Ἰταλίας κεῖνται καὶ τῆς
 Σικελίας.

venturesome it seemed, unemployed, and if there ever was a general who put to proof in a war every chance of success, it was he. But now that fortunes were reversed and there was no reasonable prospect left of saving the troops under his command, he showed his practical good sense in yielding to circumstance and sending an embassy to treat for peace. For our opinion should be that a general ought to be qualified to discern both when he is victorious and when he is beaten. Lutatius readily consented to negotiate, conscious as he was that the Romans were by this time worn out and enfeebled by the war, and he succeeded in putting an end to the contest by a treaty more or less as follows. "There shall be friendship between the Carthaginians and Romans on the following terms if approved by the Roman people. The Carthaginians to evacuate the whole of Sicily and not to make war on Hiero or bear arms against the Syracusans or the allies of the Syracusans. The Carthaginians to give up to the Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians to pay to the Romans by instalments in twenty years two thousand two hundred Euboean talents." 63. But when these terms were referred to Rome, the people did not accept the treaty, but sent ten commissioners to examine the matter. On their arrival they made no substantial changes in the terms, but only slight modifications rendering them more severe for Carthage: for they reduced the term of payment by one half, added a thousand talents to the indemnity, and demanded the evacuation by the Carthaginians of all islands lying between Sicily and Italy.

- 4 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις συστάς
περὶ Σικελίας πόλεμος ἐπὶ τοιούτοις καὶ τοιοῦτον
ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, ἔτη πολεμηθεὶς εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρα
συνεχῶς, πόλεμος ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἀκοῇ μαθόντες
- 5 πολυχρονιώτατος καὶ συνεχέστατος καὶ μέγιστος.
ἐν ᾧ χωρὶς τῶν λοιπῶν ἀγώνων καὶ παρασκευῶν,
καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀνώτερον, ἅπαξ μὲν οἱ συνάμφω
πλείοσιν ἢ πεντακοσίοις, πάλιν δὲ μικρῶ λείπουσιν
ἑπτακοσίοις σκάφεσι πεντηρικοῖς ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς
- 6 ἀλλήλους. ἀπέβαλόν γε μὴν Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν ἐν τῷ
πολέμῳ τούτῳ πεντήρεις μετὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυα-
γίαις διαφθαρεισῶν εἰς ἑπτακοσίας, Καρχηδόνιοι δ'
- 7 εἰς πεντακοσίας. ὥστε τοὺς θαυμάζοντας τὰς Ἀν-
τιγόνου καὶ Πτολεμαίου καὶ Δημητρίου ναυμαχίας
καὶ τοὺς στόλους εἰκότως ἂν περὶ τούτων ἱστορή-
σαντας ἐκπεπλήχθαι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν πράξεων.
- 8 εἰ δέ τις βουλευθείη συλλογίσασθαι τὴν διαφορὰν
τῶν πεντηρικῶν πλοίων πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις, αἷς οἷ
τε Πέρσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ πάλιν Ἀθηναῖοι
καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐναυμάχουν, οὐδ'
ἂν καθόλου δυνηθείη τηλικαύτας δυνάμεις εὐρεῖν
- 9 ἐν θαλάττῃ διηγωνισμένας. ἐξ ὧν δῆλον τὸ προ-
τεθὲν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡς οὐ τύχῃ Ῥωμαῖοι, καθάπερ
ἔνιοι δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐδ' αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ
καὶ λίαν εἰκότως ἐν τοιούτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις πράγ-
μασιν ἐνασκήσαντες οὐ μόνον ἐπεβάλοιτο τῇ τῶν
ὄλων ἡγεμονία καὶ δυναστεία τολμηρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ
- 64 καθίκοντο τῆς προθέσεως. καὶ τί δήποτ' ἔστι τὸ
αἴτιον, ἀπορήσαι τις ἂν, ὅτι κεκρατηκότες τῶν ὄλων
καὶ πολλαπλασίαν ἔχοντες ὑπεροχὴν νῦν ἢ πρόσθεν
οὐτ' ἂν πληρῶσαι τοσαύτας ναῦς οὐτ' ἀναπλεῦσαι
- 2 τηλικούτοις στόλοις δυνηθεῖεν; οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ

Such then was the end of the war between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of Sicily, and such were the terms of peace. It had lasted without a break for twenty-four years and is the longest, most unintermittent, and greatest war we know of. Apart from all the other battles and armaments, the total naval forces engaged were, as I mentioned above, on one occasion more than five hundred quinqueremes and on a subsequent one very nearly seven hundred. Moreover the Romans lost in this war about seven hundred quinqueremes, inclusive of those that perished in the shipwrecks, and the Carthaginians about five hundred. So that those who marvel at the great sea-battles and great fleets of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius would, if I mistake not, on inquiring into the history of this war, be much astonished at the huge scale of the operations. Again, if we take into consideration the difference between quinqueremes and the triremes in which the Persians fought against the Greeks and the Athenians and Lacedaemonians against each other, we shall find that no forces of such magnitude ever met at sea. This confirms the assertion I ventured to make at the outset that the progress of the Romans was not due to chance and was not involuntary, as some among the Greeks choose to think, but that by schooling themselves in such vast and perilous enterprises it was perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal dominion, but executed their purpose. 64. Some of my readers will wonder what can be the reason why, now that they are masters of the world and far more puissant than formerly, they could neither man so many ships, nor put to sea with such large fleets.

- μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σαφῶς ἐξέσται τὰς αἰτίας
 κατανοεῖν, ὅταν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξήγησιν αὐτῶν τῆς πολι-
 τείας ἔλθωμεν· ὑπὲρ ἧς οὐθ' ἡμῖν ἐν παρέργῳ ῥη-
 3 τέον οὔτε τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἀργῶς προσεκτέον. τὸ
 μὲν γὰρ θέαμα καλόν, σχεδὸν δ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν
 ἄγνωστον ἕως τοῦ νῦν, χάριν τῶν περὶ αὐτῆς συγ-
 4 γεγραφότων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡγνοήκασιν, οἱ δ' ἀσαφῇ
 5 καὶ τελέως ἀνωφελῇ πεποιήνται τὴν ἐξήγησιν. πλὴν
 ἐν γε τῷ προειρημένῳ πολέμῳ τὰς μὲν τῶν πολι-
 τευμάτων ἀμφοτέρων προαιρέσεις ἐφαμίλλους εὗροι
 τις ἂν γεγενημένας, οὐ μόνον ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ ταῖς μεγαλοψυχαῖς, μάλιστα δὲ τῇ περὶ τῶν
 6 πρωτείων φιλοτιμίᾳ, τοὺς γε μὴν ἄνδρας οὐ μικρῶ,
 πολλῶ δὲ γενναιοτέρους ἐν παντὶ Ῥωμαίους· ἡγε-
 μόνα δὲ καὶ γνώμη καὶ τόλμη θετέον ἄριστον Ἀμίλ-
 καν τῶν τότε γεγονέναι τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπικαλούμενον,
 πατέρα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν Ἀννίβου τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα
 πολεμήσαντος Ῥωμαίους.
- 65 Μετὰ δὲ τὰς διαλύσεις ταύτας ἴδιόν τι καὶ
 2 παραπλήσιον ἀμφοτέροις συνέβη παθεῖν. ἐξεδέξατο
 γὰρ πόλεμος ἐμφύλιος Ῥωμαίους μὲν ὁ πρὸς τοὺς
 Φαλίσκους καλουμένους, ὃν ταχέως καὶ συμφερόντως
 ἐπετέλεσαν, ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐγκρατεῖς γενόμενοι
 3 τῆς πόλεως αὐτῶν, Καρχηδονίους δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐ-
 τὸν καιρὸν οὐ μικρὸς οὐδ' εὐκαταφρόνητος ὁ πρὸς
 τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς Νομάδας καὶ τοὺς ἅμα τού-
 4 τοις ἀποστάντας Λίβυας, ἐν ᾧ πολλοὺς καὶ μεγά-
 λους ὑπομείναντες φόβους τέλος οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς
 χώρας ἐκινδύνευσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν
 5 καὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν πόλεμον
 τοῦτον ἐπιστῆσαι μὲν ἄξιον διὰ πλείους αἰτίας, ἐπὶ
 κεφαλαίου δὲ καὶ διὰ βραχέων αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι

Those, however, who are puzzled by this, will be enabled to understand the reason clearly when we come to deal with their political institutions, a subject not to be treated incidentally by the writer or followed inattentively by the reader. It offers a noble spectacle and one almost wholly unrevealed hitherto, owing to the incompetence of the authors who have dealt with it, some of whom sinned from lack of knowledge, while the account given by others is wanting in clearness and entirely unprofitable. As regards, however, the war of which we are speaking, one will find its purpose and prosecution on the part of the two states equally characterized on both sides by enterprise, by lofty spirit, and above all by ambition for supremacy. In individual courage indeed the Romans were far superior, but the general to whom the palm must be given both for daring and for genius is Hamilcar called Barcas, the actual father of that Hannibal who afterwards made war on the Romans.

65. Shortly after this treaty it so happened that both states found themselves placed in circumstances peculiarly similar. For at Rome there followed a civil war against the Falisci, but this they brought to a speedy and favourable conclusion, taking Falerii in a few days. But the war the Carthaginians had to face was no little or contemptible one, being against their mercenaries, the Numidians and those Libyans who joined in the revolt. In this war they encountered many great perils and finally were in danger of losing not only their territory, but their own liberty and the soil of their native town. For several reasons I think it worth my while to call attention to this war, and, according to the plan I stated at the outset, to give a summary and brief

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- 6 τὴν ἐξήγησιν κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. τὸν τε γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς λεγόμενον ἄσπονδον πόλεμον, τίνα φύσιν ἔχει καὶ διάθεσιν, μάλιστ' ἂν τις
- 7 ἐκ τῶν τότε γεγονότων ἐπιγνοίῃ, τοὺς τε χρωμένους μισθοφορικαῖς δυνάμεσι τίνα δεῖ προορᾶσθαι καὶ φυλάττεσθαι μακρόθεν ἐναργέστατ' ἂν ἐκ τῆς τότε περιστάσεως συνθεωρήσῃς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τί διαφέρει καὶ κατὰ πόσον ἦθῃ σύμμικτα καὶ βάρ-
- 8 βαρα τῶν ἐν παιδείαις καὶ νόμοις καὶ πολιτικοῖς ἔθεσιν ἐκτεθραμμένων· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον τὰς αἰτίας ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς καιροῖς πεπραγμένων κατανοήσῃς, δι' ἃς ὁ κατ' Ἀννίβαν συνέστη Ῥωμαίοις
- 9 καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πόλεμος. ὑπὲρ οὗ διὰ τὸ μὴ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς συγγραφεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πεπολεμηκόσιν ἔτι νῦν ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι τὰς αἰτίας, χρήσιμόν ἐστι τὴν ἀληθινωτάτην παραστήσαι διὰ ληψιν τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν.
- 66 Ὡς γὰρ θᾶπτον ἐπιτελεσθεισῶν τῶν προειρημένων διαλύσεων ἀποκατέστησε τὰς περὶ τὸν Ἑρκα δυνάμεις εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον ὁ Βάρκας, εὐθέως αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπέθετο τὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως στρατηγὸς Γέσκων ἐγένετο περὶ τὸ περαιοῦν τοὺς
- 2 στρατιώτας εἰς τὴν Λιβύην. προῖδόμενος δὲ τὸ μέλλον ἐμφρόνως ἐνεβίβαζε κατὰ μέρη διαιρῶν αὐ-
- 3 τοὺς καὶ διαλείμματα ποιῶν τῆς ἐξαποστολῆς, βουλόμενος ἀναστροφὴν διδόναι τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς τὸ τοὺς καταπλεύσαντας καὶ μισθοδοτηθέντας τὰ προσοφειλόμενα τῶν ὀψωνίων φθάνειν ἀπαλλαττομένους ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνας εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν πρὶν ἢ
- 4 τοὺς ἐξῆς περαιουμένους ἐπικαταλαβεῖν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Γέσκων ἐχόμενος ταύτης τῆς ἐννοίας οὕτως ἐχείριζε
- 5 τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐξαποστολήν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὰ

BOOK I

narrative of it. In the first place one could not find a better illustration of the nature and character of what is vulgarly known as a truceless war than the circumstances of this one, and secondly one can see very clearly from all that took place what kind of dangers those who employ mercenary forces should foresee and take early precautions to avert, as well as in what lies the great difference of character between a confused herd of barbarians and men who have been brought up in an educated, law-abiding, and civilized community. But the most important thing is that from these events one can get an idea of the causes of the Hannibalic war. As it is still a matter of dispute, not only among historians, but among the combatants, what were the actual causes of this latter war, it will be useful to students of history if I lay before them the explanation that is nearest to the truth.

66. It is this. When, at once on the conclusion of the treaty, Barcas had transferred his forces from Eryx to Lilybæum he immediately resigned his command, and Gesco the commandant there took steps for sending the troops over to Africa. Foreseeing what was likely to happen, he very wisely embarked them in detachments and at certain intervals in order to give the Carthaginians time to pay them their arrears as they arrived and to pack them off to their own countries before the next batch that crossed could catch them up. Such was the idea Gesco had, and he managed to dispatch the troops in this manner, but the Carthaginians

- μὲν οὐκ εὐπορούμενοι χρημάτων διὰ τὰς προγεγε-
 νημένας δαπάνας, τὰ δὲ καὶ πεπεισμένοι παραιτή-
 σεσθαι τοὺς μισθοφόρους μέρος τι τῶν προσοφειλο-
 μένων ὀψωνίων, ἔαν καὶ συναθροίσωσι καὶ δέξων-
 ται πάντας εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, παρακατεῖχον ἐκεῖ
 τοὺς καταπλέοντας διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ συν-
 6 εἶχον ἐν τῇ πόλει. γινομένων δὲ πλειόνων ἀδικη-
 μάτων καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
 ὑπιδόμενοι τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὴν συμβαίνουσαν ἀκρα-
 σίαν ἡξίωσαν τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, ἕως ἂν ἐτοιμασθῇ
 μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὰς σιταρχίας αὐτοῖς, προσδέξωνται
 δὲ τοὺς ἀπολειπομένους, ἀναχωρῆσαι πάντας εἰς
 7 τινὰ πόλιν τὴν προσαγορευομένην Σίκκαν, λαβόν-
 τας εἰς τὰ κατεπείγοντα χρυσοῦν ἕκαστον. προθύ-
 μως δὲ συνυπακουσάντων πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον, καὶ
 βουλομένων αὐτοῦ καταλιπεῖν τὰς ἀποσκευάς, καθ-
 άπερ καὶ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ὑπῆρχον, ὡς θᾶττον
 ἐσομένης τῆς ἐπανόδου πρὸς τοὺς ὀψωνιασμούς,
 8 ἀγωνιῶντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι μήποτε διὰ χρόνου
 παραγεγονότες, καὶ τινὲς μὲν τέκνων, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ
 γυναικῶν ἰμείροντες, οἱ μὲν οὐκ ἐκπορευθῶσι τὸ
 παράπαν, οἱ δ' ἐκπορευθέντες αὐθις ἀνακάμπτωσι
 πρὸς ταῦτα, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ μηδὲν ἥττον
 ἀδίκημα γίνηται κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ταῦτα προορώμε-
 9 νοι μετὰ πολλῆς ἀπεχθείας οὐδαμῶς βουλομένους
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἠνάγκασαν τὰς ἀποσκευὰς μεθ'
 10 ἑαυτῶν ἀπαγαγεῖν. οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι συναναχθέν-
 τες εἰς τὴν Σίκκαν, καὶ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου τετευ-
 χότες ἀνέσεως καὶ σχολῆς, ὅπερ ἀφυέστατον ὑπάρ-
 χει ξενικαῖς δυνάμεσι, καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀρχη-
 γὸν καὶ μόνον αἴτιον γίνεται στάσεως, διήγον
 11 ἀδεῶς. ἅμα δὲ ῥαθυμοῦντες, τινὲς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐξ-

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partly because, owing to their recent outlay, they were not very well off for money, and partly because they were convinced that the mercenaries would let them off part of their arrears of pay, once they had got them all collected in Carthage, detained them there on their arrival in this hope, confining them to the city. As they committed frequent offences there both by night and by day, the government in the first place, suspicious of their numbers and their present licentious spirit, asked their commanding officers, until arrangements had been made for paying them in full and those who were still missing had arrived, to withdraw them all to a town called Sicca, each man receiving a gold stater for pressing expenses. The troops readily consented to leave the capital, but wished to leave their baggage there, as they had formerly done, thinking that they would be soon returning to be paid off. The Carthaginians, however, were afraid lest, longing to be with their wives or children after their recent protracted absence, they might in many cases refuse to leave Carthage, or, if they did, would come back again to their families, so that there would be no decrease of outrages in the city. In anticipation then of this, they compelled the men, much against their will and in a manner calculated to cause much offence, to take their baggage with them. The mercenaries, when assembled in Sicca, lived in a free and easy manner, having not enjoyed for a long time relaxation of discipline and leisure, things most prejudicial to a force raised abroad, and nearly always the very arch-instigators and sole causes of mutiny. At the same time, as they had nothing else to do, some of them began

- ελογίζοντο τὰ προσοφειλόμενα σφίσι τῶν ὀψωνίων ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον, καὶ συγκεφαλαιούμενοι πολλαπλάσια τῶν καθηκόντων, ταῦτ' ἔφασαν δεῖν ἀπαιτεῖν τοὺς
- 12 Καρχηδονίους· πάντες δ' ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, ὧν οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἐπισφαλεῖς τῶν καιρῶν παρακαλοῦντες σφᾶς ἐπεποίητο, μεγάλας εἶχον ἐλπίδας καὶ μεγάλην προσδοκίαν τῆς ἐσο-
- 67 μένης περὶ αὐτοὺς ἐπανορθώσεως. διόπερ ἅμα τῷ συλλεχθῆναι πάντας εἰς τὴν Σίκκαν, καὶ παραγενόμενον Ἄνωνα τὸν ὑπάρχοντα στρατηγὸν ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ τότε τῶν Καρχηδονίων μὴ οἶον τὰς ἐλπίδας καὶ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας ἐκπληροῦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον λέγοντα τὸ βάρος τῶν φόρων καὶ τὴν καθόλου στενοχωρίαν τῆς πόλεως ἐγχειρεῖν παραιτεῖσθαι μέρος τι τῶν ἐξ ὁμολόγου προσοφειλομένων ὀψωνίων, εὐθέως διαφορὰ καὶ στάσις ἐγεννᾶτο καὶ συνδρομαὶ συνεχεῖς ἐγίνοντο, ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ γένη, ποτὲ
- 3 δ' ὁμοῦ πάντων. ὥς δ' ἂν μὴθ' ὁμοεθνῶν μὴθ' ὁμογλώττων ὑπαρχόντων, ἦν ἀμιξίας καὶ θορύβου καὶ τῆς λεγομένης τύρβης πλήρες τὸ στρατόπεδον.
- 4 Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ αἰεὶ χρώμενοι ποικίλαις καὶ μισθοφορικαῖς δυνάμεσι, πρὸς μὲν τὸ μὴ ταχέως συμφρονήσαντας ἀπειθεῖν μηδὲ δυσκαταπλήκτους εἶναι τοῖς ἡγουμένοις ὀρθῶς στοχάζονται, ποιοῦντες ἐκ
- 5 πολλῶν γενῶν τὴν δύναμιν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ γενομένης ὀργῆς ἢ διαβολῆς ἢ στάσεως διδάξαι καὶ πραῖναι καὶ μεταθεῖναι τοὺς ἡγνοσηκότας ὀλοσχερῶς ἀστοχοῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ οἶον ἀνθρωπίνῃ χρησθαι κακίᾳ συμβαίνει τὰς τοιαύτας δυνάμεις, ὅταν ἅπαξ εἰς ὀργὴν καὶ διαβολὴν ἐμπέσωσι πρὸς τινος, ἀλλ' ἀπο-

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reckoning up the total pay due to them, all to their own advantage, and having arrived at a most exorbitant result, submitted that this was the sum they should demand from the Carthaginians. The whole force remembered the promises the generals had made to them in critical situations, and had great hopes and indeed quite expected that the government would thus correct in their favour the account of the sum they had earned. 67. The consequence was that when the total force was assembled at Sicea, and when Hanno, who was then commander-in-chief in Africa, came there and not only said that it was impossible to meet their claims and fulfil their hopes, but on the contrary tried by dwelling on the present heavy taxation and general distress of Carthage to induce them to renounce some of their stipulated wage, it produced at once a spirit of dissension and sedition, and the soldiers began to hold constant meetings, sometimes of particular nations and sometimes general. As they were neither all of the same nationality nor spoke the same language, the camp was full of confusion and tumult and what is known as *τὴρβή* or turbulence. For the Carthaginian practice of employing hired troops of various nationalities is indeed well calculated to prevent them from combining rapidly in acts of insubordination or disrespect to their officers, but in cases of an outburst of anger or of slanderous rumours or disaffection it is most prejudicial to all efforts to convey the truth to them, to calm their passions, or to conciliate the culprits. Indeed, such forces, when once their anger is aroused against anyone, or slander spreads among them, are not content with mere human wickedness, but end by becoming like

7 θηριοῦσθαι τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ παραστατικὴν λαμ-
 βάνειν διάθεσιν. ὃ καὶ τότε συνέβη γενέσθαι περὶ
 αὐτούς· ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ μὲν Ἰβηρες, οἱ δὲ Κελτοί,
 τινὲς δὲ Λιγυστῖνοι καὶ Βαλιαρεῖς, οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ
 μιξέλληνες, ὧν οἱ πλείους αὐτόμολοι καὶ δοῦλοι.
 8 τὸ δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῶν ἦν Λίβυες. διόπερ
 οὗτ' ἐκκλησιάσαι συναθροίσαντα πάντας ὁμοῦ δυ-
 νατὸν ἦν οὗτ' ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν εὑρέσθαι πρὸς τοῦτο
 9 μηχανήν. πῶς γὰρ οἶόν τε; τὸν μὲν γὰρ στρατηγὸν
 εἰδέναι τὰς ἐκάστων διαλέκτους ἀδύνατον· διὰ
 πλειόνων δ' ἐρμηνέων ἐκκλησιάζειν, ἅμα τετράκισ
 καὶ πεντάκισ περὶ ταύτου λέγοντα πράγματος, σχε-
 10 δὸν ὥς εἰπεῖν ἔτι τοῦ πρόσθεν ἀδυνατώτερον. λοι-
 πὸν ἦν διὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀξιώσεις
 καὶ παρακλήσεις· ὅπερ ἐπειρᾶτο τότε συνεχῶς
 11 ποιεῖν ὁ Ἄνων. ἀκμὴν δὲ καὶ τούτους συνέβαινε
 ἃ μὲν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν λεγομένων, ἃ δὲ καὶ
 συναινέσαντας ἐνίοτε τῷ στρατηγῷ τάναντία πρὸς
 τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀναγγέλλειν, τοὺς μὲν δι' ἄγνοιαν, τοὺς
 δὲ διὰ κακίαν· ἐξ ὧν ἦν ἀσαφείας, ἀπιστίας, ἀμι-
 12 ξίας, ἅπαντα πλήρη. πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὥοντο
 καὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐπίτηδες τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας
 στρατηγοὺς τὰς γεγενημένας χρείας κατὰ Σικελίαν
 ἐξ αὐτῶν, καὶ πεποιημένους σφίσι τὰς ἐπαγγελίας,
 οὐκ ἐξαποστέλλειν ὥς αὐτούς, τὸν δὲ μηδενὶ τού-
 13 των παρηκολουθηκότα τοῦτον ἐκπεπομφέναι. τέλος
 δ' οὖν ἀπαξιώσαντες μὲν τὸν Ἄνονα, διαπιστή-
 σαντες δὲ τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόσιν, ἐξοργισθέντες
 δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, ὥρμησαν πρὸς τὴν
 πόλιν· καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ἀπέχοντες ὥς ἂν
 ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι στάδια τῆς Καρχηδόνης ἐπὶ τῷ
 καλουμένῳ Τύνητι, πλείους ὄντες τῶν δισμυρίων.

BOOK 1

wild beasts or men deranged, as happened in the present case. Some of these troops were Iberians, some Celts, some Ligurians, and some from the Balearic islands; there were a good many Greek half-breeds, mostly deserters and slaves, but the largest portion consisted of Libyans. It was therefore impossible to assemble them and address them as a body or to do so by any other means; for how could the general be expected to know all their languages? And again to address them through several interpreters, repeating the same thing four or five times, was, if anything, more impracticable. The only means was to make demands or entreaties through their officers, as Hanno continued to attempt on the present occasion, and even these did not understand all that was told them, or at times, after seeming to agree with the general, addressed their troops in just the opposite sense either from ignorance or from malice. The consequence was that everything was in a state of uncertainty, mistrust and confusion. For one thing, they thought the Carthaginians had acted purposely in not communicating with them through the generals who were acquainted with their performances in Sicily and who had made them the promises of bounties, but in sending one who had not been present on any of those occasions. At length, then, refusing to treat with Hanno, thoroughly distrusting their divisional officers, and highly indignant with the Carthaginians, they marched on the capital and encamped at a distance of about one hundred and twenty stades from Carthage at the place called Tunis. They were more than twenty thousand in number.

68 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τότε πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλάμβα-
 2 νον τὴν αὐτῶν ἄγνοιαν, ὅτ' ἦν οὐδέν ὄφελος. με-
 γάλα μὲν γὰρ ἤμαρτον, εἰς ἓνα τόπον ἀθροίσαντες
 τοσοῦτο πλῆθος μισθοφόρων, ἔχοντες οὐδεμίαν
 ἐλπίδα πολεμικῆς χρείας ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς δυνά-
 3 μεσι, τούτου δὲ μείζον ἔτι, προέμενοι τὰ τέκνα καὶ
 τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ σὺν τούτοις τὰς ἀποσκευάς· οἷς
 ἐξῆν ὁμήροις χρησαμένους ἀσφαλέστερον μὲν αὐ-
 τοὺς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων, εὐπει-
 θεστέροις δ' ἐκείνοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ παρακαλού-
 4 μενον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ καταπλαγέντες τὴν στρατο-
 πεδείαν πᾶν ὑπέμενον, σπουδάζοντες ἐξιλάσασθαι
 5 τὴν ὀργὴν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς τε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀγο-
 ρὰς ἐκπέμποντες δαιψιλεῖς ἐπώλουν, καθὼς ἐκείνοι
 βούλονται καὶ τάττοιεν τὰς τιμάς, τῶν τε τῆς γε-
 ρουσίας αἰεὶ τινὰς ἐξαπέστελλον πρέσβεις, ὑπισχνού-
 μενοι ποιήσιν πᾶν ὅ, τι ποτ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ἀξιώσαιεν
 6 εἰ κατὰ δύναμιν. ἦν δὲ πολὺ τὸ καθ' ἐκάστην
 ἡμέραν παρὰ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐπινοούμενον, ἅτε
 δὴ κατατεθαρρηκότων μὲν καὶ συντεθεωρηκότων
 7 τὴν κατάπληξιν καὶ πτοίαν τῶν Καρχηδονίων, πε-
 φρονηματισμένων δὲ καὶ πεπεισμένων διὰ τοὺς
 προγεγονότας αὐτοῖς ἐν Σικελίᾳ πρὸς τὰ Ῥωμαϊκὰ
 στρατόπεδα κινδύνους μὴ οἶον Καρχηδονίους ἀντο-
 φθαλμῆσαί ποτ' ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, ἀλλὰ
 8 μηδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδένα ῥαδίως. διό-
 περ ἅμα τῷ συγχωρῆσαι τὰ περὶ τῶν ὀψωνίων αὐ-
 τοῖς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους εὐθέως ἐπέβαινον, καὶ τῶν
 9 τεθνεώτων ἵππων ἀπήτουν τὰς ἀξίας. προσδεξα-
 μένων δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, πάλιν τῆς προσοφειλομένης
 σιτομετρίας ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου τὴν μεγίστην γε-
 γουυῖαν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τιμὴν ἔφασκον αὐτοὺς δεῖν

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68. Now, when there was no mending, it was brought home to the Carthaginians how blind they had been. For they had committed two great mistakes. The first was in collecting at one place so large a body of mercenaries while themselves they could hope for nothing from the fighting power of their civic force. Their second error was even more serious, to let out of their hands the women and children of the mercenaries as well as their movables, all which would have served as hostages, giving themselves greater security in their deliberations about the circumstances and ensuring a more favourable reception for their demands. Still now, in their alarm at the troops encamping so near, they were ready to put up with anything in their eagerness to propitiate them, sending out lavish supplies of provisions which they sold to them at any price they chose to pay and constantly dispatching envoys from the Senate, promising to meet all their demands as far as it was in their power. These increased daily, the mercenaries continuing to invent new claims, gaining confidence as they witnessed the terror and cowardice of the Carthaginians, and being convinced in their arrogance, owing to their success in Sicily against the Roman legions, that not only the Carthaginians, but any other people in the world would not readily face them in arms. When, therefore, the Carthaginians had agreed to their claims for pay, they went a step further and asked for the value of the horses they had lost. This also was conceded, whereupon they maintained that they ought to get the value of the rations of corn due to them for a considerable time at the highest price corn had stood

- 10 κομίζεσθαι. καθόλου δ' αἰεί τι νέον καὶ καινὸν προσεξεύρισκον, εἰς ἀδύνατον ἐκβάλλοντες τὴν διάλυσιν, διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς καχέκτας καὶ στασιώδεις ἐν
- 11 αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ δυνατόν ὑπισχνουμένων τῶν Καρχηδονίων, κατένευσαν ἐπιτρέψειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἐνὶ τῶν ἐν
- 12 Σικελίᾳ γεγονότων στρατηγῶν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν Ἀμίλκαν τὸν Βάρκαν, μεθ' οὗ συγκεκινδυνεύκεσαν ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, δυσχερῶς εἶχον, δοκοῦντες οὐχ ἥκιστα δι' ἐκείνον ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι, τῷ μῆτε πρεσβεύειν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τὴν τε στρατηγίαν ἐκουσίως
- 13 δοκεῖν ἀποτεθεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ Γέσκωνα πάννυ διέκειντο φιλανθρώπως, ὃς ἐγεγόνει μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ στρατηγός, ἐπεποίητο δ' αὐτῶν πρόνοϊαν τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τὴν ἀνακομιδὴν. διόπερ ἐπέτρεψαν τούτῳ περὶ τῶν
- 69 ἀμφισβητουμένων. ὃς παραγενόμενος κατὰ θάλατταν μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων, καὶ προσπλεύσας πρὸς τὸν Τύνητα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λαμβάνων τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συναθροίζων κατὰ γένη τοὺς
- 2 πολλοὺς, ἃ μὲν ἐπετίμα περὶ τῶν γεγονότων, ἃ δὲ διδάσκειν ἐπειρᾶτο περὶ τῶν παρόντων. τὸ δὲ πλεῖον παρεκάλει πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ἀξιῶν αὐτοὺς εὖνους
- 3 ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μισθοδόταις. τέλος δ' ὥρμησε πρὸς τὸ διαλύειν τὰ προσοφειλόμενα τῶν ὀψωνίων, κατὰ γένη ποιούμενος τὴν μισθοδοσίαν.
- 4 ἦν δέ τις Καμπανὸς ἡϋτομοληκῶς παρὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων δοῦλος, ἔχων σωματικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τόλμαν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς παράβολον, ὄνομα Σπένδιος.
- 5 οὗτος εὐλαβούμενος μὴ παραγενόμενος αὐτὸν ὁ δεσπότης κομίσηται, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Ῥωμαίων νόμους αἰκισθεὶς διαφθαρῇ, πᾶν ἐτόλμα καὶ λέγειν καὶ

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at during the war. In short they always went on devising some new claim, putting matters off so as to make it impossible to come to terms, a great many of them being disaffected and mutinous. However, on the Carthaginians promising to concede everything in their power, they agreed to refer the disputed points to one of the generals who had been present in Sicily. Now to Hamilcar Barcas, with whom they had served there, they were ill disposed, thinking that it was largely his fault that they had been slighted, since he never came himself as an envoy to them and was believed to have resigned his command voluntarily. But being very favourably inclined to Gesco, who had been general in Sicily and had been full of attention to them in other matters and in that of their transport, they submitted the points in dispute to him. 69. Gesco, on reaching Tunis by sea bringing the money, at first conferred privately with the officers, and subsequently held meetings of the troops according to their nationalities. He rebuked them for their past conduct, attempted to enlighten them about the present, but most of all dwelt on the future, begging them to show themselves well-disposed to those in whose pay they had been from the outset. Finally he proceeded to discharge their arrears, paying off each nationality separately. There was a certain Campanian, a runaway Roman slave, called Spendius, a man of great physical strength and remarkable courage in war. He was afraid of his master coming to claim him, when, if given up, he would by Roman law be tortured and put to death. He therefore hesitated at nothing in his endeavour both by speech

- πράττειν, σπουδάζων διακόψαι τὰς διαλύσεις τὰς
6 πρὸς Καρχηδονίους. ἅμα δὲ τούτῳ καὶ Λίβυς τις
Μάθως, ὃς ἦν μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ τῶν συνεστρατευ-
μένων, πλεῖστα δὲ κεκινηκὼς κατὰ τὰς προειρημένιας
ταραχάς. ἀγωνιῶν οὖν μὴ τίσῃ καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν
λοιπῶν δίκην, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐγένετο γνώμης τοῖς
7 περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον. καὶ λαμβάνων τοὺς Λίβυας
ὑπεδείκνυε διότι μετὰ τὸν ὀψωνιασμὸν χωρισθέντων
τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν εἰς τὰς πατρίδας ἀπερείσονται
καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ὀργὴν εἰς αὐτοὺς οἱ Καρχη-
δόνιοι, καὶ βουλήσονται διὰ τῆς εἰς σφᾶς τιμωρίας
8 ἅπαντας καταπλήξασθαι τοὺς ἐν τῇ Λιβύῃ. ταχὺ
δὲ προσανασεισθέντες οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λό-
γοις, καὶ λαμβανόμενοι βραχείας ἀφορμῆς ἐκ τοῦ
τὸν Γέσκωνα τὰ μὲν ὀψώνια διαλύειν, τὰς δὲ τιμὰς
τοῦ τε σίτου καὶ τῶν ἵππων ὑπερτίθεσθαι, συν-
9 ἔτρεχον εὐθέως εἰς ἐκκλησίαν. καὶ τοῦ μὲν Σπεν-
δίου καὶ τοῦ Μάθω διαβαλλόντων καὶ κατηγορούν-
των τοῦ τε Γέσκωνος καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἤκουον,
καὶ προσεῖχον ἐπιμελῶς τὸν νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις.
10 εἰ δέ τις ἕτερος προπορευθεῖη συμβουλεύσων, οὐδ'
αὐτὸ τοῦτο περιμείναντες ἕως τοῦ γνῶναι πότερον
ἀντερῶν ἢ συνηγορήσων πάρεστι τοῖς περὶ τὸν
Σπένδιον, παραχρῆμα βάλλοντες τοῖς λίθοις ἀπ-
11 ἔκτεινον. καὶ πολλοὺς δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ κατὰ
τὰς συνδρομὰς καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν
12 διέφθειρον. καὶ μόνον τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦτο κοινῇ συν-
ῖεσαν τὸ βάλλε διὰ τὸ συνεχῶς αὐτὸ πράττειν. μά-
λιστα δὲ τοῦτ' ἐποιοῦν, ὅποτε μεθυσθέντες ἀπὸ
13 τῶν ἀρίστων συνδράμοιεν. διόπερ ὅτε τις ἄρξαιτο
βάλλε λέγειν, οὕτως ἐγένετο πανταχόθεν ἅμα καὶ
ταχέως ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι διαφυγεῖν τῶν ἀπαξ

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and action to break off the negotiations with the Carthaginians. He was supported by a Libyan called Matho, who was indeed a freeman and a member of the force, but had taken a leading part in the late disturbances. Consequently he stood in great fear of being singled out to bear the whole penalty and therefore was of one mind with Spendius. Taking the Libyans aside, he pointed out to them that when the other nations departed to their own countries after being paid off, they would be left to bear the whole weight of the wrath of the Carthaginians, whose object it would be by the punishment they inflicted on them to terrorize all their Libyan subjects. The men were soon stirred by such arguments, and availing themselves of the slender pretext that Gesco while discharging their pay postponed the compensation for the horses and corn, they at once held a meeting. When Spendius and Matho began to traduce and accuse Gesco and the Carthaginians, they were all ears, and listened with great attention, but if anyone else came forward to offer an opinion, they did not even wait to find out if he were going to speak in favour of Spendius or against him, but at once stoned him to death. Numbers both of the officers and privates perished thus in the different meetings, and in fact this phrase "Stone him" was the only one that became intelligible to all the different nations, owing to the frequency of the act. They used to behave thus mostly when they held meetings after their morning meal in a drunken condition, so that the moment anyone called out "Stone him," the stones flew from all sides and so quickly that it was impossible for anyone who once came forward to address them to escape. As,

- 14 προελθόντων. πλὴν οὐδενὸς ἔτι τολμῶντος συμβουλεύειν διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, κατέστησαν αὐτῶν στρατηγούς Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον.
- 70 ὁ δὲ Γέσκων ἐώρα μὲν τὴν ὅλην ἀκαταστασίαν καὶ ταραχήν, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιούμενος τὸ τῇ πατρίδι συμφέρον, καὶ θεωρῶν ὅτι τούτων ἀποθηριωθέντων κινδυνεύουσι προφανῶς οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τοῖς
- 2 ὅλοις πράγμασι, παρεβάλλετο καὶ προσεκαρτέρει, ποτὲ μὲν τοὺς προεστῶτας αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας
- 3 λαμβάνων, ποτὲ δὲ κατὰ γένη συναθροίζων καὶ παρακαλῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν Λιβύων οὐδέπω κεκομισμένων τὰς σιταρχίας, οἰομένων δὲ δεῖν ἀποδεδόσθαι σφίσι, καὶ προσιόντων θρασέως, βουλόμενος ὁ Γέσκων ἐπιπληῆσαι τὴν προπέτειαν αὐτῶν, Μάθω τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀπαιτεῖν ἐκέλευεν. οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωργίσθησαν ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸν
- 4 τυχόντα χρόνον ἀναστροφὴν δόντες ὥρμησαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὸ διαρπάζειν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν χρημάτων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συλλαμβάνειν τὸν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ Καρχηδονίους. οἱ δὲ περὶ
- 5 τὸν Μάθω καὶ τὸν Σπένδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες τάχιστ' ἂν οὕτως ἐκκαυθῆναι τὸν πόλεμον, εἰ παράνομόν τι πράξειαν καὶ παράσπονδον, συνήργουν ταῖς τῶν ὄχλων ἀπονοίαις, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀποσκευὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἅμα τοῖς χρήμασι διήρπαζον, τὸν δὲ Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ δῆσαντες ὑβριστικῶς εἰς φυλακὴν
- 6 παρεδίδουσαν. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπολέμουν ἤδη φανερώς πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, συνωμοσίας ἀσεβεῖς καὶ παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔθη ποιησάμενοι.
- 7 Ὁ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ξένους καὶ Λιβυκὸς ἐπικληθεὶς πόλεμος διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτην ἔλαβε τὴν

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for this reason, no one dared any longer to express an opinion, they appointed Matho and Spendius Generals.

70. Gesco saw how complete was the disorganization and disturbance, but valuing more than anything the interest of his country and foreseeing that if these troops became utterly deaf to all considerations of humanity, Carthage would evidently be in the gravest danger, he persisted, at great personal risk, in his conciliatory efforts, sometimes conferring privately with their officers, and at other times summoning and addressing meetings of the separate nations. The Libyans, however, had not yet received their pay, and considering it overdue, came to him to demand it in a very insolent manner, when Gesco, thinking to rebuke their presumption, told them to go and ask Matho their "General" for it. This aroused their anger to such a pitch, that without a moment's delay they, first of all, seized on what money they could lay their hands on, and next arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians who were with him. As for Matho and Spendius, thinking that the most expeditious means of fanning the flame would be to commit some violation of law or good faith, they co-operated in the excesses of the soldiery, plundering the personal effects as well as the money-chests of the Carthaginians, and after subjecting Gesco and those with him to the outrage of putting them in fetters, sent them to prison. From this time forward they were at open war with Carthage, having bound themselves by certain impious oaths contrary to the principles recognized by all mankind.

Such then was the origin and beginning of the 240 B.C.
war against the mercenaries, generally known as the

- 8 ἀρχήν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω συντελεσάμενοι τὰ προειρημένα παραυτικά μὲν ἔξαπέστελλον πρέσβεις ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην πόλεις, παρακαλοῦντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν καὶ
- 9 συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην ἐτοίμως συνυπακουσάντων αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπόστασιν, καὶ τὰς τε χορηγίας καὶ τὰς βοηθείας προθύμως ἔξαποστελλόντων, διελόντες σφᾶς πολιορκεῖν ἐνεχείρησαν οἱ μὲν τὴν Ἰτύκην, οἱ δὲ τοὺς Ἰππακρίτας, διὰ τὸ ταύτας τὰς πόλεις μὴ βούλεσθαι μετασχεῖν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀποστάσεως.
- 71 Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τοὺς μὲν κατ' ἰδίαν βίους αἰὲ διεξαγαγόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας γεννημάτων, τὰς δὲ κοινὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ χορηγίας ἀθροίζοντες ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην προσόδων, ἔτι δὲ πολεμεῖν
- 2 εἰθισμένοι ξενικαῖς δυνάμεσι, τότε πάντων ἅμα τούτων οὐ μόνον ἐστερημένοι παραλόγως, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' αὐτῶν ὁρῶντες ἕκαστα τῶν προειρημένων ἐπιστρέφοντα, τελέως ἐν μεγάλῃ δυσθυμίᾳ καὶ δυσελπιστίᾳ καθέστασαν, ἅτε παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν αὐτοῖς τῶν
- 3 πραγμάτων ἀποβεβηκότων. τετρυμένοι γὰρ ἐν τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ συνεχῶς, ἥλπιζον ἐπιτελεσθεισῶν τῶν διαλύσεων ἀναπνοῆς τινος τεύξεσθαι καὶ
- 4 καταστάσεως εὐδοκουμένης. συνέβαινε δ' αὐτοῖς τὰναντία· μείζονος γὰρ ἐνίστατο πολέμου καταρχὴ καὶ φοβερωτέρου. πρόσθεν μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ Σικελίας ἡμφισβήτησαν Ῥωμαίοις, τότε δὲ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἔμελλον κινδυνεύσειν, πόλεμιον
- 6 ἀναλαμβάνοντες ἐμφύλιον. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ὅπλων πλῆθος, οὐ ναυτικὴ δύναμις, οὐ πλοίων κατασκευὴ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἦν, ὥς ἂν τοσαύταις ναυμα-

Libyan war. Matho, having so far carried out his purpose, at once sent envoys to the Libyan towns urging them to strike a blow for liberty and imploring their support and practical assistance. Hereupon, when nearly all the Libyans had agreed to join in the revolt against Carthage and willingly contributed troops and supplies, they divided their forces into two and undertook the sieges of Utica and Hippacritae, since these cities had refused to participate in the rebellion.

71. The Carthaginians had ever been accustomed to depend for their private supplies on the produce of the country, their public expenses for armaments and commissariat had been met by the revenue they derived from Libya, and they had always been in the habit of employing hired soldiers. At the present moment not only did they find themselves deprived of all these resources at one blow, but actually saw them turned against themselves. Consequently they fell into a state of utter depression and despondency, things having turned out quite otherwise than they expected. For they had been much worn by the long continued war for Sicily, and had hoped that the peace would procure them some rest and a grateful period of tranquillity, and what happened was just the reverse, as they were now threatened by the outbreak of a greater and more formidable war. In the former case they were disputing the dominion of Sicily with the Romans, but now they were about to fight for their own existence and that of their native city. Besides neither had they a sufficient supply of arms, nor a proper navy, nor the material left to construct one, so many had been the battles in which they

- χίαις περιπεπτωκότων· καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ χορηγιῶν διά-
 θεσις οὐδὲ φίλων οὐδὲ συμμάχων τῶν βοηθησόντων
 7 ἔξωθεν ἐλπίς οὐδ' ἡτισοῦν ὑπῆρχε. διὸ καὶ τότε
 σαφῶς ἔγνωσαν ἡλικίην ἔχει διαφορὰν ξενικὸς καὶ
 8 διαπόντιος πόλεμος ἐμφυλίου στάσεως καὶ ταραχῆς.
 72 Οὐχ ἥκιστα δ' αὐτοὶ σφίσι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τη-
 λικούτων κακῶν ἐγεγόνεισαν αἴτιοι. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν
 προγεγονότα πόλεμον εὐλόγους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ὑπο-
 λαμβάνοντες, πικρῶς ἐπεστάτησαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν
 2 Λιβύην ἀνθρώπων, παραιρούμενοι μὲν τῶν ἄλλων
 πάντων τῶν καρπῶν τοὺς ἡμίσεις διπλασίους δὲ
 ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς φόρους ἢ πρὶν ἐπιτάττοντες, συγ-
 γνώμην δὲ τοῖς ἀπόροις ἢ συμπεριφορὰν οὐδ' ἦν-
 3 τινοῦν ἐπ' οὐδενὶ τῶν πραττομένων διδόντες, θαυ-
 μάζοντες δὲ καὶ τιμῶντες τῶν στρατηγῶν οὐ τοὺς
 πράως καὶ φιλανθρώπως τῷ πλήθει χρωμένους,
 ἀλλὰ τοὺς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἐτοιμάζοντας πλείστας χορη-
 γίας κάπισκευάς, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πικρό-
 4 τατα χρωμένους, ὧν εἰς ἦν Ἄννων. τοιγαροῦν οἱ
 μὲν ἄνδρες οὐχ οἷον παρακλήσεως πρὸς τὴν ἀπό-
 5 στασιν, ἀλλ' ἀγγέλου μόνον ἐδεήθησαν· αἱ δὲ γυ-
 ναῖκες αἱ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον ἀπαγομένους περι-
 ορῶσαι τοὺς σφετέρους ἄνδρας καὶ γονεῖς πρὸς τὰς
 εἰσφοράς, τότε συνομνύουσαι κατὰ πόλεις ἐφ' ᾧ
 μηδὲν κρύψειν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐταῖς, ἀφαιρού-
 μεναι τὸν κόσμον εἰσέφερον ἀπροφασίστως εἰς τοὺς
 6 ὀψωνιασμούς. καὶ τοιαύτην παρεσκεύασαν εὐπορίαν
 τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον ὥστε μὴ μόνον
 διαλῦσαι τὰ προσοφειλόμενα τῶν ὀψωνίων τοῖς μι-
 σθοφόροις κατὰ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας, ἃς ἐποίησαντο πρὸς
 τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συνεχὲς εὐπορή-
 7 σαι χορηγίας. οὕτως οὐδέποτε δεῖ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν

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had been engaged at sea. They had not even the means of providing supplies and not a single hope of external assistance from friends or allies. So it was now that they thoroughly realized how great is the difference between a war against a foreign state carried on over sea and civil discord and disturbance.

72. They had chiefly themselves to thank for all these grievous mischances. During the former war they had thought themselves reasonably justified in making their government of the Libyans very harsh. They had exacted from the peasantry, without exception, half of their crops, and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen without allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abatement to the poor. They had applauded and honoured not those governors who treated the people with gentleness and humanity, but those who procured for Carthage the largest amount of supplies and stores and used the country people most harshly—Hanno for example. The consequence was that the male population required no incitement to revolt—a mere message was sufficient—while the women, who had constantly witnessed the arrest of their husbands and fathers for non-payment of taxes, solemnly bound themselves by oath in each city to conceal none of their belongings, and stripping themselves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to the war fund. Matho and Spendius were thus so well off that not only could they pay the soldiers their arrears, as they had promised in inciting them to mutiny, but found themselves furnished with ample means for a protracted war. This teaches us that it is the right policy not only to look to the

μόνον, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀποβλέπειν
αἰεὶ τοὺς ὀρθῶς βουλευομένους.

- 73 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ ἐν τοιούτοις κακοῖς ὄντες
οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, προστησάμενοι τὸν Ἀννωνα στρα-
τηγὸν διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τοῦτον καὶ πρότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ
κατὰ τὴν Ἑκατοντάφυλον τῆς Λιβύης καταστρέψα-
σθαι, συνήθροίζον μὲν μισθοφόρους, καθώπλιζον δὲ
τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις τῶν πολιτῶν· ἐγύμναζον δὲ
2 καὶ συνέταττον τοὺς πολιτικούς ἱππεῖς· παρεσκεύαζον
δὲ καὶ τὰ περιλιπῆ τῶν πλοίων, τριήρεις καὶ πεντη-
κοντόρους καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀκατίων. οἱ δὲ περὶ
3 τὸν Μάθω, παραγενομένων αὐτοῖς εἰς ἑπτὰ μυριάδας
Λιβύων, ἐπιδιελόντες τούτους ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιόρ-
κουν τοὺς Ἴτυκαίους καὶ τοὺς Ἴππακρίτας, βεβαίως
δὲ τὴν ἐν τῷ Τύνητι στρατοπεδείαν κατεῖχον, ἀπο-
κεκλείεσαν δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπάσης τῆς
ἐκτὸς Λιβύης. ἡ γὰρ Καρχηδὼν αὐτὴ μὲν ἐν κόλπῳ
4 κεῖται, προτείνουσα καὶ χερρονησίζουσα τῇ θέσει, τὸ
μὲν τῇ θαλάττῃ, τὸ δέ τι καὶ λίμνῃ περιεχομένη
κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον· ὁ δὲ συνάπτων ἰσθμὸς αὐτὴν τῇ
5 Λιβύῃ τὸ πλάτος ὡς εἴκοσι καὶ πέντε σταδίων ἐστί.
τούτου δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος νεύοντος
μέρους οὐ μακρὰν ἢ τῶν Ἴτυκαίων κεῖται πόλις,
ἐπὶ δὲ θατέρου παρὰ τὴν λίμνην ὁ Τύνης. ἐφ' ὧν
6 ἑκατέρων τότε στρατοπεδεύσαντες οἱ μισθοφόροι,
καὶ διακλείσαντες ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας τοὺς Καρχηδο-
νίους, λοιπὸν ἐπεβούλευον αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει, καὶ ποτὲ
7 μὲν ἡμέρας, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ νύκτωρ παραγινόμενοι
πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος, εἰς φόβους καὶ θορύβους ὁλο-
σχερεῖς ἐνέβαλλον τοὺς ἔνδον.

- 74 Ἀννων δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐνδεχομένως
ἐγίνετο· καὶ γὰρ ἦν πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εὐφυής·

BOOK I

present, but to look forward still more attentively to the future.

73. Yet, although the Carthaginians were in such straits, they first of all appointed Hanno to the command, as he had, they thought, on a former occasion brought matters concerning Hecatompylus in Libya to a satisfactory conclusion; they next busied themselves with enrolling mercenaries and arming the citizens of military age. They also mustered and drilled their civic cavalry and got ready what ships they had left, consisting of triremes, quinqueremes and the largest of their skiffs. Meanwhile Matho, when about seventy thousand Libyans had joined him, divided them into several forces with which he maintained unmolested the sieges of Utica and Hippacritae, secured his main camp at Tunis and thus shut out the Carthaginians from all outer Libya. Carthage, I should explain, lies in a gulf, on a promontory or peninsula surrounded mostly by the sea and in part by a lake. The isthmus which connects it with Libya is about twenty-five stades in width and on the side of this isthmus which faces the sea, at no great distance from the capital, lies Utica, while Tunis is on the other side by the lake. So that the mutineers, encamped now as they were before both of these towns and thus shutting off Carthage from the land, continued to threaten the capital itself, appearing before the walls sometimes by day and sometimes by night and creating the utmost terror and commotion within.

74. Hanno was doing fairly well in the matter of outfit, his talent lying in that direction, but

- ἐξορμήσας δὲ μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕτερος ἦν· καὶ
 2 γὰρ τοῖς καιροῖς ἀστόχως ἐχρήτο καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις
 πράγμασιν ἀπείρως καὶ νωθρῶς. διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν
 3 πρῶτον εἰς Ἰτύκην παραβοηθήσας τοῖς πολιορκου-
 μένοις καὶ καταπληξάμενος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους τῷ
 πλήθει τῶν θηρίων· εἶχε γὰρ οὐκ ἐλάττους ἑκατὸν
 ἐλεφάντων· καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα λαβὼν προτερήματος
 ἀρχὴν ὀλοσχεροῦς οὕτως ἐχρήσατο κακῶς ὥστε
 κινδυνεῦσαι προσαπολέσαι καὶ τοὺς πολιορκου-
 μένους. κομίσας γὰρ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κατα-
 4 πέλτας καὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀπάσας τὰς
 πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν παρασκευάς, καὶ στρατοπε-
 δεύσας πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἐνεχείρησε προσβάλλειν
 πρὸς τὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων χάρακα. τῶν δὲ θηρίων
 5 βιασαμένων εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν, οὐ δυνάμενοι
 τὸ βάρος οὐδὲ τὴν ἔφοδον οἱ πολέμιοι μεῖναι,
 πάντες ἐξέπεσον ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας. καὶ πολλοὶ
 μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον τρωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων,
 6 τὸ δὲ διασωζόμενον μέρος πρὸς τινα λόφον ἐρυ-
 μνὸν καὶ σύμφυτον ἔμενε, πιστεῦον ταῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν
 7 τῶν τόπων ἀσφαλείαις. ὁ δ' Ἄννων, εἰθισμένος
 Νομάσι καὶ Λίβυσι πολεμεῖν, οἷτινες ὅταν ἅπαξ ἐγ-
 κλίνωσι, ποιοῦνται τὴν φυγὴν ἐπὶ δύο ἡμέρας καὶ
 τρεῖς ἐκτοπίζοντες αὐτούς, ὑπολαβὼν καὶ τότε πέ-
 ρας ἔχειν τοῦ πολέμου καὶ νενικηκέναι τοῖς ὅλοις,
 8 τῶν μὲν στρατιωτῶν ὀλιγώρησε καὶ καθόλου τῆς
 παρεμβολῆς, αὐτὸς δ' εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐγί-
 9 νετο περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν. οἱ δὲ συμ-
 πεφευγότες τῶν μισθοφόρων εἰς τὸν λόφον, σύν-
 τροφοὶ μὲν γεγονότες τῆς Βάρκα τόλμης, συνήθεις
 δ' ἐκ τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν ἀγώνων πολλάκις τῆς αὐ-
 τῆς ἡμέρας ποτὲ μὲν ὑποχωρεῖν, ποτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἐκ

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when it came to taking the field with his forces, he was another man. He had no idea how to avail himself of opportunities and generally showed an entire lack of experience and energy. For instance, as regards Utica, he began by coming to the help of the besieged and terrifying the enemy by his strong force of elephants, of which he had no less than a hundred; but when, in consequence of this, he had a chance of gaining a decisive success, he made such poor use of his advantage that he very nearly brought a catastrophe on the besieged, as well as on himself. For bringing from Carthage catapults, missiles and all requirements for a siege and encamping before the city he undertook the assault of the enemy's entrenched camp. When the elephants forced their way into the camp, the enemy unable to face the weight of their attack all evacuated it. Many of them were mangled and killed by the elephants, but those who escaped rallied on a steep hill overgrown with brushwood, relying on the natural security of the position. Hanno had been accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who once they give way continue their flight for two or three days, trying to get as far away as possible. Thinking then, on the present occasion too, that the war was over and he had secured a complete victory he took no precaution for the safety of his army and camp, but entered the city and occupied himself with the care of his person. The mercenaries, who had rallied on the hill, were men schooled in the daring tactics of Barcas and accustomed from their fighting in Sicily to make in one day repeated retirements followed by fresh

- 10 μεταβολῆς ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, καὶ τότε συν-
ιδόντες τὸν μὲν στρατηγὸν ἀπηλλαγμένον εἰς τὴν
πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς διὰ τὸ προτέρημα ῥάθυ-
11 μούντας καὶ διαρρέοντας ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας, συ-
στραφέντες ἐπιτίθενται τῷ χάρακι, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν
αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἠνάγκασαν φυ-
12 γεῖν αἰσchrῶς ὑπὸ τὰ τείχη καὶ τὰς πύλας· ἐκυρίευ-
σαν δὲ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ἀπάσης καὶ τῆς τῶν πολιορκ-
κουμένων παρασκευῆς· ἦν Ἄννων πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἐκκομίσας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐποίησε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς
13 ὑποχείριον. οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν
οὕτως ἀνεστράφη νωθρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετ' ὀλίγας
ἡμέρας περὶ τὴν καλουμένην Γόρζαν ἀντιστρατοπε-
δευσάντων αὐτῷ τῶν πολεμίων, λαβὼν καιροὺς
δὺς μὲν ἐκ παρατάξεως εἰς τὸ νικᾶν, δὺς δ' ἐξ ἐπι-
14 θέσεως, ἅτε καὶ στρατοπεδευόντων σύνεγγυς αὐτῷ
τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀμφοτέρους δοκεῖ τούτους εἰκῇ
καὶ παραλόγως προέσθαι.
- 75 Διόπερ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, θεωροῦντες αὐτὸν κακῶς
χειρίζοντα τὰς πράξεις, Ἀμίλκαν τὸν ἐπικαλού-
2 μενον Βάρκαν αὐθις προεστήσαντο, καὶ τοῦτον ἐξ-
έπεμπον εἰς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον στρατηγόν, δόν-
τες ἐβδομήκοντα μὲν ἐλέφαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπισυν-
ηγμένους τῶν μισθοφόρων καὶ τοὺς ἡὑτομοληκότας
ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις πολιτικοὺς ἱπ-
πεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς, ὥστε τοὺς σύμπαντας εἰς μυρίους
3 ὑπάρχειν. ὃς κατὰ τὴν πρώτην εὐθέως ἔξοδον κατα-
πληξάμενος τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἤττησε
μὲν τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν τῆς
Ἰτύκης πολιορκίαν, ἐφάνη δ' ἄξιος τῶν προγεγονό-
των ἔργων καὶ τῆς παρὰ τῷ πλήθει προσδοκίας.
4 τὸ δὲ πραχθὲν ἦν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ περὶ τὴν χρεῖαν ταύ-

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attacks. At present, on seeing that the general was absent in the city, while the troops were at their ease owing to their success and streaming out of their camp, they drew themselves up and attacked the camp, putting many to the sword and compelling the rest to take refuge ignominiously under the walls and at the gates. They captured all the baggage and all the artillery of the besieged, which Hanno had brought out of the town and added to his own, thus putting it in the enemy's hands. This was not the only occasion on which he acted so negligently, but a few days later at a place called Gorza, when the enemy were encamped opposite him and owing to their proximity he had four opportunities of beating them, twice in a pitched battle and twice by a surprise attack, he is said in each case to have thrown them away by his heedlessness and lack of judgement.

75. The Carthaginians, in consequence, seeing that he was mismanaging matters, again appointed Hamilcar Barcas to the command and dispatched him to this war, giving him seventy elephants, all the additional mercenaries they had been able to collect, and the deserters from the enemy, besides their burgher forces, horse and foot, so that in all he had about ten thousand men. Hamilcar, on his very first expedition, struck terror into the enemy by the unexpectedness of the attack, cowing their spirit, raising the siege of Utica, and showing himself worthy of his past exploits and of the high expectations of the populace. What he accomplished in this campaign was as follows. On

την τοιοῦτον. τῶν γεωλόφων τῶν ἐπιζευγνύντων
 τὸν αὐχένα τὸν συνάπτοντα τὴν Καρχηδόνα πρὸς
 τὴν Λιβύην ὄντων δυσβάτων, καὶ χειροποιήτους
 ἔχόντων διεκβολὰς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, συνέβαινε τοὺς
 περὶ τὸν Μάθω πάντας τοὺς διὰ τῶν προειρημέ-
 νων λόφων εὐκαίρως κειμένους τόπους φυλακαῖς δι-
 5 ειληφέναι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τοῦ προσαγορευομένου
 Μακάρα ποταμοῦ διείργοντος κατὰ τινας τόπους πα-
 ραπλησίως τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως
 ἔξοδον, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ ρεύματος ἀβάτου
 κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ὑπάρχοντος, μιᾶς δ' οὔσης ἐπ'
 αὐτῷ γεφύρας, καὶ ταύτην τηρεῖν τὴν δίοδον ἀσφα-
 6 λῶς, πόλιν ἐπ' αὐτῆς ὠκοδομηκότας. ἐξ ὧν συν-
 έβαινε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους μὴ οἶον στρατοπέδῳ τῆς
 χώρας ἐπιβαίνειν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς κατ' ἰδίαν θέ-
 λοντας διαπεσεῖν ῥαδίως ἂν δύνασθαι λαθεῖν τοὺς
 7 ὑπεναντίους. εἰς ἃ βλέπων Ἀμίλκας, καὶ παντὸς
 πράγματος καὶ καιροῦ πείραν λαμβάνων διὰ τὸ δυσ-
 χρηστεῖν περὶ τὴν ἔξοδον, διανοήθη τι τοιοῦτον.
 8 τοῦ προειρημένου ποταμοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰς θάλατταν
 ἐκβολὴν συνθεωρήσας κατὰ τινας ἀνέμων στάσεις
 ἀποθινούμενον τὸ στόμα καὶ τεναγώδῃ γινομένην
 τὴν παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ στόμα πάροδον, ποιήσας εὐτρεπῇ
 τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον, καὶ κρύπτων
 ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἐτήρει τὸ προειρημένον
 9 σύμπτωμα. παραπεσόντος δὲ τοῦ καιροῦ, νυκτὸς
 ἐξορμήσας ἔλαθε πάντας ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ τὸν προ-
 10 ειρημένον τόπον διαβιβάσας τὴν δύναμιν. παρα-
 δόξου δὲ τοῦ πράγματος φανέντος καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ
 πόλει καὶ τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ὁ μὲν Ἀμίλκας προῆγε
 διὰ τοῦ πεδίου, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τοὺς
 76 τὴν γέφυραν φυλάττοντας. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Σπέν-
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the neck of land connecting Carthage with Libya is a chain of hills difficult of access and with several passes to the country artificially cut in them. Matho had posted guards in all those spots which were favourable for the passage of the hills. In addition to this there is a river called Macaras^a which shuts off in certain places the access from the town to the country. This river is for the most part unfordable owing to the volume of water, and there is only one bridge, which Matho had also secured, building a town at the bridge-head. So that not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to reach the country with an army, but it was not even an easy matter for single persons wishing to get through to elude the vigilance of the enemy. Hamilcar, seeing all these obstacles, after passing in review every means and every chance of surmounting this difficulty about a passage, thought of the following plan. He had noticed that when the wind blew strongly from certain quarters the mouth of the river got silted up and the passage became shallow just where it falls into the sea. He therefore got his force ready to march out, and keeping his project to himself, waited for this to occur. When the right time came he started from Carthage at night, and without anyone noticing him, had by daybreak got his army across at the place mentioned. Both those in the city and the enemy were taken by surprise, and Hamilcar advanced through the plain making for the guardians of the bridge. 76.

^a The same as Bagraclas.

διον συνέντες τὸ γεγονὸς ἀπήντων εἰς τὸ πεδίου
 καὶ παρεβόηθουν ἀλλήλοις, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὴν
 γέφυραν πόλεως ὄντες οὐκ ἐλάττους μυρίων, οἱ δ'
 ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰτύκης ὑπὲρ τοὺς μυρίους καὶ πεντακισχι-
 2 λίους. ἐπεὶ δ' εἰς σύνοπτον ἦκον ἀλλήλοις, νομί-
 σαντες ἐν μέσῳ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπειληθέναι,
 σπουδῇ παρηγγύων ἅμα παρακαλοῦντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς
 3 καὶ συνῆπτον τοῖς πολεμίοις. ὁ δ' Ἀμίλκας ἦγε
 μὲν τὴν πορείαν πρῶτους ἔχων τοὺς ἐλέφαντας, ἐπὶ
 δὲ τούτοις τοὺς ἵππεῖς καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους, τελευ-
 4 ταῖα δὲ τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὄπλων. κατιδὼν δὲ προχει-
 ρότερον ἐπιφερομένους τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, ἀναστρέ-
 5 φειν παρήγγειλε πᾶσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ. καὶ τοὺς μὲν
 ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτοπορείας ἀναστρέψαντας σπουδῇ ποι-
 εῖσθαι τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ἐκέλευσε· τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τῆς
 οὐραγίας ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπάρχοντας ἐξ ἐπιστροφῆς περι-
 σπῶν ἐξέταττε πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιφάνειαν.
 6 οἱ δὲ Λίβυες καὶ μισθοφόροι, νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς
 καταπεπληγμένους φυγεῖν, λύσαντες τὴν τάξιν ἐπ-
 ἐκείντο καὶ συνῆπτον εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἔρρωμένως,
 7 ἅμα δὲ τῷ τοὺς ἵππεῖς συνεγγίσαντας τοῖς παρα-
 τεταγμένοις ἐκ μεταβολῆς ὑποστήναι, τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν
 δύναμιν ἐπάγειν, ἐκπλαγεῖς γινόμενοι διὰ τὸ παρά-
 δοξον οἱ Λίβυες ἐγκλίναντες εὐθέως ἔφευγον, ὡς
 8 ἂν εἰκῇ καὶ σποράδην ἐπικείμενοι. λοιπὸν οἱ μὲν
 τοῖς κατόπιν ἐπιφερομένοις περιπίπτοντες ἐσφάλλ-
 οντο, καὶ διέφθειρον αὐτούς τε καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους·
 οἱ δὲ πλείους συνεπατήθησαν, ἐκ χειρὸς τῶν ἵπ-
 9 πέων ἐπικειμένων αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν θηρίων. ἀπ-

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Spendius, on learning what had happened, put his two forces in movement to meet in the plain and render mutual assistance to each other, those from the town near the bridge being not less than ten thousand in number and those from Utica over fifteen thousand. When they got in sight of each other, thinking that they had caught the Carthaginians in a trap between them, they exhorted each other with loud shouts and advanced to attack. Hamilcar was advancing in the following order. In front were the elephants, after them the cavalry and light-armed troops and last of all the heavy-armed. When he saw that the enemy were attacking him in such precipitation he ordered his whole force to face about. He bade those in front, after facing about, retire with all speed, and reversing the order of those who originally were in the rear he deployed them to await the onslaught of the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries, thinking that the Carthaginians were afraid of them and retreating, broke their ranks and fell on them vigorously. But when the cavalry, on approaching the line of hoplites, wheeled round again and faced the Libyans, while at the same time the remainder of the Carthaginian army was coming up, the enemy were so much surprised that they at once turned and fled panic-stricken, in the same loose order and confusion in which they had advanced. Consequently some of them came into collision with their comrades who were advancing in their rear with disastrous effect, causing the destruction both of themselves and the latter, but the larger number were trampled to death, the cavalry and elephants attacking them at close quarters.

- ὦλοντο μὲν οὖν εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους τῶν Λιβύων καὶ
 τῶν ξένων, ἔάλωσαν δὲ περὶ δισχιλίους· οἱ δὲ λοι-
 ποὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν εἰς τὴν πρὸς τῇ γεφύρᾳ πό-
 10 λιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἰτύκῃ παρεμβολήν. Ἀμίλκας
 δὲ ποιήσας τὸ προτέρημα τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον,
 εἶπετο κατὰ πόδας τοῖς πολεμίοις, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ
 τῆς γεφύρας πόλιν ἐξ ἐφόδου κατέσχε, προεμένων
 καὶ φευγόντων εἰς τὸν Τύνητα τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ πολε-
 μίων, τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν χώραν ἐπιπορευόμενος τὰς μὲν
 11 προσήγετο, πλείστας δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἐξήρει. τοῖς
 δὲ Καρχηδονίοις βραχύ τι θάρσους ἐνειργάσατο καὶ
 τόλμης, ἐπὶ ποσὸν αὐτοὺς ἀπαλλάξας τῆς προγεγε-
 νημένης δυσελπιστίας.
- 77 Ὁ δὲ Μάθως αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἰππα-
 κριτῶν πολιορκίας ἐπέμενε, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Αὐ-
 τάριτον τὸν τῶν Γαλατῶν ἡγεμόνα καὶ Σπένδιον
 2 ἔχεσθαι τῶν ὑπεναντίων συνεβούλευε, τὰ μὲν πεδία
 φεύγοντας διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ὑπεναν-
 τίοις ἱππέων καὶ θηρίων, ταῖς δ' ὑπωρεΐαις ἀντι-
 παράγοντας καὶ συνεπιτιθεμένους κατὰ τὰς ὑπο-
 3 πιπτούσας αἰὲ δυσχερείας. ἅμα δὲ ταῖς ἐπινοίαις
 ταύταις καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Νομάδας καὶ τοὺς Λίβυας
 ἐξέπεμπε, δεόμενος βοηθεῖν σφίσι καὶ μὴ κατα-
 4 προῖεσθαι τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καιροὺς. ὁ δὲ
 Σπένδιος, προσλαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος ἀφ' ἐκάστου
 τῶν γενῶν τοὺς πάντας εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους, προῆγε,
 ταῖς ὑπωρεΐαις ἀντιπαράγων τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις,
 ἔχων ἅμα τοῖς προειρημένοις καὶ τοὺς μετ' Αὐτα-
 5 ρίτου Ἰαλάτας, ὄντας εἰς δισχιλίους. τὸ γὰρ λοιπὸν
 μέρος αὐτῶν τοῦ κατ' ἀρχὰς συστήματος ἡγετομο-
 λήκει πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸν Ἑρκα
 6 στρατοπεδείαις. τοῦ δ' Ἀμίλκου παρεμβεβληκότος

BOOK I

About six thousand Libyans and mercenaries fell and nearly two thousand were made prisoners. The rest escaped, some to the town by the bridge and some to the camp before Utica. Hamilcar after this victory followed closely on the retreating enemy and took the town by the bridge, the enemy in it deserting it and flying to Tunis. He next traversed the rest of the country, winning over some towns and taking others by assault. He thus restored some confidence and courage to the Carthaginians, delivering them in a measure from their previous despondency.

77. Matho for his own part continued to prosecute the siege of Hippacritae, advising Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls, and Spendius to harass the enemy, keeping away from the plains owing to the numbers of the cavalry and elephants opposed to them but marching along the foothills parallel to the Carthaginians and descending on them whenever they were on difficult ground. While adopting this plan he at the same time sent messages to the Numidians and Libyans, begging them to come to his assistance and not lose the chance of gaining their freedom. Spendius, taking with him from Tunis a force of about six thousand men drawn from all the nationalities, advanced along the slopes parallel to the Carthaginians. He had also with him Autaritus and his Gauls numbering only about two thousand, the rest of the original corps having deserted to the Romans when encamped near Eryx. Hamilcar

ἐν τινι πεδίῳ πανταχόθεν ὄρεσι περιεχομένῳ, συνέβη τὰς παρὰ τῶν Νομάδων καὶ Λιβύων βοηθείας εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον συνάψαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Σπέν-
 7 διον. γενομένης δὲ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τῆς μὲν τῶν Λιβύων ἐπιστρατοπεδείας αἰφνιδίου καὶ κατὰ πρό-
 σωπον, τῆς δὲ τῶν Νομάδων ἀπ' οὐράς, τῆς δὲ περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον ἐκ πλαγίου, μεγάλην αὐτοῖς ἀπορίαν συνέβη περιστῆναι καὶ δυσέκφευκτον.

78 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Ναραύας, ὃς ἦν μὲν Νομὰς τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων εἰς, ἦν δὲ καὶ πλήρης ὀρμῆς πολεμικῆς, οὗτος αἰὲν μὲν οἰκείως διέκειτο πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, πατρικὴν ἔχων σύστασιν, τότε δὲ μᾶλλον παρωρμήθη διὰ τὴν Ἀμίλκου τοῦ
 2 στρατηγοῦ καταξίωσιν. διὸ καὶ νομίσας ἔχειν εὐφυνῇ καιρὸν πρὸς ἔντευξιν αὐτῷ καὶ σύστασιν, ἦκεν εἰς τὴν στρατοπεδείαν, ἔχων περὶ αὐτὸν
 3 Νομάδας εἰς ἑκατόν. καὶ συνεγγίσας τῷ χάρακι τολμηρῶς ἔμενε, κατασείων τῇ χειρί. τοῦ δ' Ἀμίλκου θαυμάσαντος τὴν ἐπιβολήν, καὶ προέμψαντός τινα τῶν ἱππέων, εἰς λόγους ἔφη βούλεσθαι
 4 συνελθεῖν τῷ στρατηγῷ. διαποροῦντος δ' ἀκμὴν καὶ διαπιστοῦντος τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡγεμόνος, παραδοὺς ὁ Ναραύας τὸν ἵππον καὶ τὰς λόγχας τοῖς
 6 μεθ' αὐτοῦ, παρῆν ἄνοπλος εὐθαρσῶς εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν. οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐθαύμαζον, τὰ δὲ κατε-
 7 πλήττοντο τὴν τόλμαν· ὅμως δὲ προσεδέξαντο καὶ συνῆλθον εἰς τὰς χεῖρας. ὁ δὲ παραγενόμενος εἰς λόγους ἔφη πᾶσι μὲν Καρχηδονίοις εὐνοεῖν, μάλιστα δ' ἐπιθυμεῖν Βάρκα γενέσθαι φίλος· διὸ καὶ νῦν παρεῖναι συσταθισόμενος αὐτῷ καὶ κοινωνήσων
 8 ἀδόλως παντὸς ἔργου καὶ πάσης ἐπιβολῆς. Ἀμίλκας δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκούσας οὕτως ἦσθη μεγάλως ἐπὶ τε τῷ

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had established his camp in a plain surrounded by mountains, and just at this time Spendius was joined by the Numidian and Libyan reinforcements. The Carthaginians, suddenly finding the additional force of Libyans in their front, and that of the Numidians in their rear, while Spendius was on their flank, were in a very difficult situation, from which it was not easy to extricate themselves.

78. There was a certain Naravas, a Numidian of high rank and full of martial spirit. He had always had that attachment to the Carthaginians which was traditional in his family, and it was now strengthened by his admiration for Hamilcar. Thinking that this was a favourable opportunity for meeting Hamilcar and introducing himself, he rode up to the camp escorted by about a hundred Numidians. Coming close to the palisade he remained there quite fearlessly making signals with his hand. Hamilcar was much astonished at his venturesomeness and sent out a horseman to meet him, when he said that he desired an interview with the general. The Carthaginian leader remaining still much amazed and distrustful, Naravas handed over his horse and his spears to his attendants, and very boldly came into the camp unarmed. The Carthaginians looked on in mingled admiration and amazement at his daring, but they met and received him, and when he was admitted to the interview, he said that he wished all the Carthaginians well but particularly desired the friendship of Barcas, and this was why he had come to introduce himself and offer his cordial assistance in all actions and enterprises. Hamilcar, on hearing this, was so delighted at the young man's courage in

κατὰ τὴν παρουσίαν θάρσει καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἔντευξιν ἀπλότητι τοῦ νεανίσκου, ὥς οὐ μόνον εὐδόκησε κοινωνὸν αὐτὸν προσλαβέσθαι τῶν πράξεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν θυγατέρα δώσειν ἐπηγγείλατο
9 μεθ' ὅρκου, διαφυλάξαντος αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους πίστιν.

Γενομένων δὲ τῶν ὁμολογιῶν, ὁ μὲν Ναραύας ἦκε τοὺς ὑφ' αὐτὸν τεταγμένους ἔχων Νομάδας,
10 ὄντας εἰς δισχιλίους, ὁ δ' Ἀμίλκας, προσγενομένης αὐτῷ τῆς χειρὸς ταύτης, παρετάξατο τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον συνάψαντες ἐπὶ ταῦτό τοις Λίβυσι καὶ καταβάντες εἰς τὸ πεδίον συνέβαλλον τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.
11 γενομένης δὲ μάχης ἰσχυρᾶς, ἐνίκων οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀμίλκαν, καλῶς μὲν τῶν θηρίων ἀγωνισαμένων, ἐπιφανεστάτην δὲ τοῦ Ναραύα παρασχομένου
12 χρεῖαν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Λυτάριτος καὶ Σπένδιος διέφυγον, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἔπεσον μὲν εἰς μυρίους,
13 ἐάλωσαν δ' εἰς τετρακισχιλίους. ἐπιτελεσθέντος δὲ τοῦ κατορθώματος, Ἀμίλκας τοῖς μὲν βουλομένοις τῶν αἰχμαλώτων μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ συστρατεύειν ἐξουσίαν ἔδωκε καὶ καθώπλιζε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν
14 πολεμίων σκύλοις, τοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους ἀθροίσας παρεκάλει, φάσκων, ἕως μὲν τοῦ νῦν συγγνώμην αὐτοῖς ἔχειν τῶν ἡμαρτημένων· διὸ καὶ συγχωρεῖν τρέπεσθαι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας ὁρμὰς οὐ ποτ'
15 ἂν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν προαιρῇται. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διηπειλήσατο μηθένα φέρειν ὄπλον πολέμιον κατ' αὐτῶν, ὥς, εἰ ἄλλῃ τις, ἀπαραιτήτου τευξόμενον τιμωρίας.

79 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς οἱ τὴν Σαρδόνα [τὴν νῆσον] παραφυλάττοντες τῶν μισθοφόρων,

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coming to him and his simple frankness at their interview that not only did he consent to associate him in his undertakings but swore to give him his daughter in marriage if he remained loyal to Carthage.

The agreement having thus been made, Naravas came in with the Numidians under his command, about two thousand in number, and Hamilcar, thus reinforced, offered battle to the enemy. Spendius, after effecting a junction with the Libyans, descended into the plain and attacked the Carthaginians. The battle was a stubborn one, but ended in the victory of Hamilcar, the elephants fighting well and Naravas rendering brilliant services. Autaritus and Spendius escaped, but with the loss of about ten thousand killed and four thousand prisoners. After the victory Hamilcar gave permission to those of the prisoners who chose to join his own army, arming them with the spoils of the fallen enemies; those who were unwilling to do so he collected and addressed saying that up to now he pardoned their offences, and therefore they were free to go their several ways, wherever each man chose, but in future he threatened that if any of them bore arms against Carthage he would if captured meet with inevitable punishment.

79. About the same time the mercenaries who garrisoned Sardinia, emulous of the exploits of Matho

- ζηλώσαντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον,
 2 ἐπιτίθενται τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Καρχηδονίοις. καὶ τὸν
 μὲν τότε παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄντα βοήθαρχον Βώσταρον
 συγκλείσαντες εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν μετὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ
 3 πολιτῶν ἀπέκτειναν. αὐθις δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων
 στρατηγὸν ἐξαποστείλάντων μετὰ δυνάμεως Ἄννω-
 να, κᾶπειτα καὶ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων ἐγκαταλιπου-
 4 σὼν τὸν Ἄννωνα, καὶ μεταθεμένων πρὸς σφᾶς,
 γενόμενοι ζωγρία κύριοι τοῦ προειρημένου, παραντί-
 κα τοῦτον μὲν ἀνεσταύρωσαν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παρηλ-
 λαγμένας ἐπινοοῦντες τιμωρίας, πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ
 νήσῳ Καρχηδονίους στρεβλοῦντες ἀπέκτειναν· καὶ
 τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη ποιησάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς
 5 εἶχον ἐγκρατῶς τὴν νῆσον, ἕως οὗ στασιάσαντες
 πρὸς τοὺς Σαρδονίους ἐξέπεσον ὑπ' ἐκείνων εἰς
 6 τὴν Ἰταλίαν. ἡ μὲν οὖν Σαρδὼ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον
 ἀπηλλοτριώθη Καρχηδονίων, νῆσος καὶ τῷ μεγέθει
 καὶ τῇ πολυανθρωπίᾳ καὶ τοῖς γεννήμασι δια-
 7 φέρουσα. τῷ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ πολὺν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς
 πεποιῆσθαι λόγον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθ' εἶναι
 ταυτολογεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων.
 8 Μάθως δὲ καὶ Σπένδιος, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις Αὐτάριτος
 ὁ Γαλάτης, ὑπιδόμενοι τὴν Ἀμίλκου φιλανθρωπίαν
 εἰς τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, καὶ φοβηθέντες μὴ τῷ
 τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ψυχαγωγηθέντες ὀρμήσωσι πρὸς τὴν
 ὑποδεικνυμένην ἀσφάλειαν οἳ τε Λίβυες καὶ τὸ τῶν
 μισθοφόρων πλῆθος, ἐβουλεύοντο πῶς ἂν καινοτομή-
 9 σαντές τι τῶν πρὸς ἀσέβειαν εἰς τέλος ἀποθηριώ-
 σειαν τὰ πλῆθη πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. ἔδοξεν
 οὖν αὐτοῖς συναθροῖσαι τοὺς πολλούς. γενομένου
 δὲ τούτου γραμματοφόρον εἰσήγαγον, ὡς ἀπεσταλ-
 10 μένον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Σαρδόνος αἰρετιστῶν. ἡ δ'

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and Spendius, attacked the Carthaginians in the island. They began by shutting up in the citadel and putting to death Bostar, the commander of the foreign contingent, and his compatriots. Next, when the Carthaginians sent Hanno over in command of a fresh force, this force deserted him and joined the mutineers, who thereupon took him prisoner and at once crucified him. After this, devising the most exquisite torments, they tortured and murdered all the Carthaginians in the island, and when they had got all the towns into their power continued to hold forcible possession of Sardinia, until they quarrelled with the natives, and were driven out by them to Italy. Thus was Sardinia lost to the Carthaginians, an island of great extent, most thickly populated and most fertile. Many authors have described it at length, and I do not think it necessary to repeat statements which no one disputes.

Matho and Spendius, as well as the Gaul Autaritus, ^{239 B.C.} were apprehensive of the effect of Hamilcar's leniency to the prisoners, fearing that the Libyans and the greater part of the mercenaries might thus be won over and hasten to avail themselves of the proffered immunity. They therefore set themselves to devise some infamous crime which would make the hatred of the troops for Carthage more savage. They decided to call a general meeting and at this they introduced a letter-bearer supposed to have been sent by their confederates in Sardinia. The letter

- ἐπιστολὴν διεσάφει τὸν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ πάντας, οὓς παρεσπόνδησαν ἐν τῷ Τύνητι, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, φυλάττειν ἐπιμελῶς, ὡς πραττόντων τινῶν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου τοῖς Καρχη-
- 11 δονίοις ὑπὲρ τῆς τούτων σωτηρίας. λαβόμενος δὲ τῆς ἀφορμῆς ταύτης ὁ Σπένδιος, πρῶτον μὲν παρεκάλει μὴ πιστεύειν τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων γεγεννημένην φιλανθρωπίαν πρὸς
- 12 τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους· οὐ γὰρ σῶσαι προαιρούμενον αὐτὸν ταῦτα βεβουλεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀλόντων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀφέσεως ἡμῶν ἐγκρατῇ γενέσθαι σπουδάζοντα, πρὸς τὸ μὴ τινάς, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἡμᾶς
- 13 ἅμα τιμωρήσασθαι πιστεύσαντας αὐτῷ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φυλάττεσθαι παρήνει μὴ προέμενοι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Γέσκωνα καταφρονηθῶσι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, μεγάλα δὲ βλάβῃσι τὰς ἰδίας πράξεις, ἄνδρα τοιοῦτον καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν ἑάσαντες διαφυγεῖν, ὃν
- 14 εἰκὸς ἐχθρὸν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι φοβερῶτατον. ἔτι δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ παρῆν ἄλλος γραμματοφόρος, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος ἀπεσταλμένος, παρα-
- 80 πλῆσια τοῖς ἐκ τῆς Σαρδόνης διασαφῶν. ἐφ' ὃν Αὐτάριτος ὁ Γαλάτης ἐπιβαλὼν μίαν ἔφη σωτηρίαν εἶναι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν πράγμασι τὸ πάσας ἀπογνῶναι
- 2 τὰς ἐν Καρχηδονίοις ἐλπίδας· ἕως δ' ἂν ἀντέχηταί τις τῆς ἐκείνων φιλανθρωπίας, οὐ δυνατόν αὐτοῖς
- 3 ἀληθινὸν γενέσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον σύμμαχον. διόπερ ἡξίου τούτοις πιστεύειν, τούτοις ἀκούειν, τοῖς τοιούτοις προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, οἷτινες ἂν αἰεὶ τι τῶν ἀπεχθεστάτων καὶ πικροτάτων εἰσαγγέλλωσι κατὰ Καρχηδονίων· τοὺς δ' ἐναντία τούτοις λέγοντας
- 4 προδότας καὶ πολεμίους ἡγεῖσθαι παρήνει. ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν συνεβούλευε τὸν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς

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advised them to keep careful guard over Gesco and all the others whom they had, as above narrated, treacherously arrested at Tunis, since some persons in the camp were negotiating with the Carthaginians about their release. Spendius, seizing on this pretext, begged them in the first place to have no reliance on the Carthaginian general's reported clemency to the prisoners. "It is not," he said, "with the intention of sparing their lives that he has taken this course regarding his captives, but by releasing them he designs to get us into his power, so that he may take vengeance not on some, but on all of us who trust him." Moreover, he warned them to take care lest by giving up Gesco and the others they incur the contempt of their enemies and seriously damage their own situation by allowing to escape them so able a man and so good a general, who was sure to become their most formidable enemy. He had not finished his speech when in came another post supposed to be from Tunis with a message similar to that from Sardinia. 80. Autaritus the Gaul was the next speaker. He said that the only hope of safety for them was to abandon all reliance on the Carthaginians. Whoever continued to look forward to clemency from them could be no true ally of their own. Therefore he asked them to trust those, to give a hearing to those, to attend to those only who bring the most hateful and bitterest accusations against the Carthaginians, and to regard speakers on the other side as traitors and enemies. Finally, he recommended them to torture and put to

- μετ' αὐτοῦ συλληφθέντας καὶ τοὺς ὕστερον γενο-
 μένους αἰχμαλώτους τῶν Καρχηδονίων αἰκισαμέ-
 5 νους ἀποκτεῖναι. πρακτικώτατος δ' ἦν οὗτος ἐν
 ταῖς συμβουλίαις διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ
 6 συνιέναι. πάλοι γὰρ στρατευόμενος ἤδει διαλέγε-
 σθαι φοινικιστί· ταύτῃ δέ πως οἱ πλείστοι συν-
 εσαίνοντο τῇ διαλέκτῳ διὰ τὸ μῆκος τῆς προγεγενη-
 7 μένης στρατείας. διόπερ ἐπαινέσαντος αὐτὸν ὁμο-
 θυμαδὸν τοῦ πλήθους, οὗτος μὲν εὐδοκιμῶν ἀν-
 8 εχώρησε. πολλῶν δὲ προπορευομένων ἀφ' ἐκάστου
 γένους ἅμα, καὶ βουλομένων αὐτὴν παραιτεῖσθαι
 τὴν αἰκίαν διὰ τὰς γεγενημένας ἐκ τοῦ Γέσκωνος
 εἰς αὐτοὺς εὐεργεσίας, οὔτε μὴν τῶν λεγομένων
 οὐθὲν ἦν συνετόν, ὥς ἂν ἅμα πολλῶν, ἐκάστου
 9 δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν διάλεκτον συμβουλευόντος· ἐπεὶ
 δὲ καὶ παρεγυμνώθη διότι τὴν τιμωρίαν παραι-
 τοῦνται, καὶ τις ἐκ τῶν καθημένων εἶπε Βάλλε,
 10 πάντας ἅμα κατέλευσαν τοὺς προπορευθέντας. καὶ
 τούτους μὲν, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ θηρίων διεφθαρμένους,
 11 ἐξέφερον οἱ προσήκοντες. τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν Γέ-
 σκωνα λαβόντες, ὄντας εἰς ἑπτακοσίους, ἤγον ἐκ
 τοῦ χάρακος οἱ περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον· καὶ προαγα-
 γόντες βραχὺ πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας πρῶτον μὲν
 12 ἀπέκοπτον τὰς χεῖρας, ποιούμενοι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ
 τοῦ Γέσκωνος, ὃν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ πρότερον ἐκ πάν-
 των Καρχηδονίων προκρίναντες ἀνέδειξαν μὲν
 εὐεργέτην αὐτῶν, ἐπέτρεψαν δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβη-
 13 τουμένων. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰς χεῖρας ἀπέκοψαν, ἤκρω-
 τηρίαζον τοὺς τालαιπώρους· κολοβῶσαντες δὲ καὶ
 συντρίψαντες τῷ σκέλε' ἔτι ζῶντας ἔρριψαν εἰς
 τινὰ τάφρον.
- 81 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνοι, τοῦ δυστυχήματος αὐτοῖς

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death not only Gesco and those arrested with him, but all the Carthaginians they had subsequently taken prisoners. He was much the most effective speaker in their councils, because a number of them could understand him. He had been a long time in the service and had learned Phoenician, a language which had become more or less agreeable to their ears owing to the length of the previous war. His speech therefore met with universal approbation, and he retired from the platform amid applause. Numerous speakers from each nationality now came forward all together, maintaining that the prisoners should be spared at least the infliction of torture in view of Gesco's previous kindness. Nothing, however, they said was intelligible, as they were all speaking together and each stating his views in his own language. But the moment it was disclosed that they were begging for a remission of the sentence someone among the audience called out "Stone them," and they instantly stoned all the speakers to death. These unfortunates, mangled as if by wild beasts, were carried off for burial by their friends. Spendius and his men then led out from the camp Gesco and the other prisoners, in all about seven hundred. Taking them a short distance away, they first of all cut off their hands, beginning with Gesco, that very Gesco whom a short time previously they had selected from all the Carthaginians, proclaiming him their benefactor and referring the points in dispute to him. After cutting off their hands they cut off the wretched men's other extremities too, and after thus mutilating them and breaking their legs, threw them still alive into a trench.

81. The Carthaginians, when news came of this

ἀναγγελθέντος, ποιεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν εἶχον, ἐσχετλία-
 ζον δέ, καὶ περιπαθεῖς γινόμενοι τῇ συμφορᾷ πρὸς
 μὲν Ἀμίλκαν καὶ τὸν ἕτερον τῶν στρατηγῶν Ἄν-
 νωνα πρεσβευτὰς ἐξέπεμπον, δεόμενοι βοηθεῖν καὶ
 2 τιμωρεῖν τοῖς ἡτυχηκόσι. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἡσεβηκότας
 κήρυκας ἐξαπέστελλον περὶ τῆς τῶν νεκρῶν ἀναι-
 3 ρέσεως. οἱ δ' οὐτ' ἔδοσαν, προεῖπόν τε τοῖς παρ-
 οῦσι μήτε κήρυκα πέμπειν πρὸς σφᾶς μήτε πρε-
 σβευτήν, ὥς τῆς αὐτῆς κολάσεως ὑπομενούσης τοὺς
 4 παραγενομένους ἥς νῦν Γέσκων τέτευχε. πρὸς δὲ
 τὸ λοιπὸν ἐδογματοποίησαν καὶ παρήνεσαν αὐτοῖς,
 ὃν μὲν ἂν λάβωσι Καρχηδονίων, τιμωρησαμένους
 ἀποκτείνειν· ὃν δ' ἂν τῶν συμμαχοῦντων αὐτοῖς,
 ἀποκόψαντας τὰς χεῖρας αὐθις εἰς Καρχηδόν' ἀπο-
 πέμπειν. ὃ δὴ καὶ διετέλεσαν ἐπιμελῶς ποιοῦντες.
 5 διόπερ εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων οὐκ ἂν τις εἰπεῖν ὀκνή-
 σειεν ὥς οὐ μόνον τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ
 τινα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς γεννωμένων ἐλκῶν καὶ φυμά-
 των ἀποθηριοῦσθαι συμβαίνει καὶ τελέως ἀβοήθητα
 6 γίνεσθαι, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα τὰς ψυχάς. ἐπὶ τε γὰρ
 τῶν ἐλκῶν, ἐὰν μὲν θεραπείαν τοῖς τοιούτοις προσ-
 ᾶγη τις, ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἐνίοτε ταύτης ἐρεθιζόμενα θᾶτ-
 τον ποιεῖται τὴν νομήν· ἐὰν δὲ πάλιν ἀφῇ, κατὰ
 τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν φύσιν φθείροντα τὸ συνεχὲς οὐκ ἴσχει
 7 παῦλαν, ἕως ἂν ἀφανίσῃ τὸ ὑποκείμενον· ταῖς τε
 ψυχαῖς παραπλησίως τοιαῦται πολλάκις ἐπιφύονται
 μελανίαι καὶ σηπεδόνες ὥστε μηδὲν ἀσεβέστερον
 ἀνθρώπου μηδ' ὠμότερον ἀποτελεῖσθαι τῶν ζώων.
 8 οἷς ἐὰν μὲν συγγνώμην τινὰ προσάγῃς καὶ φιλαν-
 θρωπίαν, ἐπιβουλήν καὶ παραλογισμόν ἡγούμενοι
 τὸ συμβαῖνον ἀπιστότεροι καὶ δυσμενέστεροι γί-
 9 νονται πρὸς τοὺς φιλανθρωποῦντας· ἐὰν δ' ἀντι-

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unhappy event, could take no action, but their indignation was extreme, and in the heat of it they sent messengers to Hamilcar and their other general Hanno imploring them to come and avenge the unfortunate victims. To the assassins they sent heralds begging that the bodies might be given up to them. Not only was this request refused but the messengers were told to send neither herald nor envoy again, as they would meet with the same fate that had just befallen Gesco. With regard to treatment of prisoners in the future, the mutineers passed a resolution and engaged each other to torture and kill every Carthaginian and send back to the capital with his hands cut off every ally of Carthage, and this practice they continued to observe carefully. No one looking at this would have any hesitation in saying that not only do men's bodies and certain of the ulcers and tumours afflicting them become so to speak savage and brutalized and quite incurable, but that this is true in a much higher degree of their souls. In the case of ulcers, if we treat them, they are sometimes inflamed by the treatment itself and spread more rapidly, while again if we neglect them they continue, in virtue of their own nature, to eat into the flesh and never rest until they have utterly destroyed the tissues beneath. Similarly such malignant lividities and putrid ulcers often grow in the human soul, that no beast becomes at the end more wicked or cruel than man. In the case of men in such a state, if we treat the disease by pardon and kindness, they think we are scheming to betray them or take them in, and become more mistrustful and hostile to their would-be benefactors, but if, on the

- τιμωρῇ, διαμιλλώμενοι τοῖς θυμοῖς οὐκ ἔστι τι τῶν ἀπειρημένων ἢ δεινῶν ὁποῖον οὐκ ἀναδέχονται, σὺν καλῷ τιθέμενοι τὴν τοιαύτην τόλμαν· τέλος δ' ἀποθηριωθέντες ἐξέστησαν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως.
- 10 τῆς δὲ διαθέσεως ἀρχηγὸν μὲν καὶ μεγίστην μερίδα νομιστέον ἔβη μοχθηρὰ καὶ τροφὴν ἐκ παίδων κακὴν, συνεργὰ δὲ καὶ πλείω, μέγιστα δὲ τῶν συνεργῶν, τὰς αἰὶ τῶν προεστώτων ὕβρεις καὶ πλεονεξίας. ἃ δὴ τότε συνέβαινε καὶ περὶ μὲν τὸ σύστημα τῶν μισθοφόρων, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον περὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν.
- 82 Ἀμίλκας δέ, δυσχρηστούμενος τῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπονοίᾳ, τὸν μὲν Ἄννωνα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐκάλει, πεπεισμένος ἀθροισθέντων ὁμοῦ τῶν στρατοπέδων
- 2 θάττον ἐπιθήσειν τέλος τοῖς ὅλοις. τῶν δὲ πολεμίων οὓς ποτε κρατήσσειε, τοὺς μὲν ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ διέφθειρε, τοὺς δὲ ζωγρίᾳ πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰσαναχθέντας ὑπέβαλλε τοῖς θηρίοις, μίαν ὁρῶν λύσιν ταύτην, εἰ δυνηθεῖη τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἄρδην ἀφανίσει.
- 3 Δοκούντων δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπικυδεστέρας ἐλπίδας ἔχειν ἤδη κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, γίνεται τις ὁλοσχερῆς καὶ παράδοξος περὶ αὐτοὺς παλίρροια τῶν
- 4 πραγμάτων. οἳ τε γὰρ στρατηγοὶ συνελθόντες ἐπὶ ταῦτ' ὁλοσχερῆς διεστασίασαν πρὸς σφᾶς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μὴ μόνον τοὺς κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν παραλιπεῖν καιροὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλὰς ἀφορμὰς διδόναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους
- 5 φιλονεικίαν. ἃ δὴ καὶ συνέντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τῷ μὲν ἐν τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι προσέταξαν, τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ μένειν, ὃν ἂν αἱ δυνάμεις προκρίνω-
- 6 σιν. ἅμα δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰς παρακομιζομένας ἀγο-

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contrary, we attempt to cure the evil by retaliation they work up their passions to outrival ours, until there is nothing so abominable or so atrocious that they will not consent to do it, imagining all the while that they are displaying a fine courage. Thus at the end they are utterly brutalized and no longer can be called human beings. Of such a condition the origin and most potent cause lies in bad manners and customs and wrong training from childhood, but there are several contributory ones, the chief of which is habitual violence and unscrupulousness on the part of those in authority over them. All these conditions were present in this mercenary force as a whole and especially in their chiefs.

82. This desperation of the enemy made Hamilcar anxious, and he begged Hanno to join him, being convinced that if both armies united, an end would be put sooner to the whole war. Meanwhile he continued to put to the sword those of the enemy who were conquered in the field, while those brought to him captive prisoners he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death, as it was clear to him that the rebellion would never be stamped out until the enemy were utterly exterminated.

The prospects of the Carthaginians now seemed much brighter, but the tide suddenly turned completely against them. For when the two generals met, they quarrelled so seriously, that this difference caused them not only to neglect many opportunities of striking a blow at the enemy, but to afford many such to the latter. The Carthaginians perceiving this, ordered one of the two to leave his post and the other to remain in sole command, leaving the choice to the troops. In addition to this

- ρὰς ἐκ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς καλουμένων Ἐμπορίων, ἐφ'
 αἷς εἶχον τὰς μεγίστας ἐλπίδας περί τε τῆς τροφῆς
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, διαφθαρῆναι συνέβη
 7 κατὰ θάλατταν ὁλοσχερῶς ὑπὸ χειμῶνος. τὰ δὲ
 κατὰ τὴν Σαρδόνα, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προείπον, ἐτύγ-
 χανεν ἀπηλλοτριωμένα, μεγάλας αὐτοῖς αἰεὶ ποτε
 8 χρείας παρεχομένης τῆς νήσου ταύτης κατὰ τὰς
 περιστάσεις. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἢ τῶν Ἰππακριτῶν
 καὶ τῶν Ἰτυκαίων ἀπέστη πόλις, αἵτινες ἐτύγχανον
 μόναι τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην οὐ μόνον τὸν ἐνεστῶτα
 πόλεμον ἀναδεδεγμένοι γενναίως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
 κατ' Ἀγαθοκλέα καιροὺς καὶ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἔφοδον
 εὐγενῶς ὑπομεμενηκυῖαι, καὶ συλλήβδην οὐδέποτε
 9 βεβουλευμένοι Καρχηδονίοις οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον. τότε
 δὲ χωρὶς τῆς ἀλόγου πρὸς τοὺς Λίβυας ἀποστάσεως
 καὶ διὰ τῆς μεταθέσεως εὐθέως τούτοις μὲν τὴν
 μεγίστην οἰκειότητα καὶ πίστιν ἐναπεδείξαντο, πρὸς
 δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀπαραίτητον ὀργὴν ἐνεστή-
 10 σαντο καὶ μῖσος. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ παραβεβοηθηκότας
 αὐτοῖς παρ' ἐκείνων, ὄντας εἰς πεντακοσίους, καὶ
 τὸν ἡγεμόνα τούτων ἀποκτείναντες ἅπαντας ἔρρι-
 ψαν κατὰ τοῦ τείχους, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐνεχείρισαν τοῖς
 Λίβυσι· τοῖς γε μὴν Καρχηδονίοις οὐδὲ θάψαι συν-
 11 ἐχώρησαν τοὺς ἡτυχηκότας αἰτουμένοις. τούτων δὲ
 συμβαινόντων, οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπέν-
 διον, ἐπαρθέντες τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι, πολιορκεῖν
 12 ἐνεχείρισαν αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχηδόνα. Βάρκας δὲ
 παραλαβὼν Ἀννίβαν τὸν στρατηγόν· τοῦτον γὰρ
 ἐξαπέστειλαν οἱ πολῖται πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις, ἐπεὶ
 τὸν Ἀννωνὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἔκρινε δεῖν ἀπαλ-
 λάττεσθαι, κατὰ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων αὐτοῖς

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they suffered the total loss at sea in a storm, of the supplies they were conveying from the place they call Emporiae, supplies on which they entirely relied for their commissariat and other needs. And again, as I said above, they had lost Sardinia, an island which had always been of great service to them in difficult circumstances. The severest blow of all, however, was the defection of Hippacritae and Utica, the only two cities in Libya which had not only bravely faced the present war, but had gallantly held out during the invasion of Agathocles and that of the Romans; indeed they never had on any occasion given the least sign of hostility to Carthage. But now, apart from their unjustifiable defection to the cause of the Libyans, their sympathies so suddenly changed, that they exhibited the greatest friendship and loyalty to the rebels, while beginning to show every symptom of passionate and determined hatred of Carthage. After butchering the troops the Carthaginians had sent to assist them, about five hundred in number, together with their commander, they threw all the bodies from the wall, and surrendered the city to the Libyans. They would not even give the Carthaginians the permission they requested to bury their unfortunate compatriots. Matho and Spendius in the meantime, elated by these events, undertook the siege of Carthage itself. Barcas had now been joined in the command by Hannibal, the general whom the citizens had dispatched to the army, on the soldiers voting that Hanno should be the one to retire, when the decision was left in their hands by the Carthaginians at the

- δοθεῖσαν ἐπιτροπὴν περὶ τὰς γενομένας τῶν στρα-
 13 τηγῶν στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους· διόπερ Ἀμίλκας,
 ἔχων τοῦτόν τε καὶ Ναραύαν, ἐπήει τὴν χώραν,
 διακλείων τὰς χορηγίας τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ
 Σπένδιον, μεγίστην αὐτῷ παρεχομένου χρεῖαν περὶ
 τε ταῦτα καὶ τᾶλλα Ναραύα τοῦ Νομάδος.
- 14 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ὑπαίθρους δυνάμεις ἐν
 83 τούτοις ἦν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι περικλειόμενοι παν-
 ταχόθεν ἡναγκάζοντο καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὰς συμμα-
 2 χίδων πόλεων ἐλπίδας. Ἰέρων δ' αἰεὶ μὲν ποτε κατὰ
 τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο σπουδὴν
 3 εἰς πᾶν τὸ παρακαλούμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, τότε δὲ καὶ
 μᾶλλον ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο, πεπεισμένος συμφέρειν ἑαυτῷ
 καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δυναστείαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν
 Ῥωμαίων φιλίαν τὸ σώζεσθαι Καρχηδονίους, ἵνα μὴ
 παντάπασιν ἐξῇ τὸ προτεθὲν ἀκονιτὶ συντελεῖσθαι
 τοῖς ἰσχύουσι, πάνυ φρονίμως καὶ νουνεχῶς λογι-
 4 ζόμενος. οὐδέποτε γὰρ χρή τὰ τοιαῦτα παρορᾶν,
 οὐδὲ τηλικαύτην οὐδενὶ συγκατασκευάζειν δυνα-
 στείαν, πρὸς ἣν οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ἐξ-
 5 ἔσται δικαίων ἀμφισβητεῖν. οὐ μὲν ἄλλὰ καὶ
 Ῥωμαῖοι τηροῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας δίκαια
 6 προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον. ἐν ἀρχαῖς μὲν γὰρ
 ἐγένετό τις ἀμφισβήτησις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν διὰ τινος
 7 τοιαύτας αἰτίας. τῶν Καρχηδονίων τοὺς πλέοντας ἐξ
 Ἰταλίας εἰς Λιβύην καὶ χορηγοῦντας τοῖς πολεμίοις
 καταγόντων ὡς αὐτοὺς, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀθροισθέντων
 τούτων εἰς τὴν φυλακὴν εἰς τοὺς πεντακοσίους,
 8 ἡγανάκτησαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαπρε-
 σβευσάμενοι, καὶ κομισάμενοι διὰ λόγου πάντας, ἐπὶ
 τοσοῦτον εὐδόκησαν ὥστε παραχρῆμα τοῖς Καρχη-
 δονίοις ἀντιδωρήσασθαι τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους παρ'

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time the two generals had quarrelled. Accompanied then by this Hannibal and by Naravas, Hamilear scoured the country, intercepting the supplies of Matho and Spendius, receiving the greatest assistance in this and all other matters from the Numidian Naravas.

Such were the positions of the field forces. 83. The Carthaginians, being shut in on all sides, were obliged to resort to an appeal to the states in alliance with them. Hiero during the whole of the present war had been most prompt in meeting their requests, and was now more complaisant than ever, being convinced that it was in his own interest for securing both his Sicilian dominions and his friendship with the Romans, that Carthage should be preserved, and that the stronger Power should not be able to attain its ultimate object entirely without effort. In this he reasoned very wisely and sensibly, for such matters should never be neglected, and we should never contribute to the attainment by one state of a power so preponderant, that none dare dispute with it even for their acknowledged rights. But now the Romans as well as Hiero observed loyally the engagements the treaty imposed on them. At first there had been a slight dispute between the two states for the following reason. The Carthaginians when they captured at sea traders coming from Italy to Africa with supplies for the enemy, brought them in to Carthage, and there were now in their prisons as many as five hundred such. The Romans were annoyed at this, but when on sending an embassy, they recovered all the prisoners by diplomatic means, they were so much gratified, that in return they gave back to the Carthaginians all

- αὐτοῖς αἰχμαλώτους ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Σικελίαν πολέμου.
 9 ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τοῦ καιροῦ πρὸς ἕκαστα τῶν παρα-
 καλουμένων ἐτοίμως καὶ φιланθρωπῶς ὑπῆκουον.
 10 διὸ καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐπέτρεψαν τοῖς
 ἐμπόροις ἐξαγαγεῖν αἰεὶ τὸ κατεπεῖγον, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς
 11 πολεμίους ἐκώλυσαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν μὲν ἐν τῇ
 Σαρδόνι μισθοφόρων, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Καρ-
 χηδονίων ἀπέστησαν, ἐπισπωμένων αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν
 νῆσον οὐχ ὑπῆκουσαν· τῶν δ' Ἰτυκαίων ἐγχειρι-
 ζόντων σφᾶς, οὐ προσεδέξαντο, τηροῦντες τὰ κατὰ
 τὰς συνθήκας δίκαια.
 12 Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν οὖν τῆς παρὰ τῶν προειρημέ-
 νων φίλων τυγχάνοντες ἐπικουρίας ὑπέμενον τὴν
 84 πολιορκίαν. τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον
 οὐχ ἥττον πολιορκεῖσθαι συνέβαινε ἢ πολιορκεῖν.
 2 εἰς τοιαύτην γὰρ αὐτοὺς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀμίλκαν ἔν-
 δειαν καθίστασαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, ὥστ' ἀναγκα-
 3 σθῆναι τέλος αὐτοὺς διαλύσαι τὴν πολιορκίαν. μετὰ
 δέ τινα χρόνον ἄθροίσαντες τῶν τε μισθοφόρων
 τοὺς ἀρίστους καὶ Λιβύων, τοὺς ἅπαντας εἰς πεν-
 τακισμυρίους, μεθ' ὧν ἦν καὶ Ζάρζας ὁ Λίβυς ἔχων
 τοὺς ὑφ' αὐτὸν ταπτομένους, ὥρμησαν αὐθις ἀντι-
 παράγειν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις καὶ τηρεῖν τοὺς περὶ
 4 τὸν Ἀμίλκαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πεδινῶν τόπων ἀπεί-
 χοντο, καταπεπληγμένοι τὰ θηρία καὶ τοὺς περὶ
 τὸν Ναραύαν ἱππεῖς, τοὺς δ' ὄρεινους καὶ στενοὺς
 5 ἐπειρῶντο προκαταλαμβάνειν. ἐν οἷς καιροῖς συν-
 ἔβη ταῖς μὲν ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ τόλμαις μηδὲν αὐτοὺς
 λείπεσθαι τῶν ὑπεναντίων, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπειρίαν
 6 πολλάκις ἐλαττοῦσθαι. τότε γὰρ ἦν, ὥς ἔοικε, συν-
 ιδεῖν ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας πηλίκην ἔχει διαφορὰν
 ἐμπειρία μεθοδικὴ καὶ στρατηγικὴ δύναμις ἀπειρίας

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the remaining prisoners from the Sicilian war and henceforth gave prompt and friendly attention to all their requests. They gave permission to their merchants to export all requirements for Carthage, but not for the enemy, and shortly afterwards, when the mercenaries in Sardinia on revolting from Carthage invited them to occupy the island, they refused. Again on the citizens of Utica offering to surrender to them they did not accept, but held to their treaty engagements.

The Carthaginians, then, on thus obtaining assist- 238 B.C.
ance from their allies continued to withstand the siege. 84. But Matho and Spendius were just as much in the position of besieged as of besiegers. Hamilcar had reduced them to such straits for supplies that they were finally forced to raise the siege. A short time afterwards, collecting a picked force of mercenaries and Libyans to the number of about fifty thousand and including Zarzas the Libyan and those under his command, they tried again their former plan of marching in the open parallel to the enemy and keeping a watch on Hamilcar. They avoided level ground, as they were afraid of the elephants and Naravas' horse, but they kept on trying to anticipate the enemy in occupying positions on the hills and narrow passes. In this campaign they were quite equal to the enemy in courage and enterprise, but were often worsted owing to their want of tactical skill. This was, it seems, an opportunity for seeing by the light of actual fact, how much the methods gained by experience and the skill of a general, differ from a soldier's inexperience

- 7 καὶ τριβῆς ἀλόγου στρατιωτικῆς. πολλοὺς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς κατὰ μέρος χρεαῖαις ἀποτεμνόμενος καὶ συγκλείων ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς πεττευτής, ἀμαχεῖ
8 διέφθειρε, πολλοὺς δ' ἐν τοῖς ὀλοσχερέσι κινδύνοις τοὺς μὲν εἰς ἐνέδρας ἀνυπονοήτους ἐπαγόμενος ἀνῆρει, τοῖς δ' ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως ποτὲ μὲν μεθ' ἡμέραν, ποτὲ δὲ νύκτωρ, ἐπιφαινόμενος ἐξ-
9 ἐπληττεν· ὧν ὅσους λάβοι ζωγρία, πάντας παρέβαλ-
λε τοῖς θηρίοις. τέλος δ' ἐπιστρατοπεδεύσας αὐτοῖς ἀνυπονοήτως ἐν τόποις ἀφυέσι μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἐκεί-
νων χρεῖαν, εὐφυέσι δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν, εἰς τοῦτ' ἤγαγε περιστάσεως ὥστε μήτε διακιν-
δυνεύειν τολμῶντας μήτ' ἀποδρᾶναι δυναμένους διὰ τὸ τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι περιειληφθαι πανταχόθεν τέ-
λος ὑπὸ τῆς λιμοῦ συναγομένους ἐσθίειν ἀλλήλων
10 ἀναγκασθῆναι, τοῦ δαιμονίου τὴν οἰκείαν ἀμοιβὴν αὐτοῖς ἐπιφέροντος τῇ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας ἀσεβείᾳ καὶ
11 παρανομίᾳ. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸν κίνδυνον οὐκ ἐτόλμων ἐξιέναι, προδήλου τῆς ἥττης καὶ τῆς τιμωρίας τοῖς ἀλίσκομένοις ὑπαρχούσης, περὶ δὲ διαλύσεως οὐδ' ὑπενόουν ποιεῖσθαι μνήμην, συνειδότες σφίσι
12 τὰ πεπραγμένα. προσανέχοντες δ' αἰεὶ ταῖς ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος βοθηταῖς διὰ τὰς τῶν ἡγουμένων ἐπαγγελίας πᾶν ὑπέμενον ποιεῖν κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν.
85 ἐπεὶ δὲ κατεχρήσαντο μὲν ἀσεβῶς τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, τροφῇ ταύτῃ χρώμενοι, κατεχρήσαντο δὲ τὰ δουλικὰ τῶν σωμάτων, ἐβόηθει δ' ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος οὐ-
2 δείς, τότε προδήλου τῆς αἰκίας διὰ τὴν περικάκη-
σιν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν ὑπαρχούσης, ἔκρι-
ναν οἱ περὶ τὸν Λυτάριτον καὶ Ζάρξαν καὶ Σπέν-

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in the art of war and mere unreasoning routine. For in many partial engagements, Hamilcar, like a good draught-player, by cutting off and surrounding large numbers of the enemy, destroyed them without their resisting, while in the more general battles he would sometimes inflict large loss by enticing them into unsuspected ambuscades and sometimes throw them into panic by appearing when they least expected it by day or by night. All those he captured were thrown to the elephants. Finally, taking them by surprise and encamping opposite to them in a position unfavourable for action on their part but favouring his own strong point—generalship—he brought them to such a pass, that not daring to risk a battle and unable to escape, as they were entirely surrounded by a trench and palisade, they were at last driven by famine to eat each other—a fitting retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all law human and divine in their treatment of their neighbours. They did not venture to march out and do battle, as they were faced by the certainty of defeat and condign punishment for all captured, and they did not even think of asking for terms, as they had their evil deeds on their conscience. Always expecting the relief from Tunis that their leaders continued to promise them, there was no crime against themselves that they scrupled to commit. 85. But when they had used up their prisoners in this abominable manner by feeding on them, and had used up their slaves, and no help came from Tunis, and their leaders saw that their persons were in obvious danger owing to the dreadful extremity to which the soldiers were reduced, Autaritus, Zarzas and Spendius decided to

- 3 διον ἐγχειρίζειν ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ δια-
 κήρυκα καὶ λαβόντες συγχώρημα περὶ πρεσβείας,
 4 ἦκον ὄντες δέκα πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. πρὸς
 οὓς Ἀμίλκας ὁμολογίας ἐποιήσατο τοιαύτας· ἐξ-
 εἶναι Καρχηδονίοις ἐκλέξασθαι τῶν πολεμίων οὓς
 5 ἂν αὐτοὶ βούλωνται δέκα· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἀφ-
 ἑλκεῖν μετὰ χιτῶνος. γενομένων δὲ τούτων, εὐθέως
 Ἀμίλκας ἔφη τοὺς παρόντας ἐκλέγεσθαι κατὰ τὰς
 ὁμολογίας. τῶν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Αὐτάριτον καὶ
 Σπένδιον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἡγε-
 6 μόνων τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐκυρίευσαν οἱ Καρχηδό-
 νιοι. τῶν δὲ Λιβύων, ἐπεὶ τὴν σύλληψιν ἤσθοντο
 τῶν ἡγεμόνων, νομισάντων, αὐτοὺς παρεσπονδῆσθαι
 7 διὰ τὸ τὰς συνθήκας ἀγνοεῖν, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν
 αἰτίαν ὀρμησάντων ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα, περιστήσας αὐτοῖς
 Ἀμίλκας τά τε θηρία καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἅπαν-
 τας διέφθειρε πλείους ὄντας τῶν τετρακισμυρίων
 περὶ τὸν τόπον τὸν Πρίονα καλούμενον· ὃν συμ-
 βαίνει διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ σχήματος πρὸς τὸ νῦν
 εἰρημένον ὄργανον ταύτης τετευχέναι τῆς προση-
 γορίας.
- 86 Πράξας δὲ τὰ προδεδηλωμένα τοῖς μὲν Καρχη-
 δονίοις αὐθις ἐλπίδα παρέστηκεν μεγάλην πρὸς τὸ
 βέλτιον, καίπερ ἀπεγνωκόσιν ἤδη τὴν σωτηρίαν·
 αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ Ναραύα καὶ μετ' Ἀννίβου τὴν χώ-
 2 ραν ἐπῆει καὶ τὰς πόλεις. προσχωρούντων δὲ καὶ
 μετατιθεμένων πρὸς αὐτοὺς τῶν Λιβύων διὰ τὸ
 γεγονὸς εὐτύχημα, ποιησάμενοι τὰς πλείστας πόλεις
 3 ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ἦκον ἐπὶ τὸν Τύννητα, καὶ πολιορκεῖν
 ἐνεχείρησαν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω. κατὰ μὲν οὖν
 τὴν ἀπὸ Καρχηδόνης πλευρὰν προσεστρατοπέδευσεν

BOOK I

give themselves up to the enemy and discuss terms with Hamilcar. They therefore dispatched a herald, and when they had obtained leave to send envoys, they went, ten in all, to the Carthaginians. The terms Hamilcar made with them were, that the Carthaginians might choose from the enemy any ten they wished, the remainder being free to depart with one tunic apiece. These terms having been agreed to, Hamilcar at once said that by virtue of them he chose the ten envoys. By this means the Carthaginians got into their power Autaritus, Spendius, and the other principal leaders. The Libyans, when they learnt of their officers' arrest, thought they had been betrayed, as they were ignorant of the treaty, and rushed to arms, but Hamilcar, surrounding them with his elephants and the rest of his forces, cut them all to pieces. They numbered more than forty thousand. The scene of this slaughter was a place called the Saw from its resemblance to that tool.

86. By this achievement Hamilcar again made the Carthaginians very hopeful of better fortune, although by this time they had nearly given up all for lost. In conjunction with Naravas and Hannibal he now raided the country and its towns. The Libyans in general gave in and went over to them owing to the recent victory, and after reducing most of the cities, they reached Tunis and began to besiege Matho. Hannibal encamped on the side of

- Ἀννίβας, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπέναντι ταύτης Ἀμίλκας.
 4 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προσαγαγόντες πρὸς τὰ τείχη τοὺς
 περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον αἰχμαλώτους ἐσταύρωσαν ἐπι-
 5 φανῶς. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω, κατανοήσαντες τὸν
 Ἀννίβαν ραθύμως καὶ κατατεθαρρηκότως ἀναστρε-
 φόμενον, ἐπιθέμενοι τῷ χάρακι πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν
 Καρχηδονίων ἀπέκτειναν, πάντας δ' ἐξέβαλον ἐκ
 τῆς στρατοπεδείας, ἐκυρίευσαν δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς
 ἀπάσης, ἔλαβον δὲ καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν Ἀννίβαν ζω-
 6 γρία. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν παραχρῆμα πρὸς τὸν τοῦ
 Σπενδίου σταυρὸν ἀγαγόντες καὶ τιμωρησάμενοι
 πικρῶς, ἐκείνον μὲν καθεῖλον, τοῦτον δ' ἀνέθεσαν
 ζῶντα καὶ περικατέσφαξαν τριάκοντα τῶν Καρχηδο-
 νίων τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους περὶ τὸ τοῦ Σπενδίου
 7 σῶμα, τῆς τύχης ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἐκ παραθέσεως
 ἀμφοτέροις ἐναλλάξ διδούσης ἀφορμὰς εἰς ὑπερβο-
 8 λὴν τῆς κατ' ἀλλήλων τιμωρίας. ὁ δὲ Βάρκας ὁψὲ
 μὲν συνῆκε τὴν ἐπίθεσιν τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως διὰ
 τὴν ἀπόστασιν τῶν στρατοπέδων· οὐδὲ μὴν συνεῖς
 οὐδ' οὕτως κατετάχει πρὸς τὴν βοήθειαν διὰ τὰς
 9 μεταξὺ δυσχωρίας. διόπερ ἀναζεύξας ἀπὸ τοῦ Τύ-
 νητος, καὶ παρελθὼν ἐπὶ τὸν Μακάραν ποταμὸν,
 κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρὸς τῷ στόματι τοῦ ποταμοῦ
 καὶ τῇ θαλάττῃ.
- 87 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, παραδόξου τῆς περιπετείας
 αὐτοῖς φανείσης δυσθύμως καὶ δυσελπίστως εἶχον
 πάλιν· ἄρτι γὰρ ἀναθαρροῦντες ταῖς ψυχαῖς παρὰ
 2 πόδας ἐπιπτον αὐθις ταῖς ἐλπίσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀφ-
 3 ἴσταντο τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν. διὸ καὶ
 τριάκοντα μὲν τῆς γερουσίας προχειρισάμενοι, καὶ
 μετὰ τούτων τὸν πρότερον μὲν ἀπελθόντα στρα-
 τηγὸν Ἀννωνά, (τότε δ' ἐπαναγαγόντα) σὺν δὲ
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the town next Carthage and Hamilcar on the opposite side. Their next step was to take Spendius and the other prisoners up to the walls and crucify them there in the sight of all. Matho noticed that Hannibal was guilty of negligence and over-confidence, and attacking his camp, put many Carthaginians to the sword and drove them all out of the camp. All the baggage fell into the rebel's hands and they made Hannibal himself prisoner. Taking him at once to Spendius' cross they tortured him cruelly there, and then, taking Spendius down from the cross, they crucified Hannibal alive on it and slew round the body of Spendius thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank. Thus did Fortune, as if it were her design to compare them, give both the belligerents in turn cause and opportunity for inflicting on each other the cruellest punishments. Owing to the distance between the two camps it was some time before Hamilcar heard of the sortie and attack, and even then he was slow to give assistance owing to the difficult nature of the interjacent ground. He therefore broke up his camp before Tunis and on reaching the river Macaras, encamped at its mouth by the seaside.

87. The suddenness of this reverse took the Carthaginians by surprise, and they became again despondent and low-spirited. It was only the other day that their spirits had begun to revive; so they at once fell again. Yet they did not omit to take steps for their safety. They appointed a committee of thirty senators and dispatched them to Hamilcar accompanied by Hanno, the general who had previously retired from command, but now resumed it,

- τούτοις τοὺς ὑπολοίπους τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις καθ-
 οπλίσαντες, οἷον ἐσχάτην τρέχοντες ταύτην, ἔξαπ-
 4 ἔστελλον πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν, ἐντειλάμενοι πολλὰ τοῖς
 τῆς γερουσίας κατὰ πάντα τρόπον διαλῦσαι τοὺς
 στρατηγούς ἐκ τῆς προγεγενημένης διαφορᾶς καὶ
 συμφρονεῖν σφᾶς ἀναγκάσαι, βλέψαντας εἰς τὰ παρ-
 5 ὄντα τῶν πραγμάτων. ὧν πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους
 διαθεμένων λόγους, ἐπειδὴ συνήγαγον ὁμόσε τοὺς
 στρατηγούς, ἠναγκάσθησαν συγχωρεῖν καὶ πείθε-
 σθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄννωνα καὶ τὸν
 6 Βάρκαν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη συμφρονήσαντες μιᾷ
 γνώμῃ πάντα κατὰ νοῦν ἔπραττον τοῖς Καρχηδο-
 7 νίοις, ὥστε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω, δυσχρηστούμενους
 ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος κινδύνοις, πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐποιή-
 σαντο περὶ τε τὴν Λέπτιν προσαγορευομένην καὶ
 τινας τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων, τέλος ἐπὶ τὸ διὰ μάχης
 κρίνειν ὀρμῆσαι τὰ πράγματα, προθύμως ἐχόντων
 8 πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. διόπερ
 ἀμφοτέροι τοῦτο προθέμενοι παρεκάλουν μὲν πάν-
 τας τοὺς συμμάχους πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, συνήγον
 δὲ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, ὥς ἂν μέλλοντες
 9 ἐκκυβεύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐκατέροις ἦν
 τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἔτοιμα, παραταξάμενοι συν-
 10 ἔβαλον ἀλλήλοισι ἐξ ὁμολόγου. γενομένου δὲ τοῦ
 νικήματος κατὰ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι
 τῶν Λιβύων ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ κινδύνῳ διεφθάρησαν, οἱ
 δὲ πρὸς τινα πόλιν συμφυγόντες μετ' οὐ πολὺ
 παρέδωκαν ἑαυτοὺς, ὃ δὲ Μάθως ὑποχείριος ἐγένετο
 τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ζωγρία.
- 88 Ἐὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα μέρη τῆς Λιβύης μετὰ τὴν
 2 μάχην εὐθέως ὑπήκουσε τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· ἡ δὲ
 τῶν Ἰππακριτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἰτυκαίων πόλις ἔμενον,

and by all their remaining citizens of military age, whom they had armed as a sort of forlorn hope. They enjoined these commissioners to put an end by all means in their power to the two generals' long-standing quarrel, and to force them, in view of the circumstances, to be reconciled. The senators, after they had brought the generals together, pressed them with so many and varied arguments, that at length Hanno and Barcas were obliged to yield and do as they requested. After their reconciliation they were of one mind, and consequently everything went as well as the Carthaginians could wish, so that Matho, unsuccessful in the many partial engagements which took place around Leptis and some other cities, at length resolved to decide matters by a general battle, the Carthaginians being equally anxious for this. Both sides then, with this purpose, called on all their allies to join them for the battle and summoned in the garrisons from the towns, as if about to stake their all on the issue. When they were each ready to attack, they drew up their armies confronting each other and at a preconcerted signal closed. The Carthaginians gained the victory, most of the Libyans falling in the battle, while the rest escaped to a certain city and soon afterwards surrendered, but Matho himself was taken prisoner.

88. The rest of Libya at once submitted to Carthage after the battle, but Hippacritae and Utica

- οὐδεμίαν ἀφορμὴν ἔχουσαι πρὸς διάλυσιν διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλείπεσθαι σφίσι τόπον ἐλέους μηδὲ συγγνώ-
3 μης κατὰ τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολάς. οὕτως καὶ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς ἁμαρτίας μεγάλην ἔχει διαφορὰν ἢ με-
τριότης καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἀνήκεστον ἐπιτηδεύειν ἐκου-
4 σίως. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ παραστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἥ μὲν Ἄννων, ἥ δὲ Βάρκας, ταχέως ἠνάγκασαν αὐτοὺς ὁμολογίας ποιήσασθαι καὶ διαλύσεις εὐδοκουμένας Καρχηδονίοις.
- 5 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Λιβυκὸς πόλεμος εἰς τοιαύτην ἀγα-
γὼν περίστασιν Καρχηδονίους τοιοῦτον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, ὥστε μὴ μόνον κυριεῦσαι πάλιν τῆς Λιβύης τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς ἀπο-
6 στάσεως τιμωρήσασθαι καταξίως· τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀγα-
γόντες οἱ νέοι τὸν θρίαμβον διὰ τῆς πόλεως πᾶσαν
7 αἰκίαν ἐναπεδείξαντο τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω. τρία μὲν οὖν ἔτη καὶ τέτταράς που μῆνας ἐπολέμησαν οἱ μισθοφόροι πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους πόλεμον ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἀκοῇ μαθόντες πολὺ τι τοὺς ἄλλους
8 ὠμότητι καὶ παρανομίᾳ διενηνοχότα. Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Σαρδόνος αὐτομολησάντων μισθοφόρων πρὸς σφᾶς ἐκκληθέν-
τες ἐπεβάλοντο πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν προειρημένην νῆσον.
9 τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ἀγανακτούντων, ὥς αὐτοῖς καθηκούσης μᾶλλον τῆς τῶν Σαρδῶων δυναστείας, καὶ παρασκευαζομένων μεταπορεύεσθαι τοὺς ἀπο-
10 στήσαντας αὐτῶν τὴν νῆσον, λαβόμενοι τῆς ἀφορ-
μῆς ταύτης οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πόλεμον ἐψηφίσαντο πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐπὶ Σαρδονίους, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παρα-
11 σκευήν. οἱ δὲ παραδόξως διαπεφευγότες τὸν προ-

BOOK I

still held out, feeling they had no reasonable grounds to expect terms in view of their having been so proof to all considerations of mercy and humanity when they first rebelled. This shows us that even in such offences it is advantageous to be moderate and abstain from unpardonable excesses. However, Hanno besieging one town and Barcas the other soon compelled them to accept such terms and ransom as the Carthaginians thought fit to impose.

This Libyan war, that had brought Carthage into such peril, resulted not only in the Carthaginians regaining possession of Libya, but in their being able to inflict exemplary punishment on the authors of the rebellion. The last scene in it was a triumphal procession of the young men leading Matho through the town and inflicting on him all kinds of torture. This war had lasted for three years and four months, and it far excelled all wars we know of in cruelty and defiance of principle.

The Romans about the same time, on the invitation of the mercenaries who had deserted to them from Sardinia, undertook an expedition to that island. When the Carthaginians objected on the ground that the sovereignty of Sardinia was rather their own than Rome's, and began preparations for punishing those who were the cause of its revolt, the Romans made this the pretext of declaring war on them, alleging that the preparations were not against Sardinia, but against themselves. The Carthaginians, who had barely escaped destruction in this

ειρημένον πόλεμον, κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἀφυῶς δια-
 κείμενοι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν πρὸς τὸ πάλιν ἀναλαμβάν-
 12 νειν τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀπέχθειαν, εἵξαντες τοῖς
 καιροῖς οὐ μόνον ἀπέστησαν τῆς Σαρδόνης, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ χίλια τάλαντα καὶ διακόσια προσέθηκαν τοῖς
 Ῥωμαίοις, ἐφ' ᾧ μὴ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἀναδέξασθαι
 τὸν πόλεμον. ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἐπράχθη.

BOOK I

last war, were in every respect ill-fitted at this moment to resume hostilities with Rome. Yielding therefore to circumstances, they not only gave up Sardinia, but agreed to pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents to the Romans to avoid going to war for the present.

Β'

- 1 Ἐν μὲν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλῳ διεσαφήσαμεν
 πότε Ῥωμαῖοι συστησάμενοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν
 τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐγχειρεῖν ἤρξαντο πράγμασιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τού-
 τοις πῶς εἰς Σικελίαν διέβησαν καὶ δι' ἧς αἰτίας
 τὸν περὶ τῆς προειρημένης νήσου συνεστήσαντο
- 2 πόλεμον πρὸς Καρχηδονίους, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πότε
 πρῶτον συνίστασθαι ναυτικὰς ἤρξαντο δυνάμεις,
 καὶ τὰ συμβάντα κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἑκατέροις ἕως
 τοῦ τέλους, ἐν ᾧ Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἐξεχώρησαν πά-
 σης Σικελίας, Ῥωμαῖοι δ' ἐπεκράτησαν τῆς ὅλης
 νήσου πλὴν τῶν ὑφ' Ἱέρωνα ταττομένων μερῶν.
- 3 ἐξῆς δὲ τούτοις ἐπεβαλόμεθα λέγειν πῶς στασιά-
 σαντες οἱ μισθοφόροι πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τὸν
 προσαγορευθέντα Λιβυκὸν πόλεμον ἐξέκαυσαν, καὶ
 τὰ συμβάντα κατὰ τοῦτον ἀσεβήματα μέχρι τίνος
 προύβη καὶ τίνα διέξοδον ἔλαβε τὰ παράλογα τῶν
 ἔργων, ἕως τοῦ τέλους καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἐπι-
- 4 κρατείας. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ συνεχῇ τούτοις πειρασόμεθα
 δηλοῦν κεφαλαιωδῶς ἐκάστων ἐπιβαύοντες κατὰ τὴν
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν.
- 5 Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ ὡς θᾶπτον κατεστήσαντο τὰ
 κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, εὐθέως Ἀμίλκαν ἐξαπέστελλον
 δυνάμεις συστήσαντες εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν
- 6 τόπους. ὁ δ' ἀναλαβὼν τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν

BOOK II

1. In the preceding book I stated in the first place at what date the Romans having subjected Italy began to concern themselves in enterprises outside the peninsula; next I narrated how they crossed to Sicily and what were their reasons for undertaking the war with Carthage for the possession of that island. After relating when and how they first built a navy, I pursued the history of the war until its end, at which the Carthaginians evacuated all Sicily, and the Romans acquired the whole island except Hiero's dominions. In the next place I set myself to describe how the mercenaries mutinied against Carthage and set ablaze the so-called Libyan war; I described all the terrible atrocities committed in this war, all its dramatic surprises, and their issues, until it ended in the final triumph of Carthage. I will now attempt to give a summary view, according to my original project, of the events immediately following.

The Carthaginians, as soon as they had set the 238 B.C.
affairs of Libya in order, dispatched Hamilcar to Spain entrusting him with an adequate force. Taking with him his army and his son Hannibal now about

- Ἀννίβαν, ὄντα τότε κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐτῶν ἐννέα, καὶ διαβὰς κατὰ τὰς Ἡρακλέους στήλας ἀνεκτᾶτο τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.
- 7 διατρίψας δ' ἐν τοῖς τόποις τούτοις ἔτη σχεδὸν ἐννέα, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν πολέμῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ πειθοῖ ποιήσας Ἰβήρων ὑπηκόους Καρχηδόνι, κατέστρεψε
- 8 τὸν βίον ἀξίως τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων. πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς ἀνδρωδεστάτους καὶ μεγίστην δύναμιν ἔχοντας παραταττόμενος, καὶ χρώμενος πολμηρῶς καὶ παραβόλως ἑαυτῷ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ κινδύνου και-
- 9 ρόν, ἐρρωμένως τὸν βίον μετήλλαξε. τὴν δὲ στρατηγίαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι παρέδωκαν Ἀσδρούβα, τῷ κείνου κηδεστῇ καὶ τριηράρχῳ.
- 2 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν πρώτην διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Εὐρώπης ἐπεβάλλοντο ποιεῖσθαι μετὰ δυνάμεως.
- 2 ἅπερ οὐ παρέργως, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐπιστάσεως θεωρητέον τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀληθινῶς τὴν τε πρόθεσιν τὴν ἡμετέραν συνθεάσασθαι καὶ τὴν αὕξησιν καὶ
- 3 κατασκευὴν τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυναστείας. ἔγνωσαν δὲ
- 4 διαβαίνειν διὰ τινος τοιαύτας αἰτίας. Ἄγρων ὁ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν βασιλεὺς ἦν μὲν υἱὸς Πλευράτου, δύναμιν δὲ πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικὴν μεγίστην ἔσχε τῶν πρὸ
- 5 αὐτοῦ βεβασιλευκότων ἐν Ἰλλυριοῖς. οὗτος ὑπὸ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φιλίππου πατρὸς πεισθεὶς χρήμασιν ὑπέσχετο βοηθήσειν Μεδιωνίοις ὑπ' Αἰτωλῶν πο-
- 6 λιορκουμένοις. Αἰτωλοὶ γὰρ οὐδαμῶς δυνάμειοι πείσαι Μεδιωνίους μετέχειν σφίσι τῆς αὐτῆς πολι-
- 7 τείας, ἐπεβάλλοντο κατὰ κράτος ἐλεῖν αὐτούς. στρατεύσαντες οὖν πανδημεῖ, καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύσαντες αὐτῶν τὴν πόλιν, κατὰ τὸ συνεχές ἐπολιόρκουν,
- 8 πᾶσαν βίαν προσφέροντες καὶ μηχανήν. συνάψαν-

nine years of age, he crossed the straits of Gibraltar and applied himself to subjugating Spain to the Carthaginians. In this country he spent about nine years during which he reduced many Iberian tribes to obedience either by force of arms or by diplomacy, and finally met with an end worthy of his high achievements, dying bravely in a battle against one of the most warlike and powerful tribes, after freely exposing his person to danger on the field. The Carthaginians handed over the command of the army to Hasdrubal his son-in-law and chief naval officer. 228-229
B.C.

2. It was at this period that the Romans first crossed with an army to Illyria and that part of Europe. This is a matter not to be lightly passed over, but deserving the serious attention of those who wish to gain a true view of the purpose of this work and of the formation and growth of the Roman dominion. The circumstances which decided them to cross were as follows: Agron, king of Illyria, was the son of Pleuratus, and was master of stronger land and sea forces than any king of Illyria before him. Demetrius, the father of Philip V., had induced him by a bribe to go to the assistance of the town of Medion which the Aetolians were besieging. The Aetolians being unable to persuade the Medionians to join their league, determined to reduce them by force. Levying all their forces they encamped round the city and strictly besieged it, employing every forcible means and every device. The date 232-232
B.C.

- τος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν, καὶ δέον στρατηγὸν ἕτερον αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ τῶν πολιορκουμένων ἤδη κακῶς διακειμένων, καὶ δοκούντων ἀν' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἐνδῶσειν ἑαυτούς, ὃ προϋπάρχων στρατηγὸς προσφέρει λόγον τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, φάσκων, ἐπειδὴ τὰς κακοπαθείας καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους αὐτὸς ἀναδέδεκται τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν, δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν λαφύρων, ἐπὰν κρατήσωσι, καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ὀπλῶν ἑαυτῷ συγχωρεῖσθαι.
- 10 τινῶν δέ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν προϊόντων πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀμφισβητούντων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ παρακαλούντων τὰ πλήθη μὴ προδιαλαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' ἀκέραιον εἶναι, ᾧ ποτ' ἂν ἡ τύχη βουλευθῇ περι-
- 11 θεῖναι τοῦτον τὸν στέφανον, ἔδοξε τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, ὃς ἂν ἐπικατασταθεὶς στρατηγὸς κρατήσῃ τῆς πόλεως, κοινὴν ποιεῖν τῷ προϋπάρχοντι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν λαφύρων καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ὀπλῶν.
- 3 Δεδογμένων δὲ τούτων, καὶ δέον τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ γενέσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν παράληψιν τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶν Αἰτωλοῖς, προσπλέουσι τῆς νυκτὸς ἑκατὸν λέμβοι πρὸς τὴν Μεδιωνίαν, κατὰ τοὺς ἔγγιστα τόπους τῆς πόλεως, ἐφ' ὧν ἦσαν Ἰλ-
- 2 λυριοὶ πεντακισχίλιοι. καθορμισθέντες δέ, καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης ἐνεργὸν καὶ λαθραίαν ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἀπόβασιν, καὶ χρησάμενοι τῇ παρ' αὐτοῖς εἰθισμένῃ τάξει, προῆγον κατὰ σπεῖρας ἐπὶ τὴν
- 3 τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατοπεδεῖαν. οἱ δ' Αἰτωλοί, συνέντες τὸ γινόμενον, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ παραδόξῳ καὶ τῇ τόλμῃ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν ἦσαν ἐκπλαγεῖς· πεφρονηματισμένοι δ' ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου, καὶ καταπιστεύσαντες ταῖς ἰδίαις δυνάμεσι, κατὰ ποσὸν εὐθαρσῶς εἶ-
- 4 χον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πολὺ μέρος τῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν

of the annual elections was now at hand, and they had to choose another Strategus. As the besieged were in the utmost extremity and were expected to surrender every day, the actual Strategus addressed the Aetolians, maintaining that as it was he who had supported the dangers and hardships of the siege, it was only just, that, on the town falling, he should have the privilege of dealing with the booty and inscribing with his name the shields dedicated in memory of the victory. Some, more especially the candidates for the office, disputed this, and begged the people not to decide the matter in advance, but leave it, as things stood, to Fortune to determine to whom she should award this prize. The Aetolians hereupon passed a resolution, that if it was the new Strategus whoever he might be, to whom the city fell, he should share with the present one the disposition of the booty and the honour of inscribing the shields.

3. This decree had been passed, and next day the election was to be held, and the new Strategus was to enter at once into office, as is the practice of the Aetolians, when that night a hundred boats containing a force of five thousand Illyrians arrived at the nearest point on the coast to Medion. Anchoring there they landed, as soon as it was daylight, with promptitude and secrecy, and forming in the order customary in Illyria, advanced by companies on the Aetolian camp. The Aetolians, on becoming aware of it, were taken aback by the unexpected nature and boldness of the attack, but having for many years ranked very high in their own estimation and relying on their strength, they were more or less confident. Stationing the greater part of their

ἱππέων αὐτοῦ πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας ἐν τοῖς ἐπι-
 πέδοις παρενέβαλλον, μέρει δέ τινι τῆς ἵππου καὶ
 τοῖς εὐζώνοις τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους καὶ πρὸ τοῦ χάρα-
 κος εὐφυῶς κειμένους τόπους προκατελάμβανον.
 5 οἱ δ' Ἰλλυριοὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐλαφροὺς ἐξ ἐφόδου προσ-
 πεσόντες τῷ τε πλήθει καὶ τῷ βάρει τῆς συντάξεως
 ἐξέωσαν, τοὺς δὲ μετὰ τούτων ἱππεῖς συγκινδυνεύ-
 οντας ἠνάγκασαν ἀποχωρῆσαι πρὸς τὰ βαρέα τῶν
 6 ὀπλων. λοιπὸν ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου ποιούμενοι τὴν ἔφ-
 οδον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ τεταγμένους, ταχέως ἐτρέ-
 ψαντο, συνεπιθεμένων τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς ἅμα καὶ τῶν
 7 Μεδιωνίων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐ-
 τῶν ἀπέκτειναν, ἔτι δὲ πλείους αἰχμαλώτους ἔλα-
 βον· τῶν δ' ὀπλων καὶ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ἐγένοντο
 8 πάσης ἐγκρατεῖς. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἰλλυριοὶ πράξαντες
 τὸ συνταχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ διακομίσαν-
 τες τὴν ἀποσκευὴν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὠφέλειαν ἐπὶ
 τοὺς λέμβους εὐθέως ἀνήγοντο, ποιούμενοι τὸν
 4 πλοῦν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. οἱ δὲ Μεδιῶνιοι τετευχότες
 ἀνελπίστου σωτηρίας, ἀθροισθέντες εἰς τὴν ἐκκλη-
 σίαν ἐβουλεύοντο περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ περὶ τῆς
 2 τῶν ὀπλων ἐπιγραφῆς. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς κοινήν
 ποιήσκειν τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ἀπὸ τε τοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν
 Αἰτωλῶν ἔχοντος καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸ μέλλον προπορευ-
 3 ομένων κατὰ τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δόγμα, τῆς τύχης
 ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἐκείνοις συμβαινόντων ἐνδεικνυμένης τὴν αὐτῆς δύ-
 4 ναμιν. ἃ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν αὐτοὶ προσεδόκων
 ὅσον ἤδη πείσεσθαι, ταῦτα πράττειν αὐτοῖς ἐκεί-
 νοις παρέδωκεν ἐν πανὶ βραχεὶ χρόνῳ κατὰ τῶν
 5 πολεμίων. Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ τῇ παραδόξῳ χρησάμενοι
 συμφορᾷ πάντας ἐδίδαξαν μηδέποτε βουλεύεσθαι

hoplites and cavalry on the level ground just in front of their lines, they occupied with a portion of their cavalry and their light-armed infantry certain favourable positions on the heights in front of the camp. The Illyrians, charging the light infantry, drove them from their positions by their superior force and the weight of their formation, compelling the supporting body of cavalry to fall back on the heavy-armed troops. After this, having the advantage of attacking the latter, who were drawn up on the plain, from higher ground, they speedily put them to flight, the Medionians also joining in the attack from the city. They killed many Aetolians and took a still larger number of prisoners, capturing all their arms and baggage. The Illyrians, having thus executed the orders of their king, carried off to their boats the baggage and other booty and at once set sail for home. 4. The Medionians, thus unexpectedly saved, met in assembly and discussed, among other matters, that of the proper inscription for the shields. They decided, in parody of the Aetolian decree, to inscribe them as won *from* and not *by* the present Aetolian chief magistrate and the candidates for next year's office. It seemed as if what had befallen this people was designed by Fortune to display her might to men in general. For in so brief a space of time she put it in their power to do to the enemy the very thing which they thought the enemy were just on the point of doing to themselves. The unlooked-for calamity of the Aetolians was a lesson to mankind never to

περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ὥς ἤδη γεγονότος, μηδὲ προκατελπίζειν βεβαιουμένους ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀκμὴν ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστιν ἄλλως γενέσθαι, νέμειν δὲ μερίδα τῷ παραδόξῳ πανταχῇ μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὄντας, μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς.

- 6 Ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἀγρων, ἐπεὶ κατέπλευσαν οἱ
λέμβοι, διακούσας τῶν ἡγεμόνων τὰ κατὰ τὸν κίν-
δυνον, καὶ περιχαρὴς γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ δοκεῖν Αἰτω-
λοὺς τοὺς μέγιστον ἔχοντας τὸ φρόνημα νενικηκέ-
ναι, πρὸς μέθας καὶ τινας τοιαύτας ἄλλας εὐωχίας
τραπεῖς ἐνέπεσεν εἰς πλευρίτιν· ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἐν
7 ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις μετήλλαξε τὸν βίον. τὴν δὲ βασι-
λείαν ἣ γυνὴ Τεύτα διαδεξαμένη τὸν κατὰ μέρος
χειρισμὸν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐποιεῖτο διὰ τῆς τῶν
8 φίλων πίστεως. χρωμένη δὲ λογισμοῖς γυναικείois,
καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ γεγονὸς εὐτύχημα μόνον ἀπο-
βλέπουσα, τῶν δ' ἐκτὸς οὐδὲν περισκεπτομένη,
πρῶτον μὲν συνεχώρησε τοῖς κατ' ἰδίαν πλέουσι
9 λήζεσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, δεύτερον δ' ἀθροίσασα
στόλον καὶ δύναμιν οὐκ ἐλάττω τῆς πρότερον ἐξ-
έπεμψε, πᾶσαν γῆν ἀποδείξασα πολεμίαν τοῖς ἡγου-
5 μένοις. οἱ δ' ἐξαποσταλέντες τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἐπι-
βολὴν ἔσχον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡλείαν καὶ τὴν Μεσσηνίαν·
ταύτας γὰρ αἰεὶ τὰς χώρας Ἰλλυριοὶ πορθοῦντες δι-
2 ετέλουν. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μῆκος τῆς παραλίας καὶ διὰ τὸ
μεσογαίους εἶναι τὰς δυναστευούσας ἐν αὐταῖς πό-
λεις μακραὶ καὶ βραδεῖαι λίαν ἐγίνοντο τοῖς προ-
ειρημένοις αἰ παραβοήθειας πρὸς τὰς ἀποβάσεις τῶν
Ἰλλυριῶν· ὅθεν ἀδεῶς ἐπέτρεχον καὶ κατέσυρον αἰ
3 ταύτας τὰς χώρας. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τότε γενόμενοι
τῆς Ἰπείρου κατὰ Φοινίκην προσέσχον ἐπισιτισμοῦ
4 χάριν. συμμίζαντες δὲ τῶν Γαλατῶν τισιν, οἱ

BOOK II

discuss the future as if it were the present, or to have any confident hope about things that may still turn out quite otherwise. We are but men, and should in every matter assign its share to the unexpected, this being especially true of war.

King Agron, when the flotilla returned and his officers gave him an account of the battle, was so overjoyed at the thought of having beaten the Aetolians, then the proudest of peoples, that he took to carousals and other convivial excesses, from which he fell into a pleurisy that ended fatally in a few days. He was succeeded on the throne by his wife Teuta, who left the details of administration to friends on whom she relied. As, with a woman's natural shortness of view, she could see nothing but the recent success and had no eyes for what was going on elsewhere, she in the first place gave letters of marque to privateers to pillage any ships they met, and next she collected a fleet and a force of troops as large as the former one and sent it out, ordering the commanders to treat all countries alike as belonging to their enemies. 5. The expedition began by making a descent on Elis and Messenia, lands which the Illyrians had always been in the habit of pillaging, because, owing to the extent of their sea-board and owing to the principal cities being in the interior, help against their raids was distant and slow in arriving; so that they could always overrun and plunder those countries unmolested. On this occasion, however, they put in at Phoenice in Epirus for the purpose of provisioning themselves. There they fell in with certain Gaulish soldiers, about eight hundred

231 B.C.

230 B.C.

- μισθοφοροῦντες παρὰ τοῖς Ἰππειρώταις διέτριβον ἐν τῇ Φοινίκῃ, τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες εἰς ὀκτακοσίους, καὶ κοινολογηθέντες τούτοις περὶ προδοσίας τῆς πόλεως ἐξέβησαν, συγκαταθεμένων σφίσι τῶν προειρημένων, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐξ ἐφόδου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ κύριοι κατέστησαν, συνεργησάντων ἔσωθεν αὐτοῖς
- 5 τῶν Γαλατῶν. οἱ δ' Ἰππειῶται πυθόμενοι τὸ γεγονός ἐβοήθουν πανδημεὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς. παραγενόμενοι δὲ πρὸς τὴν Φοινίκην, καὶ προβαλόμενοι τὸν παρὰ τὴν πόλιν ρέοντα ποταμόν, ἐστρατοπέδευσαν, τῆς ἐπ' αὐτῷ γεφύρας ἀνασπάσαντες τὰς σ
- 6 νίδας ἀσφαλείας χάριν. προσαγγελθέντος δ' αὐτοῖς Σκερδιλαΐδαν ἔχοντα πεντακισχιλίους Ἰλλυριοὺς παραγίνεσθαι κατὰ γῆν διὰ τῶν παρ' Ἀντιγόνειαν στενῶν, μερίσαντες αὐτῶν τινὰς ἐξαπέστειλαν παραφυλάξοντας τὴν Ἀντιγόνειαν· αὐτοὶ δὲ τὰ τε λοιπὰ ῥαθύμως διῆγον, ἀπολαύοντες τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀνέδην, τῶν τε κατὰ τὰς φυλακὰς καὶ προκοι
- 7 τίας ὠλιγώρουν. οἱ δ' Ἰλλυριοὶ συνέντες τὸν μερισμὸν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν ῥαθυμίαν, ἐκπορεύονται νυκτός· καὶ τῇ γεφύρᾳ σανίδας ἐπιβαλόντες τὸν τε ποταμόν ἀσφαλῶς διέβησαν καὶ λαβόντες ὄχυρόν
- 8 τόπον ἔμειναν τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος τῆς νυκτός. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ παραταξαμένων ἀμφοτέρων πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, συνέβη λειφθῆναι τοὺς Ἰππειώτας, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν πεσεῖν, ἔτι δὲ πλείους ἀλῶναι, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς διαφυγεῖν ὡς ἐπ' Ἀτινῶν.
- 6 Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτοις περιπεσόντες ἀτυχήμασι, καὶ πάσας ἀπολέσαντες τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας, ἐπρέσβευον πρὸς τοὺς Λίτωλους καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος, δεόμενοι μεθ' ἱκετηρίας σφίσι βοη

BOOK II

in number, at present in the employ of the Epirots. They approached these Gauls with a proposal for the betrayal of the city, and on their agreeing, they landed and captured the town and its inhabitants by assault with the help from within of the Gauls. When the Epirots learnt of this they hastened to come to help with their whole force. On reaching Phoenice they encamped with the river that runs past the town on their front, removing the planking of the bridge so as to be in safety. On news reaching them that Scerdilaïdas with five thousand Illyrians was approaching by land through the pass near Antigonía, they detached a portion of their force to guard Antigonía, but they themselves henceforth remained at their ease, faring plenteously on the produce of the country, and quite neglecting night and day watches. The Illyrians, learning of the partition of the Epirot force and of their general remissness, made a night sortie, and replacing the planks of the bridge, crossed the river in safety and occupied a strong position where they remained for the rest of the night. When day broke, both armies drew up their forces in front of the town and engaged. The battle resulted in the defeat of the Epirots, many of whom were killed and still more taken prisoners, the rest escaping in the direction of Atintania.

6. The Epirots, having met with this misfortune and lost all hope in themselves, sent embassies to the Aetolians and to the Achaean league imploring their

- 2 θεῖν. οἱ δὲ κατελεήσαντες τὰς συμφορὰς αὐτῶν
 ὑπήκουσαν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα παραβοηθοῦντες ἤκον
 3 εἰς Ἑλίκρανον. οἱ δὲ τὴν Φοινίκην κατασχόντες,
 τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παραγενόμενοι μετὰ Σκερδιλαΐδου
 πρὸς τὸ χωρίον παρεστρατοπέδευσαν τοῖς βεβοη-
 4 θηκόσι, βουλόμενοι συμβαλεῖν. δυσχρηστούμενοι δὲ
 διὰ τὰς δυσχωρίας τῶν τόπων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ προσπε-
 σόντων παρὰ τῆς Τεύτας γραμμάτων, δι' ὧν ὤρετο
 δεῖν αὐτοὺς τὴν ταχίστην εἰς οἶκον ἀναχωρεῖν διὰ
 τὸ τινὰς τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν ἀφεστηκέναι πρὸς τοὺς Δαρ-
 5 δανεῖς, οὕτω λεηλατήσαντες τὴν Ἡπειρον ἀνοχὰς
 6 ἐποίησαντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἡπειρώτας. ἐν αἷς τὰ μὲν
 ἐλεύθερα σώματα καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀπολυτρώσαντες
 αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ δουρικὰ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν σκευὴν ἀνα-
 λαβόντες εἰς τοὺς λέμβους, οἱ μὲν ἀπέπλευσαν, οἱ
 δὲ περὶ τὸν Σκερδιλαΐδαν πεζῇ πάλιν ἀνεχώρησαν
 7 διὰ τῶν παρὰ τὴν Ἀντιγόνειαν στενῶν, οὐ μικρὰν
 οὐδὲ τὴν τυχοῦσαν κατάπληξιν καὶ φόβον ἐνεργασά-
 μενοι τοῖς τὰς παραλίας οἰκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων.
 8 ἕκαστοι γὰρ θεωροῦντες τὴν ὀχυρωτάτην ἅμα καὶ
 δυνατωτάτην πόλιν τῶν ἐν Ἡπείρῳ παραλόγως
 οὕτως ἐξηνδραποδισμένην, οὐκέτι περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς
 χώρας ἡγωνίων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρό-
 νοις, ἀλλὰ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν πόλεων.
 9 Οἱ δ' Ἡπειρώται παραδόξως διασεσωσμένοι, το-
 σοῦτον ἀπεῖχον τοῦ πειράζειν ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς ἡδι-
 κηκότας ἢ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς βοηθήσασιν, ὥστε
 τοῦναντίον διαπρεσβευσάμενοι πρὸς τὴν Τεύταν
 συμμαχίαν ἔθεντο μετ' Ἀκαρνάνων πρὸς τοὺς Ἰλ-
 10 λυριοὺς, καθ' ἣν ἐκείνοις μὲν κατὰ τοὺς ἐξῆς και-
 ροὺς συνήργουν, τοῖς δ' Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ τοῖς Λίτωλοις
 11 ἀντέπραττον. ἐξ ὧν ἐγένοντο καταφανεῖς ἀκρίτως

succour. Both leagues took pity on their situation and consented, and shortly afterwards this relieving force reached Helicranum. The Illyrians in Phoenice at first united with Scerdilaïdas, and advancing to Helicranum encamped opposite the Achaeans and Aetolians, and were anxious to give battle. But the ground was very difficult and unfavourable to them, and just at this time a dispatch came from Teuta ordering them to return home by the quickest route, as some of the Illyrians had revolted to the Dardanians. They therefore, after plundering Epirus, made a truce with the Epirots. By the terms of this they gave up to them the city and its free population on payment of a ransom; the slaves and other goods and chattels they put on board their boats, and while the one force sailed off home, Scerdilaïdas marched back through the pass near Antigonia. They had caused the Greek inhabitants of the coast no little consternation and alarm; for, seeing the most strongly situated and most powerful town in Epirus thus suddenly taken and its population enslaved, they began to be anxious not, as in former times, for their agricultural produce, but for the safety of themselves and their cities.

The Epirots, thus unexpectedly saved, were so far from attempting to retaliate on the wrongdoers or from thanking those who had come to their relief, that, on the contrary, they sent an embassy to Teuta, and together with the Acarnanians entered into an alliance with Illyria, engaging in future to co-operate with the Illyrians and work against the Achaeans and Aetolians. Their whole conduct showed them

μὲν κεχρημένοι τότε τοῖς εὐεργέταις, ἀφρόνως δ'
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς βεβουλευμένοι περὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτοὺς πραγ-
 7 μάτων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας παραλόγως
 περιπεσεῖν τινι τῶν δεινῶν οὐ τῶν παθόντων, τῆς
 2 τύχης δὲ καὶ τῶν πραξάντων ἐστὶν ἔγκλημα, τὸ δ'
 ἀκρίτως καὶ προφανῶς περιβαλεῖν αὐτοὺς ταῖς με-
 γίσταις συμφοραῖς ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι τῶν πασχόν-
 3 των ἀμάρτημα. διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τύχης πταίου-
 σιν ἔλεος ἔπεται μετὰ συγγνώμης καπικουρία, τοῖς
 δὲ διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀβουλίαν ὄνειδος καπιτίμησις
 4 συνεξακολουθεῖ παρὰ τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν. ἃ δὲ
 καὶ τότε παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰκότως ἂν τοῖς
 5 Ἡπειρώταις ἀπηντήθη. πρῶτον γὰρ τίς οὐκ ἂν
 τὴν κοινὴν περὶ Γαλατῶν φήμην ὑπιδόμενος εὐλα-
 βηθείη τούτοις ἐγχειρίσαι πόλιν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πολ-
 6 λὰς ἀφορμὰς ἔχουσαν εἰς παρασπόνδησιν; δεύτερον
 τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐφυλάξατο τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ συστήματος
 ἐκείνου προαίρεσιν; οἳ γε τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἐξέπεσον
 ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας, συνδραμόντων ἐπ' αὐτοὺς τῶν ὁμο-
 εθνῶν, διὰ τὸ παρασπονδῆσαι τοὺς αὐτῶν οἰκείους
 7 καὶ συγγενεῖς· ὑποδεξαμένων γε μὴν αὐτοὺς Καρχη-
 δονίων διὰ τὸ κατεπείγεσθαι πολέμῳ, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον
 γενομένης τινὸς ἀντιρρήσεως τοῖς στρατιώταις πρὸς
 τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ὑπὲρ ὀψωνίων ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐπεβά-
 λοντο διαρπάζειν τὴν τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων πόλιν,
 φυλακῆς χάριν εἰσαχθέντες εἰς αὐτήν, ὄντες τότε
 8 πλείους τῶν τρισχιλίων· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παρεια-
 γαγόντων αὐτοὺς πάλιν εἰς Ἑρυκα τῆς αὐτῆς χρείας
 ἔνεκεν, πολιορκούντων τὴν πόλιν Ῥωμαίων, ἐπ-
 εχείρησαν μὲν καὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς συμπολιορ-
 9 κουμενοὺς προδοῦναι· τῆς δὲ πράξεως ταύτης ἀπο-

not only to have acted now towards their benefactors without judgement, but to have blundered from the outset in the management of their own affairs. 7. For we are but men, and to meet with some unexpected blow is not the sufferer's fault, but that of Fortune and those who inflict it on him; but when we involve ourselves by sheer lack of judgement and with our eyes open in the depth of misfortune, everyone acknowledges that we have none to blame but ourselves. It is for this reason that those whom Fortune leads astray meet with pity, pardon and help, but if their failures are due to their own indiscretion, all right-thinking men blame and reproach them. And in this case the Greeks would have been amply justified in their censure of the Epirots. To begin with would not anyone who is aware of the general reputation of the Gauls, think twice before entrusting to them a wealthy city, the betrayal of which was easy and profitable? In the second place who would not have been cautious in the case of a company with such a bad name? First of all they had been expelled from their own country by a general movement of their fellow-countrymen owing to their having betrayed their own friends and kinsmen. Again, when the Carthaginians, hard pressed by the war, received them, they first availed themselves of a dispute about pay between the soldiers and generals to pillage the city of Agrigentum of which they formed the garrison, being then about three thousand strong. Afterwards, when the Carthaginians sent them on the same service to Eryx, then besieged by the Romans, they attempted to betray the city and those who were suffering siege in their company, and when this plan fell through, they deserted to

- τυχόντες ἡὐτομόλησαν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους· παρ'
 οἷς πιστευθέντες πάλιν ἐσύλησαν τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδί-
 10 τῆς τῆς Ἑρυκίνης ἱερόν. διὸ σαφῶς ἐπεγνωκότες
 Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν ἀσέβειαν αὐτῶν, ἅμα τῷ διαλύσασθαι
 τὸν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους πόλεμον οὐδὲν ἐποίησαντο
 προυργιαίτερον τοῦ παροπλίσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐμβαλεῖν
 εἰς πλοῖα καὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας πάσης ἐξορίστους κατα-
 11 στήσαι. οὓς Ἡπειρῶται τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν
 νόμων φύλακας ποιησάμενοι, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονε-
 στάτην πόλιν ἐγχειρίσαντες, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἰκότως
 φανείησαν αὐτοῖς τῶν συμπτωμάτων αὐτοῖς αἴτιοι
 γεγονότες;
- 12 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Ἡπειρωτῶν ἀγνοίας, καὶ περὶ
 τοῦ μηδέποτε δεῖν τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας ἰσχυροτέραν
 εἰσάγεσθαι φυλακὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ βαρβάρων, ἐπὶ
 8 τοσοῦτον ἔκρινον ποιήσασθαι μνήμην. οἱ δ' Ἰλλυ-
 ριοὶ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνωτέρω μὲν χρόνους συνεχῶς
 2 ἡδίκουν τοὺς πλοῖζομένους ἀπ' Ἰταλίας· καθ' οὓς
 δὲ καιροὺς περὶ τὴν Φοινίκην διέτριβον, καὶ πλεί-
 οους ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου χωριζόμενοι πολλοὺς τῶν Ἰτα-
 λικῶν ἐμπόρων ἔσθ' οὓς μὲν ἐσύλησαν, οὓς δ'
 ἀπέσφαξαν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ ζωγρία τῶν ἀλίσκο-
 3 μένων ἀνῆγον. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, παρακούοντες τὸν
 πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον τῶν ἐγκαλούντων τοῖς Ἰλλυριοῖς,
 τότε καὶ πλειόνων ἐπελθόντων ἐπὶ τὴν σύγκλητον,
 κατέστησαν πρεσβευτὰς εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα τοὺς ἐπί-
 σκεψιν ποιησομένους περὶ τῶν προειρημένων Γαῖον
 4 καὶ Λεύκιον Κορογκανίους. ἡ δὲ Τεύτα, καταπλευ-
 σάντων πρὸς αὐτὴν τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἡπείρου λέμβων,
 καταπλαγείσα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος τῆς ἀγομέ-
 νης κατασκευῆς· πολὺ γὰρ ἡ Φοινίκη διέφερε τότε
 τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἡπειρον πόλεων εὐδαιμονία· διπλα-
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the Romans. The Romans entrusted them with the guard of the temple of Venus Erycina, which again they pillaged. Therefore, no sooner was the war with Carthage over, than the Romans, having clear evidence of their infamous character, took the very first opportunity of disarming them, putting them on board ship and banishing them from the whole of Italy. These were the men whom the Epirots employed to guard their laws and liberties and to whom they entrusted their most flourishing city. How then can they be acquitted of the charge of causing their own misfortunes?

I thought it necessary to speak at some length on this subject in order to show how foolish the Epirots were, and that no people, if wise, should ever admit a garrison stronger than their own forces, especially if composed of barbarians. 8. To return to the Illyrians. For a long time previously they had been in the habit of maltreating vessels sailing from Italy, and now while they were at Phoenice, a number of them detached themselves from the fleet and robbed or killed many Italian traders, capturing and carrying off no small number of prisoners. The Romans had hitherto turned a deaf ear to the complaints made against the Illyrians, but now when a number of persons approached the Senate on the 230 B.C. subject, they appointed two envoys, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to proceed to Illyria, and investigate the matter. Teuta, on the return of the flotilla from Epirus, was so struck with admiration by the quantity and beauty of the spoils they brought back (Phoenice being then far the wealthiest city there), that she

σίως ἐπερρώσθη πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀδι-
 5 κίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τότε μὲν ἐπέσχε διὰ τὰς ἐγχω-
 ρίους ταραχάς, καταστησαμένη δὲ ταχέως τὰ κατὰ
 τοὺς ἀποστάντας Ἰλλυριοὺς ἐπολιόρκει τὴν Ἰσσαν
 6 διὰ τὸ ταύτην ἔτι μόνον ἀπειθεῖν αὐτῇ. κατὰ δὲ
 τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον κατέπλευσαν οἱ τῶν Ῥωμαίων
 πρέσβεις· καὶ δοθέντος αὐτοῖς καιροῦ πρὸς ἔντευ-
 ξιν διελέγοντο περὶ τῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς γεγονότων ἀδι-
 7 κημάτων. ἡ δὲ Τεύτα καθόλου μὲν παρ' ὅλην τὴν
 κοινολογίαν ἀγερῶχος καὶ λίαν ὑπερηφάνως αὐτῶν
 8 διήκουε. καταπαυσάντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, κοινῇ μὲν
 ἔφη πειρᾶσθαι φροντίζειν ἵνα μηδὲν ἀδίκημα γίνη-
 ται Ῥωμαίοις ἐξ Ἰλλυριῶν· ἰδίᾳ γε μὴν οὐ νόμιμον
 εἶναι τοῖς βασιλεῦσι κωλύειν Ἰλλυριοῖς τὰς κατὰ
 9 θάλατταν ὠφελείας. ὁ δὲ νεώτερος τῶν πρεσβευ-
 τῶν, δυσχεράνας ἐπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἐχρήσατο παρ-
 ρησία καθηκούσῃ μὲν, οὐδαμῶς δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν.
 10 εἶπε γὰρ ὅτι Ῥωμαίοις μὲν, ὦ Τεύτα, κάλλιστον
 ἔθος ἐστὶ τὰ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀδικήματα κοινῇ μετα-
 11 πορεύεσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις· πειρα-
 σόμεθα δὴ θεοῦ βουλομένου σφόδρα καὶ ταχέως
 ἀναγκάσαι σε τὰ βασιλικά νόμιμα διορθώσασθαι πρὸς
 12 Ἰλλυριοὺς. ἡ δὲ γυναικοθύμως κάλογίστως δεξα-
 μένη τὴν παρρησίαν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐξωργίσθη πρὸς
 τὸ ῥηθὲν ὥς ὀλιγωρήσασα τῶν παρ' ἀνθρώποις
 ὠρισμένων δικαίων ἀποπλέουσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαποστεῖ-
 λαί τινας τὸν παρρησιασάμενον τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπο-
 13 κτεῖναι. προσπεσόντος δὲ τοῦ γεγονότος εἰς τὴν
 Ῥώμην, διοργανθέντες ἐπὶ τῇ παρανομίᾳ τῆς γυναι-
 κὸς εὐθέως περὶ παρασκευὴν ἐγίνοντο, καὶ στρατό-
 πεδα κατέγραφον καὶ στόλον συνήθροισον.

was twice as eager as before to molest the Greeks. For the present, however, she had to defer her projects owing to the disturbance in her own dominions; she had speedily put down the revolt elsewhere, but was engaged in besieging Issa, which alone still refused to submit to her, when the Roman ambassadors arrived. Audience having been granted them, they began to speak of the outrages committed against them. Teuta, during the whole interview, listened to them in a most arrogant and overbearing manner, and when they had finished speaking, she said she would see to it that Rome suffered no public wrong from Illyria, but that, as for private wrongs, it was contrary to the custom of the Illyrian kings to hinder their subjects from winning booty from the sea. The younger of the ambassadors was very indignant at these words of hers, and spoke out with a frankness most proper indeed, but highly inopportune: "O Teuta," he said, "the Romans have an admirable custom, which is to punish publicly the doers of private wrongs and publicly come to the help of the wronged. Be sure that we will try, God willing, by might and main and right soon, to force thee to mend the custom toward the Illyrians of their kings." Giving way to her temper like a woman and heedless of the consequences, she took this frankness ill, and was so enraged at the speech that, defying the law of nations, when the ambassadors left in their ship, she sent emissaries to assassinate the one who had been so bold of speech. On the news reaching Rome, the outrage created great indignation and they at once set themselves to prepare for an expedition, enrolling legions and getting a fleet together.

- 9 Ἡ δὲ Τεύτα, τῆς ὥρας ἐπιγενομένης, ἐπισκευά-
 σασα λέμβους πλείους τῶν πρότερον ἔξαπέστειλε
 2 πάλιν εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόπους. ὧν οἱ
 μὲν διὰ πόρου τὸν πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ἐποι-
 οῦντο, μέρος δέ τι προσέσχε τὸν τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων
 λιμένα, λόγῳ μὲν ὑδρείας κάπισιτισμοῦ χάριν, ἔργῳ
 3 δ' ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ πράξεως ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν. τῶν δ'
 Ἐπιδαμνίων ἀκάκως ἅμα καὶ ῥαθύμως αὐτοὺς
 παραδεξαμένων, εἰσελθόντες ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς περι-
 ζώμασιν ὡς ὑδρευσόμενοι, μαχαίρας ἔχοντες ἐν τοῖς
 κεραμίοις, οὕτως κατασφάξαντες τοὺς φυλάττοντας
 τὴν πύλην ταχέως ἐγκρατεῖς ἐγένοντο τοῦ πυλῶνος.
 4 ἐπιγενομένης δὲ κατὰ τὸ συντεταγμένον ἐνεργῶς
 τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν πλοίων βοηθείας, παραδεξάμενοι τού-
 5 τους ῥαδίως κατεῖχον τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν τειχῶν. τῶν
 δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπαρασκευῶς μὲν διὰ τὸ παρά-
 δοξον, ἐκθύμως δὲ βοηθούντων καὶ διαγωνιζομένων,
 συνέβη τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀντιποιη-
 6 σαμένους τέλος ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. Ἐπι-
 δάμνιοι μὲν οὖν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πράξει διὰ μὲν τὴν
 ὀλιγωρίαν ἐκινδύνευσαν ἀποβαλεῖν τὴν πατρίδα,
 διὰ δὲ τὴν εὐψυχίαν ἀβλαβῶς ἐπαιδεύθησαν πρὸς τὸ
 7 μέλλον. τῶν δ' Ἰλλυριῶν οἱ προεστῶτες κατὰ σπου-
 δὴν ἀναχθέντες, καὶ συνάψαντες τοῖς προπλέουσι,
 κατῆραν εἰς τὴν Κέρκυραν· καὶ ποιησάμενοι κατα-
 πληκτικὴν τὴν ἀπόβασιν ἐνεχείρησαν πολιορκεῖν τὴν
 8 πόλιν. ὧν συμβαινόντων οἱ Κερκυραῖοι, δυσχρη-
 στούμενοι καὶ δυσελπίστως διακεείμενοι τοῖς ὅλοις,
 ἐπρεσβεύοντο πρὸς τε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ τοὺς Αἰτω-
 λούς, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις Ἀπολλωνιᾶται καὶ Ἐπιδά-
 μνιοι, δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν κατὰ σπουδὴν καὶ μὴ
 περιδεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναστάτους γενομένους ὑπὸ

9. Teuta, when the season came, fitted out a ^{220 B.C.} larger number of boats than before and dispatched them to the Greek coasts. Some of them sailed through the strait to Coreyra, while a part put in to the harbour of Epidamnus, professedly to water and provision, but really with the design of surprising and seizing the town. They were received by the Epidamnians without any suspicion or concern, and landing as if for the purpose of watering, lightly clad but with swords concealed in the water-jars, they cut down the guards of the gate and at once possessed themselves of the gate-tower. A force from the ships was quickly on the spot, as had been arranged, and thus reinforced, they easily occupied the greater part of the walls. The citizens were taken by surprise and quite unprepared, but they rushed to arms and fought with great gallantry, the result being that the Illyrians, after considerable resistance, were driven out of the town. Thus the Epidamnians on this occasion came very near losing their native town by their negligence, but through their courage escaped with a salutary lesson for the future. The Illyrian commanders hastened to get under weigh and catching up the rest of their flotilla bore down on Coreyra. There they landed, to the consternation of the inhabitants, and laid siege to the city. Upon this the Coreyreans, in the utmost distress and despondency, sent, together with the peoples of Apollonia and Epidamnus, envoys to the Achaeans and Aetolians, imploring them to hasten to their relief and not allow them to be driven from

- 9 τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν. οἱ δὲ διακούσαντες τῶν πρέσβειων, καὶ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς λόγους, ἐπλήρωσαν κοινῇ τὰς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δέκα ναῦς καταφράκτους, καταρτίσαντες δ' ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τῆς Κερ-
 10 κύρας, ἐλπίζοντες λύσειν τὴν πολιορκίαν. οἱ δ' Ἰλλυριοί, συμπαραλαβόντες Ἀκαρνάνων ναῦς κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν οὔσας ἑπτὰ καταφράκτους, ἀνταν-
 2 αχθέντες συνέβαλον τοῖς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σκάφεσι περὶ τοὺς καλουμένους Παξούς. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀκαρνᾶνες καὶ τῶν Ἀχαϊκῶν νεῶν αἱ κατὰ τούτους ταχθεῖσαι
 3 ἄνδρας γινομένων τραυμάτων. οἱ δ' Ἰλλυριοὶ ζεύξαντες τοὺς παρ' αὐτῶν λέμβους ἀνὰ τέτταρας συνεπλέκοντο τοῖς πολεμίοις. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ὠλιγώρουν, καὶ παραβάλλοντες πλαγίους συνήργουν
 4 ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων. ὅτε δὲ τρώσαντα καὶ δεθέντα κατὰ τὰς ἐμβολὰς δυσχρήστως (διέκειτο πρὸς τὸ παρὸν) τὰ τῶν ἀντιπάλων σκάφη, προσ-
 5 κρεμαμένων αὐτοῖς περὶ τοὺς ἐμβόλους τῶν ἐξευγμένων λέμβων, τότε ἐπιπηδῶντες ἐπὶ τὰ καταστρώματα τῶν Ἀχαϊκῶν νεῶν κατεκράτουν διὰ τὸ πλή-
 6 θος τῶν ἐπιβατῶν. καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τεττάρων μὲν πλοίων ἐκυρίευσαν τετρηρικῶν, μίαν δὲ πεν-
 7 τήρη σὺν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐβύθισαν, ἐφ' ἧς ἔπλει Μάργος ὁ Καρυνεύς, ἀνὴρ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τῷ κοινῷ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματι πεποιηκὼς μέχρι τῆς καταστροφῆς. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαρνᾶνας δια-
 7 γωνιζόμενοι, συνιδόντες τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς προτέρημα, καὶ πιστεύοντες τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν, ἐπυ-
 7 ρώσαντες ἀσφαλῶς τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἐποίησαντο. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν πλήθος, φρονη-

their homes by the Illyrians. The two Leagues, after listening to the envoys, consented to their request, and both joined in manning the ten decked ships belonging to the Achaeans. In a few days they were ready for sea and sailed for Coreyra in the hope of raising the siege. 10. The Illyrians, now reinforced by seven decked ships sent by the Acarnanians in compliance with the terms of their treaty, put to sea and encountered the Achaean ships off the island of Paxi. The Acarnanians and those Achaean ships which were told off to engage them fought with no advantage on either side, remaining undamaged in their encounter except for the wounds inflicted on some of the crew. The Illyrians lashed their boats together in batches of four and thus engaged the enemy. They sacrificed their own boats, presenting them broadside to their adversaries in a position favouring their charge, but when the enemy's ships had charged and struck them and getting fixed in them, found themselves in difficulties, as in each case the four boats lashed together were hanging on to their beaks, they leapt on to the decks of the Achaean ships and overmastered them by their numbers. In this way they captured four quadriremes and sunk with all hands a quinquereme, on board of which was Margos of Caryneia, a man who up to the end served the Achaeans most loyally. The ships that were engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing the success of the Illyrians, and trusting to their speed, made sail with a fair wind and escaped home in safety. The Illyrian forces, highly elated by their

- ματισθὲν ἐπὶ τῷ προτερήματι, λοιπὸν ἤδη ῥαδίως ἐχρήσατο τῇ πολιορκίᾳ καὶ τεθαρρηκότως. οἱ δὲ
- 8 Κερκυραῖοι, δυσελπιστήσαντες τοῖς ὅλοις ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων, βραχὺν ἔτι χρόνον ὑπομείναντες τὴν πολιορκίαν, συνέθεντο τοῖς Ἰλλυριοῖς, καὶ παρεδέξαντο φρουρὰν καὶ μετὰ τῆς φρουρᾶς Δημήτριον
- 9 τὸν Φάριον. τούτων δὲ πραχθέντων εὐθέως οἱ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν προεστῶτες ἀνήγοντο· καὶ κατάραντες εἰς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον ταύτην πάλιν ἐπεβάλοντο πολιορκεῖν τὴν πόλιν.
- 11 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς τῶν τὰς ὑπάτους ἀρχὰς ἐχόντων Γνάιος μὲν Φουλούιος ἐξέπλει ναυσὶ διακοσίαις ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης, Αὐλὸς δὲ Ποστούμιος τὰς
- 2 πεζικὰς ἔχων δυνάμεις ἐξώρμα. τὴν μὲν οὖν πρῶτην ἐπιβολὴν ἔσχε πλεῖν ὁ Γνάιος ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας, ὑπολαμβάνων ἔτι καταλήψεσθαι τὴν πολιορ-
- 3 κίαν ἄκριτον· ὑστερήσας δὲ τῶν καιρῶν ὅμως ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον ἔπλει, βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν ἐπιγνώναι σαφῶς τὰ γεγονότα περὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἅμα δὲ πείραν λαβεῖν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ Δημητρίου προσαγγελλομέ-
- 4 νων. ὁ γὰρ Δημήτριος ἐν διαβολαῖς ὦν καὶ φοβούμενος τὴν Τεύταν διεπέμπετο πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, ἐπαγγελλόμενος τὴν τε πόλιν ἐγχειριεῖν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πράγματα παραδώσειν, ὧν ἦν αὐτὸς κύ-
- 5 ριος. οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀσμένως ἰδόντες, τὴν τε φρουρὰν παρέδοσαν τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν μετὰ τῆς τοῦ Δημητρίου γνώμης, αὐτοὶ τε σφᾶς ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἔδωκαν παρακληθέντες εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν, μίαν ταύτην ὑπολαβόντες ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα
- 6 χρόνον πρὸς τὴν Ἰλλυριῶν παρανομίαν. Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς Κερκυραίους εἰς τὴν φιλίαν

success, continued the siege with more security and confidence, and the Coreyreans, whose hopes were crushed by the repulse of their allies, after enduring the siege for a short time longer, came to terms with the Illyrians, receiving a garrison under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. After this the Illyrian commanders at once sailed off and coming to anchor at Epidamnus, again set themselves to besiege that city.

11. At about the same time one of the Consuls, ^{229 B. C.} Gnaeus Fulvius, sailed out from Rome with the two hundred ships, while the other, Aulus Postumius, left with the land forces. Gnaeus' first intention had been to make for Coreyra, as he supposed he would find the siege still undecided. On discovering that he was too late, he none the less sailed for that island, wishing on the one hand to find out accurately what had happened about the city, and on the other hand to put to a test the sincerity of communications made to him by Demetrius. Accusations had been brought against the latter, and being in fear of Teuta he sent messages to the Romans undertaking to hand over to them the city and whatever else was under his charge. The Coreyreans were much relieved to see the Romans arrive, and they gave up the Illyrian garrison to them with the consent of Demetrius. They unanimously accepted the Romans' invitation to place themselves under their protection, considering this the sole means of assuring for the future their safety from the violence of the Illyrians. The Romans, having admitted the Coreyreans to their

- ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀπολλωνίας, ἔχοντες εἰς τὰ κατὰ-
λοιπα τῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεμόνα τὸν Δημήτριον.
7 κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ Ποστούμιος τὰς πε-
ζικὰς διεβίβαζε δυνάμεις ἐκ τοῦ Βρεντεσίου, πεζοὺς
8 μὲν εἰς δισμυρίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ δισχιλίους. ἅμα
δὲ τῷ προσέχειν ἑκατέρας ὁμοῦ τὰς δυνάμεις πρὸς
τὴν Ἀπολλωνίαν ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων ἀποδεξαμένων
καὶ δόντων ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν παραχρῆμα
9 Ἐπίδαμνον. οἱ δ' Ἰλλυριοὶ συνέντες τὴν ἔφοδον
τῶν Ῥωμαίων, οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ λύσαντες τὴν πολιορ-
10 κίαν ἔφυγον. Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἐπιδαμνίους
παραλαβόντες εἰς τὴν πίστιν, προῆγον εἰς τοὺς εἴσω
τόπους τῆς Ἰλλυρίδος, ἅμα καταστρεφόμενοι τοὺς
11 Ἀρδιαίους. συμμαχάντων δὲ πρεσβευτῶν αὐτοῖς καὶ
πλειόνων, ὧν οἱ παρὰ τῶν Παρθίνων ἦκον ἐπιτρέ-
ποντες τὰ καθ' αὐτούς, δεξάμενοι τούτους εἰς τὴν
φιλίαν, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν Ἀτιν-
τάνων προσεληλυθότας προῆγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰσσαν,
διὰ τὸ καὶ ταύτην ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν πολιορκεῖ-
12 σθαι τὴν πόλιν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ καὶ λύσαντες τὴν
πολιορκίαν, προσεδέξαντο καὶ τοὺς Ἰσσαίους εἰς τὴν
13 ἑαυτῶν πίστιν. εἶλον δὲ καὶ πόλεις τινὰς Ἰλλυρί-
δας ἐν τῷ παράπλῳ κατὰ κράτος· ἐν αἷς περὶ Νου-
τρίαν οὐ μόνον τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀπέβαλον πολλούς,
14 ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν χιλιάρχων τινὰς καὶ τὸν ταμίαν. ἐκυ-
ρίευσαν δὲ καὶ λέμβων εἴκοσι τῶν ἀποκομιζόντων
15 τὴν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ὠφέλειαν. τῶν δὲ πολιορκούν-
των τὴν Ἰσσαν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Φάρῳ διὰ τὸν Δημή-
τριον ἀβλαβεῖς ἔμειναν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πάντες ἔφυγον
16 εἰς τὸν Ἀρβωνα σκεδασθέντες. ἡ δὲ Τεύτα πάνυ
μετ' ὀλίγων εἰς τὸν Ῥίζωνα διεσώθη, πολισμάτιον
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BOOK II

friendship, set sail for Apollonia, Demetrius in future acting as their guide. Simultaneously Postumius was bringing across from Brundisium the land forces consisting of about twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse. On the two forces uniting at Apollonia and on the people of that city likewise agreeing to put themselves under Roman protection, they at once set off again, hearing that Epidamnus was being besieged. The Illyrians, on hearing of the approach of the Romans, hastily broke up the siege and fled. The Romans, taking Epidamnus also under their protection, advanced into the interior of Illyria, subduing the Ardiaei on their way. Many embassies met them, among them one from the Parthini offering unconditional surrender. They admitted this tribe to their friendship as well as the Atintanes, and advanced towards Issa which was also being besieged by the Illyrians. On their arrival they forced the enemy to raise the siege and took the Issaeans also under their protection. The fleet too took several Illyrian cities by assault as they sailed along the coast, losing, however, at Nutria not only many soldiers, but some of their military tribunes and their quaestor. They also captured twenty boats which were conveying away agricultural produce to save it from pillage. Of the besiegers of Issa those now in Pharos were allowed, through Demetrius' influence, to remain there unhurt, while the others dispersed and took refuge at Arbo. Teuta, with only a few followers, escaped to

- εὖ πρὸς ὀχυρότητα κατεσκευασμένον, ἀνακεχωρηκὸς
 μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης, ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὲ κείμενον τῷ
 17 Ῥίζονι ποταμῷ. ταῦτα δὲ πράξαντες, καὶ τῷ Δη-
 μητρίῳ τοὺς πλείστους ὑποτάξαντες τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν,
 καὶ μεγάλην αὐτῷ περιθέντες δυναστείαν ἀνεχώ-
 ρησαν εἰς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον ἅμα τῷ στόλῳ καὶ τῇ
 12 πεζικῇ δυνάμει. Γνάιος μὲν οὖν Φουλούιος εἰς τὴν
 Ῥώμην ἀπέπλευσε, τὸ πλεῖον ἔχων μέρος τῆς τε
 2 ναυτικῆς καὶ πεζικῆς στρατιᾶς. ὁ δὲ Ποστούμιος,
 ὑπολειπόμενος τετταράκοντα σκάφη, καὶ στρατό-
 πεδον ἐκ τῶν περικειμένων πόλεων ἄθροίσας, παρ-
 εχείμαζε, συνεφεδρεύων τῷ τε τῶν Ἀρδιαίων ἔθνει
 3 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς δεδωκόσιν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν πίστιν.
 ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑαρινὴν ὥραν ἡ Τεύτα διαπρεσβευσά-
 μένη πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ποιεῖται συνθήκας, ἐν αἷς
 εὐδόκησε φόρους τε τοὺς διαταχθέντας· οἷσιν πάσης
 τ' ἀναχωρήσειν τῆς Ἰλλυρίδος πλὴν ὀλίγων τόπων,
 καὶ τὸ συνέχον ὁ μάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλληνας δι-
 έτεινε, μὴ πλεύσειν πλέον ἢ δυσὶ λέμβοις ἔξω τοῦ
 4 Λίσσου, καὶ τούτοις ἀνόπλοις. ὧν συντελεσθέντων
 ὁ Ποστούμιος μετὰ ταῦτα πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστειλε
 πρὸς τε τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος· οἱ
 καὶ παραγενόμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ἀπελογίσαντο τὰς
 αἰτίας τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς διαβάσεως, ἐξῆς δὲ τού-
 τοις τὰ πεπραγμένα διεξῆλθον, καὶ τὰς συνθήκας
 παρανέγνωσαν, ἃς ἐπεποίητο πρὸς τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς.
 5 τυχόντες δὲ παρ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἐθνῶν τῆς καθ-
 ηκούσης φιλανθρωπίας αὐθις ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν
 6 Κέρκυραν, ἱκανοῦ τινος ἀπολελυκότες φόβου τοὺς
 Ἑλληνας διὰ τὰς προειρημένας συνθήκας. οὐ γάρ
 τισὶν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι, τότε κοινούς ἐχθροὺς εἶναι συν-
 έβαινε τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς.

BOOK II

Rhizon, a small place strongly fortified at a distance from the sea and situated on the river Rhizon. After accomplishing so much and placing the greater part of Illyria under the rule of Demetrius, thus making him an important potentate, the Consuls returned to Epidamnus with the fleet and army.

12. Gnaeus Fulvius now left for Rome with the greater part of both forces, and Postumius, with whom forty ships were left, enrolled a legion from the cities in the neighbourhood and wintered at Epidamnus to guard the Ardiaeans and the other tribes who had placed themselves under the protection of Rome. In the early spring Teuta sent an 228 B.C. embassy to the Romans and made a treaty, by which she consented to pay any tribute they imposed, to relinquish all Illyria except a few places, and, what mostly concerned the Greeks, undertook not to sail beyond Lissus with more than two unarmed vessels. When this treaty had been concluded Postumius sent legates to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues. On their arrival they first explained the causes of the war and their reason for crossing the Adriatic, and next gave an account of what they had accomplished, reading the treaty they had made with the Illyrians. After meeting with all due courtesy from both the leagues, they returned to Coreyra, having by the communication of this treaty, delivered the Greeks from no inconsiderable dread: for the Illyrians were then not the enemies of this people or that, but the common enemies of all.

7 Ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη διάβασις Ῥωμαίων μετὰ δυνάμειος εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Εὐρώπης, ἔτι δ' ἐπιπλοκὴ μετὰ πρεσβείας εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τόπους, τοιάδε καὶ διὰ ταύτας
8 ἐγένετο τὰς αἰτίας. ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς καταρχῆς Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν εὐθέως ἄλλους πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστειλαν πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ὅτε δὴ καὶ Κορίνθιοι πρῶτον ἀπεδέξαντο μετέχειν Ῥωμαίους τοῦ τῶν Ἰσθμίων ἀγῶνος.

- 13 Ἀσδρούβας δὲ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἀπελίπομεν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, νουνεχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς χειρίζων τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν τε τοῖς ὅλοις μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο προκοπὴν τὴν τε παρὰ μὲν τισὶ Καρχηδόνα, παρὰ δὲ τισὶ Καϊνὴν πόλιν προσαγορευομένην κατασκευάσας, οὐ μικρά, μεγάλα δὲ συνεβάλλετο Καρχηδονίοις εἰς πραγμάτων λόγον, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τοῦ τόπου πρὸς τε τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, περὶ ἧς ἡμεῖς εὐφύεστερον καιρὸν λαβόντες ὑποδείξομεν τὴν θέσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν χρεῖαν, ἣν ἀμφοτέραις δύναται παρ-
3 ἔχεσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις χώραις. ὃν καὶ θεωροῦντες Ῥωμαῖοι μείζω καὶ φοβερωτέραν ἤδη συνιστάμενον δυναστείαν, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν τὰ
4 κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν. εὐρόντες δὲ σφᾶς ἐπικεκοιμημένους ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις καὶ προειμένους εἰς τὸ μεγάλην χεῖρα κατασκευάσασθαι Καρχηδο-
5 νίους, ἀνατρέχειν ἐπειρῶντο κατὰ δύναμιν. αὐτόθεν μὲν οὖν ἐπιτάττειν ἢ πολεμεῖν οὐ κατετόλμων τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις διὰ τὸ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Κελτῶν φόβον ἐπικρέμασθαι τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι καὶ μόνον οὐ καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν προσδοκᾶν τὴν ἔφοδον
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Such were the circumstances and causes of the Romans crossing for the first time with an army to Illyria and those parts of Europe, and of their first coming into relations through an embassy with Greece. But having thus begun, the Romans immediately afterwards sent envoys to Athens and Corinth, on which occasion the Corinthians first admitted them to participation in the Isthmian games.

13. We have said nothing of affairs in Spain during these years. Hasdrubal had by his wise and practical administration made great general progress, and by the foundation of the city called by some Carthage, and by others the New Town, ^{228 B.C.} made a material contribution to the resources of Carthage, especially owing to its favourable position for action in Spain or Africa. On a more suitable occasion we will describe its position and point out the services it can render to both these countries. The Romans, seeing that Hasdrubal was in a fair way to create a larger and more formidable empire than Carthage formerly possessed, resolved to begin to occupy themselves with Spanish affairs. Finding that they had hitherto been asleep and had allowed Carthage to build up a powerful dominion, they tried, as far as possible, to make up for lost time. For the present they did not venture to impose orders on Carthage, or to go to war with her, because the threat of a Celtic invasion was hanging over them, the attack being indeed expected

- 6 αὐτῶν. καταψήσαντες δὲ καὶ πραῦναντες τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν οὕτως ἔκριναν ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς Κελτοῖς καὶ διακινδυνεύειν πρὸς αὐτούς, οὐδέποτ' ἂν ὑπολαμβάνοντες οὐχ οἷον δυναστεύσαι τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀσφαλῶς οἰκῆσαι τὴν ἑαυτῶν
- 7 πατρίδα τούτους ἔχοντες ἐφέδρους τοὺς ἄνδρας. διόπερ ἅμα τῷ διαπρεσβευσάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ποιήσασθαι συνθήκας, ἐν αἷς τὴν μὲν ἄλλην Ἰβηρίαν παρεσιώπων, τὸν δὲ καλούμενον Ἰβηρα ποταμὸν οὐκ ἔδει Καρχηδονίους ἐπὶ πολέμῳ διαβαίνειν, εὐθέως ἐξήνεγκαν τὸν πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν Κελτοὺς πόλεμον.
- 14 Ἰπὲρ ᾧν δοκεῖ μοι χρήσιμον εἶναι κεφαλαιώδη μὲν ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν, ἵνα τὸ τῆς προκατασκευῆς οἰκεῖον συσώσωμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν, ἀναδραμεῖν δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐξ ὅτου
- 2 κατέσχον οἱ προειρημένοι τὴν χώραν· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἱστορίαν οὐ μόνον ἀξίαν εἶναι γνώσεως καὶ μνήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τελέως ἀναγκαίαν, χάριν τοῦ μαθεῖν τίσι μετὰ ταῦτα πιστεύσας ἀνδράσι καὶ τόποις Ἀννίβας ἐπεβάλετο καταλύειν τὴν
- 3 Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν. πρῶτον δὲ περὶ τῆς χώρας ῥητέον ποία τίς ἐστι καὶ πῶς κεῖται πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην Ἰταλίαν. οὕτως γὰρ ἔσται καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις διαφέροντα κατανοεῖν βέλτιον, ὑπογραφέντων τῶν περὶ τε τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὴν χώραν ἰδιωμάτων.
- 4 Τῆς δὴ συμπάσης Ἰταλίας τῷ σχήματι τριγωνοειδοῦς ὑπαρχούσης, τὴν μὲν μίαν ὀρίζει πλευρὰν αὐτῆς τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολὰς κεκλιμένην ὅτ' Ἴόνιος πόρος καὶ κατὰ τὸ συνεχές ὁ κατὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν κόλπος, τὴν δὲ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν καὶ δυσμὰς τετραμ-
- 5 μένην τὸ Σικελικὸν καὶ Τυρρηρικὸν πέλαγος. αὗται

BOOK II

from day to day. They decided, then, to smooth down and conciliate Hasdrubal in the first place, and then to attack the Celts and decide the issue by arms, for they thought that as long as they had these Celts threatening their frontier, not only would they never be masters of Italy, but they would not even be safe in Rome itself. Accordingly, after having sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty, in which no mention was made of the rest of Spain, but the Carthaginians engaged not to cross the Ebro in arms, they at once entered on the struggle against the Italian Celts.

14. I think it will be of use to give some account of these peoples, which must be indeed but a summary one, in order not to depart from the original plan of this work as defined in the preface. We must, however, go back to the time when they first occupied these districts. I think the story is not only worth knowing and keeping in mind, but quite necessary for my purpose, as it shows us who were the men and what was the country on which Hannibal afterwards relied in his attempt to destroy the Roman dominion. I will first describe the nature of the country and its position as regards the rest of Italy. A sketch of its peculiarities will help us better to comprehend the more important of the events I have to relate.

Italy as a whole has the shape of a triangle of which the one or eastern side is bounded by the Ionian Sea and then continuously by the Adriatic Gulf, the next side, that turned to the south and west, by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian Seas. The

- δ' αἱ πλευραὶ συμπίπτουσai πρὸς ἀλλήλας κορυφὴν
 ποιοῦσι τοῦ τριγώνου τὸ προκείμενον ἄκρωτήριον
 τῆς Ἰταλίας εἰς τὴν μεσημβρίαν, ὃ προσαγορεύεται
 μὲν Κόκυνθος, διαιρεῖ δὲ τὸν Ἰόνιον πόρον καὶ τὸ
 6 Σικελικὸν πέλαγος. τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν τὴν παρά τε
 τὰς ἄρκτους καὶ τὴν μεσόγαιαν παρατείνουσai ὀρί-
 ζει κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἢ τῶν Ἄλπειν παρώρεια, λαμ-
 βάνουσα τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας καὶ τῶν
 ὑπὲρ τὸ Σαρδῶον πέλαγος τόπων, παρήκουσα δὲ
 συνεχῶς μέχρι πρὸς τὸν τοῦ παντὸς Ἀδρίου μυχόν,
 πλὴν βραχέος, ὃ προκαταλήγουσα λείπει τοῦ μὴ
 7 συνάπτειν αὐτῷ. παρὰ δὲ τὴν προειρημένην παρ-
 ὠρειαν, ἣν δεῖ νοεῖν ὡς ἂν εἰ βάσιν τοῦ τριγώ-
 νου, παρὰ ταύτην ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας ὑπόκειται πεδία
 τῆς συμπάσης Ἰταλίας τελευταῖα πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους,
 ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νῦν δὴ λόγος, ἀρετῇ καὶ μεγέθει δια-
 φέροντα τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὅσα πέπτωκεν
 8 ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἱστορίαν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅλον
 εἶδος καὶ τῆς ταῦτα τὰ πεδία περιγραφούσης γραμ-
 μῆς τριγωνοειδές. τούτου δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τὴν μὲν
 κορυφὴν ἢ τε τῶν Ἀπεννίνων καλουμένων ὄρων
 καὶ τῶν Ἀλπεινῶν σύμπτωσις οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ
 9 Σαρδῶου πελάγους ὑπὲρ Μασσαλίας ἀποτελεῖ τῶν
 δὲ πλευρῶν παρὰ μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρκτων, ὡς
 ἐπάνω προεῖπον, τὰς Ἄλπεις αὐτὰς ἐπὶ δισχιλίους
 10 καὶ διακοσίους σταδίους παρήκειν συμβαίνει, παρὰ
 δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας τὸν Ἀπεννῖνον ἐπὶ τρισχι-
 11 λίους ἑξακοσίους. βάσεώς γε μὴν τάξιν λαμβάνει
 τοῦ παντὸς σχήματος ἢ παραλία τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ἀ-
 δρίαν κόλπου· τὸ δὲ μέγεθος τῆς βάσεώς ἐστιν ἀπὸ
 πόλεως Σήνης ἕως ἐπὶ τὸν μυχόν ὑπὲρ τοὺς δισχι-
 12 λίους σταδίους καὶ πεντακοσίους, ὥστε τὴν πᾶσαν

BOOK II

apex of the triangle, formed by the meeting of these two sides, is the southernmost cape of Italy known as Cocynthus and separating the Ionian Strait from the Sicilian Sea. The remaining or northern and inland side of the triangle is bounded continuously by the chain of the Alps which beginning at Marseilles and the northern coasts of the Sardinian Sea stretches in an unbroken line almost to the head of the whole Adriatic, only failing to join that sea by stopping at quite a short distance from it. At the foot of this chain, which we should regard as the base of the triangle, on its southern side, lies the last plain of Italy to the north. It is with this that we are now concerned, a plain surpassing in fertility any other in Europe with which we are acquainted. The general shape of the lines that bound this plain is likewise triangular. The apex of the triangle is formed by the meeting of the Apennines and Alps not far from the Sardinian Sea at a point above Marseilles. Its northern side is, as I have said, formed by the Alps themselves and is about two thousand two hundred stades in length, the southern side by the Apennines which extend for a distance of three thousand six hundred stades. The base of the whole triangle is the coast of the Adriatic, its length from the city of Sena^a to the head of the gulf being more than two thousand five hundred stades; so that the whole circumference of

^a Siniglia.

- περίμετρον τῶν προειρημένων πεδίων μὴ πολὺ λεί-
 15 πειν τῶν μυρίων σταδίων. περί γε μὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς
 οὐδ' εἰπεῖν ῥάδιον. σίτου τε γὰρ τοσαύτην ἀφθονίαν
 ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, ὥστ' ἐν τοῖς
 καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροῖς πολλάκις τεττάρων ὀβολῶν εἶναι
 τῶν πυρῶν τὸν Σικελικὸν μέδιμνον, τῶν δὲ κρι-
 θῶν δυεῖν, τοῦ δ' οἴνου τὸν μετρητὴν ἰσόκριθον.
 2 ἐλύμου γε μὴν καὶ κέγχρου τελέως ὑπερβάλλουσα
 δαψίλεια γίνεται παρ' αὐτοῖς. τὸ δὲ τῶν βαλά-
 νων πλῆθος τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ τῶν κατὰ διάστημα
 δρυμῶν ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις ἐκ τούτων ἂν τις μάλιστα
 3 τεκμήραιτο· πλείστων γὰρ ὕϊκων ἱερείων κοπτομέ-
 νων ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ διὰ τε τὰς εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους βίους καὶ
 τὰς εἰς τὰ στρατόπεδα παραθέσεις, τὴν ὅλοσχερε-
 στάτην χορηγίαν ἐκ τούτων συμβαίνει τῶν πεδίων
 4 αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν. περί δὲ τῆς κατὰ μέρος εὐωνίας
 καὶ δαψιλείας τῶν πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ἀνηκόντων οὐ-
 5 τως ἂν τις ἀκριβέστατα κατανοήσῃ· ποιοῦνται γὰρ
 τὰς καταλύσεις οἱ διοδοεῦντες τὴν χώραν ἐν τοῖς
 πανδοκείοις, οὐ συμφωνοῦντες περὶ τῶν κατὰ μέ-
 ρος ἐπιτηδείων, ἀλλ' ἐρωτῶντες πόσου τὸν ἄνδρα
 6 δέχεται. ὥς μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ παρίενται τοὺς
 καταλύτας οἱ πανδοκεῖς, ὥς ἱκανὰ πάντ' ἔχειν τὰ
 πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν, ἡμιασσαρίου· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τέταρ-
 τον μέρος ὀβολοῦ· σπανίως δὲ τοῦθ' ὑπερβαίνουσι.
 7 τό γε μὴν πλῆθος τῶν ἀνδρῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ
 κάλλος τῶν σωμάτων, ἔτι δὲ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις
 τόλμαν, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων σαφῶς ἔσται κατα-
 μαθεῖν.
 8 Τῶν δ' Ἄλπεων ἑκατέρας τῆς πλευρᾶς, τῆς ἐπὶ
 τὸν Ῥοδανὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα
 πεδιά νεουούσης, τοὺς βουνώδεις καὶ γεώδεις τόπους
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BOOK II

the plain is not much less than ten thousand stades. 15. Its fertility is not easy to describe. It produces such an abundance of corn, that often in my time the price of wheat was four obols per Sicilian medimnus^a and that of barley two obols, a metretes of wine costing the same as the medimnus of barley. Panic and millet are produced in enormous quantities, while the amount of acorns grown in the woods dispersed over the plain can be estimated from the fact that, while the number of swine slaughtered in Italy for private consumption as well as to feed the army is very large, almost the whole of them are supplied by this plain. The cheapness and abundance of all articles of food will be most clearly understood from the following fact. Travellers in this country who put up in inns, do not bargain for each separate article they require, but ask what is the charge per diem for one person. The innkeepers, as a rule, agree to receive guests, providing them with enough of all they require for half an *as* per diem, *i.e.* the fourth part of an obol, the charge being very seldom higher. As for the numbers of the inhabitants, their stature and beauty and their courage in war, the facts of their history will speak.

16. The hilly ground with sufficient soil on both slopes of the Alps, that on the north towards the Rhone and that towards the plain I have been

^a About 5 Roman *modii* or 10 gallons. The *metretes* of wine was about 9 gallons.

- κατοικοῦσι, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν καὶ τὰς ἄρ-
 κτους ἐστραμμένους Γαλάται Τρανσαλπῖνοι προσ-
 αγορευόμενοι, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τὰ πεδία Ταυρίσκοι καὶ
 9 Ἄγῳνες καὶ πλείω γένη βαρβάρων ἕτερα. Τρανσ-
 αλπῖνοί γε μὴν οὐ διὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ διὰ
 τὴν τοῦ τόπου διαφορὰν προσαγορεύονται, τὸ γὰρ
 10 τρᾶνς ἑξερμηνευόμενόν ἐστι πέραν· διὸ τοὺς ἐπ-
 ἔκεινα τῶν Ἄλπεων Τρανσαλπίνους καλοῦσι. τὰ δ'
 ἄκρα διὰ τε τὴν τραχύτητα καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς ἐπι-
 16 μενούσης αἰὲ χιόνος ἀοίκητα τελέως ἐστί. τὸν δ'
 Ἀπεννῖνον ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ὑπὲρ Μασσα-
 λίαν καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰς Ἄλπεις συμπτώσεως Λιγυ-
 στῖνοι κατοικοῦσι, καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ Τυρρηνικὸν πέ-
 λαγος αὐτοῦ πλευρὰν κεκλιμένην καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ
 2 πεδία, παρὰ θάλατταν μὲν μέχρι πόλεως Πίσσης,
 ἣ πρώτη κεῖται τῆς Τυρρηνίας ὡς πρὸς τὰς δυ-
 σμάς, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεσόγαιαν ἕως τῆς Ἀρρητίνων
 3 χώρας. ἐξῆς δὲ Τυρρηνοί· τούτοις δὲ συνεχεῖς ἐκά-
 τερον τὸ κλίμα νέμονται τῶν προειρημένων ὁρῶν
 4 Ὀμβροί. λοιπὸν ὁ μὲν Ἀπεννῖνος, ἀπέχων τῆς κατὰ
 τὸν Ἀδρίαν θαλάττης σταδίου ὡς ἂν εἰ πεντακο-
 σίους, ἀπολείπει τὰ πεδία, δεξιὸς ἀπονέυων, καὶ διὰ
 μέσης τῆς λοιπῆς Ἰταλίας διήκων εἰς τὸ Σικελικὸν
 5 κατατείνει πέλαγος. τὸ δ' ἀπολειπόμενον μέρος
 πεδινὸν τῆς πλευρᾶς ἐπὶ θάλατταν καὶ πόλιν καθήκει
 6 Σήνην. ὁ δὲ Πάδος ποταμός, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ποιητῶν
 Ἡριδανὸς θρυλούμενος, ἔχει μὲν τὰς πηγὰς ἀπὸ
 τῶν Ἄλπεων ὡς πρὸς τὴν κορυφὴν μᾶλλον τοῦ
 προειρημένου σχήματος, καταφέρεται δ' εἰς τὰ πεδία,
 7 ποιούμενος τὴν ρύσιν ὡς ἐπὶ μεσημβρίαν. ἀφικό-
 μενος δ' εἰς τοὺς ἐπιπέδους τόπους, ἐκκλίνας τῷ
 ῥεύματι πρὸς ἑὼν φέρεται δι' αὐτῶν· ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν
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describing, is inhabited in the former case by the Transalpine Gauls and in the latter by the Taurisci, Agones and several other barbarous tribes. Transalpine is not a national name but a local one, *trans* meaning "beyond," and those beyond the Alps being so called. The summits of the Alps are quite uninhabitable owing to their ruggedness and the quantity of snow which always covers them. 16. The Apennines, from their junction with the Alps above Marseilles, are inhabited on both slopes, that looking to the Tyrrhenian sea and that turned to the plain, by the Ligurians whose territory reaches on the seaboard-side as far as Pisa, the first city of western Etruria, and on the land side as far as Arretium.^a Next come the Etruscans, and after them both slopes are inhabited by the Umbrians. After this the Apennines, at a distance of about five hundred stades from the Adriatic, quit the plain and, turning to the right, pass along the centre of the rest of Italy as far as the Sicilian sea, the remaining flat part of this side of the triangle continuing to the sea and the city of Sena. The river Po, celebrated by poets as the Eridanus, rises in the Alps somewhere near the apex of the triangle and descends to the plain, flowing in a southerly direction. On reaching the flat ground, it takes a turn to the East and flows through the plain,

^a Arezzo.

ἐκβολὴν δυσὶ στόμασιν εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν
 τόπους· τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἀποτεμένεται μέρος τῆς πε-
 διαδὸς χώρας εἰς τὰς Ἀλπεῖς καὶ τὸν Ἀδριατικὸν
 8 μυχόν. ἄγει δὲ πλῆθος ὕδατος οὐδενὸς ἔλαττον
 τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ποταμῶν, διὰ τὸ τὰς ῥύσεις
 τὰς ἐπὶ τὰ πεδία νευούσας ἀπὸ τε τῶν Ἀλπεων καὶ
 τῶν Ἀπεννίνων ὄρων εἰς τοῦτον ἐμπίπτειν ἀπάσας
 9 καὶ πανταχόθεν. μεγίστῳ δὲ καὶ καλλίστῳ ῥεύ-
 ματι φέρεται περὶ κυνὸς ἐπιτολήν, αὐξόμενος ὑπὸ
 τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀνατηκομένων χιόνων ἐν τοῖς
 10 προειρημένοις ὄρεσιν. ἀναπλεῖται δ' ἐκ θαλάττης
 κατὰ τὸ στόμα τὸ καλούμενον Ὀλανα σχεδὸν ἐπὶ
 11 δισχιλίους σταδίους. τὴν μὲν γὰρ πρώτην ἐκ
 τῶν πηγῶν ἔχει ῥύσιν ἀπλὴν, σχίζεται δ' εἰς δύο
 μέρη κατὰ τοὺς προσαγορευομένους Τριγαβόλους·
 τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον στόμα προσονομάζεται
 12 Παδόα, τὸ δ' ἕτερον Ὀλανα. κεῖται δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ
 λιμὴν, οὐδενὸς τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν ἡττω παρ-
 εχόμενος ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ καθορμιζομένοις.
 παρά γε μὴν τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις ὁ ποταμὸς προσαγο-
 13 ρεύεται Βόδεγκος. τᾶλλα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν
 τοῦτον ἱστορούμενα παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησι, λέγω δὴ
 τὰ περὶ Φαέθοντα καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου πτώσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὰ
 δάκρυα τῶν αἰγείρων καὶ τοὺς μελανείμονας τοὺς
 περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν οἰκοῦντας, οὓς φασὶ τὰς ἐσθῆ-
 14 θοντα πένθους, καὶ πᾶσαν δὴ τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ
 ταύτῃ προσεικυῖαν ὕλην, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ παρόντος
 ὑπερθησόμεθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ λίαν καθήκειν τῷ τῆς
 προκατασκευῆς γένει τὴν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀκρι-
 15 βολογίαν. μεταλαβόντες δὲ καιρὸν ἀρμόττοντα
 ποιησόμεθα τὴν καθήκουσαν μνήμην, καὶ μάλιστα

BOOK II

falling into the Adriatic by two mouths. It cuts off the larger half of the plain, which thus lies between it on the south and the Alps and head of the Adriatic on the north. It has a larger volume of water than any other river in Italy, since all the streams that descend into the plain from the Alps and Apennines fall into it from either side, and is highest and finest at the time of the rising of the Dog-star,^a as it is then swollen by the melting of the snow on those mountains. It is navigable for about two thousand stades from the mouth called Olana; for the stream, which has been a single one from its source, divides at a place called Trigaboli, one of the mouths being called Padua and the other Olana. At the latter there is a harbour, which affords as safe anchorage as any in the Adriatic. The native name of the river is Bodencus. The other tales the Greeks tell about this river, I mean touching Phaëthon and his fall and the weeping poplar-trees and the black clothing of the inhabitants near the river, who, they say, still dress thus in mourning for Phaëthon, and all similar matter for tragedy, may be left aside for the present, detailed treatment of such things not suiting very well the plan of this work. I will, however, when I find a suitable occasion make proper mention of all

^a Middle of July.

διὰ τὴν Τιμαίου περὶ τοὺς προειρημένους τόπους ἄγνοιαν.

- 17 Πλὴν ταῦτά γε τὰ πεδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἐνέμοντο
 Τυρρηνοί, καθ' οὓς χρόνους καὶ τὰ Φλεγραιᾶ ποτε
 καλούμενα τὰ περὶ Καπύην καὶ Νώλην· ἃ δὲ καὶ
 διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς ἐμποδῶν εἶναι καὶ γνωρίζεσθαι με-
 2 γάλην ἐπ' ἀρετῇ δόξαν εἴληφε. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἱστο-
 ροῦντας τὰς Τυρρηνῶν δυναστείας οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖ-
 σθαι τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐπὶ τὴν νῦν κατεχομένην ὑπ'
 αὐτῶν χώραν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα πεδία καὶ
 3 τὰς ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀφορμάς. οἷς ἐπιμιγ-
 νύμενοι κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν Κελτοὶ καὶ περὶ τὸ
 κάλλος τῆς χώρας ὀφθαλμιάσαντες, ἐκ μικρᾶς προ-
 φάσεως μεγάλη στρατιᾷ παραδόξως ἐπελθόντες ἐξ-
 έβαλον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὸν Πάδον χώρας Τυρρηνούς καὶ
 4 κατέσχον αὐτοὶ τὰ πεδία. τὰ μὲν οὖν πρῶτα καὶ
 περὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς τοῦ Πάδου κείμενα Λάοι καὶ
 Λεβέκιοι, μετὰ δὲ τούτους Ἰνσομβρες κατώκησαν, ὃ
 μέγιστον ἔθνος ἦν αὐτῶν· ἐξῆς δὲ τούτοις παρὰ
 5 τὸν ποταμὸν Γονομάνοι. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν Ἀδρίαν
 ἤδη προσήκοντα γένος ἄλλο πάνυ παλαιὸν διακατ-
 έσχε· προσαγορεύονται δ' Οὐένετοι, τοῖς μὲν ἔθεσι
 καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ βραχὺ διαφέροντες Κελτῶν, γλώττῃ
 6 δ' ἄλλοιᾳ χρώμενοι. περὶ ὧν οἱ τραγωδιογράφοι
 πολὺν τινα πεποιήνται λόγον καὶ πολλὴν διατέθειν-
 7 ται τερατείαν. τὰ δὲ πέραν τοῦ Πάδου τὰ περὶ
 τὸν Ἀπεννῖνον πρῶτοι μὲν Ἀναρες, μετὰ δὲ τού-
 8 τος Βοῖοι κατώκησαν· ἐξῆς δὲ τούτων ὡς πρὸς
 τὸν Ἀδρίαν Λίγγονες, τὰ δὲ τελευταῖα πρὸς
 θαλάττῃ Σήνωνες.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐπιφανέστατα τῶν κατασχόντων τοὺς
 9 προειρημένους τόπους ἐθνῶν ταῦθ' ὑπῆρχει. ᾗκουν

BOOK II

this, especially as Timaeus has shown much ignorance concerning the district.

17. The Etruscans were the oldest inhabitants of this plain at the same period that they possessed also that Phlegraean plain in the neighbourhood of Capua and Nola, which, accessible and well known as it is to many, has such a reputation for fertility. Those therefore who would know something of the dominion of the Etruscans should not look at the country they now inhabit, but at these plains and the resources they drew thence. The Celts, being close neighbours of the Etruscans and associating much with them, cast covetous eyes on their beautiful country, and on a small pretext, suddenly attacked them with a large army and, expelling them from the plain of the Po, occupied it themselves. The first settlers at the eastern extremity, near the source of the Po, were the Laevi and Lebecii, after them the Insubres, the largest tribe of all, and next these, on the banks of the river, the Cenomani. The part of the plain near the Adriatic had never ceased to be in the possession of another very ancient tribe called the Veneti, differing slightly from the Gauls in customs and costume and speaking another language. About this people the tragic poets tell many marvellous stories. On the other bank of the Po, by the Apennines, the first settlers beginning from the west were the Anares and next them the Boii. Next the latter, towards the Adriatic, were the Lingones and lastly, near the sea, the Senones.

These are the names of the principal tribes that settled in the district. They lived in unwallled

- 10 δὲ κατὰ κώμας ἀτειχίστους, τῆς λοιπῆς κατασκευῆς ἄμοιροι καθεστῶτες. διὰ γὰρ τὸ στιβαδοκοιτεῖν καὶ κρεαφαγεῖν, ἔτι δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὰ κατὰ γεωργίαν ἀσκεῖν, ἀπλοῦς εἶχον τοὺς βίους, οὗτ' ἐπιστήμης ἄλλης οὔτε τέχνης παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ παράπαν γινωσκομένης. ὕπαρξίς γε
- 11 μὴν ἐκάστοις ἦν θρέμματα καὶ χρυσὸς διὰ τὸ μόνον ταῦτα κατὰ τὰς περιστάσεις ῥαδίως δύνασθαι πανταχῇ περιαγαγεῖν καὶ μεθιστάναι κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν
- 12 προαιρέσεις. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἐταιρείας μεγίστην σπουδὴν ἐποιοῦντο διὰ τὸ καὶ φοβερώτατον καὶ δυνατώτατον εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτον ὃς ἂν πλείστους ἔχειν δοκῇ τοὺς θεραπεύοντας καὶ συμπεριφερομένους αὐτῷ.
- 18 Τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς οὐ μόνον τῆς χώρας ἐπεκράτουν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς πολλοὺς ὑπηκόους
- 2 ἐπεποίηντο, τῇ τόλμῃ καταπεπληγμένοι. μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον μάχῃ νικήσαντες Ῥωμαίους καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τούτων παραταξαμένους, ἐπόμενοι τοῖς φεύγουσι τρισὶ τῆς μάχης ἡμέραις ὕστερον κατέσχον αὐτὴν
- 3 τὴν Ῥώμην πλὴν τοῦ Καπετωλίου. γενομένου δ' ἀντισπάσματος, καὶ τῶν Οὐενέτων ἐμβαλόντων εἰς τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν, τότε μὲν ποιησάμενοι συνθήκας πρὸς Ῥωμαίους καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀποδόντες, ἔπαν-
- 4 ἦλθον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς ἐμφυλίοις συνείχοντο πολέμοις, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τῶν τὰς Ἄλπεις κατοικούντων ὁρμὰς ἐποιοῦντο, καὶ συνηθροίζοντο πολλάκις ἐπ' αὐτούς, θεωροῦντες ἐκ παραθέσεως
- 5 τὴν παραγεγεννημένην αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίαν. ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν τε σφετέραν δύναμιν ἀνέλαβον καὶ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Λατίνους αὐθις πράγματα συν-
- 6 ἐστήσαντο. παραγενομένων δὲ πάλιν τῶν Κελτῶν

BOOK II

villages, without any superfluous furniture; for as they slept on beds of leaves and fed on meat and were exclusively occupied with war and agriculture, their lives were very simple, and they had no knowledge whatever of any art or science. Their possessions consisted of cattle and gold, because these were the only things they could carry about with them everywhere according to circumstances and shift where they chose. They treated comradeship as of the greatest importance, those among them being the most feared and most powerful who were thought to have the largest number of attendants and associates.

18. On their first invasion they not only conquered 390 B.C.
this country but reduced to subjection many of the neighbouring peoples, striking terror into them by their audacity. Not long afterwards they defeated the Romans and their allies in a pitched battle, and pursuing the fugitives, occupied, three days after the battle, the whole of Rome with the exception of the Capitol, but being diverted by an invasion of their own country by the Veneti, they made on this occasion a treaty with the Romans, and evacuating the city, returned home. After this they were occupied by domestic wars, and certain of the neighbouring Alpine tribes, witnessing to what prosperity they had attained in comparison with themselves, frequently gathered to attack them. Meanwhile the Romans re-established their power and again became masters of Latium. 360 B.C.

εἰς Ἄλβαν στρατεύματι μεγάλῳ μετὰ τὴν τῆς πό-
 λεως κατάληψιν ἔτει τριακοστῷ, τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλ-
 μησαν ἀντεξαγαγεῖν Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ στρατόπεδα, διὰ τὸ
 παραδόξου γενομένης τῆς ἐφόδου προκαταληφθῆναι
 καὶ μὴ καταταχῆσαι τὰς τῶν συμμάχων ἀθροίσα-
 7 τας δυνάμεις. αὐθις δ' ἐξ ἐπιβολῆς ἐτέρας ἔτει δω-
 δεκάτῳ μετὰ μεγάλῃς στρατιᾷς ἐπιπορευομένων,
 προαισθόμενοι καὶ συναγείραντες τοὺς συμμάχους,
 μετὰ πολλῆς προθυμίας ἀπήντων, σπεύδοντες συμ-
 8 βαλεῖν καὶ διακινδυνεύσαι περὶ τῶν ὅλων. οἱ δὲ Γα-
 λάται καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἐφοδὸν αὐτῶν καὶ διαστά-
 σιάσαντες πρὸς σφᾶς, νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης φυγῇ
 παραπλησίαν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰ-
 9 κείαν. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τοῦ φόβου τριακαίδεκα μὲν
 ἔτη τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνορῶντες
 αὐξανομένην τὴν Ῥωμαίων δύναμιν, εἰρήνην ἐποι-
 19 ἦσαν καὶ συνθήκας. ἐν αἷς ἔτη τριάκοντα μεί-
 ναντες ἐμπεδῶς, αὐθις γενομένου κινήματος ἐκ τῶν
 Τρανσαλπίνων, δείσαντες μὴ πόλεμος αὐτοῖς ἐγερθῇ
 βαρὺς, ἀπὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἔτρεψαν τὰς ὁρμὰς τῶν ἐξ-
 ανισταμένων, δωροφοροῦντες καὶ προτιθέμενοι τὴν
 συγγένειαν, ἐπὶ δὲ Ῥωμαίους παρώξυναν καὶ μετ-
 2 ἔσχον αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατείας. ἐν ᾗ τὴν ἐφοδὸν ποι-
 ησάμενοι διὰ Τυρρηνίας, ὁμοῦ συστρατευσαμένων
 σφίσι Τυρρηνῶν, καὶ περιβαλόμενοι λείας πλῆθος,
 ἐκ μὲν τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἐπαρχίας ἀσφαλῶς ἐπανῆλθον.
 3 εἰς δὲ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀφικόμενοι, καὶ στασιάσαντες
 περὶ τὴν τῶν εἰλημμένων πλεονεξίαν, τῆς τε λείας
 καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν δυνάμεως τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος δι-
 4 ἐφθειραν. τοῦτο δὲ σύνηθές ἐστι Γαλάταις πράτ-
 τειν, ἐπειδὴν σφετερίζονται τι τῶν πέλας, καὶ μά-
 λιστα διὰ τὰς ἀλόγους οἰνοφλυγίας καὶ πλησμονάς.

BOOK II

after the occupation of Rome, the Celts again appeared before Alba with a large army, and the Romans on this occasion did not venture to meet them in the field, because, owing to the suddenness of the attack, they were taken by surprise and had not had time to anticipate it by collecting the forces of their allies. But when, twelve years later, the Celts again invaded in great strength, they had early word of it, and, assembling their allies, marched eagerly to meet them, wishing for nothing better than a decisive battle. The Gauls, alarmed by the Roman advance and at variance among themselves, waited until nightfall and then set off for home, their retreat resembling a flight. After this panic, they kept quiet for thirteen years, and then, as they saw how rapidly the power of the Romans was growing, they made a formal peace with them, to the terms of which they adhered steadfastly for thirty years. 19. But then, when a fresh movement began among the Transalpine Gauls, and they feared they would have a big war on their hands, they deflected from themselves the inroad of the migrating tribes by bribery and by pleading their kinship, but they incited them to attack the Romans, and even joined them in the expedition. They advanced through Etruria, the Etruscans too uniting with them, and, after collecting a quantity of booty, retired quite safely from the Roman territory, but, on reaching home, fell out with each other about division of the spoil and succeeded in destroying the greater part of their own forces and of the booty itself. This is quite a common event among the Gauls, when they have appropriated their neighbour's property, chiefly owing to their inordinate drinking and

348 B.C.

334 B.C.

299 B.C.

5 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἔτει τετάρτῳ συμφρονήσαν-
 τες ἅμα Σαννίται καὶ Γαλάται παρετάξαντο Ῥω-
 μαίοις ἐν τῇ Καμερτίων χώρα καὶ πολλοὺς αὐτῶν
 6 ἐν τῷ κινδύνῳ διέφθειραν. ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ προσ-
 φιλονεικῆσαντες πρὸς τὸ γεγονὸς ἐλάττωμ' αὐτοῖς
 Ῥωμαῖοι μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ἐξῆλθον, καὶ συμβα-
 λόντες πᾶσι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις ἐν τῇ τῶν Σεντινατῶν
 χώρα πρὸς τοὺς προειρημένους τοὺς μὲν πλείστους
 ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἠνάγκασαν προτροπά-
 7 δην ἐκάστους εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν φυγεῖν. διαγενο-
 μένων δὲ πάλιν ἐτῶν δέκα παρεγένοντο Γαλάται
 μετὰ μεγάλης στρατιᾶς, πολιορκήσαντες τὴν Ἀρρη-
 8 τίνων πόλιν. Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ παραβοηθήσαντες, καὶ
 συμβαλόντες πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἡττήθησαν. ἐν δὲ
 τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ Λευκίου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τελευτή-
 9 σαντος Μάνιον ἐπικατέστησαν τὸν Κόριον. οὗ
 πρεσβευτὰς ἐκπέμψαντος εἰς Γαλατίαν ὑπὲρ τῶν αἰχ-
 μαλώτων, παρασπονδήσαντες ἐπανείλοντο τοὺς πρέ-
 10 σβεις. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων ὑπὸ τὸν θυμὸν ἐκ χειρὸς
 ἐπιστρατευσαμένων, ἀπαντήσαντες συνέβαλον οἱ Σή-
 11 νωνες καλούμενοι Γαλάται. Ῥωμαῖοι δ' ἐκ παρα-
 τάξεως κρατήσαντες αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπ-
 ἐκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐξέβαλον, τῆς δὲ χώρας
 12 ἐγένοντο πάσης ἐγκρατεῖς. εἰς ἣν καὶ πρώτην τῆς
 Γαλατίας ἀποικίαν ἔστειλαν τὴν Σήνην προσαγο-
 ρευομένην πόλιν, ὁμώνυμον οὖσαν τοῖς πρότερον
 13 αὐτὴν κατοικοῦσι Γαλάταις, ὑπὲρ ἧς ἀρτίως διεσα-
 φήσαμεν, φάσκοντες αὐτὴν παρὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν ἐπὶ
 τῷ πέρατι κεῖσθαι τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδίῳ.
 20 οἱ δὲ Βοῖοι, θεωροῦντες ἐκπεπτωκότας τοὺς Σή-
 νωνας, καὶ δείσαντες περὶ σφῶν καὶ τῆς χώρας,
 μὴ πάθωσι τὸ παραπλήσιον, ἐξεστράτευσαν παν-

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surfeiting. Four years later the Gauls made a league with the Samnites, and engaging the Romans in the territory of Camerinum inflicted on them considerable loss; but the Romans, determined on avenging their reverse, advanced again a few days after with all their legions, and attacking the Gauls and Samnites in the territory of Santinum, put the greater number of them to the sword and compelled the rest to take precipitate flight each to their separate homes. Again, ten years afterwards, the Gauls appeared in force and besieged Arretium. The Romans, coming to the help of the town, attacked them in front of it and were defeated. In this battle their Praetor Lucius Caecilius fell, and they nominated Manius Curius in his place. When Manius sent legates to Gaul to treat for the return of the prisoners, they were treacherously slain, and this made the Romans so indignant that they at once marched upon Gaul. They were met by the Senones, whom they defeated in a pitched battle, killing most of them and driving the rest out of their country, the whole of which they occupied. This was the first part of Gaul in which they planted a colony, calling it Sena after the name of the tribe who formerly inhabited it. This is the city I mentioned above as lying near the Adriatic at the extremity of the plain of the Po. 20. Hereupon the Boii, seeing the Senones expelled from their territory, and fearing the same fate for themselves and their own land, implored the aid of the Etruscans and

- 2 δημεὶ παρακαλέσαντες Τυρρηνοὺς. ἀθροισθέντες δὲ
 περὶ τὴν Ὀάδμονα προσαγορευομένην λίμνην παρ-
 3 ετάξαντο Ῥωμαίοις. ἐν δὲ τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ Τυρρη-
 νῶν μὲν οἱ πλείστοι κατεκόπησαν, τῶν δὲ Βοίων
 4 τελέως ὀλίγοι διέφυγον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῷ κατὰ πό-
 δας ἐνιαυτῷ συμφρονήσαντες αὖθις οἱ προειρημέ-
 νοι καὶ τοὺς ἄρτι τῶν νέων ἡβῶντας καθοπλίσαν-
 5 τες παρετάξαντο πρὸς Ῥωμαίους. ἡττηθέντες δ'
 ὀλοσχερῶς τῇ μάχῃ μόλις εἰζαν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, καὶ δια-
 πρεσβευσάμενοι περὶ σπονδῶν καὶ διαλύσεων, συν-
 6 θήκας ἔθεντο πρὸς Ῥωμαίους. ταῦτα δὲ συνέβαινε
 γίνεσθαι τῷ τρίτῳ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς Πύρρου δια-
 βάσεως εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, πέμπτῳ δὲ τῆς Γαλατῶν
 7 περὶ Δελφούς διαφθορᾶς. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἡ τύχη
 τοῖς καιροῖς ὥς ἂν εἰ λοιμικὴν τινα πολέμου διάθεσιν
 8 ἐπέστησε πᾶσι Γαλάταις. ἐκ δὲ τῶν προειρημένων
 ἀγώνων δύο τὰ κάλλιστα συνεκύρησε Ῥωμαίοις· τοῦ
 γὰρ κατακόπτεσθαι συνήθειαν ἐσχηκότες ὑπὸ Γα-
 λατῶν οὐδὲν ἡδύναντο δεινότερον ἰδεῖν οὐδὲ προσ-
 9 δοκῆσαι τῶν αὐτοῖς ἤδη πεπραγμένων· ἐξ ὧν πρὸς
 τε Πύρρον ἀθληταὶ τέλειοι γεγονότες τῶν κατὰ πό-
 10 λεμον ἔργων συγκατέστησαν τὴν τε Γαλατῶν τόλ-
 μαν ἐν καιρῷ καταπληξάμενοι λοιπὸν ἀπερισπάστως
 τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πρὸς Πύρρον περὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπο-
 λέμουν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς Καρχηδονίους ὑπὲρ τῆς
 Σικελιωτῶν ἀρχῆς διηγωνίζοντο.
- 21 Γαλάται δ' ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἐλαττωμάτων
 ἔτη μὲν πέντε καὶ τετταράκοντα τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον,
 2 εἰρήνην ἄγοντες πρὸς Ῥωμαίους. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ μὲν
 αὐτόπται γεγονότες τῶν δεινῶν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἐξεχώ-
 ρησαν διὰ τὸν χρόνον, ἐπεγένοντο δὲ νέοι, θυμοῦ
 μὲν ἀλογίστου πλήρεις, ἄπειροι δὲ καύρατοι παν-

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marched out in full force. The united armies gave 282 B.C.
battle to the Romans near Lake Vadimon, and in this battle most of the Etruscans were cut to pieces while only quite a few of the Boii escaped. But, notwithstanding, in the very next year these two peoples once more combined and arming their young men, even the mere striplings, again encountered the Romans in a pitched battle. They were utterly defeated and it was only now that their courage at length gave way and that they sent an embassy to sue for terms and made a treaty with the Romans. This took place three years before the crossing of Pyrrhus to Italy and five years before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi; for it really seems that at this time Fortune afflicted all Gauls alike with a sort of epidemic of war. From all these struggles the Romans gained two great advantages. In the first place, having become accustomed to be cut up by Gauls, they could neither undergo nor expect any more terrible experience, and next, owing to this, when they met Pyrrhus they had become perfectly trained athletes in war, so that they were able to daunt the courage of the Gauls before it was too late, and henceforth could give their whole mind first to the fight with Pyrrhus for Italy and afterwards to the maintenance of the contest with Carthage for the possession of Sicily.

21. After these reverses, the Gauls remained quiet and at peace with Rome for forty-five years. But when, as time went on, those who had actually witnessed the terrible struggle were no more, and a younger generation had taken their place, full of unreflecting passion and absolutely without experi-

3 τὸς κακοῦ καὶ πάσης περιστάσεως, αὖθις ἤρξαντο
τὰ καθεστῶτα κινεῖν· ὁ φύσιν ἔχει γίνεσθαι, καὶ
τραχύνεσθαι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων πρὸς Ῥωμαίους,
4 ἐπισπᾶσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Γαλάτας. τὸ
μὲν οὖν πρῶτον χωρὶς τοῦ πλήθους δι' αὐτῶν τῶν
ἡγουμένων ἐν ἀπορρήτοις ἐπράττετο τὰ προειρη-
5 μένα. διὸ καὶ παραγενομένων τῶν Τρανσαλπίνων
ἕως Ἀριμίνου μετὰ δυνάμεως, διαπιστήσαντα τὰ
πλήθη τῶν Βοίων καὶ στασιάσαντα πρὸς τε τοὺς
ἑαυτῶν προεστῶτας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παραγεγονότας,
ἀνεῖλον μὲν τοὺς ἰδίους βασιλεῖς Ἄτιν καὶ Γάλα-
τον, κατέκοιψαν δ' ἄλλήλους, συμβαλόντες ἐκ παρα-
6 τάξεων. ὅτε δὴ καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι κατάφοβοι γενόμενοι
τὴν ἔφοδον, ἐξῆλθον μετὰ στρατοπέδου· συνέντες
δὲ τὴν αὐθαίρετον καταφθορὰν τῶν Γαλατῶν,
7 αὖθις ἀνεχώρησαν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦ-
τον τὸν φόβον ἔτει πέμπτῳ, Μάρκου Λεπέδου στρα-
τηγοῦντος, κατεκληρούχησαν ἐν Γαλατία Ῥωμαῖοι
τὴν Πικεντίνην προσαγορευομένην χώραν, ἐξ ἧς
νικήσαντες ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Σήνωνας προσαγορευομέ-
8 νους Γαλάτας, Γαῖου Φλαμινίου ταύτην τὴν δημ-
αγωγίαν εἰσηγησαμένου καὶ πολιτείαν, ἣν δὴ καὶ
Ῥωμαῖοις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν φατέον ἀρχηγὸν μὲν γε-
νέσθαι τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ δήμου διαστροφῆς,
αἰτίαν δὲ καὶ τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα πολέμου συστάντος
9 αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς προειρημένους. πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ
τῶν Γαλατῶν ὑπεδύοντο τὴν πρᾶξιν, μάλιστα δ'
οἱ Βοῖοι, διὰ τὸ συντερμονεῖν τῇ τῶν Ῥωμαίων
χώρα, νομίσαντες οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἡγεμονίας ἔτι καὶ δυ-
ναστείας Ῥωμαίους τὸν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ποιήσασθαι
πόλεμον, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὀλοσχεροῦς ἐξαναστάσεως καὶ
καταφθορᾶς.

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ence of suffering or peril, they began again, as was natural, to disturb the settlement, becoming exasperated against the Romans on the least pretext and inviting the Alpine Gauls to make common cause with them. At first these advances were made secretly by their chiefs without the knowledge of the multitude; so that when a force of Transalpine Gauls advanced as far as Ariminum the Boian populace were suspicious of them, and quarrelling with their own leaders as well as with the strangers, killed their kings, Atis and Galatus, and had a pitched battle with the other Gauls in which many fell on either side. The Romans had been alarmed by the advance of the Gauls, and a legion was on its way; but, on learning of the Gauls' self-inflicted losses, they returned home. Five years after this alarm, in the consulship of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the Romans divided among their citizens the territory in Gaul known as Picenum, from which they had ejected the Senones when they conquered them. Gaius Flaminius was the originator of this popular policy, which we must pronounce to have been, one may say, the first step in the demoralization of the populace, as well as the cause of the war with the Gauls which followed. For what prompted many of the Gauls and especially the Boii, whose territory bordered on that of Rome, to take action was the conviction that now the Romans no longer made war on them for the sake of supremacy and sovereignty, but with a view to their total expulsion and extermination.

- 22 Διόπερ εὐθέως τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἔθνων, τό τε τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων καὶ Βοίων, συμφρονήσαντα διεπέμποντο πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὰς Ἀλπεῖς καὶ περὶ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν ποταμὸν κατοικοῦντας Γαλάτας, προσαγορευομένους δὲ διὰ τὸ μισθοῦ στρατεύειν Γαισάτους·
- 2 ἢ γὰρ λέξις αὕτη τοῦτο σημαίνει κυρίως. ὦν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι Κογκολιτάνω καὶ Ἀνηροέστω παραυτίκα μὲν χρυσίου προτείναντες πλήθος, εἰς τὸ μέλλον δ' ὑποδεικνύντες τὸ μέγεθος τῆς Ῥωμαίων εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν ὑπαρξόντων αὐτοῖς ἀγαθῶν, εἰς κρατήσωσι, προυτρέποντο καὶ παρώξυνον
- 3 πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ Ῥωμαίους στρατείαν. ῥαδίως δ' ἔπεισαν, ἅμα τοῖς προειρημένοις διδόντες μὲν τὰ πιστὰ περὶ τῆς αὐτῶν συμμαχίας, ἀναμιμνήσκοντες δὲ τῆς
- 4 τῶν ἰδίων προγόνων πράξεως αὐτοῦς· ἐν ᾗ ῥ' ἐκεῖνοι στρατεύσαντες οὐ μόνον ἐνίκησαν μαχόμενοι Ῥωμαίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐξ ἐφόδου κατέσχον αὐτὴν τὴν Ῥώμην· γενόμενοι δὲ καὶ τῶν
- 5 ὑπαρχόντων ἀπάντων ἐγκρατεῖς, καὶ τῆς πόλεως αὐτῆς ἑπτὰ μῆνας κυριεύσαντες, τέλος ἐθέλοντι καὶ μετὰ χάριτος παραδόντες τὴν πόλιν, ἄθραυστοι καὶ σινεῖς ἔχοντες τὴν ὠφέλειαν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἐπ-
- 6 ανῆλθον. ὦν ἀκούοντες οἱ περὶ αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνες οὕτω παρωρμήθησαν ἐπὶ τὴν στρατείαν ὥστε μηδέποτε μήτε πλείους μήτ' ἐνδοξοτέρους μήτε μαχιμωτέρους ἄνδρας ἐξελθεῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων τῆς
- 7 Γαλατίας· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ μὲν ἀκούοντες, τὰ δὲ καταμαντευόμενοι τὸ μέλλον, εἰς φόβους ἐνέπιπτον συνεχεῖς καὶ ταραχὰς
- 8 ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε ποτὲ μὲν στρατόπεδα καταγράφειν καὶ σίτου καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ποιέεσθαι παρασκευάς, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐξάγειν ἐπὶ τοὺς

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22. The two largest tribes, therefore, the Insubres ^{231 B.C.} and Boii, made a league and sent messengers to the Gauls dwelling among the Alps and near the Rhone, who are called Gaesatae because they serve for hire, this being the proper meaning of the word. They urged and incited their kings Concolitanus and Aneroestus to make war on Rome, offering them at present a large sum in gold, and as to the future, pointing out to them the great prosperity of the Romans, and the vast wealth that would be theirs if they were victorious. They had no difficulty in persuading them, as, in addition to all this, they pledged themselves to be loyal allies and reminded them of the achievement of their own ancestors, who had not only overcome the Romans in combat, but, after the battle, had assaulted and taken Rome itself, possessing themselves of all it contained, and, after remaining masters of the city for seven months, had finally given it up of their own free will and as an act of grace, and had returned home with their spoil, unbroken and unscathed. When the kings had been told all this, they became so eager for the expedition that on no occasion has that district of Gaul sent out so large a force or one composed of men so distinguished or so warlike. All this time, the Romans, either hearing what was happening or divining what was coming, were in such a state of constant alarm and unrest, that at times we find them busy enrolling legions and making provision of corn and other stores, at times marching to the

- ὄρους, ὡς ἤδη παρόντων εἰς τὴν χώραν τῶν πολε-
 μίων, οὐδέπω κεκινηκότων ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας τῶν Κελ-
 9 τῶν. οὐκ ἐλάχιστα δὲ συνήργησε καὶ Καρχηδο-
 νίοις τοῦτο τὸ κίνημα πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάσασθαι τὰ
 10 κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀσφαλῶς. Ῥωμαῖοι γάρ, ὡς καὶ
 πρόσθεν ἡμῖν εἴρηται, κρίνοντες ἀναγκαιότερα ταῦτα
 διὰ τὸ πρὸς ταῖς πλευραῖς αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν παρορᾶν
 ἡναγκάζοντο τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, σπουδάζοντες
 πρότερον ἐν καλῷ θέσθαι τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Κελτούς.
 11 διόπερ ἀσφαλισάμενοι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους
 διὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν Ἀσδρούβαν ὁμολογιῶν, ὑπὲρ ὧν
 ἄρτι δεδηλώκαμεν, ἐνεχείρησαν ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐν τού-
 τοις τοῖς καιροῖς πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολε-
 μίους, νομίζοντες συμφέρειν σφίσι τὸ διακριθῆναι
 πρὸς τούτους.
- 23 Οἱ δὲ Γαισάται Γαλάται συστησάμενοι δύναμιν
 πολυτελῆ καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἥκον ὑπεράραντες τὰς Ἄλ-
 2 πεις εἰς τὸν Πάδον ποταμὸν ἔτει μετὰ τὴν τῆς χώ-
 ρας διάδοσιν ὀγδόῳ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἰνσὸμβρων
 καὶ Βοίων γένος ἔμεινε γενναίως ἐν ταῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 ἐπιβολαῖς, οἱ δ' Οὐένετοι καὶ Γονομάνοι, διαπρε-
 σβευσαμένων Ῥωμαίων, τούτοις εἴλοντο συμμαχεῖν.
 3 διὸ καὶ μέρος τι τῆς δυνάμεως καταλιπεῖν ἡναγκά-
 σθησαν οἱ βασιλεῖς τῶν Κελτῶν φυλακῆς χάριν τῆς
 4 χώρας πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ τούτων φόβον. αὐτοὶ δ' ἐξ-
 ἄραντες παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι κατατεθαρρηκότως
 ὤρμησαν, ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ Τυρρη-
 νίας, ἔχοντες πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς πεντακισμυρίους, ἵπ-
 5 πεῖς δὲ καὶ συνωρίδας εἰς δισμυρίους. Ῥωμαῖοι δ'
 ὡς θᾶπτον ἤκουσαν τοὺς Κελτοὺς ὑπερβεβληκέναι
 τὰς Ἄλπεις, Λεύκιον μὲν Λίμιλιον ὑπατον μετὰ
 δυνάμεως ἐξαπέστειλαν ὡς ἐπ' Ἀριμίνου, τηρήσουτα

frontier, as if the enemy had already invaded their territory, while as a fact the Celts had not yet budged from their own country. This movement of the Gauls contributed in no small measure to the rapid and unimpeded subjugation of Spain by the Carthaginians; for the Romans, as I stated above, regarded this matter as of more urgency, since the danger was on their flank, and were compelled to neglect the affairs of Spain until they had dealt with the Gauls. They therefore secured themselves against the Carthaginians by the treaty with Hasdrubal, the terms of which I stated above, and threw their whole effort into the struggle with their enemies in Italy, considering it their main interest to bring this to a decisive conclusion.

23. The Gaesatae, having collected a richly equipped and formidable force, crossed the Alps, and descended into the plain of the Po in the eighth 225 B.C. year after the partition of Picenum. The Insubres and Boii held stoutly to their original purpose; but the Veneti and Cenomani, on the Romans sending an embassy to them, decided to give them their support; so that the Celtic chiefs were obliged to leave part of their forces behind to protect their territory from invasion by these tribes. They themselves marched confidently out with their whole available army, consisting of about fifty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse and chariots, and advanced on Etruria. The Romans, the moment they heard that the Gauls had crossed the Alps, sent Lucius Aemilius, their Consul, with his army to Ariminum to await

- ταύτη τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἔφοδον, ἓνα δὲ τῶν ἑξα-
 6 πελέκεων εἰς Τυρρηνίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερος τῶν
 ὑπάτων Γάιος Ἀτίλιος προεξεληλυθὼς ἔτυχεν εἰς
 7 Σαρδόνα μετὰ τῶν στρατοπέδων, οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ
 πάντες περιδεεῖς ἦσαν, μέγαν καὶ φοβερόν αὐτοῖς
 ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐπιφέρεισθαι κίνδυνον. ἔπασχον δὲ
 τοῦτ' εἰκότως, ἔτι περὶ Γαλατῶν ἐγκαθημένους ταῖς
 8 ψυχαῖς αὐτῶν τοῦ παλαιοῦ φόβου. διὸ καὶ πρὸς
 ταύτην ἀναφέροντες τὴν ἔννοιαν τὰ μὲν συνήθροι-
 ζον, τὰ δὲ κατέγραφον στρατόπεδα, τοῖς δ' ἐτοίμοις
 9 εἶναι παρήγγελλον τῶν συμμάχων. καθόλου δὲ τοῖς
 ὑποτεταγμένοις ἀναφέρειν ἐπέταξαν ἀπογραφὰς τῶν
 ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις, σπουδάζοντες εἰδέναι τὸ σύμπαν
 10 πλῆθος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς δυνάμεως. σίτου
 δὲ καὶ βελῶν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιτηδειότητος πρὸς
 πόλεμον τηλικάυτην ἐποιήσαντο κατασκευὴν ἡλικὴν
 11 οὐδεὶς πω μνημονεύει πρότερον. συνηργεῖτο δ'
 12 αὐτοῖς πάντα καὶ πανταχόθεν ἐτοίμως. καταπε-
 πληγμένοι γὰρ οἱ τὴν Ἰταλίαν οἰκοῦντες τὴν τῶν
 Γαλατῶν ἔφοδον, οὐκέτι Ῥωμαίοις ἡγοῦντο συμμα-
 χεῖν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς τούτων ἡγεμονίας γίνεσθαι τὸν
 πόλεμον, ἀλλὰ περὶ σφῶν ἐνόμιζον ἕκαστοι καὶ τῆς
 ἰδίας πόλεως καὶ χώρας ἐπιφέρεισθαι τὸν κίνδυνον.
 13 διόπερ ἐτοίμως τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις ὑπήκουον.
 24 Ἴνα δὲ συμφανὲς ἐπ' αὐτῶν γένηται τῶν ἔργων
 ἡλίκους Ἀννίβας ἐτόλμησε πράγμασιν ἐπιθέσθαι
 [μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα] καὶ πρὸς ἡλικὴν δυναστείαν παρα-
 βόλως ἀντοφθαλμῆσας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο καθίκετο τῆς
 προθέσεως ὥστε τοῖς μεγίστοις συμπτώμασι περι-
 2 βάλλειν Ῥωμαίους, ῥητέον ἂν εἴη τὴν παρασκευὴν
 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς τότε δυνά-
 3 μεως. μετὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν ὑπάτων ἐξεληλύθει τέτταρα

BOOK II

the attack of the enemy, and one of their Praetors to Etruria, their other Consul, Gaius Atilius, being absent in Sardinia with his legions. There was great and general alarm in Rome, as they thought they were in imminent and serious peril, and this indeed was but natural, as the terror the old invasion had inspired still dwelt in their minds. Being, therefore, in this state of profound apprehension, they busied themselves mustering and enrolling their own legions and ordered those of the allies to be in readiness. All their subjects in general were commanded to supply lists of men of military age, as they wished to know what their total forces amounted to. Of corn, missiles and other war material they had laid in such a supply as no one could remember to have been collected on any previous occasion. On every side there was a ready disposition to help in every possible way; for the inhabitants of Italy, terror-struck by the invasion of the Gauls, no longer thought of themselves as the allies of Rome or regarded this war as undertaken to establish Roman supremacy, but every man considered that the peril was descending on himself and his own city and country. So there was great alacrity in obeying orders.

24. But, that it may appear from actual facts what a great power it was that Hannibal ventured to attack, and how mighty was that empire boldly confronting which he came so near his purpose as to bring great disasters on Rome, I must state what were their resources and the actual number of their forces at this time. Each of the Consuls was in

στρατόπεδα Ῥωμαϊκά, πεντάκις μὲν χιλίους καὶ
διακοσίους πεζικούς, ἱππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους ἔχον
4 ἕκαστον. σύμμαχοι δὲ μεθ' ἑκατέρων ἦσαν οἱ συν-
άμφω πεζοὶ μὲν τρισμύριοι, δισχίλιοι δ' ἱππεῖς.
5 τῶν δ' ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ προσβοηθησάντων εἰς τὴν
Ῥώμην Σαβίνων καὶ Τυρρηνῶν ἱππεῖς μὲν ἦσαν
εἰς τετρακισχιλίους, πεζοὶ δὲ πλείους τῶν πεντακισ-
6 μυρίων. τούτους μὲν ἀθροίσαντες ὥς ἐπὶ Τυρρη-
νίας προεκάθισαν, ἐξαπέλεκυν αὐτοῖς ἡγεμόνα συ-
7 στήσαντες. οἱ δὲ τὸν Ἀπεννῖνον κατοικοῦντες Ὀμ-
βροι καὶ Σαρσινάτοι συνήχθησαν εἰς δισμυρίους,
μετὰ δὲ τούτων Οὔνετοι καὶ Γονομάνοι δισμύριοι.
8 τούτους δ' ἔταξαν ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρων τῆς Γαλατίας, ἵν'
ἐμβαλόντες εἰς τὴν τῶν Βοίων χώραν ἀντιπερι-
σπῶσι τοὺς ἐξεληλυθότας. τὰ μὲν οὖν προκαθ-
9 ἡμενα στρατόπεδα τῆς χώρας ταύτ' ἦν. ἐν δὲ τῇ
Ῥώμῃ διέτριβον ἡτοιμασμένοι χάριν τῶν συμβαι-
νόντων ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις, ἐφεδρείας ἔχοντες τάξιν,
Ῥωμαίων μὲν αὐτῶν πεζοὶ δισμύριοι, μετὰ δὲ
τούτων ἱππεῖς χίλιοι καὶ πεντακόσιοι, τῶν δὲ συμ-
10 μάχων πεζοὶ μὲν τρισμύριοι, δισχίλιοι δ' ἱππεῖς.
καταγραφὰ δ' ἀνηνέχθησαν Λατίνων μὲν ὀκτακισ-
μύριοι πεζοί, πεντακισχίλιοι δ' ἱππεῖς, Σαυνιτῶν
δὲ πεζοὶ μὲν ἑπτακισμύριοι, μετὰ δὲ τούτων ἱππεῖς
11 ἑπτακισχίλιοι, καὶ μὴν Ἰαπύγων καὶ Μεσσαπίων
συνάμφω πεζῶν μὲν πέντε μυριάδες, ἱππεῖς δὲ μύ-
12 ριοι σὺν ἑξακισχιλίοις, Λευκανῶν δὲ πεζοὶ μὲν τρις-
μύριοι, τρισχίλιοι δ' ἱππεῖς, Μαρσῶν δὲ καὶ Μαρ-
ρουκίνων καὶ Φρεντανῶν, ἔτι δ' Οὔεστίνων, πεζοὶ
μὲν δισμύριοι, τετρακισχίλιοι δ' ἱππεῖς. ἔτι γε
13 μὴν καὶ Σικελία καὶ Τάραντι στρατόπεδα δύο παρ-
εφήδρευεν, ὧν ἑκάτερον ἦν ἀνὰ τετρακισχιλίους

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command of four legions of Roman citizens, each consisting of five thousand two hundred foot and three hundred horse. The allied forces in each Consular army numbered thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse. The cavalry of the Sabines and Etruscans, who had come to the temporary assistance of Rome, were four thousand strong, their infantry above fifty thousand. The Romans massed these forces and posted them on the frontier of Etruria under the command of a Praetor. The levy of the Umbrians and Sarsinatae inhabiting the Apennines amounted to about twenty thousand, and with these were twenty thousand Veneti and Cenomani. These they stationed on the frontier of Gaul, to invade the territory of the Boii and divert them back from their expedition. These were the armies protecting the Roman territory. In Rome itself there was a reserve force ready for any contingency consisting of twenty thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, all Roman citizens, and thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse furnished by the allies. The lists of men able to bear arms that had been returned were as follows. Latins eighty thousand foot and five thousand horse, Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand horse, Iapygians and Messapians fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse, Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani, and Vestini twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. In Sicily and Tarentum were two reserve legions, each consisting of four thousand

- 14 καὶ διακοσίους πεζούς, ἵππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους. Ῥω-
μαίων δὲ καὶ Καμπανῶν ἡ πληθὺς πεζῶν μὲν εἰς
εἴκοσι καὶ πέντε κατελέχθησαν μυριάδες, ἵππέων
δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς δύο μυριάσιν ἐπῆσαν ἔτι τρεῖς χιλιάδες.
- 15 ὥστ' εἶναι τὸ [κεφάλαιον τῶν μὲν προκαθημένων
τῆς Ῥώμης δυνάμεων πεζοὶ μὲν ὑπὲρ πεντεκαίδεκα
16 μυριάδες, ἵππεῖς δὲ πρὸς ἑξακισχιλίου, τὸ δὲ] σύμ-
παν πλῆθος τῶν δυναμένων ὅπλα βαστάζειν αὐτῶν
τε Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πεζῶν ὑπὲρ τὰς
ἑβδομήκοντα μυριάδας, ἵππέων δ' εἰς ἑπτὰ μυριά-
17 δας. ἐφ' οὓς Ἀννίβας ἐλάττους ἔχων δισμυρίων
ἐπέβαλεν εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων
ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς σαφέστερον ἐκποιήσῃ κατανοεῖν.
- 25 Οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ κατάραντες εἰς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν ἐπ-
επορεύοντο τὴν χώραν, πορθοῦντες ἀδεῶς· οὐδενὸς
δ' αὐτοῖς ἀντιταττομένου, τέλος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ὥρμησαν
2 τὴν Ῥώμην. ἤδη δ' αὐτῶν περὶ πόλιν ὄντων ἡ
καλεῖται μὲν Κλούσιον, ἀπέχει δ' ἡμερῶν τριῶν
ὁδὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥώμης, προσαγγέλλεται διότι κατόπιν
αὐτοῖς ἔπονται καὶ συνάπτουσιν αἱ προκαθήμεναι
3 τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐν τῇ Τυρρηνίᾳ δυνάμεις. οἱ δ' ἀκού-
σαντες ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς ἀπῆντων, σπεύδοντες τούτοις
4 συμβαλεῖν. ἐγγίσαντες δ' ἀλλήλοις ἤδη περὶ δυ-
σμὰς ἡλίου, τότε μὲν ἐν συμμέτρῳ διαστήματι κατα-
5 στρατοπεδεύσαντες ἠϋλίσθησαν ἀμφότεροι. τῆς δὲ
νυκτὸς ἐπιγενομένης πῦρ ἀνακαύσαντες οἱ Κελτοὶ
τοὺς μὲν ἵππεῖς ἀπέλιπον, συντάξαντες ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ
συμφανεῖς γενομένους τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑποχωρεῖν κατὰ
6 τὸν αὐτὸν στίβον. αὐτοὶ δὲ λαθραῖαν ποιησάμενοι
τὴν ἀποχώρησιν ὥς ἐπὶ πόλιν Φαισόλαν, αὐτοῦ παρ-
ενέβαλον, πρόθεσιν ἔχοντες ἅμα μὲν ἐκδέχεσθαι
τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἵππεῖς, ἅμα δὲ παραδόξως ἐνοχλῆσαι

two hundred foot and two hundred horse. Of Romans and Campanians there were on the roll two hundred and fifty thousand and about twenty-three thousand horse; so that the total number of Romans and allies able to bear arms was more than seven hundred thousand foot and seventy thousand horse, while Hannibal invaded Italy with an army of less than twenty thousand men. 25. On this matter I shall be able to give my readers more explicit information in the course of this work.

The Celts, descending on Etruria, overran the country without let or hindrance and, as nobody appeared to oppose them, they marched on Rome itself. When they had got as far as Clusium, a city three days' journey from Rome, news reached them that the advanced force which the Romans had posted in Etruria was on their heels and approaching. On hearing this, they turned to meet it, eager to engage it. At sunset the two armies were in close proximity, and encamped for the night at no great distance from each other. After nightfall, the Celts lit their camp-fires, and, leaving orders with their cavalry to wait until daybreak and then, when visible to the enemy, to follow on their track, they themselves secretly retreated to a town called Faesulae and posted themselves there, their intention being to wait for their cavalry, and also to put unexpected difficulties in the way of the enemy's

- 7 τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἔφοδον. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς
 ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης συνιδόντες τοὺς ἱππεῖς αὐτοὺς,
 καὶ νομίσαντες τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἀποδεδρακέναι, κατὰ
 σπουδὴν ἠκολούθουν τοῖς ἱππεύσι κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνων
 8 ἀποχώρησιν. ἅμα δὲ τῷ συνεγγίζειν τοῖς πολεμίοις
 διαναστάντων τῶν Κελτῶν, καὶ συμπεσόντων αὐτοῖς,
 9 ἦν ἄγὼν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν βίαιος. τέλος δὲ καθ-
 υπερεχόντων τῶν Κελτῶν τῇ τόλμῃ καὶ τῷ πλήθει,
 συνέβη διαφθαρῆναι μὲν τῶν Ῥωμαίων οὐκ ἐλάτ-
 τους ἑξακισχιλίων, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς φεύγειν. ὧν οἱ
 πλείους πρὸς τινα τόπον ἐρυμνὸν ἀποχωρήσαντες
 10 ἔμενον. οὓς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἱ Κελτοὶ πολιορκεῖν
 ἐπεβάλλοντο· κακῶς δ' ἀπαλλάττοντες ἐκ τῆς προγε-
 γεννημένης ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ πορείας καὶ κακοπαθείας καὶ
 ταλαιπωρίας, ὥρμησαν πρὸς ἀνάπανσιν καὶ θερα-
 πείαν, φυλακὴν ἀπολιπόντες τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων περὶ
 11 τὸν λόφον, πρόθεσιν ἔχοντες κατὰ τὴν ἐπιούσαν
 πολιορκεῖν τοὺς συμπεφευγότες, εἰ μὴ παραδῶσιν
 ἑαυτοὺς ἐκουσίως.
- 26 Κατὰ δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Λεύκιος Αἰμίλιος ὁ
 προκαθήμενος ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀδρίαν τόπων
 ἀκούσας τοὺς Κελτοὺς διὰ Τυρρηνίας ἐμβεβληκότας
 συνεγγίζειν τῇ Ῥώμῃ, παρῆν βοηθῶν κατὰ σπουδὴν
 2 εὐτυχῶς εἰς δέοντα καιρόν. καταστρατοπεδεύσαν-
 τος δ' αὐτοῦ σύνεγγυς τῶν πολεμίων, κατιδόντες
 τὰ πυρὰ καὶ νοήσαντες τὸ γεγονός οἱ συμπεφευ-
 γότες ἐπὶ τὸν λόφον, ταχέως ἀναθαρρήσαντες ἐξ-
 ἀπέστειλαν αὐτῶν τινὰς τῆς νυκτὸς ἀνόπλους διὰ
 τῆς ὕλης ἀναγγελοῦντας τῷ στρατηγῷ τὸ συμβεβη-
 3 κός. ὁ δὲ διακούσας, καὶ θεωρῶν οὐδὲ διαβούλιον
 αὐτῷ καταλειπόμενον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστώτων, τοῖς
 μὲν χιλιάρχοις ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ παρήγγειλε τοὺς πεζοὺς

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attack. At daybreak, the Romans, seeing the cavalry alone and thinking the Celts had taken to flight, followed the cavalry with all speed on the line of the Celts' retreat. On their approaching the enemy, the Celts issued from their camp and attacked them, and a conflict, at first very stubborn, took place, in which finally the numbers and courage of the Celts prevailed, not fewer than six thousand Romans falling and the rest taking to flight. Most of them retreated to a hill of some natural strength where they remained. The Celts at first attempted to besiege them, but as they were getting the worst of it, fatigued as they were by their long night march and the suffering and hardships it involved, they hastened to rest and refresh themselves, leaving a detachment of their cavalry to keep guard round the hill, intending next day to besiege the fugitives, if they did not offer to surrender.

26. At this very time Lucius Aemilius, who was in command of the advanced force near the Adriatic, on hearing that the Celts had invaded Etruria and were approaching Rome, came in haste to help, fortunately arriving in the nick of time. He encamped near the enemy, and the fugitives on the hill, seeing his camp-fires and understanding what had occurred, immediately plucked up courage and dispatched by night some unarmed messengers through the wood to announce to the Consul the plight they were in. On hearing of it and seeing that there was no alternative course under the circumstances, he ordered his Tribunes to march

- ἐξάγειν, αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς ἵππεὺς ἀναλαβὼν καθηγείτο τῆς δυνάμεως, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὸν
 4 προειρημένον βουνόν. οἱ δὲ τῶν Γαλατῶν ἡγε-
 μόνες, ἀφορῶντες τὰ πυρὰ τῆς νυκτὸς καὶ συλλογι-
 ζόμενοι τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν πολεμίων συνήδρευον.
 5 οἷς Ἀνηροέστης ὁ βασιλεὺς γνώμην εἰσέφερε λέγων
 ὅτι δεῖ τοσαύτης λείας ἐγκρατεῖς γεγονότας, ἦν γάρ,
 ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ τὸ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων
 πλήθος, ἔτι δὲ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ἥς εἶχον, ἀμύθητον.
 6 διόπερ ἔφη δεῖν μὴ κινδυνεύειν ἔτι μηδὲ παραβάλλε-
 σθαι τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀδεῶς ἐπανάγειν.
 ταῦτα δ' ἀποσκευασαμένους καὶ γενομένους εὐ-
 ζώνους αὐθις ἐγχειρεῖν ὁλοσχερῶς, ἐὰν δοκῇ, τοῖς
 7 Ῥωμαίων πράγμασι. δόξαντος δὲ σφίσι κατὰ τὴν
 Ἀνηροέστου γνώμην χρήσασθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν,
 οὗτοι μὲν τῆς νυκτὸς ταῦτα βουλευσάμενοι, πρὸ
 φωτὸς ἀναζεύξαντες προῆγον παρὰ θάλατταν διὰ τῆς
 8 Τυρρηνῶν χώρας. ὁ δὲ Λεύκιος, ἀναλαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ
 βουνοῦ τὸ διασωζόμενον τοῦ στρατοπέδου μέρος ἅμα
 ταῖς ἰδίαις δυνάμεσι, τὸ μὲν διακινδυνεύειν ἐκ παρα-
 τάξεως οὐδαμῶς ἔκρινε συμφέρειν, ἐπιτηρεῖν δὲ
 μᾶλλον καιροὺς καὶ τόπους εὐφυνεῖς, ἐπόμενος, ἐὰν
 πού τι βλάβηται τοὺς πολεμίους ἢ τῆς λείας ἀπο-
 σπάσαι δυνηθῇ.
 27 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους ἐκ Σαρδόνης
 μετὰ τῶν στρατοπέδων Γάιος Ἀτίλιος ὕπατος εἰς
 Πίσας καταπεπλευκὼς προῆγε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως
 εἰς Ῥώμην, ἐναντίαν ποιούμενος τοῖς πολεμίοις τὴν
 2 πορείαν. ἤδη δὲ περὶ Τελαμῶνα τῆς Τυρρηνίας
 τῶν Κελτῶν ὑπαρχόντων, οἱ προνομεύοντες ἐξ
 αὐτῶν ἐμπεσόντες εἰς τοὺς παρὰ τοῦ Γαῖου προπο-
 3 ρενομένους ἐάλωσαν· καὶ τά τε προγεγονότα διεσά-
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out the infantry at daybreak, he himself proceeding in advance with the cavalry towards the hill. The leaders of the Gauls, on seeing the camp-fires at night, surmised that the enemy had arrived and held a council at which the King Aneroestes expressed the opinion, that having captured so much booty (for it appears that the quantity of slaves, cattle and miscellaneous spoil was enormous), they should not give battle again nor risk the fortune of the whole enterprise, but return home in safety, and having got rid of all their encumbrances and lightened themselves, return and, if advisable, try issues with the Romans. It was decided under the circumstances to take the course recommended by Aneroestes, and having come to this resolution in the night, they broke up their camp before daybreak and retreated along the sea-coast through Etruria. Lucius now took with him from the hill the survivors of the other army and united them with his other forces. He thought it by no means advisable to risk a general battle, but decided to hang on the enemy's rear and watch for times and places favourable for inflicting damage on them or wresting some of the spoil from their hands.

27. Just at this time, Gaius Atilius, the other Consul, had reached Pisa from Sardinia with his legions and was on his way to Rome, marching in the opposite direction to the enemy. When the Celts were near Telamon in Etruria, their advanced guard encountered that of Gaius and were made prisoners. On being examined by the Consul they

φουν ἀνακρινόμενοι τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τὴν παρουσίαν
 ἀμφοτέρων τῶν στρατοπέδων ἀνήγγελλον, σημαί-
 νοντες διότι τελείως σύνεγγυς εἰσιν οἱ Κελτοὶ καὶ
 4 τούτων κατόπιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Λεύκιον. ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν
 ξενισθεὶς ἐπὶ τοῖς προσπίπτουσι, τὰ δ' εὐέλπιδι γενό-
 μενος ἐπὶ τῷ δοκεῖν μέσους κατὰ πορείαν ἀπειλη-
 φέειν τοὺς Κελτοὺς, τοῖς μὲν χιλιάρχοις παρήγγειλε
 τάττειν τὰ στρατόπεδα, καὶ βάδην εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν
 προάγειν, καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἱ τόποι προσδέχωνται τὴν
 5 μετωπηδὸν ἔφοδον. αὐτὸς δὲ συνθεωρήσας εὐκαί-
 ρως λόφον κείμενον ὑπὲρ τὴν ὁδόν, ὑφ' ὃν ἔδει παρα-
 πορευθῆναι τοὺς Κελτοὺς, ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἵππεῖς,
 ὥρμησε σπεύδων προκαταλαβέσθαι τὴν ἀκρολοφίαν
 καὶ πρῶτος κατάρξαι τοῦ κινδύνου, πεπεισμένος τῆς
 ἐπιγραφῆς τῶν ἐκβαίνοντων πλεῖστον οὕτω κληρονο-
 6 μῆσειν. οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τὴν παρουσίαν
 τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀτίλιον ἀγνοοῦντες, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ συμ-
 βαίνοντος ὑπολαμβάνοντες τοὺς περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον
 περιπεπορευθῆναι τὴν νύκτα τοῖς ἵππεῦσι καὶ προ-
 καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς τόπους, εὐθέως ἐξαπέστελλον
 τοὺς παρ' αὐτῶν ἵππεῖς καὶ τινὰς τῶν εὐζώνων,
 7 ἀντιποιησομένους τῶν κατὰ τὸν βουνὸν τόπων. ταχὺ
 δὲ συνέντες τὴν τοῦ Γαῖου παρουσίαν ἐκ τινος τῶν
 ἀχθέντων αἰχμαλώτων, σπουδῇ παρενέβαλον τοὺς
 πεζοὺς, ποιούμενοι τὴν ἑκταξιν ἅμα πρὸς ἑκατέραν
 τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, καὶ τὴν ἀπ' οὐρᾶς καὶ τὴν κατὰ
 8 πρόσωπον· οὓς μὲν γὰρ ἤδεσαν ἐπομένους αὐτοῖς,
 οὓς δὲ κατὰ τὸ στόμα προσεδόκων ἀπαντήσειν, ἐκ
 τε τῶν προσαγγελλομένων τεκμαιρόμενοι καὶ τῶν
 28 κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν συμβαινόντων. οἱ δὲ περὶ
 τὸν Αἰμίλιον ἀκηκοότες μὲν τὸν εἰς τὰς Πίσας
 κατάπλουν τῶν στρατοπέδων, οὕπῳ δὲ προσδοκῶν-

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narrated all that had recently occurred and told him of the presence of the two armies, stating that the Gauls were quite near and Lucius behind them. The news surprised him but at the same time made him very hopeful, as he thought he had caught the Gauls on the march between the two armies. He ordered his Tribunes to put the legions in fighting order and to advance thus at marching pace in so far as the nature of the ground allowed the attack in line. He himself had happily noticed a hill situated above the road by which the Celts must pass, and taking his cavalry with him, advanced at full speed, being anxious to occupy the crest of the hill before their arrival and be the first to begin the battle, feeling certain that thus he would get the largest share of credit for the result. The Celts at first were ignorant of the arrival of Atilius and imagined from what they saw, that Aemilius' cavalry had got round their flank in the night and were engaged in occupying the position. They therefore at once sent on their own cavalry and some of their light-armed troops to dispute the possession of the hill. But very soon they learnt of Gaius' presence from one of the prisoners brought in, and lost no time in drawing up their infantry, deploying them so that they faced both front and rear, since, both from the intelligence that reached them and from what was happening before their eyes, they knew that the one army was following them, and they expected to meet the other in their front. 28. Aemilius, who had heard of the landing of the legions at Pisa but had not any idea that they were already

2 τες αὐτὰ συνεγγίζειν, τότε σαφῶς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὸν
 λόφον ἀγῶνος ἔγνωσαν διότι τελέως ἐγγὺς εἶναι
 3 συμβαίνει τὰς οἰκείας αὐτῶν δυνάμεις. διὸ καὶ
 τοὺς μὲν ἵππεῖς παραυτίκα βοηθήσαντας ἔξαπ-
 ἔστελλον τοῖς ἐν τῷ λόφῳ διαγωνιζομένοις, αὐτοὶ
 δὲ κατὰ τὰς εἰθισμένας τάξεις διακοσμήσαντες τοὺς
 4 πεζοὺς προῆγον ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. οἱ δὲ Κελ-
 τοὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Γαισάτους προσ-
 αγορευομένους ἔταξαν πρὸς τὴν ἀπ' οὐρᾶς ἐπιφάνειαν
 ἣ προσεδόκων τοὺς περὶ τὸν Αἰμίλιον, ἐπὶ δὲ τού-
 5 τοις τοὺς Ἰνσομβρας· πρὸς δὲ τὴν κατὰ πρόσωπον
 τοὺς Ταυρίσκους καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Πάδου
 κατοικοῦντας Βοίους παρενέβαλον, τὴν ἐναντίαν
 μὲν στάσιν ἔχοντας τοῖς προειρημένοις, βλέποντας
 δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν τοῦ Γαῖου στρατοπέδων ἔφοδον.
 6 τὰς δ' ἀμάξας καὶ συνωρίδας ἐκτὸς ἐκατέρου τοῦ
 κέρατος παρέστησαν, τὴν δὲ λείαν εἰς τι τῶν παρα-
 κειμένων ὁρῶν φυλακὴν περιστήσαντες ἡθροίζον.
 7 γενομένης δ' ἀμφιστόμου τῆς τῶν Κελτῶν δυνά-
 μεως, οὐ μόνον καταπληκτικὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρακτικὴν
 8 εἶναι συνέβαινε τὴν τάξιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἰνσομβρες
 καὶ Βοῖοι τὰς ἀναξυρίδας ἔχοντες καὶ τοὺς εὐπετεῖς
 9 τῶν σάγων περὶ αὐτοὺς ἐξέταξαν. οἱ δὲ Γαισάται
 διὰ τε τὴν φιλοδοξίαν καὶ τὸ θάρσος ταῦτ' ἀπορρί-
 ψαντες γυμνοὶ μετ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὅπλων πρῶτοι τῆς
 δυνάμεως κατέστησαν, ὑπολαβόντες οὕτως ἔσεσθαι
 πρακτικώτατοι, διὰ τὸ τινὰς τῶν τόπων βατώδεις
 ὄντας ἐμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς ἐφάμμασι καὶ παραποδίζειν
 τὴν τῶν ὅπλων χρεῖαν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον αὐτὸς
 ὁ κατὰ τὸν λόφον ἐνείσθηκει κίνδυνος, ἅπασιν ὦν
 σύνοπτος, ὥς ἂν ἅμα τοσοῦτου πλήθους ἱππέων
 ἀφ' ἐκάστου τῶν στρατοπέδων ἀναμιξέσθαι ἀλλήλοις

BOOK II

so near him, now, when he saw the fight going on round the hill, knew that the other Roman army was quite close. Accordingly, sending on his cavalry to help those who were fighting on the hill, he drew up his infantry in the usual order and advanced to attack. The Celts had drawn up facing their rear, from which they expected Aemilius to attack, the Gaesatae from the Alps and behind them the Insubres, and facing in the opposite direction, ready to meet the attack of Gaius' legions, they placed the Taurisci and the Boii from the left bank of the Po. Their wagons and chariots they stationed at the extremity of either wing and collected their booty on one of the neighbouring hills with a protecting force round it. This order of the Celtic forces, facing both ways, not only presented a formidable appearance, but was well adapted to the exigencies of the situation. The Insubres and Boii wore their trews and light cloaks, but the Gaesatae had discarded these garments owing to their proud confidence in themselves, and stood naked, with nothing but their arms, in front of the whole army, thinking that thus they would be more efficient, as some of the ground was overgrown with brambles which would catch in their clothes and impede the use of their weapons. At first the battle was confined to the hill, all the armies gazing on it, so great were the numbers of cavalry from each host com-

- 10 συμπεπτωκότος. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ συνέβη
Γάιον μὲν τὸν ὑπατον παραβόλως ἀγωνιζόμενον ἐν
χειρῶν νόμῳ τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν
αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλέας ἐπανενεχθῆναι τῶν Κελ-
τῶν· τοὺς δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῖς, κινδυνεύσαντας
ἐρρωμένως τέλος ἐπικρατῆσαι τοῦ τόπου καὶ τῶν
11 ὑπεναντίων. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν πεζικῶν στρατο-
πέδων ἥδη σύνεγγυς ὄντων ἀλλήλοις ἴδιον ἦν καὶ
θαυμαστὸν τὸ συμβαίνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ
τῷ καιρῷ τότε παροῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ποτε μετὰ
ταῦτα δυναμένοις ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν λαμβάνειν ἐκ τῶν
29 λεγομένων τὸ γεγονός. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν
στρατοπέδων τῆς μάχης συνισταμένης, δῆλον ὡς
ξένην καὶ παρηλλαγμένην εἰκὸς καὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν
2 καὶ τὴν χρεῖαν φαίνεσθαι τοῦ συντεταγμένου. δεύ-
τερον δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀπορήσαι τις καὶ νῦν καὶ
τότε παρ' αὐτὸν ὢν τὸν καιρὸν πότερον οἱ Κελτοὶ
τὴν ἐπισφαλεστάτην εἶχον χώραν, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν
3 μεροῖν ἅμα τῶν πολεμίων ἐπαγόντων αὐτοῖς, ἢ
τοῦναντίον τὴν ἐπιτευκτικωτάτην, ἅμα μὲν ἀγωνι-
ζόμενοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους, ἅμα δὲ τὴν ἀφ' ἐκατέρων
ἀσφάλειαν ἐκ τῶν ὀπισθεν αὐτοῖς παρασκευάζοντες,
τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀποκεκλειμένης πάσης τῆς εἰς τοῦ-
πισθεν ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ λείπεσθαι
4 σωτηρίας; ἢ γὰρ τῆς ἀμφιστόμου τάξεως ἰδιότης
5 τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν χρεῖαν. τοὺς γε μὴν Ῥωμαίους
τὰ μὲν εὐθαρσεῖς ἐποίει τὸ μέσους καὶ πάντοθεν
περιειληφέναι τοὺς πολεμίους, τὰ δὲ πάλιν ὁ κόσμος
αὐτοὺς καὶ θόρυβος ἐξέπληττε τῆς τῶν Κελτῶν
6 δυνάμεως. ἀναρίθμητον μὲν γὰρ ἦν τὸ τῶν βυ-
κανητῶν καὶ σαλπικτῶν πλήθος. οἷς ἅμα τοῦ
παντὸς στρατοπέδου συμπαιανίζοντος τηλικαύτην

BOOK II

bating there pell-mell. In this action Gaius the Consul fell in the mellay fighting with desperate courage, and his head was brought to the Celtic kings; but the Roman cavalry, after a stubborn struggle, at length overmastered the enemy and gained possession of the hill. The infantry were now close upon each other, and the spectacle was a strange and marvellous one, not only to those actually present at the battle, but to all who could afterwards picture it to themselves from the reports. 29. For in the first place, as the battle was between three armies, it is evident that the appearance and the movements of the forces marshalled against each other must have been in the highest degree strange and unusual. Again, it must have been to all present, and still is to us, a matter of doubt whether the Celts, with the enemy advancing on them from both sides, were more dangerously situated, or, on the contrary, more effectively, since at one and the same time they were fighting against both their enemies and were protecting themselves in the rear from both, while, above all, they were absolutely cut off from retreat or any prospect of escape in the case of defeat, this being the peculiarity of this two-faced formation. The Romans, however, were on the one hand encouraged by having caught the enemy between their two armies, but on the other they were terrified by the fine order of the Celtic host and the dreadful din, for there were innumerable trumpeters and horn-blowers, and, as the whole army were shouting their war-cries at the same

καὶ τοιαύτην συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι κραυγὴν ὥστε μὴ
μόνον τὰς σάλπιγγας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τοὺς παρακειμένους τόπους συνηχοῦντας ἐξ αὐτῶν
7 δοκεῖν προῖεσθαι φωνήν. ἐκπληκτικὴ δ' ἦν καὶ
τῶν γυμνῶν προεστώτων ἀνδρῶν ἢ τ' ἐπιφάνεια
καὶ κίνησις, ὡς ἂν διαφερόντων ταῖς ἀκμαῖς καὶ
8 τοῖς εἵδεσι. πάντες δ' οἱ τὰς πρώτας κατέχοντες
σπείρας χρυσοῖς μανιάκαις καὶ περιχείροις ἦσαν
9 κατακεκοσμημένοι. πρὸς ἃ βλέποντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι
τὰ μὲν ἐξεπλήττοντο, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς
ἐλπίδος ἀγόμενοι διπλασίως παρωξύνοντο πρὸς τὸν
30 κίνδυνον. πλὴν ἅμα τῷ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς προελ-
θόντας ἐκ τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν στρατοπέδων κατὰ τὸν
ἔθισμόν εἰσακοντίζειν ἐνεργοῖς καὶ πυκνοῖς τοῖς
βέλεσι, τοῖς μὲν ὀπίσω τῶν Κελτῶν πολλὴν εὐχρη-
2 στίαν οἱ σάγοι μετὰ τῶν ἀναξυρίδων παρείχον· τοῖς
δὲ γυμνοῖς προεστώσι παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τοῦ
πράγματος συμβαίνοντος τάναντία πολλὴν ἀπορίαν
3 καὶ δυσχρηστίαν παρείχε τὸ γινόμενον. οὐ γὰρ
δυναμένου τοῦ Γαλατικοῦ θυρεοῦ τὸν ἄνδρα περι-
σκέπειν, ὅσω γυμνὰ καὶ μείζω τὰ σώματ' ἦν, τοσού-
4 τω συνέβαινε μᾶλλον τὰ βέλη πίπτειν ἔνδον. τέλος
δ' οὐ δυνάμενοι μὲν ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς εἰσακοντίζοντας
διὰ τὴν ἀπόστασιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πιπτόντων
βελῶν, περικακοῦντες δὲ καὶ δυσχρηστούμενοι τοῖς
παροῦσιν, οἱ μὲν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ
καὶ τῆς ἀλογιστίας εἰκῇ προπίπτοντες καὶ διδόντες
σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐκουσίως ἀπέθνησκον, οἱ δ' εἰς τοὺς
φίλους ἀναχωροῦντες ἐπὶ πόδα καὶ προδῆλως ἀπο-
5 δειλιῶντες διέστρεφον τοὺς κατόπιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν
τῶν Γαισατῶν φρόνημα παρὰ τοῖς ἀκοντισταῖς
6 τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ κατελύθη, τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων

BOOK II

time, there was such a tumult of sound that it seemed that not only the trumpets and the soldiers but all the country round had got a voice and caught up the cry. Very terrifying too were the appearance and the gestures of the naked warriors in front, all in the prime of life, and finely built men, and all in the leading companies richly adorned with gold torques and armlets. The sight of them indeed dismayed the Romans, but at the same time the prospect of winning such spoils made them twice as keen for the fight. 30. But when the javelineers advanced, as is their usage, from the ranks of the Roman legions and began to hurl their javelins in well-aimed volleys, the Celts in the rear ranks indeed were well protected by their trews and cloaks, but it fell out far otherwise than they had expected with the naked men in front, and they found themselves in a very difficult and helpless predicament. For the Gaulish shield does not cover the whole body: so that their nakedness was a disadvantage, and the bigger they were^a the better chance had the missiles of going home. At length, unable to drive off the javelineers owing to the distance and the hail of javelins, and reduced to the utmost distress and perplexity, some of them, in their impotent rage, rushed wildly on the enemy and sacrificed their lives, while others, retreating step by step on the ranks of their comrades, threw them into disorder by their display of faint-heartedness. Thus was the spirit of the Gaesatae broken down by the javelineers; but the main body of the Insubres.

^a Literally "so that the more naked and the bigger they were . . ."

καὶ Βοίων ἔτι δὲ Ταυρίσκων πλῆθος ἅμα τῷ τοῦς
 Ῥωμαίους δεξαμένους τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἀκοντιστὰς
 προσβάλλειν σφίσι τὰς σπείρας συμπεσὼν τοῖς
 7 πολεμίοις ἐκ χειρὸς ἐποίει μάχην ἐχυράν. διακοπ-
 τόμενοι γὰρ ἔμενον ἐπ' ἴσον ταῖς ψυχαῖς, αὐτῷ τούτῳ
 καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα λειπόμενοι, ταῖς τῶν
 8 ὀπλων κατασκευαῖς. οἱ μὲν οὖν θυρεοὶ πρὸς ἀσφά-
 λειαν, αἱ δὲ μάχαιραι πρὸς πρᾶξιν μεγάλην διαφορὰν
 . . . ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ Γαλατικὴν καταφορὰν ἔχειν μό-
 νον. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐξ ὑπερδεξίων καὶ κατὰ κέρας οἱ τῶν
 Ῥωμαίων ἵππεῖς ἐμβαλόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου προσέ-
 φερον τὰς χεῖρας ἐρρωμένως, τόθ' οἱ μὲν πεζοὶ τῶν
 Κελτῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς παρατάξεως τόπῳ κατεκό-
 πησαν, οἱ δ' ἵππεῖς πρὸς φυγὴν ὥρμησαν.

31 Ἀπέθανον μὲν οὖν τῶν Κελτῶν εἰς τετρακισμυ-
 ρίους, ἐάλωσαν δ' οὐκ ἐλάττους μυρίων, ἐν οἷς καὶ
 2 τῶν βασιλέων Κογκολιτάνος. ὁ δ' ἕτερος αὐτῶν
 Ἀνηρόεστος εἰς τινα τόπον συμφυγὼν μετ' ὀλίγων
 προσήνεγκε τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις.
 3 ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ῥωμαίων τὰ μὲν σκῦλα συν-
 αθροίσας εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἀπέστειλε, τὴν δὲ λείαν
 4 ἀπέδωκε τοῖς προσήκουσιν. αὐτὸς δ' ἀναλαβὼν τὰ
 στρατόπεδα καὶ διελθὼν παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν Λιγυστι-
 κὴν εἰς τὴν τῶν Βοίων ἐνέβαλε χώραν. πληρώσας
 δὲ τὰς ὁρμὰς τῶν στρατοπέδων τῆς ὠφελείας ἐν
 ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἦκε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων εἰς τὴν
 5 Ῥώμην. καὶ τὸ μὲν Καπετώλιον ἐκόσμησε ταῖς τε
 σημαῖαις καὶ τοῖςμανιάκαις· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι χρυσοῦν
 ψέλιον, ὃ φοροῦσι περὶ τὸν τράχηλον οἱ Γαλάται·
 6 τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς σκύλοις καὶ τοῖς αἰχμαλώτοις πρὸς
 τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχρήσατο τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ
 θριάμβου διακόσμησιν.

BOOK II

Boii, and Taurisci, once the javelineers had withdrawn into the ranks and the Roman maniples attacked them, met the enemy and kept up a stubborn hand-to-hand combat. For, though being almost cut to pieces, they held their ground, equal to their foes in courage, and inferior only, as a force and individually, in their arms. The Roman shields, it should be added, were far more serviceable for defence and their swords for attack, the Gaulish sword being only good for a cut and not for a thrust. But finally, attacked from higher ground and on their flank by the Roman cavalry, which rode down the hill and charged them vigorously, the Celtic infantry were cut to pieces where they stood, their cavalry taking to flight.

31. About forty thousand Celts were slain and at least ten thousand taken prisoners, among them the king Concolitanus. The other king, Aneroestes, escaped with a few followers to a certain place where he put an end to his life and to those of his friends. The Roman Consul collected the spoils and sent them to Rome, returning the booty of the Gauls to the owners. With his legions he traversed Liguria and invaded the territory of the Boii, from whence, after letting his legions pillage to their heart's content, he returned at their head in a few days to Rome. He sent to ornament the Capitol the standards and torques (the gold necklets worn by the Gauls), but the rest of the spoil and the prisoners he used for his entry into Rome and the adornment of his triumph.

- 7 Ἡ μὲν οὖν βαρυτάτη τῶν Κελτῶν ἔφοδος οὕτω
καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ διεφθάρη, πᾶσι μὲν Ἰτα-
λιώταις, μάλιστα δὲ Ῥωμαίοις, μέγαν καὶ φοβερὸν
8 ἐπικρεμάσασα κίνδυνον. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ κατορθώματος
τούτου κατελπίσαντες Ῥωμαῖοι δυνήσεσθαι τοὺς
Κελτοὺς ἐκ τῶν τόπων τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον ὁλο-
σχερῶς ἐκβαλεῖν, τοὺς τε μετὰ ταῦτα κατασταθέντας
ὑπάτους Κόϊντον Φόλουιον καὶ Τίτον Μάλιον
ἀμφοτέρους καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις μετὰ παρασκευῆς με-
9 γάλῃς ἐξαπέστειλαν ἐπὶ τοὺς Κελτοὺς. οὗτοι δὲ
τοὺς μὲν Βοίους ἐξ ἐφόδου καταπληξάμενοι συν-
ηνάγκασαν εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἑαυτοὺς δοῦναι πίστιν,
10 τὸν δὲ λοιπὸν χρόνον τῆς στρατείας, ἐπιγενομένων
ὄμβρων ἐξαισίων, ἔτι δὲ λοιμικῆς διαθέσεως ἐμ-
πεσοῦσης αὐτοῖς, εἰς τέλος ἄπρακτον εἶχον.
- 32 Μετὰ δὲ τούτους κατασταθέντες Πόπλιος Φούριος
καὶ Γάιος Φλαμίνιος αὐθις ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν Κελτικὴν
διὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀνάρων χώρας, οἷς συμβαίνει μὴ μα-
2 κρὰν ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας ἔχειν τὴν οἴκησιν. οὗς εἰς
τὴν φιλίαν προσαγαγόμενοι διέβησαν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰν-
σόμβρων γῆν κατὰ τὰς συρροίας τοῦ τ' Ἀδόα καὶ
3 Πάδου ποταμοῦ. λαβόντες δὲ πληγὰς περὶ τε τὴν
διάβασιν καὶ περὶ τὴν στρατοπεδεΐαν, παραντίκα
μὲν ἔμειναν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα σπειςάμενοι καθ' ὁμο-
4 λογίαν ἀνέλυσαν ἐκ τῶν τόπων. περιελθόντες δὲ
πλείους ἡμέρας, καὶ διελθόντες τὸν Κλούσιον πο-
ταμόν, ἦλθον εἰς τὴν τῶν Γονομάνων χώραν, καὶ
προσλαβόντες τούτους, ὄντας συμμάχους, ἐνέβαλον
πάλιν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὰς Ἀλπεῖς τόπων εἰς τὰ τῶν
Ἰνσόμβρων πεδία καὶ τὴν τε γῆν ἐδήρουν καὶ τὰς
5 κατοικίας αὐτῶν ἐξεπόρθουν. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων
προεστῶτες, θεωροῦντες ἀμετάθετον οὔσαν τὴν ἐπι-

BOOK II

Thus were destroyed these Celts during whose invasion, the most serious that had ever occurred, all the Italians and especially the Romans had been exposed to great and terrible peril. This success encouraged the Romans to hope that they would be able entirely to expel the Celts from the plain of the Po; and the Consuls of the next year, Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius, were sent against them ^{224 B.C.} with a formidable expeditionary force. They surprised and terrified the Boii, compelling them to submit to Rome, but the rest of the campaign had no practical results whatever, owing to the very heavy rains, and an epidemic which broke out among them.

32. Next year's Consuls, however, Publius Furius ^{223 B.C.} and Gaius Flaminius, again invaded the Celtic territory, through the country of the Anares who dwelt not far from Marseilles. Having admitted this tribe to their friendship, they crossed into the territory of the Insubres, near the junction of the Po and Adda. Both in crossing and in encamping on the other side, they suffered some loss, and at first remained on the spot, but later made a truce and evacuated the territory under its terms. After a circuitous march of some days, they crossed the river Clusius and reached the country of the Cenomani, who were their allies, and accompanied by them, again invaded from the district at the foot of the Alps the plains of the Insubres and began to lay the country waste and pillage their dwellings. The chieftains of the Insubres, seeing that the

- βολὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἔκριναν τῆς τύχης λαβεῖν
 πείραν καὶ διακινδυνεύσαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁλοσχερῶς.
 6 συνναθροίσαντες οὖν ἀπάσας <τὰς δυνάμεις>
 ἐπὶ ταῦτόν, καὶ τὰς χρυσᾶς σημαίας τὰς ἀκι-
 νήτους λεγομένας καθελόντες ἐκ τοῦ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς
 ἱεροῦ, καὶ τᾶλλα παρασκευασάμενοι δεόντως, μετὰ
 ταῦτα τεθαρρηκότως καὶ καταπληκτικῶς ἀντεστρα-
 τοπέδευσαν τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὄντες τὸ πλῆθος εἰς
 7 πέντε μυριάδας. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, τὰ μὲν ὁρῶντες
 σφᾶς ἐλάττους ὄντας παρὰ πολὺ τῶν ἐναντίων,
 ἐβούλοντο συγχρῆσθαι ταῖς τῶν συμμαχούντων αὐ-
 8 τοῖς Κελτῶν δυνάμεσι· τὰ δὲ συλλογισάμενοι τὴν
 τε Γαλατικὴν ἀθεσίαν καὶ διότι πρὸς ὁμοφύλους
 τῶν προσλαμβανομένων μέλλουσι ποιεῖσθαι τὸν
 κίνδυνον, εὐλαβοῦντο τοιούτοις ἀνδράσι τοιούτου
 9 καιροῦ καὶ πράγματος κοινωνεῖν. τέλος δ' οὖν
 αὐτοὶ μὲν ὑπέμειναν ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τοὺς
 δὲ τῶν Κελτῶν σφίσι συνόντας διαβιβάσαντες
 εἰς τὸ πέραν ἀνέσπασαν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ ρείθρου γε-
 10 φύρας, ἅμα μὲν ἀσφαλιζόμενοι τὰ πρὸς ἐκείνους,
 ἅμα δὲ μίαν ἑαυτοῖς ἀπολείποντες ἐλπίδα τῆς
 σωτηρίας τὴν ἐν τῷ νικᾶν, διὰ τὸ κατόπιν αὐτοῖς
 ἄβατον ὄντα παρακεῖσθαι τὸν προειρημένον ποτα-
 11 μόν. πράξαντες δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τῷ διακινδυνεύειν
 ᾗσαν.
- 33 Δοκοῦσι δ' ἐμφρόνως κεχρῆσθαι τῇ μάχῃ ταύτῃ
 Ῥωμαῖοι, τῶν χιλιάρχων ὑποδειξάντων ὥς δεῖ ποι-
 εῖσθαι τὸν ἀγῶνα κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστους.
 2 συνεωρακότες γὰρ ἐκ τῶν προγεγονότων κινδύνων
 ὅτι τοῖς τε θυμοῖς κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον, ἕως
 ἂν ἀκέραιον ᾗ, φοβερώτατόν ἐστι πᾶν τὸ Γαλατικόν
 3 φύλον, αἶ' τε μάχαιραι ταῖς κατασκευαῖς, καθάπερ

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Romans adhered to their purpose of attacking them, decided to try their luck in a decisive battle. Collecting all their forces in one place, they took down the golden standards called "immovable" from the temple of Minerva, and having made all other necessary preparations, boldly took up a menacing position opposite the enemy. They were about fifty thousand strong. The Romans, on the one hand, as they saw that the enemy were much more numerous than themselves, were desirous of employing also the forces of their Celtic allies, but on the other hand, taking into consideration Gaulish fickleness and the fact that they were going to fight against those of the same nation as these allies, they were shy of asking such men to participate in an action of such vital importance. Finally, remaining themselves on their side of the river, they sent the Celts who were with them across it, and demolished the bridges that crossed the stream, firstly as a precaution against their allies, and secondly to leave themselves no hope of safety except in victory, the river, which was impassable, lying in their rear. After taking these measures they prepared for battle.

33. The Romans are thought to have managed matters very skilfully in this battle, their commanding officers having instructed them how they should fight, both as individuals and collectively. For they had observed from former battles that Gauls in general are most formidable and spirited in their first onslaught, while still fresh, and that, from the way

- εἴρηται πρότερον, μίαν ἔχουσι τὴν πρώτην κατα-
 φορὰν καιρίαν, ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης εὐθέως ἀποξυστρούν-
 ται, καμπτόμεναι κατὰ μῆκος καὶ κατὰ πλάτος ἐπὶ
 τοσοῦτον ὥστ' ἐὰν μὴ δῶ τις ἀναστροφὴν τοῖς χρω-
 μένοις, ἐρείσαντας πρὸς τὴν γῆν ἀπευθῆναι τῷ
 4 αὐτῶν· ἀναδόντες οὖν οἱ χιλιάρχοι τὰ τῶν τριαρίων
 δόρατα τῶν κατόπιν ἐφεστώτων ταῖς πρώταις σπεί-
 ραις, καὶ παραγγείλαντες ἐκ μεταλήψεως τοῖς ξί-
 φεσι χρῆσθαι, συνέβαλον ἐκ παρατάξεως κατὰ πρό-
 5 σωπον τοῖς Κελτοῖς. ἅμα δὲ τῷ πρὸς τὰ δόρατα
 ταῖς πρώταις καταφοραῖς χρωμένων τῶν Γαλατῶν
 ἀχρειωθῆναι τὰς μαχαίρας συνδραμόντες εἰς τὰς
 χεῖρας τοὺς μὲν Κελτοὺς ἀπράκτους ἐποίησαν, ἀφ-
 ελόμενοι τὴν ἐκ διάρσεως αὐτῶν μάχην, ὅπερ ἰδιὸν
 ἐστὶ Γαλατικῆς χρείας, διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς κέντημα τὸ
 6 ξίφος ἔχειν· αὐτοὶ δ' οὐκ ἐκ καταφορᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐκ
 διαλήψεως ὀρθαῖς χρώμενοι ταῖς μαχαίραις, πρα-
 κτικοῦ τοῦ κεντήματος περὶ αὐτὰς ὑπάρχοντος, τύ-
 πτοντες εἰς τὰ στέρνα καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ πληγὴν
 ἐπὶ πληγῇ φέροντες, διέφθειραν τοὺς πλείστους τῶν
 παραταξαμένων διὰ τὴν τῶν χιλιάρχων πρόνοιαν.
 7 ὁ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγὸς Φλαμίνιος οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ
 κεκρῆσθαι τῷ προειρημένῳ κινδύνῳ. παρ' αὐτὴν
 γὰρ τὴν ὀφρὺν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ποιησάμενος τὴν ἑκ-
 ταξιν διέφθειρε τὸ τῆς Ῥωμαϊκῆς μάχης ἰδιον, οὐχ
 ὑπολειπόμενος τόπον πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ πόδα ταῖς σπεί-
 8 ραις ἀναχώρησιν. εἰ γὰρ συνέβη βραχὺ μόνον πιε-
 σθῆναι τῇ χώρᾳ τοὺς ἄνδρας κατὰ τὴν μάχην, ρί-
 πτειν ἂν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν αὐτοὺς ἔδει διὰ τὴν ἀστο-
 9 χίαν τοῦ προεστῶτος. οὐ μὲν ἄλλὰ γε πολλῶ νικῆ-
 σαντες ταῖς σφετέραις ἀρεταῖς, καθάπερ εἶπον, καὶ

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their swords are made, as has been already explained, only the first cut takes effect ; after this they at once assume the shape of a strigil, being so much bent both length-wise and side-wise that unless the men are given leisure to rest them on the ground and set them straight with the foot, the second blow is quite ineffectual. The tribunes therefore distributed amongst the front line the spears of the triarii who were stationed behind them, ordering them to use their swords instead only after the spears were done with. They then drew up opposite the Celts in order of battle and engaged. Upon the Gauls slashing first at the spears and making their swords unserviceable the Romans came to close quarters, having rendered the enemy helpless by depriving them of the power of raising their hands and cutting, which is the peculiar and only stroke of the Gauls, as their swords have no points. The Romans, on the contrary, instead of slashing, continued to thrust with their swords which did not bend, inflicting very effectual penetrating wounds. Thus, striking one blow after another on the breast or face, they slew the greater part of their adversaries. This was solely due to the foresight of the tribunes, the Consul Flaminius being thought to have mismanaged the battle by deploying his force at the very edge of the river-bank and thus rendering impossible a tactical movement peculiar to the Romans, as he left the cohorts no room to fall back gradually. For had the troops been even in the slightest degree pushed back from their ground during the battle, they would have had to throw themselves into the river, all owing to their general's blunder. However, as it was, they gained a decisive victory by their own skill and valour, as I said, and

παμπληθοῦς μὲν λείας, οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ σκύλων κρα-
τήσαντες, ἐπανήλθον εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην.

- 34 Τῷ δ' ἐξῆς ἔτει, διαπρεσβευσαμένων τῶν Κελ-
τῶν ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ πᾶν ποιήσῃν ὑπισχνουμέ-
νων, ἔσπευσαν οἱ κατασταθέντες ὕπατοι Μάρκος
Κλαύδιος καὶ Γνάιος Κορνήλιος τοῦ μὴ συγχωρη-
2 θῆναι τὴν εἰρήνην αὐτοῖς. οἱ δ' ἀποτυχόντες, καὶ
κρίναντες ἐξελέγξαι τὰς τελευταίας ἐλπίδας, αὐθις
ᾠρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ μισθοῦσθαι τῶν περὶ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν
Γαισατῶν Γαλατῶν εἰς τρισμυρίους· οὓς παραλα-
βόντες εἶχον ἐν ἐτοιμῳ καὶ προσεδόκων τὴν τῶν
3 πολεμίων ἔφοδον. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγοί,
τῆς ᾠρας ἐπιγενομένης, ἀναλαβόντες τὰς δυνάμεις
4 ἤγον εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων χώραν. παραγενόμε-
νοι δὲ καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύσαντες πόλιν Ἀχέρρας,
ἣ μεταξὺ κεῖται τοῦ Πάδου καὶ τῶν Ἀλπεινῶν
5 ὄρων, ἐπολιόρκουν ταύτην. οἱ δ' Ἰνσομβρες, βοη-
θεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνάμενοι, διὰ τὸ προκαταληφθῆναι
τοὺς εὐφυεῖς τόπους, σπεύδοντες δὲ λῦσαι τὴν
πολιορκίαν τῶν Ἀχερρῶν, μέρος τι τῆς δυνάμεως
διαβιβάσαντες τὸν Πάδον εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἀνάρων χώ-
ραν ἐπολιόρκουν τὸ προσαγορευόμενον Κλαστιδίον.
6 προσπεσόντος δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος τοῖς στρατηγοῖς,
ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἵππεῖς Μάρκος Κλαύδιος καὶ τινες
τῶν πεζικῶν ἠπείγετο, σπεύδων βοηθῆσαι τοῖς πο-
7 λιορκουμένοις. οἱ δὲ Κελτοί, πυθόμενοι τὴν παρ-
ουσίαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, λύσαντες τὴν πολιορκίαν
8 ὑπήντων καὶ παρετάξαντο. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων αὐ-
τοῖς τοῖς ἵππεῦσιν ἐξ ἐφόδου τολμηρῶς σφίσι προσ-
πεσόντων, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἀντείχον· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
περισταμένων καὶ κατὰ νώτου καὶ κατὰ κέρας,
δυσχρηστούμενοι τῇ μάχῃ, τέλος ἐτράπησαν ὑπ'

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returned to Rome with a quantity of booty and many trophies.

34. Next year the Celts sent ambassadors begging ^{222 B.C.} for peace and engaging to accept any conditions, but the new Consuls Marcus Claudius and Gnaeus Cornelius strongly urged that no peace should be granted them. On meeting with a refusal, the Celts decided to resort to their last hope and again appealed to the Gaesatae on the Rhone, and hired a force of about thirty thousand men. When they had these troops they kept them in readiness and awaited the attack of the enemy. The Roman Consuls, when the season came, invaded the territory of the Insubres with their legions. Encamping round a city called Acerrae lying between the Po and the Alps, they laid siege to it. The Insubres could not come to the assistance of the besieged, as the Romans had occupied all the advantageous positions, but, with the object of making the latter raise the siege, they crossed the Po with part of their forces, and entering the territory of the Anari, laid siege to a town there called Clastidium. On the Consuls learning of this, Marcus Claudius set off in haste with the cavalry and a small body of infantry to relieve the besieged if possible. The Celts, as soon as they were aware of the enemy's arrival, raised the siege and advancing to meet them, drew up in order of battle. When the Romans boldly charged them with their cavalry alone, they at first stood firm, but afterwards, being taken both in the rear and on the flank, they found themselves in difficulties and were finally put to rout by the cavalry unaided,

- 9 αὐτῶν τῶν ἱππέων. καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν εἰς τὸν ποτα-
μὸν ἐμπεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ ρεύματος διεφθάρησαν, οἱ
10 δὲ πλείους ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων κατεκόπησαν. ἔλα-
βον δὲ καὶ τὰς Ἀχέρρας οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι σίτου γεμού-
σας, ἐκχωρησάντων εἰς τὸ Μεδιόλανον τῶν Γαλα-
τῶν, ὅσπερ ἐστὶ κυριώτατος τόπος τῆς τῶν Ἰνσόμ-
11 βρων χώρας. οἷς ἐκ ποδὸς ἐπακολουθήσαντος τοῦ
Γναίου, καὶ προσβαλόντος ἄφνω πρὸς τὸ Μεδιό-
12 λανον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον· ἀπολυομένου
δ' αὐτοῦ πάλιν εἰς τὰς Ἀχέρρας, ἐπεξελθόντες καὶ
τῆς οὐραγίας ἀψάμενοι θρασέως πολλοὺς μὲν νε-
κροὺς ἐποίησαν, μέρος δέ τι καὶ φυγεῖν αὐτῶν
13 ἠνάγκασαν, ἕως ὃ Γνάιος ἀνακαλεσάμενος τοὺς ἐκ
τῆς πρωτοπορείας παρώρμησε στήναι καὶ συμβαλεῖν
14 τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαῖοι, πειθαρχήσαν-
τες τῷ στρατηγῷ, διεμάχοντο πρὸς τοὺς ἐπικειμέ-
15 νους εὐρώστως. οἱ δὲ Κελτοί, διὰ τὸ παρὸν εὐτύ-
χημα μέιναντες ἐπὶ ποσὸν εὐθαρσῶς, μετ' οὐ πολὺ
τραπέντες ἔφευγον εἰς τὰς παρωρείας. ὃ δὲ Γνάιος
ἐπακολουθήσας τὴν τε χώραν ἐπόρθει καὶ τὸ Με-
35 διόλανον εἶλε κατὰ κράτος. οὗ συμβαίνοντος οἱ
προεστῶτες τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων, ἀπογνόντες τὰς τῆς
σωτηρίας ἐλπίδας, πάντα τὰ καθ' αὐτοὺς ἐπέτρεψαν
τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις.
- 2 Ὁ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς Κελτοὺς πόλεμος τοιοῦτον
ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀπόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν
τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων ἀνδρῶν, ἔτι δὲ κατὰ τὰς μάχας
καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἀπολλυμένων καὶ
παραταπτομένων, οὐδενὸς καταδεέστερος τῶν ἱστο-
3 ρημένων, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ τὴν ἀκρισίαν
τοῦ κατὰ μέρος χειρισμοῦ τελέως εὐκαταφρόνητος,
διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸ πλεῖον, ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην ἅπαν τὸ γινό-
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many of them throwing themselves into the river and being swept away by the current, while the larger number were cut to pieces by the enemy. The Romans now took Acerrae, which was well stocked with corn, the Gauls retiring to Mediolanum, the chief place in the territory of the Insubres. Gnaeus followed close on their heels, and suddenly appeared before Mediolanum. The Gauls at first did not stir, but, when he was on his way back to Acerrae, they sallied out, and made a bold attack on his rear, in which they killed a considerable number of the Romans and even forced a portion of them to take to flight, until Gnaeus, calling back the forces in advance, urged the fugitives to rally and withstand the enemy. After this the Romans, on their part obeying their Consul, continued to fight vigorously with their assailants, and the Celts after holding their ground for a time, encouraged as they were by their momentary success, were shortly put to flight and took refuge on the hills. Gnaeus, following them, laid waste the country and took Mediolanum itself by assault, (35) upon which the chieftains of the Insubres, despairing of safety, put themselves entirely at the mercy of the Romans.

Such was the end of the war against the Celts, a war which, if we look to the desperation and daring of the combatants and the numbers who took part and perished in the battles, is second to no war in history, but is quite contemptible as regards the plan of the campaigns, and the judgment shown in executing it, not most steps but

μενον ὑπὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν θυμῷ μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ
 4 βραβεύεσθαι. περὶ ὧν ἡμεῖς συνθεωρήσαντες μετ'
 ὀλίγον χρόνον αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πε-
 δίων ἐξωσθέντας, πλὴν ὀλίγων τόπων τῶν ὑπ' αὐ-
 τὰς τὰς Ἀλπεῖς κειμένων, οὐκ ὤήθημεν δεῖν οὔτε
 τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔφοδον αὐτῶν ἀμνημόνευτον παραλι-
 5 πεῖν οὔτε τὰς μετὰ ταῦτα πράξεις οὔτε τὴν τελευ-
 ταίαν ἐξανάστασιν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες οἰκείον ἱστορίας
 ὑπάρχειν τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐπεισόδια τῆς τύχης εἰς μνή-
 6 μην ἄγειν καὶ παράδοσιν τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις, ἵνα μὴ
 τελέως οἱ μεθ' ἡμᾶς ἀεννόητοι τούτων ὑπάρχοντες
 ἐκπλήττωνται τὰς αἰφνιδίους καὶ παραλόγους τῶν
 βαρβάρων ἐφόδους, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἐν νῷ λαμβά-
 νοντες ὡς ὀλιγοχρόνιον ἐστὶ καὶ λίαν εὐφθαρτον
 <τὸ τοιοῦτον>, τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν ὑπομένωσι καὶ
 πάσας ἐξελέγχωσι τὰς σφετέρας ἐλπίδας πρότερον
 7 ἢ παραχωρῆσαί τινος τῶν ἀναγκαίων. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς
 τὴν Περσῶν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ Γαλατῶν
 ἐπὶ Δελφούς εἰς μνήμην καὶ παράδοσιν ἡμῖν ἀγαγόν-
 8 τας οὐ μικρά, μεγάλα δ' οἶομαι συμβεβλῆσθαι πρὸς
 τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ἀγῶ-
 νας. οὔτε γὰρ χορηγιῶν οὔθ' ὅπλων οὔτ' ἀνδρῶν
 πλῆθος καταπλαγεῖς ἂν τις ἀποσταίῃ τῆς τελευταίας
 ἐλπίδος, τοῦ διαγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῆς σφετέρας χώρας
 καὶ πατρίδος, λαμβάνων πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ παρά-
 9 δοξον τῶν τότε γενομένων, καὶ μνημονεύσας ὅσας
 μυριάδας καὶ τίνας τόλμας καὶ πηλίκας παρασκευὰς
 ἢ τῶν σὺν νῷ καὶ μετὰ λογισμοῦ κινδυνευόντων
 10 αἵρεσις καὶ δύναμις καθεῖλεν. ὁ δ' ἀπὸ Γαλατῶν
 φόβος οὐ μόνον τὸ παλαιόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς
 ἤδη πλεονάκεις ἐξέπληξε τοὺς Ἕλληνας. διὸ καὶ

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every single step that the Gauls took being commended to them rather by the heat of passion than by cool calculation. As I have witnessed them not long afterwards entirely expelled from the plain of the Po, except a few communities close under the Alps, I did not think it right to make no mention either of their original invasion or of their subsequent conduct and their final expulsion ; for I think it is the proper task of History to record and hand down to future generations such episodes of Fortune, that those who live after us may not, owing to entire ignorance of these incidents, be unduly terrified by sudden and unexpected invasions of barbarians, but that, having a fair comprehension of how short-lived and perishable is the might of such peoples, they may confront the invaders and put every hope of safety to the test, before yielding a jot of anything they value. For indeed I consider that the writers who chronicled and handed down to us the story of the Persian invasion of Greece and the attack of the Gauls on Delphi have made no small contribution to the struggle of the Hellenes for their common liberty. For there is no one whom hosts of men or abundance of arms or vast resources could frighten into abandoning his last hope, that is to fight to the end for his native land, if he kept before his eyes what part the unexpected played in those events, and bore in mind how many myriads of men, what determined courage and what armaments were brought to nought by the resolve and power of those who faced the danger with intelligence and coolness. It is not only in old times but more than once in my own days that the Greeks have been alarmed by the prospect of a Gaulish invasion ; and this especially

- μᾶλλον ἔγωγε παρωρμήθην ἐπὶ τὸ κεφαλαιώδη μέν, ἀνέκαθεν δὲ ποιήσασθαι τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων ἐξήγησιν.
- 36 Ἀσδρούβας δ' ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός, ἀπὸ γὰρ τούτων παρεξέβημεν τῆς ἐξηγήσεως, ἔτη χειρίσας ὀκτὼ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἐτελεύτησε δολοφονηθεὶς ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ καταλύμασι νυκτὸς ὑπὸ τινος Κελτοῦ τὸ γένος ἰδίων ἕνεκεν ἀδικημάτων,
- 2 οὐ μικράν, ἀλλὰ μεγάλην ποιήσας ἐπίδοσιν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις πράγμασιν, οὐχ οὕτω διὰ τῶν πολε-
- 3 μίων ἔργων ὥς διὰ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δυνάστας ὁμιλίας. τὴν δὲ στρατηγίαν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν Ἀννίβα περιέθεσαν, ὄντι νέῳ, διὰ τὴν ὑπο-
- 4 φαινομένην ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ἀγχίνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τόλμαν. ὃς παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθέως δῆλος ἦν ἐκ τῶν ἐπινοημάτων πόλεμον ἐξοίσων Ῥωμαίοις. ὁ δὲ καὶ τέλος ἐποίησε, πάνυ βραχὺν ἐπισχὼν χρό-
- 5 νον. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ Καρχηδονίους καὶ Ῥωμαίους ἀπὸ τούτων ἤδη τῶν καιρῶν ἐν ὑποψίαις ἦν πρὸς
- 6 ἀλλήλους καὶ παρατριβαῖς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπεβούλευον, ἀμύνεσθαι σπεύδοντες διὰ τὰς περὶ Σικελίαν ἐλαττώσεις, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι διηπίστουν, θεωροῦντες αὐ-
- 7 τῶν τὰς ἐπιβολάς. ἐξ ὧν δῆλον ἦν τοῖς ὀρθῶς σκοπομένοις ὅτι μέλλουσι πολεμεῖν ἀλλήλοις οὐ μετὰ πολὺν χρόνον.
- 37 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἅμα τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμάχοις συνίσταντο τὸν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς πόλεμον τὸν προσαγο-
- 2 ρευθέντα συμμαχικόν. ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπειδὴ τὰς τε περὶ Σικελίαν καὶ Λιβύην καὶ τὰς ἐξῆς πράξεις διεξιόντες κατὰ τὸ συνεχές τῆς προκατασκευῆς ἤκομεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ τε συμμαχικοῦ καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου συστάντος μὲν Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πολέμου,
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was my motive for giving here an account of these events, summary indeed, but going back to the beginnings.

36. This digression has led us away from the 221 B.C. affairs of Spain, where Hasdrubal, after governing the country for eight years, was assassinated at night in his lodging by a certain Celt owing to wrongs of a private nature. He had largely increased the power of Carthage, not so much by military action as by friendly intercourse with the chiefs. The Carthaginians appointed Hannibal to the chief command in Spain, although he was still young, owing to the shrewdness and courage he had evinced in their service. From the moment that he assumed the command, it was evident from the measures he took that he intended to make war on Rome, as indeed he finished by doing, and that very shortly. The relations between Carthage and Rome were henceforth characterized by mutual suspicion and friction. The Carthaginians continued to form designs against Rome as they were eager to be revenged for their reverses in Sicily, while the Romans, detecting their projects, mistrusted them profoundly. It was therefore evident to all competent judges that it would not be long before war broke out between them.

37. It was about this same time that the Achaeans 220 B.C. and King Philip began the war against the Aetolians known as the Social War. I have now given a continuous sketch, suitable to this preliminary part of my book, of events in Sicily, Libya and so forth down to the beginning of the Social War and that second war between the Romans and Carthaginians

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προσαγορευθέντος δὲ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις Ἀννιβια-
 κοῦ, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν ἀπὸ τούτων
 τῶν καιρῶν ἐπηγγειλάμεθα ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν
 3 τῆς ἑαυτῶν συντάξεως, πρέπον ἂν εἴη τούτων ἀφ-
 εμένους ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα μεταβαίνειν πρά-
 ξεις, ἵνα πανταχόθεν ὁμοίαν ποιησάμενοι τὴν προ-
 κατασκευὴν καὶ τὴν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς και-
 ροὺς οὕτως ἤδη [τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ] τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς
 4 ἱστορίας ἀρχώμεθα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ τινὰς πράξεις,
 καθάπερ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, οἶον τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς ἢ Περ-
 σικὰς, ὁμοῦ δὲ τὰς ἐν τοῖς γνωριζομένοις μέρεσι
 τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀναγράφειν ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, διὰ τὸ
 πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἴδιόν τι συμ-
 βεβλῆσθαι τοὺς καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροὺς, ὑπὲρ ὧν σα-
 5 φέστερον ἐν ἑτέροις δηλώσομεν, δέον ἂν εἴη καὶ
 πρὸ τῆς κατασκευῆς ἐπὶ βραχὺ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων
 καὶ γνωριζομένων ἐθνῶν καὶ τόπων ἐφάψασθαι τῆς
 6 οἰκουμένης. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν καὶ
 τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἀρκούντως ἂν ἔχοι ποιεῖ-
 σθαι τὴν ἀνάμνησιν ἀπὸ τῶν νῦν ρηθέντων και-
 ρῶν, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν προγεγονότων παρ'
 αὐτοῖς ἱστορίαν ὑπὸ πλειόνων ἐκδεδόσθαι καὶ γνώ-
 ριμον ὑπάρχειν ἅπασιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς και-
 ροῖς μηδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐξηλλαγμένον ἀπηντῆσθαι μηδὲ
 παράλογον ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης, ὥστε προσδεῖσθαι τῆς
 7 τῶν προγεγονότων ὑπομνήσεως. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τῶν
 Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους καὶ περὶ τῆς Μακεδόνων οἰκίας
 ἀρμόσει διὰ βραχέων ἀναδραμεῖν τοῖς χρόνοις,
 8 ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ μὲν ταύτην ὁλοσχερῆς ἐπαναίρεσις, περὶ
 δὲ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, παρά-
 δοξος αὐξήσις καὶ συμφρόνησις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς
 9 καιροῖς γέγονε. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπιβαλομένων ἐν τοῖς

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usually known as the Hannibalic War. This, as I stated at the outset, is the date at which I purpose to begin my history itself, and, now bidding good-bye for the present to the West, I must turn to the affairs of Greece, so that everywhere alike I may bring down this preliminary or introductory sketch to the same date, and, having done so, start on my detailed narrative. For as I am not, like former historians, dealing with the history of one nation, such as Greece or Persia, but have undertaken to describe the events occurring in all known parts of the world—my own times having, as I will more clearly explain elsewhere, materially contributed to my purpose—I must, before entering on the main portion of my work, touch briefly on the state of the principal and best known nations and countries of the world. As for Asia and Egypt, it will suffice to mention what took place there after the above date, since their previous history has been written by many and is familiar to all, besides which in our own times Fortune has wrought no such surprising change in these countries as to render any notice of their past necessary. But as regards the Achæan nation and the royal house of Macedon it will be proper to refer briefly to earlier events, since our times have seen, in the case of the latter, its complete destruction, and in the case of the Achæans, as I said above, a growth of power and a political union in the highest degree remarkable. For while many

- παρεληλυθόσι χρόνοις ἐπὶ ταῦτὸ συμφέρον ἀγαγεῖν Πελοποννησίους, οὐδενὸς δὲ καθικέσθαι δυνηθέν-
τος, διὰ τὸ μὴ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔνεκεν, ἀλλὰ
τῆς σφετέρας δυναστείας χάριν ἐκάστους ποιεῖσθαι
10 τὴν σπουδὴν, τοιαύτην καὶ τηλικαύτην ἐν τοῖς καθ'
ἡμᾶς καιροῖς ἔσχε προκοπὴν καὶ συντέλειαν τοῦτο
τὸ μέρος ὥστε μὴ μόνον συμμαχικὴν καὶ φιλικὴν
κοινωνίαν γεγονέναι πραγμάτων περὶ αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ
καὶ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ σταθμοῖς καὶ
μέτροις καὶ νομίσμασι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄρχουσι,
11 βουλευταῖς, δικασταῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς, καθόλου δὲ τού-
τῳ μόνῳ διαλλάττειν τοῦ μὴ μιᾶς πόλεως διάθεσιν
ἔχειν σχεδὸν τὴν σύμπασαν Πελοπόννησον τῷ μὴ
τὸν αὐτὸν περίβολον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν
αὐτήν, τᾶλλα δ' εἶναι καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατὰ πόλεις
ἐκάστοις ταῦτὰ καὶ παραπλήσια.
- 38 Πρῶτον δὲ πῶς ἐπεκράτησε καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ τὸ
τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὄνομα κατὰ πάντων Πελοποννησίων
2 οὐκ ἄχρηστον μαθεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ χώρας καὶ πόλεων
πλήθει διαφέρουσιν οἱ πάτριον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔχοντες τὴν
προσηγορίαν ταύτην οὔτε πλούτοις οὔτε ταῖς τῶν
3 ἀνδρῶν ἀρεταῖς. τό τε γὰρ τῶν Ἀρκάδων ἔθνος,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν Λακωνίων, πλήθει μὲν ἀνδρῶν
καὶ χώρας οὐδὲ παρὰ μικρὸν ὑπερέχει· καὶ μὴν
οὐδὲ τῶν τῆς ἀνδραγαθίας πρωτείων οὐδενὶ τῶν
Ἑλλήνων οἰοί τ' εἶσιν οὐδέποτε παραχωρεῖν οἱ
4 προειρημένοι. πῶς οὖν καὶ διὰ τί νῦν εὐδοκοῦσιν
οὗτοί τε καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Πελοποννησίων,
ἅμα τὴν πολιτείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν
5 μετεिल्φότες; δῆλον ὡς τύχην μὲν λέγειν οὐδαμῶς
ἂν εἶη πρέπον· φαῦλον γάρ· αἰτίαν δὲ μᾶλλον
ζητεῖν. χωρὶς γὰρ ταύτης οὔτε τῶν κατὰ λόγον
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have attempted in the past to induce the Peloponnesians to adopt a common policy, no one ever succeeding, as each was working not in the cause of general liberty, but for his own aggrandizement, this object has been so much advanced, and so nearly attained, in my own time that not only do they form an allied and friendly community, but they have the same laws, weights, measures and coinage, as well as the same magistrates, senate, and courts of justice, and the whole Peloponnesus only falls short of being a single city in the fact of its inhabitants not being enclosed by one wall, all other things being, both as regards the whole and as regards each separate town, very nearly identical.

38. In the first place it is of some service to learn how and by what means all the Peloponnesians came to be called Achaeans. For the people whose original and ancestral name this was were distinguished neither by the extent of their territory, nor by the number of their cities, nor by exceptional wealth or the exceptional valour of their citizens. Both the Arcadian and Laconian nations far exceed them, indeed, in population and the size of their countries, and certainly neither of the two could ever bring themselves to yield to any Greek people the palm for military valour. How is it, then, that both these two peoples and the rest of the Peloponnesians have consented to change not only their political institutions for those of the Achaeans, but even their name? It is evident that we should not say it is the result of chance, for that is a poor explanation. We must rather seek for a cause, for every event whether probable or improbable must

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- οὔτε τῶν παρὰ λόγον εἶναι δοκούντων οὐδὲν οἶόν
 τε συντελεσθῆναι. ἔστι δ' οὖν, ὥς ἐμὴ δόξα, τοι-
 6 αὕτη τις. ἰσηγορίας καὶ παρρησίας καὶ καθόλου
 δημοκρατίας ἀληθινῆς σύστημα καὶ προαίρεσιν εἰλι-
 κρινεστέραν οὐκ ἂν εὔροι τις τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς
 7 ὑπαρχούσης. αὕτη τινὰς μὲν ἐθέλοντὴν αἵρετιστὰς
 εὔρε Πελοποννησίων, πολλοὺς δὲ πειθοῖ καὶ λόγῳ
 προσηγάγετο· τινὰς δὲ βιασαμένη σὺν καιρῷ παρα-
 χρήμα πάλιν εὐδοκεῖν ἐποίησεν αὐτῇ τοὺς ἀναγκα-
 8 σθέντας. οὐδενὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπολειπομένη πλεον-
 ἐκτεμα τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἴσα δὲ πάντα ποιοῦσα τοῖς ἀεὶ
 προσλαμβανομένοις, ταχέως καθικνεῖτο τῆς προκει-
 μένης ἐπιβολῆς, δύο συνεργοῖς χρωμένη τοῖς ἰσχυ-
 9 ροτάτοις, ἰσότητι καὶ φιланθρωπία. διὸ ταύτην
 ἀρχηγὸν καὶ αἰτίαν ἡγητέον τοῦ συμφρονήσαντας
 Πελοποννησίους τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίαν
 καταστήσασθαι.
- 10 Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ τὸ τῆς πο-
 λιτείας ἰδίωμα τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον καὶ πρότερον
 11 ὑπῆρχε παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ δι'
 ἐτέρων μὲν πλειόνων, πρὸς δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἀρκέσει
 πίστεως χάριν ἐν ἣ καὶ δεύτερον ληφθὲν μαρτύριον.
- 39 καθ' οὓς γὰρ καιροὺς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν
 τόποις κατὰ τὴν Μεγάλῃν Ἑλλάδα τότε προσαγο-
 ρευομένην ἐνεπρήσθη τὰ συνέδρια τῶν Πυθαγορείων,
 2 μετὰ ταῦτα γενομένου κινήματος ὀλοσχεροῦς περὶ
 τὰς πολιτείας, ὅπερ εἰκός, ὥς ἂν τῶν πρώτων
 ἀνδρῶν ἐξ ἐκάστης πόλεως οὕτω παραλόγως δια-
 3 φθαρέντων, συνέβη τὰς κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους
 Ἑλληνικὰς πόλεις ἀναπλησθῆναι φόνου καὶ στάσεως
 4 καὶ παντοδαπῆς ταραχῆς. ἐν οἷς καιροῖς ἀπὸ τῶν
 πλείστων μερῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρεσβευόντων ἐπὶ
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have some cause. The cause here, I believe to be more or less the following. One could not find a political system and principle so favourable to equality and freedom of speech, in a word so sincerely democratic, as that of the Achæan league. Owing to this, while some of the Peloponnesians chose to join it of their own free will, it won many others by persuasion and argument, and those whom it forced to adhere to it when the occasion presented itself suddenly underwent a change and became quite reconciled to their position. For by reserving no special privileges for original members, and putting all new adherents exactly on the same footing, it soon attained the aim it had set itself, being aided by two very powerful coadjutors, equality and humanity. We must therefore look upon this as the initiator and cause of that union that has established the present prosperity of the Peloponnesians.

These characteristic principles and constitution had existed in Achæa from an early date. There is abundant testimony of this, but for the present it will suffice to cite one or two instances in confirmation of this assertion. 39. When, in the district of Italy, then known as Greater Hellas,^a the club-houses of the Pythagoreans were burnt down, there ensued, as was natural, a general revolutionary movement, the leading citizens of each city having thus unexpectedly perished, and in all the Greek towns of the district murder, sedition, and every kind of disturbance were rife. Embassies arrived from most parts of Greece offering their services as peace-

^a "Magna Græcia" in Latin. When the name was first given, Hellas cannot have meant the whole of Greece.

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τὰς διαλύσεις, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ τῇ τούτων πίστει συνε-
 χρήσαντο πρὸς τὴν τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἐξ-
 αγωγήν. οὐ μόνον δὲ κατὰ τούτους τοὺς καιροὺς
 5 ἀπεδέξαντο τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ
 τινὰς χρόνους ὁλοσχερῶς ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ μιμηταὶ
 6 γενέσθαι τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῶν. παρακαλέσαντες γὰρ
 σφᾶς καὶ συμφρονήσαντες Κροτωνιάται, Συβαρίται,
 Καυλωνιάται, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπέδειξαν Διὸς Ἀμαρίου
 κοινὸν ἱερὸν καὶ τόπον, ἐν ᾧ τὰς τε συνόδους καὶ
 τὰ διαβούλια συνετέλουν, δεύτερον τοὺς ἔθισμοὺς
 καὶ νόμους ἐκλαβόντες τοὺς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπεβά-
 λοντο χρῆσθαι καὶ διοικεῖν κατὰ τούτους τὴν
 7 πολιτείαν. ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς Διονυσίου Συρακοσίου
 δυναστείας, ἔτι δὲ τῆς τῶν περιοικούντων βαρβάρων
 ἐπικρατείας ἐμποδισθέντες, οὐχ ἔκουσίως, ἀλλὰ κατ'
 8 ἀνάγκην αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Λακε-
 δαιμονίων μὲν παραδόξως πταισάντων περὶ τὴν ἐν
 Λεύκτροις μάχην, Θηβαίων δ' ἀνελπίστως ἀντιπονη-
 σαμένων τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας, ἦν ἀκρισία
 περὶ πάντας μὲν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοὺς
 προειρημένους, ὥς ἂν τῶν μὲν μὴ συγχωρούντων
 ἡττῆσθαι, τῶν δὲ μὴ πιστευόντων ὅτι νενικήκασιν.
 9 οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ γε περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἐπέτρε-
 ψαν Θηβαῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μόνοις τῶν Ἑλλή-
 10 νων Ἀχαιοῖς, οὐ πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν ἀποβλέψαντες·
 σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐλαχίστην τότε δὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἶχον·
 τὸ δὲ πλεῖον εἰς τὴν πίστιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην καλο-
 κάγαθίαν. ὁμολογουμένως γὰρ δὴ τότε ταύτην
 περὶ αὐτῶν πάντες εἶχον τὴν δόξαν.

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makers, but it was the Achaeans on whom these cities placed most reliance and to whom they committed the task of putting an end to their present troubles. And it was not only at this period that they showed their approval of Achaean political principles; but a short time afterwards, they resolved to model their own constitution exactly on that of the League. The Crotonians, Sybarites and Caulonians, having called a conference and formed a league, first of all established a common temple and holy place of Zeus Amarius^a in which to hold their meetings and debates, and next, adopting the customs and laws of the Achaeans, decided to conduct their government according to them. It was only indeed the tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse and their subjection to the barbarian tribes around them which defeated this purpose and forced them to abandon these institutions, much against their will. Again, subsequently, when the Lacedaemonians 371 B.C. were unexpectedly defeated at Leuctra, and the Thebans, as unexpectedly, aspired to the hegemony of Greece, great uncertainty prevailed in the whole country and especially among these two peoples, the Lacedaemonians not acknowledging their defeat, and the Thebans not wholly believing in their victory. They, however, referred the points in dispute to the Achaeans alone among all the Greeks, not taking their power into consideration, for they were then almost the weakest state in Greece, but in view of their trustworthiness and high character in every respect. For indeed this opinion of them was at that time, as is generally acknowledged, held by all.

^a Such as the Achaean League had.

- 11 Τότε μὲν οὖν ψιλῶς αὐτὰ τὰ κατὰ τὴν προ-
αίρεσιν ὑπῆρχε παρ' αὐτοῖς· ἀποτέλεσμα δ' ἡ
πρᾶξις ἀξιόλογος πρὸς αὐξήσιν τῶν ἰδίων ἀνήκουσα
12 πραγμάτων οὐκ ἐγένετο, τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι φῦναι
προστάτην ἄξιον τῆς προαιρέσεως, αἰεὶ δὲ τὸν ὑπο-
δείξαντα ποτὲ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς
ἐπισκοτεῖσθαι καὶ κωλύεσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ
40 τῆς Μακεδόνων. ἐπεὶ δέ ποτε σὺν καιρῷ προστά-
τας ἀξιόχρεως εὔρε, ταχέως τὴν αὐτῆς δύναμιν
ἐποίησε φανεράν, ἐπιτελεσαμένη τὸ κάλλιστον ἔρ-
2 γον, τὴν Πελοποννησίων ὁμόνοιαν. ἥς ἀρχηγὸν
μὲν καὶ καθηγεμόνα τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς Ἄρατον
νομιστέον τὸν Σικυώνιον, ἀγωνιστὴν δὲ καὶ τελεσι-
ουργὸν τῆς πράξεως Φιλοποίμενα τὸν Μεγαλοπολί-
την, βεβαιωτὴν δὲ τοῦ μόνιμον αὐτὴν ἐπὶ ποσὸν
γενέσθαι Λυκόρταν καὶ τοὺς ταῦτά τούτῳ προελομέ-
3 νους ἄνδρας. τίνα δ' ἦν ἐκάστοις τὰ πραχθέντα καὶ
πῶς καὶ κατὰ ποίους καιροὺς πειρασόμεθα δηλοῦν,
αἰεὶ κατὰ τὸ πρέπον τῇ γραφῇ ποιούμενοι τὴν
4 ἐπίστασιν. τῶν μέντοι γ' Ἀράτῳ διωκημένων καὶ
νῦν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐπικεφαλαιούμενοι μνη-
σθησόμεθα διὰ τὸ καὶ λίαν ἀληθινούς καὶ σαφεῖς
ἐκεῖνον περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συντεταχέναι πράξεων ὑπο-
5 μνηματισμούς, τῶν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀκριβεστέραν καὶ
μετὰ διαστολῆς ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἐξήγησιν. ὑπολαμ-
βάνω δὲ ῥάστην ἐμοί τ' ἂν γενέσθαι τὴν διήγησιν
καὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εὐπαρακολούθητον τὴν μά-
θησιν, εἰ ποιησαίμεθα τὴν ἐπίστασιν ἀπὸ τούτων
τῶν καιρῶν, ἐν οἷς κατὰ πόλιν διαλυθέντος τοῦ
τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας βασι-
λέων ἀρχὴ πάλιν ἐγένετο καὶ σύννευσις τῶν πόλεων
6 πρὸς ἀλλήλας. ἀφ' ἧς αὖξανόμενον κατὰ τὸ συν-

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Up to now, these principles of government had merely existed amongst them, but had resulted in no practical steps worthy of mention for the increase of the Achaean power, since the country seemed unable to produce a statesman worthy of these principles, anyone who showed a tendency to act so being thrown into the dark and hampered either by the Lacedaemonian power or still more by that of Macedon. 40. When, however, in due time, they found statesmen capable of enforcing them, their power at once became manifest, and the League achieved the splendid result of uniting all the Peloponnesian states. Aratus of Sicyon should be regarded as the initiator and conceiver of the project; it was Philopoemen of Megalopolis who promoted and finally realized it, while Lycortas^a and his party were those who assured the permanency, for a time at least, of this union. I will attempt to indicate how and at what date each of the three contributed to the result, without transgressing the limits I have set to this part of my work. Aratus' government, however, may be dealt with here and in future quite summarily, as he published a most valuable and clearly written memoir of his own career; but the achievements of the two others must be narrated in greater detail and at more length. I think it will be easiest for myself to set forth the narrative and for my readers to follow it if I begin from the period when, after the dissolution of the Achaean League by the kings of Macedonia, the cities began again to approach each other with a view to its renewal. Henceforward the League continued to grow until

^a The father of Polybius.

εχὲς τὸ ἔθνος εἰς ταύτην ἦλθε τὴν συντέλειαν, ἐν ἣ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἦν, ὑπὲρ ἧς κατὰ μέρος ἀρτίως εἶπον.

- 41 Ὀλυμπιάς μὲν ἦν εἰκοστὴ καὶ τετάρτη πρὸς ταῖς ἑκατόν, ὅτε Πατρεῖς ἤρξαντο συμφρονεῖν καὶ Δυμαῖοι, καιροὶ δὲ καθ' οὓς Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου καὶ Λυσίμαχος, ἔτι δὲ Σέλευκος καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Κερραυνὸς μετήλλαξαν τὸν βίον. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι περὶ τὴν προειρημένην ὀλυμπιάδα τὸ ζῆν ἐξέλιπον.
- 3 τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀνώτερον τούτων χρόνους τοιαύτη
- 4 τις ἦν ἡ περὶ τὸ προειρημένον ἔθνος διάθεσις. ἀπὸ γὰρ Τισαμενοῦ βασιλευθέντες, ὃς ἦν Ὀρέστου μὲν υἱός, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν κάθοδον ἐκπεσὼν τῆς Σπάρτης κατέσχε τοὺς περὶ Ἀχαῖαν τόπους,
- 5 ἀπὸ τούτου κατὰ τὸ συνεχές καὶ κατὰ τὸ γένος ἕως Ὠγύγου βασιλευθέντες, μετὰ ταῦτα δυσαρεστήσαντες τοῖς τοῦ προειρημένου παισὶν ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ νομίμως, ἀλλὰ δεσποτικῶς αὐτῶν ἄρχειν, μετέστησαν εἰς
- 6 δημοκρατίαν τὴν πολιτείαν. λοιπὸν ἤδη τοὺς ἐξῆς χρόνους μέχρι τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου δυναστείας ἄλλοτε μὲν ἄλλως ἐχώρει τὰ πράγματα, αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, τό γε μὴν κοινὸν πολίτευμα, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν, ἐν δημοκρατία συνέχειν ἐπει-
- 7 ρῶντο. τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐκ δώδεκα πόλεων, ἃς ἔτι καὶ νῦν συμβαίνει διαμένειν, πλὴν Ὠλένου καὶ Ἑλίκης τῆς πρὸ τῶν Λευκτρικῶν ὑπὸ τῆς θαλάττης καταποθείσης· αὗται δ' εἰσὶ Πάτραι, Δύμη, Φαραί,
- 8 Τριταία, Λεόντιον, Λῆγιον, Λῆγειρα, Πελλήνη,
- 9 Βοῦρα, Καρύνεια. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς ὑστέρους μὲν τῶν κατ' Ἀλέξανδρον καιρῶν, προτέρους δὲ τῆς ἄρτι ῥηθείσης ὀλυμπιάδος, εἰς τοιαύτην διαφορὰν καὶ καχεξίαν ἐνέπεσον, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τῶν ἐκ Μακε-

it reached in my own time the state of completion I have just been describing.

41. It was in the 124th Olympiad that Patrae²⁸⁴⁻²⁸⁰ and Dyme took the initiative, by entering into^{B.C.} a league, just about the date of the deaths of Ptolemy son of Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy Ceraunus, which all occurred in this Olympiad. The condition of the Achaean nation before this date had been more or less as follows. Their first king was Tisamenus the son of Orestes, who, when expelled from Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, occupied Achaëa, and they continued to be ruled by kings of his house down to Ogyges. Being dissatisfied with the rule of Ogyges' sons, which was despotical and not constitutional, they changed their government to a democracy. After this, down to the reigns of Alexander and Philip, their fortunes varied according to circumstances, but they always endeavoured, as I said, to keep their League a democracy. This consisted of twelve cities, which still all exist with the exception of Olenus and of Helice which was engulfed by the sea a little before the battle of Leuctra. These cities are Patrae, Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium, Aegira, Pellene, Bura, and Carynceia. After the time of Alexander and previous to the above Olympiad they fell, chiefly thanks to the kings of Macedon, into such a state

- δονίας βασιλέων, ἐν ᾗ συνέβη πάσας τὰς πόλεις
χωρισθείσας ἀφ' αὐτῶν ἐναντίως τὸ συμφέρον
10 ἄγειν ἀλλήλαις. ἐξ οὗ συνέπεσε τὰς μὲν ἐμφρού-
ρους αὐτῶν γενέσθαι διὰ τε Δημητρίου καὶ Κασσάν-
δρου, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δι' Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ Γονατᾶ,
τὰς δὲ καὶ τυραννέϊσθαι· πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρ-
11 χους οὗτος ἐμφυτεῦσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἑλλήσι. περὶ
δὲ τὴν εἰκοστὴν καὶ τετάρτην Ὀλυμπιάδα πρὸς ταῖς
ἑκατόν, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, αὖθις ἤρξαντο
μετανοήσαντες συμφρονεῖν. ταῦτα δ' ἦν κατὰ τὴν
12 Πύρρου διάβασιν εἰς Ἰταλίαν. καὶ πρῶτοι μὲν
συνέστησαν Δυμαῖοι, Πατρεῖς, Τριταιεῖς, Φαραιεῖς·
διόπερ οὐδὲ στήλην ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνει τῶν πόλεων
13 τούτων περὶ τῆς συμπολιτείας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
μάλιστα πῶς ἔτει πέμπτῳ τὴν φρουρὰν ἐκβαλόντες
Αἰγιεῖς μετέσχον τῆς συμπολιτείας· ἐξῆς δὲ τούτοις
14 Βούριοι, τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείναντες. ἅμα δὲ τού-
τοις Καρυνεῖς ἀποκατέστησαν. συνιδὼν γὰρ Ἰσέας
ὁ τῆς Καρυνείας τότε τυρανεύων ἐκπεπτωκυῖαν
μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίου τὴν φρουρὰν, ἀπολωλότα δὲ τὸν ἐν
τῇ Βούρᾳ μόναρχον διὰ Μάργου καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν,
ἑαυτὸν δὲ πανταχόθεν ὁρῶν ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη πολε-
15 μηθησόμενον, ἀποθέμενος τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ λαβὼν
τὰ πιστὰ παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀσφαλείας
προσέθηκε τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύ-
στημα.
- 42 Τίνος οὖν χάριν ἐπὶ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους ἀν-
έδραμον; ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν γένηται συμφανὲς πῶς
καὶ κατὰ ποίους καιροὺς καὶ τίνες πρῶτοι τῶν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς Ἀχαιῶν αὖθις ἐποίησαντο τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς
2 νῦν συστάσεως, δεύτερον δ' ἵνα καὶ τὰ τῆς προαι-
ρέσεως μὴ μόνον διὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποφάσεως, ἀλλὰ

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of discord and ill-feeling that all the cities separated from the League and began to act against each others' interests. The consequence was that some of them were garrisoned by Demetrius and Cassander and afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, and some even had tyrants imposed on them by the latter, who planted more tyrannies in Greece than any other king. But, as I said, about the 124th Olympiad they began to repent and form fresh leagues. (This was just about the date of Pyrrhus' crossing to Italy.) The first cities to do so were Dyme, Patrac, Tritaea, and Pharae, and for this reason we do not even find any formal inscribed record of their adherence to the League. About five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their garrison and joined the League, and the Burians were the next to do so, after putting their tyrant to death. Carynceia joined almost at the same time, for Iseas, its tyrant, when he saw the garrison expelled from Aegium, and the tyrant of Bura killed by Margus and the Achaeans, and war just about to be made on himself by all the towns round, abdicated and, on receiving an assurance from the Achaeans that his life would be spared, added his city to the League.

42. Why, the reader will ask, do I go back to these times? It is, firstly, to show which of the original Achaean cities took the first steps to re-form the League and at what dates, and, secondly, that my assertion regarding their political principle may

- καὶ δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων πίστεως τυγχάνη,
 3 διότι μία τις αἰὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν αἵρεσις ὑπῆρχε, καθ'
 ἣν προτείνοντες μὲν τὴν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἰσηγορίαν καὶ
 παρρησίαν, πολεμοῦντες δὲ καὶ καταγωνιζόμενοι
 συνεχῶς τοὺς ἢ δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν βασιλέων τὰς
 σφετέρας πατρίδας καταδουλουμένους, τούτῳ τῷ
 τρόπῳ καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ προθέσει τοῦτο τοῦργον ἐπ-
 4 ετέλεσαν, τὰ μὲν δι' αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν συμ-
 μάχων. καὶ γὰρ τὰ δι' ἐκείνων συνεργήματα γεγο-
 νότα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς χρόνοις ἐπὶ
 5 τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν προαίρεσιν ἀνοιστέον. πολλοῖς
 γὰρ κοινωνήσαντες πραγμάτων, πλείστων δὲ καὶ
 καλλίστων Ῥωμαίοις, οὐδέποτε τὸ παράπαν ἐπεθύ-
 6 μησαν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων οὐδενὸς ἰδίᾳ λυσιτε-
 λοῦς, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ πάσης τῆς ἑαυτῶν φιλοτιμίας, ἣν
 παρείχοντο τοῖς συμμάχοις ἀντικατηλλάττοντες τὴν
 7 ἐκάστων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν Πελο-
 ποννησίων. σαφέστερον δ' ὑπὲρ τούτων ἔσται δια-
 λαμβάνειν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐνεργη-
 μάτων.
- 43 Εἴκοσι μὲν οὖν ἔτη τὰ πρῶτα καὶ πέντε συν-
 επολιτεύσαντο μεθ' ἑαυτῶν αἱ προειρημέναι πόλεις,
 γραμματέα κοινὸν ἐκ περιόδου προχειριζόμεναι καὶ
 2 δύο στρατηγούς. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἔδοξεν αὐ-
 τοῖς ἓνα καθιστάνειν καὶ τούτῳ πιστεύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν
 ὄλων. καὶ πρῶτος ἔτυχε τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης Μάργος
 3 ὁ Καρυνεύς. τετάρτῳ δ' ὕστερον ἔτει τοῦ προει-
 ρημένου στρατηγοῦντος Ἀρατος ὁ Σικυνώνιος, ἔτη
 μὲν ἔχων εἴκοσι, τυραννουμένην δ' ἐλευθερώσας
 τὴν πατρίδα διὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τόλμης,
 προσένευε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν, ἀρχῇ-
 4 θεν εὐθύς ἐραστής γενόμενος τῆς προαιρέσεως

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be confirmed by the actual evidence of facts. What I asserted was that the Achaeans always followed one single policy, ever attracting others by the offer of their own equality and liberty and ever making war on and crushing those who either themselves or through the kings attempted to enslave their native cities, and that, in this manner and pursuing this purpose, they accomplished their task in part unaided and in part with the help of allies. For the Achaean political principle must be credited also with the results furthering their end, to which their allies in subsequent years contributed. Though they took so much part in the enterprises of others, and especially in many of those of the Romans which resulted brilliantly, they never showed the least desire to gain any private profit from their success, but demanded, in exchange for the zealous aid they rendered their allies, nothing beyond the liberty and concord of the Peloponnesians. This will be more clearly evident when we come to see the League in active operation.

43. For twenty-five years, then, this league of cities continued, electing for a certain period a Secretary of state and two Strategi. After this they decided to elect one Strategus and entrust him with the general direction of their affairs, the first to be nominated to this honourable office being Margus of Caryneia. Four years later during his 255 B.C. term of office, Aratus of Sicyon, then only twenty 251 B.C. years of age, freed his city from its tyrant by his enterprise and courage, and, having always been a passionate admirer of the Achaean polity, made his 243 B.C. own city a member of the League. Eight years

4 αὐτῶν. ὀγδόῳ δὲ πάλιν ἔτει στρατηγὸς αἰρεθεὶς
 τὸ δεύτερον, καὶ πραξικοπήσας τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον,
 Ἀντιγόνου κυριεύοντος, καὶ γενόμενος ἐγκρατὴς,
 μεγάλου μὲν ἀπέλυσε φόβου τοὺς τὴν Πελοπόννη-
 5 σον κατοικοῦντας, ἐλευθερώσας δὲ Κορινθίους προσ-
 ἡγάγετο πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν. ἐπὶ δὲ
 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τὴν τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλιν δια-
 6 πραξάμενος προσένειμε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. ταῦτά τ' ἐγί-
 νετο τῷ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἡττης, ἐν ᾗ
 καθόλου Σικελίας ἐκχωρήσαντες πρῶτον ὑπέμειναν
 7 τότε φόρους ἐνεγκεῖν Ῥωμαίοις. μεγάλην δὲ προ-
 κοπὴν ποιήσας τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, λοι-
 πὸν ἤδη διετέλει προστατῶν μὲν τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν
 ἔθνους, πάσας δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις πρὸς
 8 ἐν τέλος ἀναφέρων· τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ Μακεδόνας μὲν
 ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, τὰς δὲ μοναρχίας κατα-
 λῦσαι, βεβαιῶσαι δ' ἐκάστοις τὴν κοινὴν καὶ πά-
 9 τριον ἐλευθερίαν. μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἦν Ἀντίγονος ὁ Γο-
 νατᾶς, πρὸς τε τὴν ἐκείνου πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ
 πρὸς τὴν Αἰτωλῶν πλεονεξίαν ἀντιταττόμενος δι-
 10 ετέλει, πραγματικῶς ἕκαστα χειρίζων, καίπερ εἰς
 τοῦτο προβάντων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδικίας καὶ τόλμης
 ὥστε ποιήσασθαι συνθήκας πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ
 44 διαιρέσεως τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους. Ἀντιγόνου
 δὲ μεταλλάξαντος, καὶ συνθεμένων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ
 συμμαχίαν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ μετασχόντων εὐ-
 γενῶς σφίσι τοῦ πρὸς Δημήτριον πολέμου, τὰ μὲν
 τῆς ἀλλοτριότητος καὶ δυσμενείας ἦρθη κατὰ τὸ
 παρόν, ὑπεγένετο δὲ κοινωνικὴ καὶ φιλική τις αὐ-
 2 τοῖς διάθεσις. Δημητρίου δὲ βασιλεύσαντος δέκα
 μόνον ἔτη, καὶ μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον περὶ τὴν
 πρώτην διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα Ῥωμαίων, ἐγέ-

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after this, during his second term of office as Strategus, he contrived to get into his hands the citadel of Corinth which was held by Antigonus, thus delivering the Peloponnesians from a great source of fear, and induced the city he had liberated to join the League. He next obtained the adhesion of Megara by the same means. These events took place in the year before that defeat of the Carthaginians which forced them to evacuate Sicily and submit for the first time to pay tribute to Rome. Having in so short a space of time thus materially advanced his projects, he continued to govern the Achaean nation, all his schemes and action being directed to one object, the expulsion of the Macedonians from the Peloponnese, the suppression of the tyrants, and the re-establishment on a sure basis of the ancient freedom of every state. During the life of Antigonus Gonatas he continued to offer a most effectual opposition both to the meddlesomeness of this king and the lust for power of the Aetolians, although the two were so unscrupulous and venturesome that they entered into an arrangement for the purpose of dissolving the Achaean League. 44. But, on the death of ^{239 B.C.} Antigonus, the Achaeans even made an alliance with the Aetolians and supported them ungrudgingly in the war against Demetrius, so that, for the time at least, their estrangement and hostility ceased, and a more or less friendly and sociable feeling sprang up between them. Demetrius only reigned for ten years, his death taking place at the time the Romans ^{229 B.C.} first crossed to Illyria, and after this the tide of

- νετό τις εὔροια πραγμάτων πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπι-
 3 βολὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ
 μόναρχοι, δυσελπιστήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ μετῆλλαχέναί
 μὲν τὸν Δημήτριον, ὃς ἦν αὐτοῖς οἶον ἰ χορηγὸς
 καὶ μισθοδότης, ἐπικεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν Ἄρατον, οἰό-
 μενον δεῖν σφᾶς ἀποτίθесθαι τὰς τυραννίδας, καὶ
 τοῖς μὲν πεισθεῖσι μεγάλας δωρεὰς καὶ τιμὰς προ-
 τείνοντος, τοῖς δὲ μὴ προσέχουσιν ἔτι μείζους ἐπ-
 ανατεινομένου φόβους καὶ κινδύνους διὰ τῶν
 4 Ἀχαιῶν, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ πεισθέντες ἀποθέσθαι μὲν
 τὰς τυραννίδας, ἐλευθερῶσαι δὲ τὰς ἑαυτῶν πατρί-
 5 δας, μετασχεῖν δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείας.
 Λυδιαάδας μὲν οὖν ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης ἔτι ζῶντος
 Δημητρίου, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν, πάνυ πραγ-
 ματικῶς καὶ φρονίμως προῖδόμενος τὸ μέλλον,
 ἀπετέθειτο τὴν τυραννίδα, καὶ μετεσχῆκει τῆς
 6 ἔθνικῆς συμπολιτείας. Ἀριστόμαχος δ' ὁ τῶν
 Ἀργείων τύραννος καὶ Ξένων ὁ τῶν Ἑρμιονέων καὶ
 Κλεώνυμος ὁ τῶν Φλιασίων τότε ἀποθέμενοι τὰς
 μοναρχίας ἐκοινώνησαν τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δημο-
 κρατίας.
- 45 Ὀλοσχερεστέρας δὲ γενομένης αὐξήσεως διὰ
 ταῦτα καὶ προκοπῆς περὶ τὸ ἔθνος, Αἰτωλοὶ διὰ τὴν
 ἔμφυτον ἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν φθονήσαντες, τὸ
 δὲ πλεῖον ἐλπίσαντες καταδιελέσθαι τὰς πόλεις,
 καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον τὰς μὲν Ἀκαρνανῶν διενεί-
 μαντο πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον, τὰς δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπ-
 2 εβάλοντο πρὸς Ἀντίγονον τὸν Γονατᾶν, καὶ τότε
 παραπλησίαις ἐλπίσιν ἐπαρθέντες, ἀπετόλμησαν
 Ἀντιγόνῳ τε τῷ κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς προ-
 εστῶτι Μακεδόνων, ἐπιτροπεύοντι δὲ Φιλίππου παι-
 δὸς ὄντος, καὶ Κλεομένει τῷ βασιλεῖ Λακεδαιμονίων

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events seemed to flow for a time in favour of the Achaeans' constant purpose; for the Peloponnesian tyrants were much cast down by the death of Demetrius, who had been, so to speak, their furnisher and paymaster, and equally so by the threatening attitude of Aratus, who demanded that they should depose themselves, offering abundance of gifts and honours to those who consented to do so, and menacing those who turned a deaf ear to him with still more abundant chastisement on the part of the Achaeans. They therefore hurried to accede to his demand, laying down their tyrannies, setting their respective cities free, and joining the Achaean League. Lydiades of Megalopolis had even foreseen what was likely to happen, and with great wisdom and good sense had forestalled the death of Demetrius and of his own free will laid down his tyranny and adhered to the national government. Afterwards Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xenon, tyrant of Hermione, and Cleonymus, tyrant of Phlius, also resigned and joined the League.

45. The League being thus materially increased in extent and power, the Aetolians, owing to that unprincipled passion for aggrandizement which is natural to them, either out of envy or rather in the hope of partitioning the cities, as they had partitioned those of Acarnania with Alexander and had previously proposed to do regarding Achaea with Antigonus Gonatas, went so far as to join hands with Antigonus, then regent of Macedonia and guardian to Philip,

- κοινωνεῖν, καὶ συμπλέκειν ἀμφοτέροις ἅμα τὰς χεῖ-
 3 ρας. ὁρῶντες γὰρ τὸν Ἀντίγονον, κυριεύοντα μὲν
 τῶν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν ἀσφαλῶς, ὁμολογούμενον
 δὲ καὶ πρόδηλον ἐχθρὸν ὄντα τῶν Ἀχαιῶν διὰ τὸ
 4 τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον πραξί<κοπήσαντας καταλαβεῖν>,
 ὑπέλαβον, εἰ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους προσλαβόντες ἔτι
 κοινωνοὺς σφίσι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς προεμβιβάσαιεν εἰς
 τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἔθνος ἀπέχθειαν, ῥαδίως ἂν καταγω-
 νίσασθαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν καιρῷ συνεπιθέμενοι καὶ
 5 πανταχόθεν περιστήσαντες αὐτοῖς τὸν πόλεμον. ὃ
 δὴ καὶ ταχέως ἂν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἐπετέλεσαν,
 εἰ μὴ τὸ κυριώτατον παρείδον τῆς προθέσεως, οὐ
 συλλογισάμενοι διότι ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς Ἄρατον ἔξου-
 σιν ἀνταγωνιστήν, ἄνδρα δυνάμενον πάσης εὐστο-
 6 χεῖν περιστάσεως. τοιγαροῦν ὁρμήσαντες ἐπὶ τὸ
 πολυπραγμονεῖν καὶ χειρῶν ἄρχειν ἀδίκων οὐχ οἷον
 ἦνυσάν τι τῶν ἐπινοηθέντων, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον καὶ τὸν
 Ἄρατον τότε προεστῶτα καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ἐσωματοποίη-
 σαν, πραγματικῶς ἀντιπερισπάσαντος ἐκείνου καὶ
 7 λυμνηναμένου τὰς ἐπιβολὰς αὐτῶν. ὥς δ' ἐχειρίσθη
 τὰ ὅλα δῆλον ἔσται διὰ τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων.
- 46 Θεωρῶν γὰρ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ὁ προειρημένος
 ἀνὴρ τὸν μὲν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς αὐτοὺς αἰσχυνομέ-
 νους ἀναλαβεῖν ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ διὰ τὸ καὶ λίαν
 εἶναι προσφάτους τὰς ἐκ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εὐεργεσίας
 2 περὶ τὸν Δημητριάκον πόλεμον εἰς αὐτούς, συμβου-
 λευομένους δὲ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ φθονούν-
 τας τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε Κλεομένους
 πεπραξικοπηκóτος αὐτοὺς καὶ παρρηρημένου Τεγέαν,
 Μαντίνειαν, Ὀρχομενόν, τὰς Αἰτωλοῖς οὐ μόνον
 συμμαχίδας ὑπαρχούσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπολιτενο-
 μένας τότε πόλεις, οὐχ οἷον ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ

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who was still a child, and Cleomenes, king of Sparta. They saw that Antigonus was undisputed master of Macedonia and at the same time the open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to their seizure by treachery of the Acrocorinthus, and they supposed that if they could get the Lacedaemonians also to join them in their project, exciting first their animosity against the League, they could easily crush the Achaeans by attacking them at the proper time all at once and from all quarters. This indeed they would in all probability soon have done, but for the most important factor which they had overlooked in their plans. They never took into consideration that in this undertaking they would have Aratus as their opponent, a man capable of meeting any emergency. Consequently the result of their intrigues and unjust aggression was that not only did they entirely fail in their designs, but on the contrary consolidated the power of the League, and of Aratus who was then Strategus, as he most adroitly diverted and spoilt all their plans. How he managed this the following narrative will show.

46. Aratus saw that the Aetolians were ashamed of openly declaring war on them, as it was so very recently that the Achaeans had helped them in their war against Demetrius, but that they were so much of one mind with the Lacedaemonians and so jealous of the Achaeans that when Cleomenes broke faith with them and possessed himself of Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus, cities which were not only allies of the Aetolians, but at the time members of their league, they not only showed no resentment, but

- 3 τούτοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ βεβαιοῦντας αὐτῷ τὴν παράληψιν, καὶ τοὺς πρότερον κατὰ τῶν μηδὲν ἀδικούντων πᾶσαν ἱκανὴν ποιουμένους πρόφασιν εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν τότε συνορῶν ἐκουσίως παρ-
σπονδουμένους καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀπολλύντας πόλεις ἐβελοντὴν ἐφ' ᾧ μόνον ἰδεῖν ἀξιόχρεων γενόμενον
4 ἀνταγωνιστὴν Κλεομένη τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἔγνω δεῖν εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων οὗτός τε καὶ πάντες ὁμοίως οἱ προεστῶτες τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματος πολέμου μὲν πρὸς μηδένα κατάρχειν, ἐνίστασθαι δὲ ταῖς τῶν
5 Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιβολαῖς. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐπὶ τούτων ἦσαν τῶν διαλήψεων· θεωροῦντες δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ἐξῆς χρόνους τὸν Κλεομένη θρασέως ἐποικο-
δομοῦντα μὲν τὸ καλούμενον Ἀθηναῖον ἐν τῇ τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν χώρα, πρόδηλον δὲ καὶ πικρὸν ἀνα-
6 δεικνύντα σφίσι πολέμιον ἑαυτόν, τότε δὴ συνα-
θροίσαντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἔκριναν μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀναλαμβάνειν φανερώς τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμο-
νίους ἀπέχθειαν.
7 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Κλεομενικὸς προσαγορευθεὶς πόλε-
μος τοιαύτην ἔλαβε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ κατὰ τούτους
47 τοὺς καιροὺς. οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διὰ τῆς ἰδίας δυνάμεως ὥρμησαν ἀντοφθαλμεῖν τοῖς Λακε-
δαιμονίοις, ἅμα μὲν ὑπολαμβάνοντες κάλλιστον εἶ-
ναι τὸ μὴ δι' ἐτέρων σφίσι πορίζεσθαι τὴν σωτη-
ρίαν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς δι' αὐτῶν σῶζειν τὰς πόλεις καὶ
2 τὴν χώραν, ἅμα δὲ βουλόμενοι καὶ τὴν πρὸς Πτο-
λεμαῖον τηρεῖν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς προγεγενημένας εὐ-
εργεσίας καὶ μὴ φαίνεσθαι πρὸς ἐτέρους ἐκτείνον-
3 τες τὰς χεῖρας, ἥδη δ' ἐπὶ ποσὸν τοῦ πολέμου προβαίνοντος, καὶ τοῦ Κλεομένου τό τε πάτριον πολίτευμα καταλύσαντος καὶ τὴν ἔννομον βασιλείαν

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actually set their seal to his occupation. It was evident that they, who on previous occasions, owing to their lust of aggrandizement, found any pretext adequate for making war on those who had done them no wrong, now allowed themselves to be treacherously attacked and to suffer the loss of some of their largest cities simply in order to see Cleomenes become a really formidable antagonist of the Achaeans. Aratus, therefore, and all the leading men of the Achaean League decided not to take the initiative in going to war with anyone, but to resist Spartan aggression. This at least was their first resolve; but when shortly afterwards Cleomenes began to fortify against them the so-called Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis, and to show himself their avowed and bitter enemy, they called the Council of the League together and decided on open war with Sparta.

This was the date at which the war known as 227 B.C. the Cleomenic war began; and such was its origin. 47. The Achaeans at first decided to face the Lacedaemonians single-handed, considering it in the first place most honourable not to owe their safety to others but to protect their cities and country unaided, and also desiring to maintain their friendship with Ptolemy owing to the obligations they were under to him, and not to appear to him to be seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted for some time, and Cleomenes, having overthrown the ancient polity at Sparta and changed the constitutional 225 B.C.

εἰς τυραννίδα μεταστήσαντος, χρωμένου δὲ καὶ τῷ
 4 πολέμῳ πρακτικῶς καὶ παραβόλως, προορώμενος
 Ἄρατος τὸ μέλλον, καὶ δεδιὼς τὴν τε τῶν Αἰτω-
 λῶν ἀπόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν, ἔκρινε πρὸ πολλοῦ λυ-
 5 μαίνεσθαι τὴν ἐπιβολὴν αὐτῶν. κατανοῶν δὲ τὸν
 Ἀντίγονον καὶ πρᾶξιν ἔχοντα καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ πί-
 στεως ἀντιποιοῦμενον, τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς σαφῶς
 εἰδὼς φύσει μὲν οὐδένα νομίζοντας οὔτε φίλιον
 οὔτε πολέμιον, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος ψήφοις
 αἰεὶ μετροῦντας τὰς ἔχθρας καὶ τὰς φιλίας,
 6 ἐπεβάλετο λαλεῖν πρὸς τὸν εἰρημένον βασιλέα καὶ
 συμπλέκειν τὰς χεῖρας, ὑποδεικνύων αὐτῷ τὸ συμ-
 7 βησόμενον ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων. προδήλως μὲν οὖν
 αὐτὸ πράττειν ἀσύμφορον ἡγεῖτο διὰ πλείους αἰτίας.
 τόν τε γὰρ Κλεομένη καὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἀνταγωνι-
 8 στὰς παρασκευάζειν ἤμελλε πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολήν, τοὺς
 τε πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν διατρέψειν, καταφεύγων
 ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ δοκῶν ὀλοσχερῶς ἀπεγνωκέαι
 τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας· ὅπερ ἡκιστα φαίνεσθαι πράτ-
 9 των ἐβούλετο. διόπερ ἔχων τοιαύτην πρόθεσιν ἀδή-
 10 λως αὐτὰ διανοεῖτο χειρίζειν. ἐξ οὗ πολλὰ παρὰ
 τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἠναγκάζετο καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν
 πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτός, δι' ὧν ἤμελλε τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔμ-
 φασιν ὑποδεικνύων ταύτην ἐπικρύψεσθαι τὴν οἰ-
 11 κονομίαν. ὧν χάριν ἔνια τούτων οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπο-
 μνήμασι κατέταξεν.

48 Εἰδὼς δὲ τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας κακοπαθοῦντας
 μὲν τῷ πολέμῳ διὰ τὸ παρακειμένους τῇ Λακεδαί-
 μονι προπολεμεῖν τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ τυγχάνοντας δὲ

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kingship into a tyranny, showed great energy and daring in the conduct of the campaign, Aratus, foreseeing what was likely to happen and dreading the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, determined to be beforehand with them and spoil their plans. He perceived that Antigonus was a man of energy and sound sense, and that he claimed to be a man of honour, but he knew that kings do not regard anyone as their natural foe or friend, but measure enmity and friendship by the sole standard of expediency. He therefore decided to approach that monarch and put himself on confidential terms with him, pointing out to him to what the present course of affairs would probably lead. Now for several reasons he did not think it expedient to do this overtly. In the first place he would thus expose himself to being outbidden in his project by Cleomenes and the Aetolians, and next he would damage the spirit of the Achaean troops by thus appealing to an enemy and appearing to have entirely abandoned the hopes he had placed in them—this being the very last thing he wished them to think. Therefore, having formed this plan, he decided to carry it out by covert means. He was consequently compelled in public both to do and to say many things quite contrary to his real intention, so as to keep his design concealed by creating the exactly opposite impression. For this reason there are some such matters that he does not even refer to in his *Memoirs*.

48. He knew that the people of Megalopolis were suffering severely from the war, as, owing to their being on the Lacedaemonian border, they had to bear the full brunt of it, and could not receive proper

τῆς καθηκούσης ἐπικουρίας ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν διὰ τὸ
 κάκεινους δυσχρηστεῖσθαι θλιβομένους ὑπὸ τῆς
 2 περιστάσεως, σαφῶς δὲ γινώσκων οἰκείως διακει-
 μένους αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν ἐκ τῶν
 3 κατὰ τὸν Ἀμύντου Φίλιππον εὐεργεσιῶν, διειλήφει
 διότι ταχέως ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ Κλεομένου πιεζόμενοι
 καταφύγοιεν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον καὶ τὰς Μακεδόνων
 4 ἐλπίδας· κοινολογηθεῖς οὖν δι' ἀπορρήτων περὶ τῆς
 ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς Νικοφάνει καὶ Κερκιδᾷ τοῖς Μεγα-
 λοπολίταις, οἵτινες ἦσαν αὐτοῦ πατρικοὶ ξένοι καὶ
 5 πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν εὐφυεῖς, ῥαδίως διὰ τούτων
 ὁρμὴν παρέστησε τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις εἰς τὸ πρε-
 σβεύειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ παρακαλεῖν πρὸς
 6 τὸν Ἀντίγονον ὑπὲρ βοηθείας. οἱ μὲν οὖν Μεγαλο-
 πολῖται κατέστησαν αὐτοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικο-
 φάνη καὶ τὸν Κερκιδᾶν πρεσβευτὰς πρὸς τε τοὺς
 Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ κεῖθεν εὐθέως πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον, ἂν
 7 αὐτοῖς συγκατάθῃται τὸ ἔθνος. οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοὶ συν-
 8 ἐχώρησαν πρεσβεύειν τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις. σπουδῇ
 δὲ συμμίζαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τῷ βασιλεῖ
 διελέγοντο περὶ μὲν τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος αὐτὰ
 τὰναγκαῖα διὰ βραχέων καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς, τὰ δὲ
 49 πολλὰ περὶ τῶν ὅλων κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς Ἀράτου
 καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις. αὗται δ' ἦσαν ὑποδεικνύναι
 τὴν Λίτωλὼν καὶ Κλεομένους κοινοπραγίαν τί δύνα-
 ται καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ δηλοῦν ὅτι πρῶτοις μὲν
 2 αὐτοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς εὐλαβητέον, ἐξῆς δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον
 Ἀντιγόνῳ. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς Ἀχαιοὶ τὸν ἐξ ἀμ-
 φοῖν πόλεμον οὐκ ἂν ὑπερέγκαιεν εὐθεώρητον εἶναι
 πᾶσι, τοῦτο δ' ὡς Λίτωλοί καὶ Κλεομένης κρατήσαν-
 τες τούτων οὐκ εὐδοκήσουσιν οὐδὲ μὴ μείνωσιν ἐπὶ
 τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔτι τοῦ πρόσθεν ῥᾶον εἶναι τῷ

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assistance from the Achaeans, as the latter were themselves in difficulties and distress. As he also knew for a surety that they were well disposed to the royal house of Macedon ever since the favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas, he felt sure that, hard pressed as they were by Cleomenes, they would be very ready to take refuge in Antigonus and hopes of safety from Macedonia. He therefore communicated his project confidentially to Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis who were family friends of his own and well suited for the business, and he had no difficulty through them in inciting the Megalopolitans to send an embassy to the Achaeans begging them to appeal to Antigonus for help. Nicophanes and Cercidas themselves were appointed envoys by the Megalopolitans, in the first place to the Achaeans and next, if the League consented, with orders to proceed at once to Antigonus. The League gave its permission and the ambassadors hastened to meet the king. They said no more than was strictly necessary on the subject of their own city, treating this matter briefly and summarily, but dwelt at length on the general situation, in the sense that Aratus had directed and prompted. 49. He had charged them to point out the importance and the probable consequences of the common action of the Aetolians and Cleomenes, representing that in the first place the Achaeans were imperilled by it and next and in a larger measure Antigonus himself. For it was perfectly evident to all that the Achaeans could not hold out against both adversaries, and it was still more easy for any person of intelligence to see that, if the Aetolians and Cleomenes were successful, they

- 3 νοῦν ἔχοντι συνιδεῖν. τὴν τε γὰρ Αἰτωλῶν πλεον-
 εξίαν οὐχ οἶον τοῖς Πελοποννησίων ὄροις εὐ-
 δοκῆσαί ποτ' ἂν περιληφθεῖσαν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς τῆς
 4 Ἑλλάδος, τὴν τε Κλεομένους φιλοδοξίαν καὶ τὴν
 ὄλην ἐπιβολὴν κατὰ μὲν τὸ παρὸν αὐτῆς ἐφίεσθαι
 τῆς Πελοποννησίων ἀρχῆς, τυχόντα δὲ ταύτης τὸν
 προειρημένον κατὰ πόδας ἀνθέξεσθαι τῆς τῶν Ἑλλή-
 5 νων ἡγεμονίας. ἥς οὐχ οἶόν τε καθικέσθαι μὴ οὐ
 6 πρόσθεν καταλύσαντα τὴν Μακεδόνων ἀρχήν. σκο-
 πεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν ἡξίου, προορώμενον τὸ μέλλον,
 πότερον συμφέρει τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι μετ'
 Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πρὸς Κλεο-
 μένη πολεμεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας ἢ
 προέμενον τὸ μέγιστον ἔθνος διακινδυνεύειν ἐν Θετ-
 ταλία πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ Βοιωτοὺς, ἔτι δ' Ἀχαιοὺς
 καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὑπὲρ τῆς Μακεδόνων ἀρχῆς.
 7 ἔαν μὲν οὖν Αἰτωλοὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς
 γεγεννημένην εὐνοίαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Δημήτριον καιροῖς
 ἐντρεπόμενοι τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ὑποκρίνονται, καθά-
 περ καὶ νῦν, πολεμήσειν αὐτοὺς ἔφασαν τοὺς Ἀχαι-
 οὺς πρὸς τὸν Κλεομένη· καὶ μὲν ἡ τύχη συνεπι-
 λαμβάνηται, μὴ δεῖσθαι χρείας τῶν βοηθησόντων·
 8 ἂν δ' ἀντιπίπτῃ τὰ τῆς τύχης, Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ συνεπι-
 τίθωνται, προσέχειν αὐτὸν παρεκάλουν τοῖς πράγ-
 μασι, ἵνα μὴ πρόηται τοὺς καιροὺς, ἔτι δὲ δυνα-
 9 μένοις σώζεσθαι Πελοποννησίοις ἐπαρκέσῃ· περὶ δὲ
 πίστεως καὶ χάριτος ἀποδόσεως ῥαθυμεῖν αὐτὸν
 ᾔοντο δεῖν· τῆς γὰρ χρείας ἐπιτελουμένης αὐτὸν
 εὐρήσειν τὸν Ἄρατον εὐδοκουμένας ἀμφοτέροις
 10 ὑπισχνοῦντο πίστει. ὁμοίως δ' ἔφασαν καὶ τὸν
 καιρὸν τῆς βοηθείας αὐτὸν ὑποδείξειν.

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would push their advantage further. The Aetolian schemes of territorial aggrandizement would never stop short of the boundaries of the Peloponnese or even those of Greece itself, while Cleomenes' personal ambition, and far-reaching projects, though for the present he aimed only at supremacy in the Peloponnese, would, on his attaining this, at once develop into a claim to be over-lord of all Hellas, a thing impossible without his first putting an end to the dominion of Macedon. They implored him then to look to the future and consider which was most in his interest, to fight in the Peloponnese against Cleomenes for the supremacy of Greece with the support of the Achaeans and Boeotians, or to abandon the greatest of the Greek nations to its fate and then do battle in Thessaly for the throne of Macedonia with the Aetolians, Boeotians, Achaeans, and Spartans all at once. Should the Aetolians, still pretending to have scruples owing to the benefits received from the Achaeans in their war with Demetrius, continue their present inaction, the Achaeans alone, they said, would fight against Cleomenes, and, if Fortune favoured them, would require no help; but should they meet with ill-success and be attacked by the Aetolians also, they entreated him to take good heed and not let the opportunity slip, but come to the aid of the Peloponnesians while it was still possible to save them. As for conditions of alliance and the return they could offer him for his support, they said he need not concern himself, for once the service they demanded was being actually rendered, they promised him that Aratus would find terms satisfactory to both parties. Aratus himself, they said, would also indicate the date at which they required his aid.

50 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀντίγονος ἀκούσας ταῦτα, καὶ δό-
 ξας ἀληθινῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς ὑποδεικνύναι τὸν
 Ἄρατον, προσεῖχε τοῖς ἐξῆς πραττομένοις ἐπιμελῶς.
 2 ἔγραψε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις, ἐπαγγελλόμε-
 νος βοηθήσειν, ἐὰν καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τοῦτο βουλο-
 3 μένοις ᾗ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη καὶ Κερκι-
 δᾶν ἐпанελθόντων εἰς οἶκον, καὶ τὰς τε παρὰ τοῦ
 βασιλέως ἐπιστολὰς ἀποδόντων καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν εὐ-
 4 νοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ προθυμίαν διασαφούντων, μετεω-
 ρισθέντες οἱ Μεγαλοπολίται προθύμως ἔσχον ἰέναι
 πρὸς τὴν σύνοδον τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἐπι-
 σπάσασθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον καὶ τὰ πράγματα κατὰ
 5 σπουδὴν ἐγχειρίζειν αὐτῷ. ὁ δ' Ἄρατος, διακούσας
 κατ' ἰδίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τὴν τοῦ βασι-
 λέως αἵρεσιν, ἣν ἔχοι πρὸς τε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ
 πρὸς αὐτόν, περιχαρὴς ἦν τῷ μὴ διακενῆς πεποιῆ-
 σθαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν μηδ' εὐρῆσθαι κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰ-
 τωλῶν ἐλπίδα τὸν Ἀντίγονον εἰς τέλος ἀπηλλοτριω-
 6 μένον ἑαυτοῦ. πάνυ δὲ πρὸς λόγον ἡγεῖτο γίνεσθαι
 καὶ τὸ τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας προθύμους εἶναι διὰ
 τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φέρειν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον τὰ πράγματα.
 7 μάλιστα μὲν γάρ, ὥς ἐπάνω προεῖπον, ἔσπευδε μὴ
 προσδεηθῆναι τῆς βοηθείας· εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ
 τοῦτο δέοι καταφεύγειν, οὐ μόνον ἡβούλετο δι' αὐ-
 τοῦ γενέσθαι τὴν κλῆσιν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀπάν-
 8 των τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. ἡγωνία γάρ, εἰ παραγενόμενος
 ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ κρατήσας τῷ πολέμῳ τοῦ Κλεομέ-
 νους καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀλλοιότερόν τι βου-
 λεύσοιτο περὶ τῆς κοινῆς πολιτείας, μήποθ' ὁμο-
 λογουμένως τῶν συμβαινόντων αὐτὸς ἀναλάβῃ τὴν
 9 αἰτίαν, δόξαντος δικαίως τοῦτο πράττειν διὰ τὴν ἐξ
 αὐτοῦ προγεγενημένην ἀδικίαν περὶ τὸν Ἀκροκό-

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50. Antigonus, having listened to them, felt convinced that Aratus took a true and practical view of the situation, and carefully considered the next steps to be taken, promising the Megalopolitans by letter to come to their assistance if such was the wish of the Achaeans too. Upon Nicophanes and Cercidas returning home and delivering the king's letter, assuring at the same time their people of his goodwill towards them and readiness to be of service, the Megalopolitans were much elated and most ready to go to the Council of the League and beg them to invite the aid of Antigonus and at once put the direction of affairs in his hands. Aratus had private information from Nicophanes of the king's favourable inclination towards the League and himself, and was much gratified to find that his project had not been futile, and that he had not, as the Aetolians had hoped, found Antigonus entirely alienated from him. He considered it a great advantage that the Megalopolitans had readily consented to approach Antigonus through the Achaeans; for, as I said above, what he chiefly desired was not to be in need of asking for help, but if it became necessary to resort to this, he wished the appeal to come not only from himself personally, but from the League as a whole. For he was afraid that if the king appeared on the scene and, after conquering Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians, took any measures the reverse of welcome regarding the League, he himself would be universally blamed for what happened, as the king would seem to have justice on his side owing to Aratus' offence against the house of Macedon in

- 10 ρινθον εἰς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν. διόπερ ἅμα τῷ
 παρελθόντας τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας εἰς τὸ κοινὸν βου-
 λευτήριον τά τε γράμματα τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐπιδεικνύ-
 ναι καὶ διασαφεῖν τὴν ὅλην εὐνοίαν τοῦ βασιλέως,
 πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀξιοῦν ἐπισπάσασθαι τὸν Ἀντί-
 γονον τὴν ταχίστην, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὸ πλήθος ἐπὶ τῆς
 11 αὐτῆς ὁρμῆς, προελθὼν Ἄρατος, καὶ τὴν τε τοῦ
 βασιλέως προθυμίαν ἀποδεξάμενος καὶ τὴν τῶν πολ-
 λῶν διάληψιν ἐπαινέσας, παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων
 μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν σῶζειν καὶ τὰς
 πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν· οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτου κάλ-
 lion οὐδὲ συμφορώτερον· ἐὰν δ' ἄρα πρὸς τοῦτο
 τὸ μέρος ἀντιβαίνει τὰ τῆς τύχης, πρότερον ἔφη
 δεῖν ἐξελέγξαντας πάσας τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας τότε
 51 καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων βοηθείας. ἐπισημη-
 ναμένου δὲ τοῦ πλήθους, ἔδοξε μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν
 ὑποκειμένων καὶ δι' αὐτῶν ἐπιτελεῖν τὸν ἐνεστώτα
 2 πόλεμον. ἐπεὶ δὲ Πτολεμαῖος ἀπογνοὺς μὲν τὸ
 ἔθνος Κλεομένει χορηγεῖν ἐπεβάλετο, βουλόμενος
 αὐτὸν ἐπαλείφειν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον διὰ τὸ πλείους
 ἐλπίδας ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἢ περ ἐν τοῖς
 Ἀχαιοῖς τοῦ δύνασθαι διακατέχειν τὰς τῶν ἐν Μακε-
 3 δονία βασιλέων ἐπιβολάς, οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοὶ τὸ μὲν
 πρῶτον ἡλαττώθησαν περὶ τὸ Λύκαιον, συμπλα-
 κέντες κατὰ πορείαν τῷ Κλεομένει, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον
 ἐκ παρατάξεως ἡττήθησαν ἐν τοῖς Λαδοκείοις καλου-
 μένοις τῆς Μεγαλοπολίτιδος, ὅτε καὶ Λυδιάδας
 ἔπεσε, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὁλοσχερῶς ἔπταισαν ἐν τῇ
 Δυμαίᾳ περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Ἑκατόμβαιον, παν-
 4 δημεῖ διακινδυνεύοντες, τότε ἤδη τῶν πραγμάτων
 οὐκέτι διδόντων ἀναστροφὴν ἠνάγκαζε τὰ περι-

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the case of the Aeroeorinthus. Therefore, when the Megalopolitans appeared before the General Council of the League, and showing the king's letter, assured them of his friendly sentiments, at the same time begging the Achaeans to ask for his intervention at once, and when Aratus saw that this was the inclination of the Achaeans also, he rose, and after expressing his gratification at the king's readiness to assist them and his approval of the attitude of the meeting, he addressed them at some length, begging them if possible to attempt to save their cities and country by their own efforts, that being the most honourable and advantageous course, but, should adverse fortune prevent this, then, but only when they had no hope left in their own resources, he advised them to resort to an appeal to their friends for aid. 51. The people applauded his speech, and a decree was passed to leave things as they were for the present and conduct the war unaided. But a series of disasters overtook them. In the first place Ptolemy threw over the League and began to give financial support to Cleomenes with a view of setting him on to attack Antigonus, as he hoped to be able to keep in check more effectually the projects of the Macedonian kings with the support of the Lacedaemonians than with that of the Achaeans. Next the Achaeans were worsted by Cleomenes while on the march near the Lycaean and again in a pitched battle at a place in the territory of Megalopolis called Ladoecia, Lydiades falling here, and finally their whole force met with utter defeat at the Hecatombaeum in the territory of Dyme. Circumstances now no longer permitting delay, they were compelled by their position to

- εστῶτα καταφεύγειν ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον.
 5 ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ πρεσβευτὴν τὸν υἱὸν ἔξαποστείλας
 Ἄρατος πρὸς Ἀντίγονον ἐβεβαιώσατο τὰ περὶ τῆς
 6 βοηθείας. παρεῖχε δ' αὐτοῖς ἀπορίαν καὶ δυσχρη-
 στίαν μεγίστην τὸ μήτε τὸν βασιλέα δοκεῖν ἂν
 βοηθῆσαι χωρὶς τοῦ κομίσασθαι τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον
 καὶ λαβεῖν ὀρμητήριον πρὸς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον
 τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων πόλιν, μήτε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἂν
 τολμῆσαι Κορινθίους ἄκοντας ἐγχειρίσαι Μακεδόσι.
 7 διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὑπέρθεσιν ἔσχε τὸ διαβούλιον
 χάριν τῆς περὶ τῶν πίστεων ἐπισκέψεως.
- 52 Ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης, καταπληξάμενος τοῖς προειρη-
 μένοις εὐτυχήμασι, λοιπὸν ἀδεῶς ἐπεπορεύετο τὰς
 πόλεις, ἃς μὲν πείθων, αἷς δὲ τὸν φόβον ἀνατεινό-
 2 μενος. προσλαβὼν δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ Καφύας,
 Πελλήνην, Φενεόν, Ἄργος, Φλιοῦντα, Κλεωνάς,
 Ἐπίδαυρον, Ἑρμιόνα, Τροίζηνα, τελευταῖον Κό-
 ρινθον, αὐτὸς μὲν προσεστρατοπέδευσε τῇ τῶν
 Σικυωνίων πόλει, τοὺς δ' Ἀχαιοὺς ἀπέλυσε τοῦ
 3 μεγίστου προβλήματος. τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων τῷ
 μὲν Ἀράτῳ στρατηγοῦντι καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς
 παραγγειλάντων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι,
 πρὸς δὲ τὸν Κλεομένην διαπεμπομένων καὶ καλούν-
 των, παρεδόθη τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀφορμὴ καὶ πρόφασις
 4 εὖλογος. ἧς ἐπιλαβόμενος Ἄρατος καὶ προτείνας
 Ἀντιγόνῳ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, κατεχόντων Ἀχαιῶν
 τότε τὸν τόπον τοῦτον, ἔλυσε μὲν τὸ γεγονὸς
 ἔγκλημα πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν, ἱκανὴν δὲ πίστιν παρ-
 ἔσχετο τῆς πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα κοινωνίας, τὸ δὲ
 συνέχον, ὀρμητήριον παρεσκεύασεν Ἀντιγόνῳ πρὸς
 τὸν κατὰ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλεμον.
- 5 Ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης, ἐπιγνοὺς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς συν-

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appeal with one voice to Antigonus. Aratus on this occasion sent his son as envoy to the king and ratified the terms of the alliance. They were, however, in considerable doubt and difficulty about the Aerocorinthus, as they did not think Antigonus would come to their assistance unless it were restored to him, so that he could use Corinth as a base for the present war, nor could they go to the length of handing over the Corinthians against their will to Macedon. This even caused at first an adjournment of the Council for the consideration of the guarantees they offered.

52. Cleomenes, having inspired terror by the victories I mentioned, henceforth made an unimpeded progress through the cities, gaining some by persuasion and others by threats. He annexed in this manner Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneus, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae, Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and finally Corinth. He now sat down in front of Sicyon, but he had solved the chief difficulty of the Achaeans; for the Corinthians by ordering Aratus, who was then Strategus, and the Achaeans to quit Corinth, and by sending to invite Cleomenes, furnished the Achaeans with good and reasonable ground for offering to Antigonus the Aerocorinthus then held by them. Availing himself of this, Aratus not only atoned for his former offence to the royal house, but gave sufficient guarantee of future loyalty, further providing Antigonus with a base for the war against Lacedaemon.

Cleomenes, when he became aware of the under-

- τιθεμένους τὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον, ἀναζεύξας ἀπὸ
 τοῦ Σικυῶνος, κατεστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τὸν Ἴσθμόν,
 διαλαβὼν χάρακι καὶ τάφρῳ τὸν μεταξὺ τόπον τοῦ
 τ' Ἀκροκορίνθου καὶ τῶν Ὀνείων καλουμένων ὄρων,
 6 πᾶσαν ἤδη βεβαίως περιειληφὼς ταῖς ἐλπίσι τὴν
 ἦν ἐν παρασκευῇ, караδοκῶν τὸ μέλλον κατὰ τὰς
 7 ὑποθέσεις τὰς Ἀράτου· τότε δὲ συλλογιζόμενος ἐκ
 τῶν προσπιπτόντων ὅσον οὕτω παρεῖναι τὸν Κλεο-
 μένη μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς Θετταλίαν, διαπεμφά-
 μενος πρὸς τε τὸν Ἀρατον καὶ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ὑπὲρ
 τῶν ὁμολογημένων, ἤκεν ἔχων τὰς δυνάμεις διὰ
 8 τῆς Εὐβοίας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἴσθμόν· οἱ γὰρ Αἰτωλοὶ πρὸς
 τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τότε βουλόμενοι κωλύσαι τὸν Ἀντί-
 γονον τῆς βοηθείας, ἀπέειπον αὐτῷ πορεύεσθαι μετὰ
 δυνάμεως ἐντὸς Πυλῶν· εἰ δὲ μή, διότι κωλύσουσι
 μεθ' ὅπλων αὐτοῦ τὴν δίοδον.
 9 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀντίγονος καὶ Κλεομένης ἀντεστρα-
 τοπέδευον ἀλλήλοισ, ὁ μὲν εἰσελθεῖν σπουδάζων εἰς
 Πελοπόννησον, ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης κωλύσαι τῆς εἰς-
 53 ὁδου τὸν Ἀντίγονον· οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοί, καίπερ οὐ με-
 τρίως ἡλαττωμένοι τοῖς ὅλοις, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίσταντο
 τῆς προθέσεως οὐδ' ἐγκατέλειπον τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλ-
 2 πίδας, ἀλλ' ἅμα τῷ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν Ἀργεῖον
 ἐπαναστῆναι τοῖς Κλεομενισταῖς, βοηθήσαντες καὶ
 παρεισπεσόντες μετὰ Τιμοξένου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ,
 3 κατέλαβον τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων πόλιν· ὃ δὲ καὶ νο-
 μιστέον αἰτιώτατον γεγονέναι πραγμάτων κατορθώ-
 σεως· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιλαβόμενον τῆς ὁρμῆς τοῦ Κλεο-
 μένους καὶ προηττήσαν τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δυνάμεων
 τοῦτ' ἦν, ὡς ἐξ αὐτῶν φανερόν ἐγένετο τῶν πραγ-
 4 μάτων· καὶ γὰρ τόπους εὐφρεστέρους προκατέχων,
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standing between the Achaeans and Antigonus, left Sicyon and encamped on the Isthmus, uniting by a palisade and trench the Acrocorinthus and the mountain called the Ass's Back, regarding confidently the whole Peloponnese as being henceforth his own domain. Antigonus had been for long making his preparations, awaiting the turn of events, as Aratus had recommended, but now, judging from the progress of events that Cleomenes was on the point of appearing in Thessaly with his army, he communicated with Aratus and the Achaeans reminding them of the terms of their treaty, and passing through Euboea with his forces, reached the Isthmus, the Aetolians having, in addition to other measures they took to prevent his assisting the Achaeans, forbidden him to advance with an army beyond Thermopylae, threatening, if he attempted it, to oppose his passage.

Antigonus and Cleomenes now faced each other, ^{224 B.C.} the former bent on penetrating into the Peloponnese and the latter on preventing him. 53. The Achaeans, although they had suffered such serious reverses, yet did not abandon their purpose or their self-reliance, but on Aristoteles of Argos revolting against the partisans of Cleomenes, they sent a force to his assistance and entering the city by surprise under the command of their Strategus, Timoxenus, established themselves there. We should look on this achievement as the principal cause of the improvement in their fortunes which ensued. For events clearly showed that it was this which checked Cleomenes' ardour and subdued in advance the spirit of his troops. Though his position was

καὶ χορηγίαις δαψιλεστέραις Ἀντιγόνου χρώμενος, καὶ τόλμῃ καὶ φιλοτιμίᾳ μείζονι παρωρμημένος, ὅμως ἅμα τῷ προσπεσεῖν αὐτῷ διότι κατελιγῆθαι συμβαίνει τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων πόλιν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, εὐθύς ἀνάσπαστος, ἀπολιπὼν τὰ προδεδηλωμένα προτερήματα, φυγῇ παραπλησίαν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ἀποχώρησιν, δείσας μὴ πανταχόθεν αὐτὸν περιστῶσιν οἱ πολέμιοι. παραπεσὼν δ' εἰς Ἄργος, καὶ κατὰ ποσὸν ἀντιποιησάμενος τῆς πόλεως, μετὰ ταῦτα γενναίως μὲν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, φιλοτίμως δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων ἐκ μεταμελείας αὐτὸν ἀμυναμένων, ἀποπεσὼν καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, καὶ ποιησάμενος τὴν πορείαν διὰ Μαντινείας, οὕτως ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην.

- 54 Ὁ δ' Ἀντίγονος ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον εἰσελθὼν παρέλαβε τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, οὐδένα δὲ χρόνον μείνας εἶχετο τῶν προκειμένων καὶ παρῆν εἰς Ἄργος. ἐπαινέσας δὲ τοὺς Ἀργεῖους, καὶ καταστησάμενος τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, αὐθις ἐκ ποδὸς ἐκίνει, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπ' Ἀρκαδίας. ἐκβαλὼν δὲ τὰς φρουράς ἐκ τῶν ἐποικοδομηθέντων χωρίων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους κατὰ τε τὴν Αἰγυῖτιν καὶ Βελμινᾶτιν χώραν, καὶ παραδοὺς τὰ φρούρια Μεγαλοπολίταις, ἤκε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύνοδον εἰς Αἶγιον. ἀπολογισάμενος δὲ περὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν καὶ χρηματίσας περὶ τῶν μελλόντων, ἔτι δὲ κατασταθεὶς ἡγεμὼν ἀπάντων τῶν συμμάχων, μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον μὲν τινα παραχειμάζων διέτριβε περὶ Σικυῶνα καὶ Κόρινθον. τῆς δ' ἑαρινῆς ὥρας ἐνισταμένης ἀναλαβὼν τὰς δυνάμεις προῆγε. καὶ διανύσας τριταῖος πρὸς τὴν τῶν Τεγεατῶν πόλιν, ἀπηντηκότων καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐν-

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stronger than that of Antigonus, and he was much better off for supplies, as well as animated by greater courage and ambition, no sooner did the news reach him that Argos had been seized by the Achaeans than he instantly took himself off, abandoning all these advantages, and made a precipitate retreat, fearing to be surrounded on all sides by the enemy. Gaining entrance to Argos he possessed himself of part of the city, but, on the Achaeans making a gallant resistance, in which the Argives joined with all the zeal of renegades, this plan broke down too, and, marching by way of Mantinea, he returned to Sparta.

54. Antigonus now safely entered the Peloponnese and took possession of the Acrocorinthus and, without wasting any time there, pushed on and reached Argos. Having thanked the Argives and put matters in the city on a proper footing, he moved on again at once, making for Arcadia. After having ejected the garrisons from the forts that Cleomenes had built there to command the country in the territory of Aegys and Belbina, and handed over these forts to the Megalopolitans, he returned to Aegium where the Council of the Achaean League was in session. He gave them an account of the measures he had taken and arranged with them for the future conduct of the war. They hereupon appointed him generalissimo of all the allied forces, and after this he retired for a short time to his winter quarters ^{223 B.C.} near Sicyon and Corinth. Early in spring he advanced with his army and reached Tegea in three days. Here the Achaeans joined him, and the

- ταῦθα, περιστρατοπεδεύσας ἤρξατο πολιορκεῖν αὐ-
7 τήν. τῶν δὲ Μακεδόνων ἐνεργῶς χρωμένων τῇ τε
λοιπῇ πολιορκίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ὀρύγμασι, ταχέως ἀπελ-
πίσαντες οἱ Τεγεᾶται τὴν σωτηρίαν παρέδοσαν αὐ-
8 τοὺς. ὁ δ' Ἀντίγονος, ἀσφαλισάμενος τὰ κατὰ τὴν
πόλιν, εἶχετο κατὰ τὸ συνεχές τῶν ἐξῆς, καὶ προῆγε
9 κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν. ἐγγίσας δὲ τῷ
Κλεομένει προκαθημένῳ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ χώρας κατεπεί-
10 ραζε, καὶ συνίστατό τινας ἀκροβολισμούς. προσπε-
σόντος δὲ διὰ τῶν κατασκόπων αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐξ Ὀρ-
χομενοῦ στρατιώτας παραβεβοηθηκέναι πρὸς τὸν
Κλεομένη, παραντίκα ποιησάμενος ἀναζυγὴν ἠπεί-
11 γετο. καὶ τὸν μὲν Ὀρχομενὸν ἐξ ἐφόδου κατὰ κρά-
τος εἶλε· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περιστρατοπεδεύσας τὴν
12 τῶν Μαντινέων ἐπολιόρκει πόλιν. ταχὺ δὲ καὶ
ταύτην καταπληξαμένων τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ λα-
βόντων ὑποχείριον, ἀναζεύξας προῆγε τὴν ἐφ'
13 Ἡραίας καὶ Τελφούσης. παραλαβὼν δὲ καὶ ταύτας
τὰς πόλεις, ἐθελοντὴν προσχωρησάντων αὐτῷ τῶν
κατοικούντων, οὕτως ἤδη συνάπτοντος τοῦ χειμῶνος
παρῆν εἰς Αἶγιον πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύνοδον.
14 καὶ τοὺς μὲν Μακεδόνας ἐπ' οἴκου διαφῆκε πάντας
εἰς τὴν χειμασίαν, αὐτὸς δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς διελέγετο
καὶ συνδιενοεῖτο περὶ τῶν ἐνεστῶτων.
- 55 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους συνθεωρῶν ὁ
Κλεομένης τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις διαφειμένας, τὸν δ'
Ἀντίγονον μετὰ τῶν μισθοφόρων ἐν Αἰγίῳ διατρί-
βοντα, καὶ τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν ἀφεστῶτα τῆς Μεγά-
2 λης πόλεως, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ταύτην εἰδὼς δυσφύλα-
κτον οὖσαν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν, τότε
δὲ καὶ ῥαθύμως τηρουμένην διὰ τὴν Ἀντιγόου
παρουσίαν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀπολωλότας τοὺς

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siege of the city was opened. The Macedonians conducted the siege energetically, especially by mining, and the Tegeans soon gave up all hope of holding out and surrendered. Antigonus, after securing the city, continued to pursue his plan of campaign and advanced rapidly on Laconia. He encountered Cleomenes posted on the frontier to defend Laconia and began to harass him, a few skirmishes taking place; but on learning from his scouts that the troops from Orchomenus had left to come to the aid of Cleomenes, he at once hastily abandoned his position and, breaking up his camp, withdrew. He surprised Orchomenus, and captured it by assault, and after this he laid siege to Mantinea which likewise the Macedonians soon frightened into submission, and then he advanced on Heraea and Telphusa which the inhabitants surrendered to him of their own accord. The winter was now approaching. Antigonus came to Aegium to be present at the meeting of the Achaean Synod, and dismissing all his Macedonians to their homes for the winter, occupied himself in discussing the present situation with the Achaeans and making joint plans for the future.

55. Cleomenes at this juncture had observed that Antigonus had dismissed his other troops and, keeping only his mercenaries with him, was spending the time at Aegium at a distance of three days' march from Megalopolis. He knew that this latter city was very difficult to defend, owing to its extent and partial desolation, that it was at present very carelessly guarded owing to the presence of Antigonus in the Peloponnese, and above all that it had lost the

- πλείστους τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἐν τε τῇ περὶ τὸ
 3 Λύκαιον καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τῇ περὶ Λαδόκεια μάχῃ,
 λαβὼν συνεργούς τινας τῶν ἐκ Μεσσήνης φυγάδων,
 οἱ διατρίβοντες ἐτύγγανον ἐν τῇ Μεγάλῃ πόλει,
 παρεισῆλθε διὰ τούτων λάθρα νυκτὸς ἐντὸς τῶν
 4 τειχῶν. τῆς δ' ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης παρ' ὀλίγον
 ἦλθε τοῦ μὴ μόνον ἐκπεσεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις
 κινδυνεῦσαι διὰ τὴν εὐψυχίαν τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν.
 5 ὁ δὲ καὶ τρισὶ μῆσιν πρότερον αὐτῷ συνέβη παθεῖν
 παρεισπεσόντι κατὰ τὸν Κωλαιὸν προσαγορευόμενον
 6 τόπον τῆς πόλεως. τότε δὲ τῷ πλήθει τῆς δυνά-
 μεως καὶ τῷ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς εὐκαίρους
 τόπους καθίκετο τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, καὶ πέρας ἐκβαλὼν
 7 τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας κατέσχε τὴν πόλιν. γενόμενος
 δ' ἐγκρατὴς οὕτως αὐτὴν πικρῶς διέφθειρε καὶ
 δυσμενῶς ὥστε μὴδ' ἐλπίσαι μὴδένα διότι δύναιτ'
 8 ἂν συνοικισθῆναι πάλιν. τοῦτο δὲ ποιῆσαί μοι
 δοκεῖ διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὰς τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις παρὰ
 μόνοις Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ Στυμφαλίοις μὴδέποτε
 δυνηθῆναι μῆθ' αἰρετιστὴν καὶ κοινωνὸν τῶν ἰδίων
 9 ἐλπίδων μήτε προδότην κατασκευάσασθαι. τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ Κλειτορίων φιλελεύθερον καὶ γενναῖον εἰς
 ἀνὴρ κατήσχυνε διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κακίαν, Θεάρκης
 ὃν εἰκότως ἐξαρνοῦνται Κλειτόριοι μὴ φῦναι παρὰ
 σφίσι, γενέσθαι δ' ὑποβολιμαῖον ἐξ Ὀρχομενοῦ τῶν
 ἐπηλύδων τινὸς στρατιωτῶν.
 56 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Ἀράτῳ
 γεγραφότων παρ' ἐνίοις ἀποδοχῆς ἀξιοῦται Φύλαρ-
 χος, ἐν πολλοῖς ἀντιδοξῶν καὶ τάναντία γράφων
 2 αὐτῷ, χρήσιμον ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν,
 Ἀράτῳ προηρημένοις κατακολουθεῖν περὶ τῶν Κλεο-

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greater part of its citizens of military age in the battles at the Lycaean and at Ladoecia. He therefore procured the co-operation of certain Messenian exiles then living in Megalopolis and by their means got inside the walls secretly by night. On day breaking, he came very near not only being driven out, but meeting with complete disaster owing to the bravery of the Megalopolitans, who had indeed expelled and defeated him three months previously when he entered the city by surprise in the quarter called Colaeum. But on this occasion, owing to the strength of his forces, and owing to his having had time to seize on the most advantageous positions, his project succeeded, and finally he drove out the Megalopolitans and occupied their city. On possessing himself of it, he destroyed it with such systematic cruelty and animosity, that nobody would have thought it possible that it could ever be re-inhabited. I believe him to have acted so, because the Megalopolitans and Stymphalians were the only peoples from among whom in the varied circumstances of his career he could never procure himself a single partisan to share in his projects or a single traitor. For in the case of the Clitorians their noble love of freedom was sullied by the malpractices of one man Thearces whom, as one would expect, they naturally deny to have been a native-born citizen, affirming that he was the son of a foreign soldier and foisted in from Orchomenus.

56. Since, among those authors who were contemporaries of Aratus, Phylarchus, who on many points is at variance and in contradiction with him, is by some received as trustworthy, it will be useful or rather necessary for me, as I have chosen to rely on Aratus' narrative for the history of the Cleomenic

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μενικῶν, μὴ παραλιπεῖν ἄσκεπτον τοῦτο τὸ μέρος,
 ἵνα μὴ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν ἰσοδυνα-
 3 μῶν ἀπολείπωμεν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. καθόλου
 μὲν οὖν ὁ συγγραφεὺς οὗτος πολλὰ παρ' ὅλην τὴν
 4 πραγματείαν εἰκῇ καὶ ὥς ἔτυχεν εἴρηκε. πλὴν περὶ
 μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιτιμᾶν κατὰ
 τὸ παρὸν οὐδ' ἐξακριβοῦν· ὅσα δὲ συνεπιβάλλει
 τοῖς ὑφ' ἡμῶν γραφομένοις καιροῖς, ταῦτα δ' ἔστι
 τὰ περὶ τὸν Κλεομενικὸν πόλεμον, ὑπὲρ τούτων
 5 ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν διευκρινεῖν. ἔσται δὲ πάν-
 τως ἄρκουντα ταῦτα πρὸς τὸ καὶ τὴν ὅλην αὐτοῦ
 προαίρεσιν καὶ δύναμιν ἐν τῇ πραγματείᾳ κατα-
 6 μαθεῖν. βουλόμενος δὴ διασαφεῖν τὴν ὁμότητα τὴν
 Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Μακεδόνων, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις τὴν
 Ἀράτου καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, φησὶ τοὺς Μαντινέας
 γενομένους ὑποχειρίους μεγάλοις περιπεσεῖν ἀτυχή-
 μασι, καὶ τὴν ἀρχαιοτάτην καὶ μεγίστην πόλιν τῶν
 κατὰ τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν τηλικαύταις παλαῖσαι συμφο-
 ραῖς ὥστε πάντας εἰς ἐπίστασιν καὶ δάκρυα τοὺς
 7 Ἕλληνας ἀγαγεῖν. σπουδάζων δ' εἰς ἔλεον ἐκκα-
 λεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀναγινώσκοντας καὶ συμπαθεῖς ποιεῖν
 τοῖς λεγομένοις, εἰσάγει περιπλοκὰς γυναικῶν καὶ
 κόμας διερριμμένας καὶ μαστῶν ἐκβολάς, πρὸς δὲ
 τούτοις δάκρυα καὶ θρήνους ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν
 ἀναμῖξ τέκνοις καὶ γονεῦσι γηραιοῖς ἀπαγομένων.
 8 ποιεῖ δὲ τοῦτο παρ' ὅλην τὴν ἱστορίαν, πειρώμενος
 ἐν ἐκάστοις αἰεὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τιθέναι τὰ δεινά.
 9 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγεννὲς καὶ γυναικῶδες τῆς αἰρέσεως
 αὐτοῦ παρείσθω, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἱστορίας οἰκεῖον ἅμα
 10 καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξεταζέσθω. δεῖ τοιγαροῦν οὐκ ἐκ-
 πλήττειν τὸν συγγραφέα τερατευόμενον διὰ τῆς
 ἱστορίας τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐνδεχομέ-
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war, not to leave the question of their relative credibility undiscussed, so that truth and falsehood in their writings may no longer be of equal authority. In general Phylarchus through his whole work makes many random and careless statements; but while perhaps it is not necessary for me at present to criticize in detail the rest of these, I must minutely examine such as relate to events occurring in the period with which I am now dealing, that of the Cleomeneic war. This partial examination will however be quite sufficient to convey an idea of the general purpose and character of his work. Wishing, for instance, to insist on the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians and also on that of Aratus and the Achaeans, he tells us that the Mantineans, when they surrendered, were exposed to terrible sufferings and that such were the misfortunes that overtook this, the most ancient and greatest city in Arcadia, as to impress deeply and move to tears all the Greeks. In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers he treats us to a picture of clinging women " with their hair dishevelled and their breasts bare, or again of crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery. This sort of thing he keeps up throughout his history, always trying to bring horrors vividly before our eyes. Leaving aside the ignoble and womanish character of such a treatment of his subject, let us consider how far it is proper or serviceable to history. A historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures, nor should he, like a tragic

" Clinging either to each other or to the altars of their gods.

- νοὺς λόγους ζητεῖν καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα τοῖς ὑπο-
κειμένοις ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι, καθάπερ οἱ τραγωδιογρά-
φοι, τῶν δὲ πραχθέντων καὶ ῥηθέντων κατ' ἀλή-
θειαν αὐτῶν μνημονεύειν πάνπαν, κἂν πάνυ μέτρια
11 τυγχάνωσιν ὄντα. τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἱστορίας καὶ τρα-
γωδίας οὐ ταυτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ
δεῖ διὰ τῶν πιθανωτάτων λόγων ἐκπληῆσαι καὶ ψυχ-
αγωγῆσαι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἐνθάδε
δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων εἰς τὸν
πάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πείσαι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦν-
12 τας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν ἡγεῖται τὸ πιθανόν,
κἂν ἦ ψεῦδος, διὰ τὴν ἀπάτην τῶν θεωμένων, ἐν
δὲ τούτοις τἀληθές διὰ τὴν ὠφέλειαν τῶν φιλο-
13 μαθούντων. χωρὶς τε τούτων τὰς πλείστας ἡμῖν ἐξ-
ηγεῖται τῶν περιπετειῶν, οὐχ ὑποτιθεὶς αἰτίαν καὶ
τρόπον τοῖς γινομένοις, ὧν χωρὶς οὔτ' ἐλεεῖν εὐ-
λόγως οὔτ' ὀργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως δυνατόν ἐπ'
14 οὐδενὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων. ἐπεὶ τίς ἀνθρώπων οὐ
δεινὸν ἡγεῖται τύπτεσθαι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους; ἀλλ'
ὅμως, εἰ μὲν ἄρχων ἀδίκων χειρῶν πάθη τις
τοῦτο, δικαίως κρίνεται πεπονθέναι. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ
διορθώσει καὶ μαθήσει ταῦτο τοῦτο γίνηται, προσ-
έτι καὶ τιμῆς καὶ χάριτος οἱ τύπτοντες τοὺς ἐλευ-
15 θέρους ἀξιοῦνται. καὶ μὴν τό γε τοὺς πολίτας ἀπο-
κτεινύναι μέγιστον ἀσέβημα τίθεται καὶ μεγίστων
ἄξιον προστίμων. καίτοι γε προφανῶς ὁ μὲν τὸν
κλέπτην ἢ μοιχὸν ἀποκτείνας ἀθῶός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τὸν
προδότην ἢ τύραννον τιμῶν καὶ προεδρίας τυγ-
16 χάνει παρὰ πᾶσιν. οὕτως ἐν παντὶ τὸ τέλος κεῖται

^a Literally "a reserved seat in the theatre or elsewhere."

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poet, try to imagine the probable utterances of his characters or reckon up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals, but simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace. For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates, since in the one case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, the purpose being to create illusion in spectators, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer benefit on learners. Apart from this, Phylarchus simply narrates most of such catastrophes and does not even suggest their causes or the nature of these causes, without which it is impossible in any case to feel either legitimate pity or proper anger. Who, for instance, does not think it an outrage for a free man to be beaten? but if this happen to one who was the first to resort to violence, we consider that he got only his desert, while where it is done for the purpose of correction or discipline, those who strike free men are not only excused but deemed worthy of thanks and praise. Again, to kill a citizen is considered the greatest of crimes and that deserving the highest penalty, but obviously he who kills a thief or adulterer is guiltless, and the slayer of a traitor or tyrant everywhere meets with honour and distinction.^a So in every such case the final criterion

τῆς διαλήψεως ὑπὲρ τούτων οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τελου-
 μένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς αἰτίαις καὶ προαιρέσεσι τῶν
 πραττόντων καὶ ταῖς τούτων διαφοραῖς.

- 57 Μαντινεῖς τοίνυν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐγκαταλιπόν-
 τες τὴν μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν ἐβελοντὴν Αἰ-
 τωλοῖς ἐνεχείρισαν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, μετὰ
 2 δὲ ταῦτα Κλεομένει. γεγονότες δ' ἐπὶ τοιαύτης
 προαιρέσεως καὶ μετέχοντες τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πο-
 λιτείας ἔτει τετάρτῳ πρότερον τῆς Ἀντιγόνου πα-
 ρουσίας ἐάλωσαν κατὰ κράτος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν,
 3 Ἀράτου πραξικοπήσαντος αὐτῶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ᾧ
 καιρῷ τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχον τοῦ παθεῖν τι δεινὸν διὰ
 τὴν προειρημένην ἀμαρτίαν, ὥς καὶ περιβόητον συν-
 ἔβη γενέσθαι τὸ πραχθὲν διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς κατὰ
 4 τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀμφοτέρων μεταβολῆς. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ
 κατασχεῖν τὴν πόλιν Ἄρατος παραυτίκα μὲν τοῖς
 ὑφ' αὐτὸν ταπτομένοις παρήγγελλε μηδένα μηδενὸς
 5 ἄπτεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἐξῆς δὲ τούτοις τοὺς Μαν-
 τινέας συναθροίσας παρεκάλεσε θαρρεῖν καὶ μένειν
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἰδίων· ὑπάρξειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν
 6 πολιτευομένοις μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. τοῖς δὲ Μαντι-
 νεῦσιν ἀνυπονοήτου καὶ παραδόξου φανείσης τῆς
 ἐλπίδος, παραυτίκα πάντες ἐπὶ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐγέ-
 7 νοντο γνώμης. καὶ πρὸς οὓς μικρῷ πρότερον μα-
 χόμενοι πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπέιδον ἀπ-
 ολλυμένους, οὐκ ὀλίγους δ' αὐτῶν βιαίους τραύμασι
 περιπεσόντας, τούτους εἰς τὰς ἰδίας οἰκίας εἰσαγό-
 μενοι καὶ ποιησάμενοι σφίσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀναγ-
 καίοις ὁμεστίους, οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον τῆς μετ' ἀλλήλων
 8 φιλοφροσύνης. καὶ τοῦτ' εἰκότως ἐποιοῦν· οὐ γὰρ
 οἷδ' εἴ τινας ἀνθρώπων εὐγνωμονεστέροις ἐνέτυχον
 πολεμίοις οὐδ' εἴ τινας ἀβλαβέστερον ἐπάλαισαν τοῖς

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of good and evil lies not in what is done, but in the different reasons and different purposes of the doer.

57. Now the Mantineans had, in the first instance, deserted the Achaean League, and of their own free will put themselves and their city into the hands first of the Aetolians and then of Cleomenes. They had deliberately ranged themselves on his side and been admitted to Spartan citizenship, when, four years before the invasion of Antigonos, their city was betrayed to Aratus and forcibly occupied by the Achaeans. On this occasion, so far from their being cruelly treated owing to their recent delinquency, the circumstances became celebrated because of the sudden revulsion of sentiments on both sides. For immediately Aratus had the city in his hands, he at once issued orders to his troops to keep their hands off the property of others, and next, calling an assembly of the Mantineans, bade them be of good courage and retain possession of all they had; for if they joined the Achaean League he would assure their perfect security. The prospect of safety thus suddenly revealed to them took the Mantineans completely by surprise, and there was an instantaneous and universal reversal of feeling. The very men at whose hands they had seen, in the fight that had just closed, many of their kinsmen slain and many grievously wounded, were now taken into their houses, and received into their families with whom they lived on the kindest possible terms. This was quite natural, for I never heard of any men meeting with kinder enemies or being less injured by what is considered the greatest of

μεγίστοις δοκοῦσιν εἶναι συμπτώμασι Μαντινέων
 διὰ τὴν Ἀράτου καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς φιλαν-
 58 θρωπίαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προορώμενοι τὰς ἐν αὐ-
 τοῖς στάσεις καὶ τὰς ὑπ' Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμο-
 νίων ἐπιβουλὰς, πρεσβεύσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς
 2 ἡξίωσαν δοῦναι παραφυλακὴν αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ πει-
 σθέντες ἀπεκλήρωσαν ἐξ αὐτῶν τριακοσίους ἄνδρας·
 ὧν οἱ λαχόντες ὥρμησαν ἀπολιπόντες τὰς ἰδίας πα-
 τρίδας καὶ τοὺς βίους, καὶ διέτριβον ἐν Μαντινείᾳ,
 παραφυλάττοντες τὴν ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίαν ἅμα καὶ
 3 σωτηρίαν. σὺν δὲ τούτοις καὶ μισθοφόρους διακο-
 σίους ἐξέπεμψαν, οἳ μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συνδιετήρουν
 4 τὴν ὑποκειμένην αὐτοῖς κατάστασιν. μετ' οὐ πολὺ
 δὲ στασιάσαντες πρὸς σφᾶς οἱ Μαντινεῖς, καὶ Λα-
 κεδαιμονίους ἐπισπασάμενοι, τὴν τε πόλιν ἐνεχείρι-
 σαν καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν διατρίβοντας παρ'
 αὐτοῖς κατέσφαξαν· οὗ μείζον παρασπόνδημα καὶ
 5 δεινότερον οὐδ' εἶπεῖν εὐμαρές. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔδοξε
 σφίσι καθόλου τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἔθνος χάριν καὶ φιλίαν
 ἀθετεῖν, τῶν γε προειρημένων ἀνδρῶν ἐχρῆν δήπου
 φεισαμένους ἑᾶσαι πάντας ὑποσπόνδους ἀπελθεῖν·
 6 τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἔθος ἐστὶ συγχωρεῖ-
 σθαι κατὰ τοὺς κοινούς τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμους.
 7 οἱ δ' ἵνα Κλεομένει καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἱκανὴν παρά-
 σχωνται πίστιν πρὸς τὴν ἐνεστῶσαν ἐπιβολήν, τὰ
 κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δίκαια παραβάντες τὸ μέγι-
 8 στον ἀσέβημα κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐπετέλεσαν. τὸ γὰρ
 τούτων αὐτόχειρας γενέσθαι καὶ τιμωροὺς οἵτινες
 πρότερον μὲν κατὰ κράτος λαβόντες αὐτοὺς ἀθώους
 ἀφήκαν, τότε δὲ τὴν ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ σωτη-
 9 ρίαν ἐφύλαττον, πηλίκης ὀργῆς ἐστὶν ἄξιον; τί δ'
 ἂν παθόντες οὔτοι δίκην δόξαιεν ἀρμόζουσαν δε-
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calamities than the Mantineans, all owing to their humane treatment by Aratus and the Achaeans. 58. Subsequently, as they foresaw discord among themselves and plots by the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians, they sent an embassy to the Achaeans asking for a garrison. The Achaeans consented and chose by lot three hundred of their own citizens, who set forth, abandoning their own houses and possessions, and remained in Mantinea to watch over the liberty and safety of its townsmen. At the same time they sent two hundred hired soldiers, who aided this Achaean force in safeguarding the established government. Very soon however the Mantineans fell out with the Achaeans, and, inviting the Lacedaemonians, put the city into their hands and massacred the garrison the Achaeans had sent them. It is difficult to find words to characterize the magnitude and atrocity of this act of treachery. For in resolving to forswear their friendship and gratitude, they should at least have spared the lives of these men and allowed them all to depart under terms. Such treatment is, by the common law of nations, accorded even to enemies; but the Mantineans, simply in order to give Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians a satisfactory guarantee of their good faith in this undertaking, violated the law recognized by all mankind and deliberately committed the most heinous of crimes. Vengeful murderers of the very men who previously on capturing their city had left them unharmed, and who now were guarding their liberties and lives—against such men, one asks oneself, can any indignation be too strong? What should we consider to be an adequate punishment for them? Someone might

- δωκέναι; τυχὸν ἴσως εἴποι τις ἄν, πραθέντες μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν, ἐπεὶ κατεπολεμήθησαν. ἀλλὰ
- 10 τοῦτό γε καὶ τοῖς μὴθὲν ἀσεβὲς ἐπιτελεσαμένοις κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους ὑπόκειται παθεῖν. οὐκοῦν ὁλοσχερεστέρας τινὸς καὶ μείζονος τυχεῖν
- 11 ἦσαν ἄξιοι τιμωρίας, ὥστ' εἴπερ ἔπαθον ἃ Φύλαρχός φησιν, οὐκ ἔλεον εἰκὸς ἦν συνεξακολουθεῖν αὐτοῖς παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἔπαινον δὲ καὶ συγκατάθεσιν μᾶλλον τοῖς πράττουσι καὶ μεταπορευο-
- 12 μένοις τὴν ἀσέβειαν αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδενὸς περαιτέρω συνεξακολουθήσαντος Μαντινεῦσι κατὰ τὴν περιπέτειαν πλὴν τοῦ διαρπαγῆναι τοὺς βίους καὶ πραθῆναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους, ὁ συγγραφεὺς αὐτῆς τῆς τερατείας χάριν οὐ μόνον ψεῦδος εἰσήνεγκε τὸ
- 13 ὅλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀπίθανον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἀγνοίας οὐδὲ τὸ παρακείμενον ἡδυνήθη συνεπιστῆσαι, πῶς οἱ αὐτοὶ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς κυριεύσαντες Τεγεατῶν κατὰ κράτος οὐδὲν
- 14 τῶν ὁμοίων ἔπραξαν. καίτοι γ' εἰ μὲν ἢ τῶν πραττόντων ὁμότης ἦν αἰτία, καὶ τούτους εἰκὸς ἦν πεπονθέναι ταῦτά τοις ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ὑποπεπτωκόσι
- 15 καιρόν. εἰ δὲ περὶ μόνους γέγονε Μαντινεῖς ἢ διαφορά, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὀργῆς ἀνάγκη διαφέρουσιν γεγονέναι περὶ τούτους.
- 59 Πάλιν Ἀριστόμαχον τὸν Ἀργεῖόν φησιν ἄνδρα τῆς ἐπιφανεστάτης οἰκίας ὑπάρχοντα, καὶ τετυραννηκότα μὲν Ἀργείων, πεφυκότα δ' ἐκ τυράινων, ὑποχείριον Ἀντιγόνῳ καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς γεόμενον, εἰς Κεγχρεᾶς ἀπαχθῆναι καὶ στρεβλούμενον ἀποθανεῖν, ἀδικώτατα καὶ δεινότατα παθόντα πάντων
- 2 ἀνθρώπων. τηρῶν δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν ὁ συγγραφεὺς τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν ἰδίωμα, φωνάς τινας

perhaps say that now when they were crushed by armed force they should have been sold into slavery with their wives and children. But to this fate the usage of war exposes those who have been guilty of no such impious crime. These men therefore were worthy of some far heavier and more extreme penalty; so that had they suffered what Phylarchus alleges, it was not to be expected that they should have met with pity from the Greeks, but rather that approval and assent should have been accorded to those who executed judgement on them for their wickedness. Yet, while nothing more serious befel the Mantineans, in this their hour of calamity, than the pillage of their property and the enslavement of the male citizens, Phylarchus, all for the sake of making his narrative sensational, composed a tissue not only of falsehoods, but of improbable falsehoods, and, owing to his gross ignorance, was not even able to compare an analogous case and explain how the same people at the same time, on taking Tegea by force, did not commit any such excesses. For if the cause lay in the barbarity of the perpetrators, the Tegeans should have met with the same treatment as those who were conquered at the same time. If only the Mantineans were thus exceptionally treated, we must evidently infer that there was some exceptional cause for anger against them.

59. Again he tells us that Aristomachus of Argos, a man of most noble birth, having himself been tyrant of Argos and being descended from tyrants, was led away captive to Cenchreae and there racked to death, no man deserving less such a terrible fate. Exercising in this case too his peculiar talent, the

πλάττει διὰ τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοῦ στρεβλουμένου προσ-
 πιπτούσας τοῖς σύνεγγυς κατοικοῦσιν, ὧν τοὺς μὲν
 ἐκπληττομένους τὴν ἀσέβειαν, τοὺς δ' ἀπιστοῦντας,
 τοὺς δ' ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ τοῖς γινομένοις προσ-
 3 τρέχειν πρὸς τὴν οἰκίαν φησί. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς
 τοιαύτης τερατείας παρείσθω· δεδήλωται γὰρ ἀρ-
 4 κούντως. ἐγὼ δ' Ἀριστόμαχον, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν εἰς
 τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἕτερον ἤμαρτε, κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ βίου
 προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν εἰς πατρίδα παρανομίαν τῆς
 5 μεγίστης ἄξιον κρίνω τιμωρίας. καίπερ ὁ συγ-
 γραφεύς, βουλόμενος αὔξειν αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ
 παραστήσασθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτῷ
 συναγανακτεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαθεν, οὐ μόνον αὐτόν φησι
 γεγονέναι τύραννον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τυράννων πεφυκέ-
 6 ναι. ταύτης δὲ μείζω κατηγορίαν ἢ πικροτέραν
 οὐδ' ἂν εἰπεῖν ῥαδίως δύναιτ' οὐδεὶς. αὐτὸ γὰρ
 τοῦνομα περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν καὶ
 πάσας περιείληφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ
 7 παρανομίας. Ἀριστόμαχος δ' εἰ τὰς δεινοτάτας ὑπ-
 ἔμεινε τιμωρίας, ὥς οὗτός φησιν, ὅμως οὐχ ἱκανὴν
 8 ἔδωκεν δίκην μιᾶς ἡμέρας, ἐν ᾗ παρεισπεσόντος
 εἰς τὴν πόλιν Ἀράτου μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ με-
 γάλους ἀγῶνας καὶ κινδύνους ὑπομείναντος ὑπὲρ
 τῆς Ἀργείων ἐλευθερίας, τέλος δ' ἐκπεσόντος διὰ
 τὸ μηδένα συγκινηθῆναι τῶν ἔσωθεν αὐτῷ ταξα-
 9 μένων, διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ τυράννου φόβον, Ἀριστό-
 μαχος, ἀφορμῇ ταύτῃ καὶ προφάσει χρησάμενος, ὥς
 τινων συνειδότην τὰ περὶ τὴν εἴσοδον τῶν Ἀχαιῶν,
 ὀγδοήκοντα τοὺς πρώτους τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἀδι-
 κήσαντας στρεβλώσας ἐναντίον τῶν ἀναγκαίων κατ-
 10 ἔσφαξε. παρήμι τὰ παρ' ὅλον τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ καὶ

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author gives us a made-up story of his cries when on the rack having reached the ears of the neighbours, some of whom, horrified at the crime, others scarcely crediting their senses and others in hot indignation ran to the house. About Phylarchus' vice of sensationalism I need say no more, for I have given sufficient evidence of it; but as for Aristomachus, even if he had been guilty of no other offence to the Achaeans, I consider that the general tenor of his life and his lawless violence at Argos rendered him worthy of the most severe punishment. Our author, it is true, with the view of magnifying his importance and moving his readers to share his own indignation at his fate, tells us that he "not only had been a tyrant himself but was descended from tyrants." It would be difficult for anyone to bring a graver or more bitter accusation against a man. Why! the very word "tyrant" alone conveys to us the height of impiety and comprises in itself the sum of all human defiance of law and justice. Aristomachus, if it is true that he was subjected to the most terrible punishment, as Phylarchus tells us, did not get his full deserts for the doings of one day; I mean the day on which when Aratus with the Achaeans had gained entrance to the town and fought hard to free the Argives at great risk, but was finally driven out, because none of those inside the city who had agreed to join him ventured to stir owing to their fear of the tyrant, Aristomachus, availing himself of the pretext that certain persons were cognisant of the entrance of the Achaeans, put to death eighty of the leading citizens who were quite innocent, after torturing them before the eyes of their relatives. I say nothing of the crimes that he and his ancestor were

- 60 τῶν προγόνων ἀσεβήματα· μακρὸν γάρ. διόπερ οὐκ εἴ τινα τῶν ὁμοίων περιέπεσε δεινὸν ἡγητέον, πολὺ δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ μηδενὸς τούτων πείραν λαβὼν 2 ἀθῶος ἀπέθανεν. οὐδ' Ἀντιγόνῳ προσαπτέον οὐδ' Ἀράτῳ παρανομίαν, ὅτι λαβόντες κατὰ πόλεμον ὑποχείριον τύραννον στρεβλώσαντες ἀπέκτειναν, ὃν γε καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν εἰρήνην τοῖς ἀνελούσι καὶ τιμωρησαμένοις ἔπαινος καὶ τιμὴ συνεξηκολούθει 3 παρὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις. ὅτε δὲ χωρὶς τῶν προειρημένων καὶ τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς παρεσπόνδησε, τί 4 παθεῖν ἦν ἄξιος; ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἀπέθετο μὲν τὴν τυραννίδα χρόνοις οὐ πολλοῖς πρότερον, ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν συγκλειόμενος διὰ τὸν Δημητρίου θάνατον, ἀνελπίστως δὲ τῆς ἀσφαλείας ἔτυχε περισταλεῖς ὑπὸ 5 τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πραότητος καὶ καλοκάγαθίας· οἷτινες οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τῆς τυραννίδος ἀσεβημάτων ἀζήμιον ἐποίησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσλαβόντες εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μεγίστην τιμὴν περιέθεσαν, ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν. 6 ὁ δ' ἐπιλαθόμενος τῶν προειρημένων φιλανθρώπων παρὰ πόδας, ἐπεὶ μικρὸν ἐπικυδεστέρας ἔσχε τὰς ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐν Κλεομένει, τὴν τε πατρίδα καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις καιροῖς προσ- 7 ἔνειμε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. ὃν ὑποχείριον γενόμενον οὐκ ἐν Κεγχρεαῖς ἔδει τὴν νύκτα στρεβλούμενον ἀποθανεῖν, ὡς Φύλαρχός φησι, περιαγόμενον δ' εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον καὶ μετὰ τιμωρίας παραδειγματιζό- 8 μενον οὕτως ἐκλιπεῖν τὸ ζῆν. ἀλλ' ὅμως τοιοῦτος

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guilty of all through their lives: it would be too long a story. 60. We must not therefore think it shocking if he met with treatment similar to what he had inflicted: it would have been much more so had he died in peace, without experiencing any such. Nor should we charge Antigonus and Aratus with criminal conduct, if having captured him in war they had tortured and put to death a tyrant, any man who killed and punished whom even in time of peace would have been applauded and honoured by all right-thinking people. When I add that in addition to all his other offences he broke his faith with the Achaeans, what fate shall we say was too bad for him? Not many years previously he had laid down his tyranny, finding himself in an embarrassed position owing to the death of Demetrius, and quite contrary to his expectation suffered no harm, being protected by the Achaeans, who showed themselves most lenient and generous; for not only did they inflict no punishment on him for the crimes he had committed during his tyranny, but receiving him into their League they invested him with the highest dignity, making him their Strategus and Commander-in-chief. But instantly dismissing from his mind all these benefits, the moment it seemed to him that his prospects would be somewhat more brilliant if he sided with Cleomenes, he broke away from the Achaeans, transferring from them to the enemy at a most critical time his personal support and that of his country. Surely when they got him into their hands, he should not have been racked to death at night in Cenchreae, as Phylarchus says, but should have been led round the whole Peloponnesus and tortured as a spectacle for the public until dead.

ὣν οὐδενὸς ἔτυχε δεινοῦ πλήν τοῦ καταποντισθῆναι διὰ τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς Κεγχρεαῖς τεταγμένων.

- 61 Χωρὶς τε τούτων τὰς μὲν Μαντινέων ἡμῖν συμφορὰς μετ' αὐξήσεως καὶ διαθέσεως ἐξηγήσατο, δῆλον ὅτι καθήκειν ὑπολαμβάνων τοῖς συγγραφεῦσι
- 2 τὰς παρανόμους τῶν πράξεων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν γενναιότητος, ἣ περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχρήσαντο καιροὺς, οὐδὲ κατὰ ποσὸν ἐποιή-
- 3 σατο μνήμην, ὥσπερ τὸ τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι τῶν πραξάντων οἰκειότερον ὑπάρχον τῆς ἱστορίας τοῦ τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια τῶν ἔργων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, ἢ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν ἥττον τι διορθομένους ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ζηλωτῶν ἔργων ἥπερ ὑπὸ τῶν παρανόμων καὶ φευκτῶν πρά-
- 4 ξεων. ὁ δὲ πῶς μὲν ἔλαβε Κλεομένης τὴν πόλιν καὶ πῶς ἀκέραιον διαφυλάξας ἐξαπέστειλε παραχρῆμα πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην γραμματοφόρους, ἀξιῶν αὐτοὺς ἀβλαβῇ κομισμένους τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα κοινωνῆσαι τῶν ἰδίων πραγμάτων, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἐδήλωσε, βουλόμενος ὑποδείξαι τὴν Κλεομένους μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ μετριό-
- 5 τητα πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται τῆς ἐπιστολῆς ἀναγινωσκομένης οὐκ ἔασαιεν εἰς τέλος ἀναγνωσθῆναι, μικροῦ δὲ καταλεύσαιεν τοὺς γραμματοφόρους, ἕως τούτου διεσάφησε.
- 6 τὸ δ' ἀκόλουθον καὶ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἴδιον ἀφεῖλε, τὸν ἔπαινον καὶ τὴν ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ μνήμην τῶν ἀξιολόγων προαιρέσεων. καίτοι γ' ἐμποδὼν ἦν. εἰ γὰρ τοὺς λόγῳ καὶ δόγματι μόνον ὑπομείναντας πόλεμον ὑπὲρ φίλων καὶ συμμάχων ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς νομίζομεν, τοῖς δὲ καὶ χώρας καταφθορὰν καὶ πολιορκίαν ἀναδεξαμένοις οὐ μόνον ἔπαινον, ἀλλὰ καὶ

Yet notwithstanding his abominable character, all the harm he suffered was to be drowned in the sea by the officers in command at Cenchreae.

61. To take another instance, Phylarchus, while narrating with exaggeration and elaboration the calamities of the Mantineans, evidently deeming it a historian's duty to lay stress on criminal acts, does not even make mention of the noble conduct of the Megalopolitans at nearly the same date, as if it were rather the proper function of history to chronicle the commission of sins than to call attention to right and honourable actions, or as if it were less improving to read of that good conduct which we should emulate than of that criminal conduct which we should shun. He tells us how Cleomenes took the city, and before doing any damage to it, sent at once a post to the Megalopolitans at Messene offering to hand it back to them uninjured on condition of their throwing in their lot with him. So much he lets us know, wishing to show the magnanimity of Cleomenes and his moderation to his enemies, and he goes on to tell how when the letter was being read out they would not allow the reader to continue until the end, and how they came very near stoning the letter-bearers. So far he makes everything quite clear to us, but he deprives us of what should follow and what is the special virtue of history, I mean praise and honourable mention of conduct noteworthy for its excellence. And yet this was obviously demanded here. For if we consider those men to be good who by speeches and resolutions only expose themselves to war for the sake of their friends and allies, and if we bestow not only praise but lavish thanks and

- 8 χάριτας καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς μεγίστας ἀπονέμεμεν, τίνα
 γε χρὴ περὶ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν ἔχειν διάληψιν; ἄρ'
 9 οὐχὶ τὴν σεμνοτάτην καὶ βελτίστην; οἱ πρῶτον μὲν
 τὴν χώραν Κλεομένει προεῖντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν
 10 ὅλοσχερῶς ἔπαισαν τῇ πατρίδι διὰ τὴν πρὸς
 τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς αἵρεσιν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, δοθείσης
 ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίας ἀβλαβῇ
 ταύτην ἀπολαβεῖν, προεῖλαντο στέρεσθαι χώρας,
 τάφων, ἱερῶν, πατρίδος, τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀπάντων
 συλλήβδην τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαιοτάτων,
 χάριν τοῦ μὴ προδοῦναι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους
 11 πίστιν. οὐ τί κάλλιον ἔργον ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γένοιτ' ἂν;
 ἐπὶ τί δ' ἂν μᾶλλον συγγραφεὺς ἐπιστήσαι τοὺς
 ἀκούοντας; διὰ τίνος δ' ἔργου μᾶλλον ἂν παρ-
 ορμήσαι πρὸς φυλακὴν πίστεως καὶ πρὸς ἀληθινῶν
 πραγμάτων καὶ βεβαίων κοινωνίαν; ὧν οὐδεμίαν
 12 ἐποίησατο μνήμην Φύλαρχος, τυφλώττων, ὥς γ'
 ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστα συγ-
 γραφεῖ καθήκοντα τῶν ἔργων.
- 62 Οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ τούτοις ἐξῆς φησιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ
 τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως λαφύρων ἑξακισχίλια τάλαντα
 τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις πεσεῖν, ὧν τὰ δισχίλια Κλεο-
 2 μένει δοθῆναι κατὰ τοὺς ἔθισμούς. ἐν δὲ τούτοις
 πρῶτον μὲν τίς οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειε τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ
 τὴν ἄγνοιαν τῆς κοινῆς ἐννοίας ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλ-
 ληνικῶν πραγμάτων χορηγίας καὶ δυνάμεως; ἦν μά-
 3 λιστα δεῖ παρὰ τοῖς ἱστοριογράφοις ὑπάρχειν. ἐγὼ
 γὰρ οὐ λέγω κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους, ἐν οἷς
 ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ βασιλέων, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον
 ὑπὸ τῆς συνεχείας τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολέμων ἄρ-
 4 ρην κατέφθαρτο τὰ Πελοποννησιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς
 καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροῖς, ἐν οἷς πάντες ἐν καὶ ταὐτὸ λέ-
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gifts on those who have suffered their country to be laid waste and their city besieged, what should we feel for the Megalopolitans? Surely the deepest reverence and the highest regard. In the first place they left their lands at the mercy of Cleomenes, next they utterly lost their city owing to their support of the Achaeans, and finally, when quite unexpectedly it was put in their power to get it back undamaged, they preferred to lose their land, their tombs, their temples, their homes, and their possessions, all in fact that is dearest to men, rather than break faith with their allies. What more noble conduct has there ever been or could there be? To what could an author with more advantage call the attention of his readers, and how could he better stimulate them to loyalty to their engagements and to true and faithful comradeship? But Phylarchus, blind, as it seems to me, to the most noble actions and those most worthy of an author's attention, has not said a single word on the subject.

62. Further he tells us that from the booty of Megalopolis six thousand talents fell to the Lacedaemonians, of which two thousand were given to Cleomenes according to usage. Now in this statement one marvels first at his lack of practical experience and of that general notion of the wealth and power of Greece so essential to a historian. For, not speaking of those times, when the Peloponnese had been utterly ruined by the Macedonian kings and still more by continued intestinal wars, but in our own times, when all are in complete

- γοντες μεγίστην καρποῦσθαι δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονίαν, ὅμως ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πάσης ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπί-
 5 πλων χωρὶς σωμάτων οὐχ οἶόν τε συναχθῆναι το-
 6 σούτο πλήθος χρημάτων. καὶ διότι τοῦτο νῦν οὐκ
 εἰκῇ, λόγῳ δέ τιμι μᾶλλον ἀποφαινόμεθα, δῆλον ἐκ
 7 τούτων. τίς γὰρ ὑπὲρ Ἀθηναίων οὐχ ἰστόρηκε δι-
 ὅτι καθ' οὓς καιροὺς μετὰ Θηβαίων εἰς τὸν πρὸς
 Λακεδαιμονίους ἐνέβαινον πόλεμον, καὶ μυρίους μὲν
 ἐξέπεμπον στρατιώτας, ἑκατὸν δ' ἐπλήρουν τριή-
 8 ρεις, ὅτι τότε κρίναντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἀξίας ποιεῖσθαι
 τὰς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον εἰσφοράς ἐτιμήσαντο τὴν τε
 χώραν τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἅπασαν καὶ τὰς οἰκίας, ὁμοίως
 9 δὲ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν οὐσίαν· ἀλλ' ὅμως τὸ σύμπαν
 τίμημα τῆς ἀξίας ἐνέλιπε τῶν ἐξακισχιλίων διακο-
 10 σίοις καὶ πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις. ἐξ ὧν οὐκ ἀπει-
 κὸς ἂν φανείη τὸ περὶ Πελοποννησίων ἄρτι ῥηθὲν
 11 ὑπ' ἐμοῦ. κατὰ δ' ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ἐξ αὐτῆς
 τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως ὑπερβολικῶς ἀποφαινόμενος
 οὐκ ἂν τις εἰπεῖν τολμήσειε πλείω γενέσθαι τρια-
 12 κοσίων, ἐπειδήπερ ὁμολογούμενόν ἐστι διότι καὶ
 τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δουλικῶν σωμάτων τὰ πλεῖ-
 στα συνέβη διαφυγεῖν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην. μέγιστον
 δὲ τῶν προειρημένων τεκμήριον· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὄν-
 13 τες δεύτεροι τῶν Ἀρκάδων Μαντινεῖς οὔτε κατὰ
 τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὴν περιουσίαν, ὥς αὐτὸς
 οὗτός φησιν, ἐκ πολιορκίας δὲ καὶ παραδόσεως ἀλόν-
 14 τες, ὥστε μήτε διαφυγεῖν μηδένα μήτε διακλαπή-
 15 ναι ῥαδίως μηδέν, ὅμως τὸ πᾶν λάφυρον ἐποίησαν
 μετὰ τῶν σωμάτων κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς
 63 τάλαντα τριακόσια.
- Τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς τούτῳ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον
 θαυμάσειε; ταῦτα γὰρ ἀποφαινόμενος λέγει πρὸ τῆς

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unison and enjoy, it is thought, very great prosperity, I assert that a sale of all the goods and chattels, apart from slaves, in the whole Peloponnese would not bring in such a sum. That I do not make this assertion lightly but after due estimate will be evident from the following consideration. Who has not read that when the Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered on the war against Sparta, sending out a force of ten thousand men and manning a hundred triremes, they decided to meet the war expenses by a property-tax and made a valuation for this purpose of the whole of Attica including the houses and other property. This estimate, however, fell short of 6000 talents by 250, from which it would seem that my assertion about the Peloponnese at the present day is not far wide of the mark. But as regards the times of which we are dealing, no one, even if he were exaggerating, would venture to say that more than three hundred talents could be got out of Megalopolis, since it is an acknowledged fact that most of the free population and the slaves had escaped to Messene. But the best proof of what I say is the following: Mantinea, both in wealth and power, was second to no city in Arcadia, as Phylarchus himself says, and it surrendered after a siege, so that it was not easy for anyone to escape or for anything to be stolen, but yet the value of the whole booty together with slaves amounted at this very period to but three hundred talents.

63. What he tells us next is still more astounding; for after this assertion about the booty, he

παρατάξεως δέχ' ἡμέραις μάλιστα τὸν παρὰ Πτο-
 λεμαίου πρεσβευτὴν ἐλθεῖν ἀγγέλλοντα πρὸς τὸν
 Κλεομένη διότι Πτολεμαῖος τὸ μὲν χορηγεῖν ἀπο-
 λέγει, διαλύεσθαι δὲ παρακαλεῖ πρὸς τὸν Ἀντί-
 2 γονον. τὸν δ' ἀκούσαντά φησι κρῖναι διότι δεῖ τὴν
 ταχίστην ἐκκυβεύειν τοῖς ὅλοις πρὸ τοῦ συνεῖναι
 τὰ προσπεπτωκότα τὰς δυνάμεις, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν
 ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις πράγμασιν ἐλπίδα τοῦ δύνα-
 3 σθαι μισθοδοτεῖν. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἑξακισχιλίων ἐγκρα-
 τὴς ἐγεγόνει ταλάντων κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς,
 τὸν Πτολεμαῖον αὐτὸν ἡδύνατο ταῖς χορηγίαις ὑπερ-
 4 θέσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἀντίγονον, εἰ μόνον τριακο-
 σίων ὑπῆρχε κύριος, καὶ λίαν ἱκανὸς ἦν ἀσφαλῶς
 5 ὑπομένων τρίβειν τὸν πόλεμον. τὸ δ' ἅμα μὲν
 πάσας ἀποφαίνειν τῷ Κλεομένει τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐν
 Πτολεμαίῳ διὰ τὰς χορηγίας, ἅμα δὲ τοσούτων
 χρημάτων αὐτὸν φάναι κύριον γεγονέναι κατὰ τοὺς
 αὐτοὺς καιροὺς, πῶς οὐ τῆς μεγίστης ἀλογίας, ἔτι
 6 δ' ἀσκεψίας ἐστὶ σημεῖον; πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα τῷ
 συγγραφεῖ τοιαῦτα, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους
 καιροὺς καὶ παρ' ὅλην τὴν πραγματείαν κατα-
 τέτακται, περὶ ὧν ἀρκεῖν ὑπολαμβάνω κατὰ τὴν
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα.

64 Μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως ἄλωσιν Ἀντι-
 γόνου παραχειμάζοντος ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἀργείων πόλει,
 συναγαγὼν Κλεομένης ἅμα τῷ τὴν ἑαρινὴν ὥραν
 ἐνίστασθαι καὶ παρακαλέσας τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς και-
 ροῖς, ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν στρατιὰν ἐνέβαλεν εἰς τὴν τῶν
 2 Ἀργείων χώραν, ὥς μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐδόκει, παρα-
 βόλως καὶ τολμηρῶς διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα τῶν κατὰ
 τὰς εἰσόδους τόπων, ὥς δὲ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις,
 3 ἀσφαλῶς καὶ νουνεχῶς. ὁρῶν γὰρ τὸν Ἀντίγονον

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states that just ten days before the battle an envoy from Ptolemy reached Cleomenes informing him that that king withdrew his subvention and requested him to come to terms with Antigonus. He says that Cleomenes on hearing this resolved to stake his all on a battle before it reached the ears of his troops, as he had no hope of being able to meet their pay from his own resources. But if at this very time he had six thousand talents at his command, he could have been more generous than Ptolemy himself in the matter of subventions; and if he could only dispose of three hundred talents it was enough to enable him to continue the war against Antigonus with absolute financial security. But to state in one breath that Cleomenes depended entirely on Ptolemy for money and that at the very same time he was in possession of such a large sum, is a sign of the greatest levity and want of reflection. Phylarchus has made many similar statements not only about this period but all through his work. I think, however, that what I have said at such length as the plan of this history allows should suffice.

64. After the capture of Megalopolis, while 222 B.C.
Antigonus was still in winter quarters at Argos, Cleomenes at the beginning of spring collected his troops, and after addressing them in terms suitable to the occasion, led them out and invaded Argolis. Most people think that this was rash and hazardous on his part, owing to the strength of the frontier, but if we judge rightly it was really a safe and wise course. For as he saw that Antigonus had dis-

διαφεικότα τὰς δυνάμεις, ἥδει σαφῶς ὥς πρῶτον μὲν
 τὴν εἰσβολὴν ἀκινδύνως ποιήσεται, δεῦτερον ἔτι
 τῆς χώρας καταφθειρομένης ἕως τῶν τειχῶν ἀνάγκη
 τοὺς Ἀργεῖους θεωροῦντας τὸ γινόμενον ἀσχάλλειν
 4 καὶ καταμέμφεσθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 συμβαίῃ μὴ δυνάμενον αὐτὸν ὑποφέρειν τὸν ἐπιρρα-
 πισμὸν τῶν ὄχλων ἐξελθεῖν καὶ διακινδυνεύσαι τοῖς
 παροῦσι, πρόδηλον ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἦν αὐτῷ
 5 διότι νικήσει ῥαδίως. εἰ δ' ἐμμείνας τοῖς λογισμοῖς
 ἀφησυχάζοι, καταπληξάμενος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους καὶ
 ταῖς ἰδίαις δυνάμεσι θάρσος ἐνεργασάμενος ἀσφαλῶς
 ὑπέλαβε ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν.
 6 ὁ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. τῆς γὰρ χώρας δηουμένης
 οἱ μὲν ὄχλοι συστρεφόμενοι τὸν Ἀντίγονον ἐλοιδό-
 ρουν. ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἡγεμονικῶς καὶ βασιλικῶς
 οὐδὲν περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενος τοῦ κατὰ λόγον
 7 < χρήσασθαι τοῖς > πράγμασιν ἤγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν.
 ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν
 καταφθείρας μὲν τὴν χώραν, καταπληξάμενος δὲ
 τοὺς ὑπεναντίους, εὐθαρσεῖς δὲ πεποιηκῶς τὰς
 ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεις πρὸς τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον κίνδυνον,
 ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἐπανῆλθε.
 65 Τοῦ δὲ θέρου ἐνισταμένου καὶ συνελθόντων
 τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐκ τῆς χειμασίας
 ἀναλαβὼν τὴν στρατιὰν Ἀντίγονος προῆγε μετὰ τῶν
 2 συμμάχων εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν, ἔχων Μακεδόνας μὲν
 τοὺς εἰς τὴν φάλαγγα μυρίους, πελταστὰς δὲ τρισ-
 χιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, Ἀγριᾶνας δὲ σὺν
 τούτοις χιλίους καὶ Γαλάτας ἄλλους τοσούτους, μι-
 σθοφόρους δὲ τοὺς πάντας πεζοὺς μὲν τρισχιλίους,
 3 ἵππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, Ἀχαιῶν δ' ἐπιλέκτους πεζοὺς
 μὲν τρισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, καὶ Μεγαλο-

missed his forces, he knew well that, in the first place, he would be exposed to no danger in invading, and secondly, that, if the country were laid waste up to the walls, the Argives on seeing it would certainly be much vexed and lay the blame on Antigonus. If, therefore, unable to support the reproaches of the people, he marched out and risked a battle with such forces as he had, the probabilities were in favour of Cleomenes gaining an easy victory; but if, adhering to his plan, he remained quiet, he thought he could, after terrifying his enemies and inspiring his own troops with fresh courage, effect a safe retreat to Laconia, as actually happened. For, when the country was being laid waste, the populace held meetings in which they heaped abuse on Antigonus; but he, like a true general and prince, paid no attention to anything but a wise conduct of affairs, and remained quiet, while Cleomenes, having carried out his intention of devastating the country and thus striking terror into the enemy and encouraging his own troops to face the coming danger, retired in safety to his own country.

65. Early in summer, on the Macedonians and Achaeans rejoining from their winter quarters, Antigonus advanced with his own army and the allies into Laconia. His Macedonian forces consisted of ten thousand to form the phalanx, three thousand peltasts, and three hundred horse. He had besides a thousand Agrianians, and a thousand Gauls, while his mercenary force numbered three thousand foot and three hundred horse. The Achaeans furnished three thousand picked infantry and three hundred horse. There were also a

πολίτας χιλίους εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον καθ-
 ωπλισμένους, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Κερκιδᾶς Μεγαλοπολίτης,
 4 τῶν δὲ συμμάχων Βοιωτῶν μὲν πεζοὺς δισχιλίους,
 ἵππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους, Ἑπειρωτῶν πεζοὺς χιλίους,
 ἵππεῖς πεντήκοντα, Ἀκαρνάνων ἄλλους τοσούτους,
 Ἰλλυριῶν χιλίους ἑξακοσίους, ἐφ' ὧν ἦν Δημήτριος
 5 ὁ Φάριος, ὥστ' εἶναι πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν πεζοὺς
 μὲν εἰς δισμυρίους ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δὲ χιλίους
 6 καὶ διακοσίους. ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης, προσδοκῶν τὴν
 ἔφοδον, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας τὰς εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσβολὰς
 ἡσφαλίσατο φυλακαῖς καὶ τάφροις καὶ δένδρων ἐκ-
 7 κοπαῖς, αὐτὸς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Σελλασίαν καλουμένην
 μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐστρατοπέδευε, τῆς πάσης ὑπαρ-
 χούσης αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς εἰς δύο μυριάδας, στοχαζό-
 μενος ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ταύτη ποιήσασθαι τοὺς
 8 ὑπεναντίους τὴν εἰσβολήν· ὁ καὶ συνεκύρησε. δύο
 δὲ λόφων ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς εἰσόδου κειμένων, ὧν τὸν
 μὲν Εὖαν, τὸν δ' ἕτερον Ὀλυμπον καλεῖσθαι συμ-
 9 βαίνει, τῆς δ' ὁδοῦ μεταξὺ τούτων παρὰ τὸν
 Οἰνοῦντα ποταμὸν φερούσης εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην, ὁ
 μὲν Κλεομένης, τῶν προειρημένων λόφων συνάμφω
 τάφρον καὶ χάρακα προβαλόμενος, ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Εὖαν
 ἔταξε τοὺς περιοίκους καὶ συμμάχους, ἐφ' ὧν ἐπέ-
 στησε τὸν ἀδελφὸν Εὐκλείδαν, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν Ὀλυμ-
 πον κατεῖχε μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν μισθο-
 10 φόρων. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν
 ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τῆς ὁδοῦ τοὺς ἵππεῖς μετὰ μέρους
 11 τινὸς τῶν μισθοφόρων παρενέβαλεν. Ἀντίγονος δὲ
 παραγενόμενος καὶ συνθεωρήσας τὴν τε τῶν τόπων
 ὀχυρότητα καὶ τὸν Κλεομένην πᾶσι τοῖς οἰκείοις μέ-
 ρεσι τῆς δυνάμεως οὕτως εὐστόχως προκατειληφότα
 τὰς εὐκαιρίας ὥστε παραπλήσιον εἶναι τὸ σύμπαν
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thousand Megalopolitans armed in the Macedonian manner under the command of Cercidas of Megalopolis. The allies consisted of two thousand Bocotian foot and two hundred horse, a thousand Epirot foot and fifty horse, the same number of Acarnanians, and one thousand six hundred Illyrians under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. His total force thus amounted to twenty-eight thousand foot and one thousand two hundred horse. Cleomenes, who expected the invasion, had occupied the other passes into Laconia, placing garrisons in them and fortifying them by means of trenches and barricades of trees, and himself encamped at a place called Sellasia, with a force of twenty thousand men, as he conjectured that the invaders would most likely take this route, as in fact they did. At the actual pass there are two hills, one called Euas and the other Olympus, the road to Sparta running between these along the bank of the river Oenous. Cleomenes, having fortified both of these hills with a trench and palisade, posted on Euas the perioeci and allies under the command of his brother Eucleides, while he himself held Olympus with the Spartans and mercenaries. On the low ground beside the river on each side of the road he drew up his cavalry and a certain portion of the mercenaries. Antigonus on his arrival observed the great natural strength of the position and how Cleomenes had so cleverly occupied the advantageous points with the portions of his force suitable in each case, that his

σχῆμα τῆς στρατοπεδείας τῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὅπλο-
12 μάχων προβολῆς· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπέλειπε τῶν πρὸς
ἐπίθεσιν ἅμα καὶ φυλακὴν, ἀλλ' ἣν ὁμοῦ παράταξις
66 ἐνεργὸς καὶ παρεμβολὴ δυσπρόσοδος· διὸ καὶ τὸ
μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου καταπειράζειν καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι
προχείρως ἀπέγνω, στρατοπεδεύσας δ' ἐν βραχεῖ
διαστήματι, καὶ λαβὼν πρόβλημα τὸν Γοργύλον
καλούμενον ποταμόν, τινὰς μὲν ἡμέρας ἐπιμένων
συνθεώρει τὰς τε τῶν τόπων ιδιότητας καὶ τὰς
2 τῶν δυνάμεων διαφοράς, ἅμα δὲ καὶ προδεικνύων
τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐξεκαλείτο τὰς τῶν
3 ὑπεναντίων ἐπινοίας. οὐ δυνάμενος δὲ λαβεῖν οὐ-
δὲν ἄργον οὐδ' ἔξοπλον διὰ τὸ πρὸς πᾶν ἐτοιμῶς
4 ἀντικεινῆσθαι τὸν Κλεομένη, τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἐπι-
νοίας ἀπέστη, τέλος δ' ἐξ ὁμολόγου διὰ μάχης ἀμ-
φότεροι προέθεντο κρίνειν τὰς πράξεις· πᾶν γὰρ
εὐφυνεῖς καὶ παραπλησίους ἡγεμόνας ἢ τύχῃ συν-
5 ἔβαλε τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς
κατὰ τὸν Εὐᾶν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀντέταξε τῶν τε Μακε-
δόνων τοὺς χαλκάσπιδας καὶ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς, κατὰ
σπείρας ἐναλλάξ τεταγμένους, Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν
6 Ἀκμήτου καὶ Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον ἐπιστήσας. ἐπὶ
δὲ τούτοις τοὺς Ἀκαρνᾶνας καὶ Κρήτας ἐπέβαλε·
τούτων δὲ κατόπιν ἦσαν δισχίλιοι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν,
7 ἐφεδρείας λαμβάνοντες τάξιν. τοὺς δ' ἱππεῖς περὶ
τὸν Οἰνοῦντα ποταμὸν ἀντέθηκε τῷ τῶν πολεμίων
ἱππικῷ, συστήσας αὐτοῖς Ἀλέξανδρον ἡγεμόνα καὶ
συμπαρεθεῖς πεζοὺς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν χιλίους καὶ Με-
8 γαλοπολίτας τοὺς ἴσους. αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς μισθοφό-
ρους ἔχων καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας κατὰ τὸν Ὀλυμπον
πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Κλεομένη διέγνω ποιεῖσθαι τὴν
9 μάχην. προτάξας οὖν τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐπέστησε

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whole formation resembled the attitude of a good heavy-armed fighter ready for combat. For attack and defence alike nothing was wanting, the position being at one and the same time a fortified camp difficult to approach and a line of battle ready for action. 66. Antigonus therefore decided to make no hasty attempt to force the position and come to blows with the enemy, but encamped at a short distance with the river Gorgylus on his front, and for several days remained there noting the peculiar features of the country and the character of the forces, while at the same time, by threatening certain movements, he attempted to make the enemy show his hand. But being unable to find any weak or unprotected spot, since Cleomenes always checked him at once by a counter-movement, he abandoned this project, and finally the kings agreed to try issues in a battle: for they were very gifted and evenly-matched, these two generals whom Fortune had thus brought face to face. To confront those on Euas Antigonus drew up the brazen-shielded Macedonians and the Illyrians in alternate lines, placing them under the command of Alexander son of Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos. Behind these stood the Acarnanians and Cretans, and in the rear as a reserve were two thousand Achaeans. His cavalry he opposed to that of the enemy by the river Oenous under the command of Alexander and supported by a thousand Achaean and as many Megalopolitan infantry. He himself in person decided to attack Cleomenes on Olympus with the mercenaries and the rest of the Macedonians. Putting

- διφαλαγγίαν ἐπάλληλον τῶν Μακεδόνων· ἐποίει δὲ
 10 τοῦτο διὰ τὴν στενότητα τῶν τόπων. σύνθημα δ'
 ἦν τοῖς μὲν Ἰλλυριοῖς τότε ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς
 πρὸς τὸν λόφον προσβολῆς, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀρθεῖσαν
 ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ὀλυμπον τόπων σινδόνα· προσ-
 ηρτημένοι γὰρ ἦσαν οὗτοι νυκτὸς ἐν τῷ Γοργύλῳ
 11 ποταμῷ πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ τοῦ λόφου ῥίζῃ· τοῖς δὲ
 Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ τοῖς ἰππεῦσι παραπλησίως,
 ἐπειδὰν φοινικὶς ἐξαρθῇ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως.
 67 Ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ μὲν καιρὸς ἦκε τῆς χρείας, τὸ δὲ
 σύνθημα τοῖς Ἰλλυριοῖς ἀπεδόθη, παρήγγειλαν δὲ
 ποιεῖν τὸ δέον οἷς ἦν ἐπιμελές, πάντες εὐθέως ἀνα-
 δείξαντες αὐτοὺς κατήρχοντο τῆς πρὸς τὸν βουνὸν
 2 προσβολῆς. οἱ δὲ μετὰ τῶν Κλεομένους ἰππέων ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς ταχθέντες εὐζωνοὶ, θεωροῦντες τὰς σπείρας
 τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐρήμους ἐκ τῶν κατόπιν οὔσας, κατ'
 οὐρὰν προσπίπτοντες εἰς ὀλοσχερῇ κίνδυνον ἦγον
 3 τοὺς πρὸς τὸν λόφον βιαζομένους, ὥς ἂν τῶν μὲν
 περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου κατὰ πρόσωπον
 αὐτοῖς ἐφeskώτων, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων κατόπιν ἐπι-
 κειμένων καὶ προσφερόντων τὰς χεῖρας ἐρρωμένως.
 4 ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ συννοήσας τὸ γινόμενον, ἅμα δὲ προ-
 ορώμενος τὸ μέλλον, Φιλοποίμην ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης
 τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὑποδεικνύειν ἐπεβάλλετο τοῖς προ-
 5 εστῶσι τὸ συμβησόμενον· οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος
 αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ μῆτ' ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τετάχθαι μηδεπώ-
 ποτε κομιδῇ τε νέον ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, παρακαλέσας
 τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ πολίτας ἐνέβαλε τοῖς πολεμίοις τολμη-
 6 ρῶς. οὗ γενομένου ταχέως οἱ προσκείμενοι μισθο-
 φόροι κατ' οὐρὰν τοῖς προσβαίνουσιν, ἀκούσαντες
 τῆς κραυγῆς καὶ συνιδόντες τὴν τῶν ἰππέων συμπλο-

the mercenaries in front, he drew up the Macedonians behind them in two phalanxes with no interval between, the narrowness of the space rendering this necessary. It was arranged that the Illyrians were to begin their assault on the hill upon seeing a white flag waved from the neighbourhood of Olympus, for in the night they had succeeded in taking up a position close under the hill in the bed of the river Gorgylus. The signal for the Megalopolitans and cavalry was to be a red cloak waved by the king.

67. When the time to begin the action came, the signal was given to the Illyrians, and, the officers calling on their men to do their duty, they all instantly showed themselves and began the attack on the hill. The light-armed mercenaries, who had been posted near Cleomenes' cavalry, upon seeing that the rear of the Achaean line was exposed, attacked them from behind, and the whole force that was pressing on to the hill was thus threatened with a serious disaster, as Eucleides' troops were facing them from above while the mercenaries were vigorously attacking their rear. At this critical moment Philopoemen of Megalopolis, who saw what was happening and foresaw what was likely to happen, first attempted to call the attention of the commanding officers to it, but as no one paid any attention to him, since he had never held any command and was quite a young man, he called on his own fellow-citizens to follow him and boldly fell upon the enemy. Upon this the mercenaries who were attacking the assailants of the hill in the rear, hearing the clamour and seeing the

- κὴν, ἀφόμενοι τῶν προκειμένων ἀνέτρεχον εἰς τὰς ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς τάξεις καὶ προσεβοήθουν τοῖς παρ' αὐτῶν ἱπ-
 πεύσι. τούτου δὲ συμβάντος, ἀπερίσπαστον γενό-
 7 μενον τό τε τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν
 ἅμα τούτοις προσβαινόντων πλῆθος ἐκθύμως ὤρ-
 8 μησε καὶ τεθαρρηκότως ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ἐξ οὗ
 καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα φανερόν ἐγενήθη διότι τοῦ κατὰ τὸν
 Εὐκλείδαν προτερήματος αἷτιος ἐγένετο Φιλοποίμην.
 68 ὅθεν καὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονόν φασι μετὰ ταῦτα κατα-
 πειράζοντα πυνθάνεσθαι τοῦ ταχθέντος ἐπὶ τῶν ἱπ-
 πέων Ἀλεξάνδρου διὰ τί πρὸ τοῦ παραδοθῆναι τὸ
 2 σύνθημα τοῦ κινδύνου κατάρξαιτο. τοῦ δ' ἄρνου-
 μένου, φάσκοντος δὲ μεираκίον τι Μεγαλοπολιτικὸν
 προεγχειρῆσαι παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην, εἰπεῖν διότι
 τὸ μὲν μεираκίον ἡγεμόνος ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ ποιῆσαι,
 συνθεασάμενον τὸν καιρόν, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἡγεμὼν ὑπ-
 ἄρχων μεираκίου τοῦ τυχόντος.
 3 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οἷ γε περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν ὁρῶντες
 προσβαινούσας τὰς σπείρας, ἀφόμενοι τοῦ χρῆσθαι
 4 ταῖς τῶν τόπων εὐκαιρίαις· τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐκ πολλοῦ
 συναντῶντας καὶ προσπίπτοντας τοῖς πολεμίοις τὰ
 μὲν ἐκείνων στίφη συνταράττειν καὶ διαλύειν,
 αὐτοὺς δ' ὑποχωρεῖν ἐπὶ πόδα καὶ μεθίστασθαι πρὸς
 5 τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους αἰεὶ τόπους ἀσφαλῶς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
 προλυμηνάμενοι καὶ συγχέαντες τὸ τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ
 καὶ τῆς συντάξεως ἰδίωμα τῶν ὑπεναντίων ῥαδίως
 6 αὐτοὺς ἐτρέψαντο διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων εὐφυΐαν·
 τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν ἐποίησαν, καθάπερ δ' ἐξ ἐτοίμου
 7 σφίσι τῆς νίκης ὑπαρχούσης τούναντίον ἔπραξαν.
 κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς στάσιν ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄκρων, ὥς ἀνωτάτω σπεύδοντες λαβεῖν τοὺς ὑπ-
 εναντίους, εἰς τὸ τὴν φυγὴν ἐπὶ πολὺ καταφερῇ
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cavalry engaged, abandoned what they had in hand and running back to their original position came to the aid of their cavalry. The Illyrians and Macedonians and the rest of this attacking force were now disengaged, and threw themselves with great dash and courage on the enemy. Thus, as became evident afterwards, the success of the attack on Eucleides was due to Philopoemen. 68. Hence it is said that subsequently Antigonos asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, to tease him, why he had begun the battle before the signal was given. On Alexander denying this and saying that a stripling from Megalopolis had begun it contrary to his own judgement, the king said that this stripling had acted like a good general and Alexander himself, the general, like an ordinary stripling.

To continue our narrative, Eucleides' troops, on seeing the enemy's lines advancing, cast away the advantage the ground gave them. They should have charged the enemy while still at a distance, thus breaking his ranks and throwing them into disorder, and then retreating slowly, have returned in safety to the higher ground. Thus having in the first instance spoilt and broken up that peculiar serried formation of the enemy so well adapted to their special equipment, they would easily have put them to flight owing to their favourable position. Instead of doing this, they acted as if the victory were already in their hand and did exactly the opposite. They remained, that is, at the summit in their original position with the view of getting the enemy as high up the hill as possible so that their flight would be for a long distance down the steep and precipitous

- 8 καὶ κρημνώδη γενέσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις. συνέβη δ',
ὅπερ εἰκὸς ἦν, τοῦναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολιπόντες
αὐτοῖς ἀναχώρησιν, προσδεξάμενοι δ' ἀκεραίους ἅμα
καὶ συνεστώσας τὰς σπείρας, εἰς τοῦτο δυσχρηστίας
ἦλθον ὥστε δι' αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ λόφου κορυφῆς δια-
9 μάχεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βιαζομένους. λοιπὸν ὅσον ἐκ
ποδὸς ἐπιέσθησαν τῷ βάρει τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ καὶ
τῆς συντάξεως, εὐθέως οἱ μὲν Ἰλλυριοὶ τὴν κατά-
στασιν ἐλάβανον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν τὴν ὑπὸ
πόδα, διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλείπεσθαι τόπον εἰς ἀναχώρη-
10 σιν καὶ μετάστασιν ἑαυτοῖς. ἐξ οὗ ταχέως συνέβη
τραπέντας αὐτοὺς ὀλεθρίῳ χρήσασθαι φυγῇ, κρη-
μνώδη καὶ δύσβατον ἔχόντων ἐπὶ πολὺ τὴν ἀνα-
χώρησιν τῶν τόπων.
- 69 Ἄμα δὲ τούτοις ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἵππεῖς συνετελεῖτο
κίνδυνος, ἐκπρεπῇ ποιουμένων τὴν χρεῖαν τῶν Ἀχαι-
κῶν ἱππέων ἀπάντων, μάλιστα δὲ Φιλοποίμενος,
διὰ τὸ περὶ τῆς αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίας συνεστάναι τὸν
2 ὅλον ἀγῶνα. καθ' ὃν καιρὸν τῷ προειρημένῳ συν-
έβη τὸν μὲν ἵππον πεσεῖν πληγέντα καιρίως, αὐτὸν
δὲ πεζομαχοῦντα περιπεσεῖν τραύματι βιαίῳ δι' ἀμ-
3 φοῖν τοῖν μηροῖν. οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς κατὰ τὸν Ὀλυμ-
πον τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐποιοῦντο διὰ τῶν εὐζώνων καὶ
μισθοφόρων τὴν συμπλοκὴν, παρ' ἑκατέροις σχεδὸν
4 ὑπαρχόντων τούτων εἰς πεντακισχιλίους. ὧν ποτὲ
μὲν κατὰ μέρη, ποτὲ δ' ὅλοσχερῶς συμπιπτόντων,
διαφέρουσαν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν
χρεῖαν, ὁμοῦ τῶν τε βασιλέων καὶ τῶν στρατοπέ-
5 δων ἐν συνόψει ποιουμένων τὴν μάχην. ἡμιλλῶντο
δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ τάγμα
6 ταῖς εὐψυχίαις. ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης, ὁρῶν τοὺς μὲν
περὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν πεφευγότας, τοὺς δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐπι-
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slope. As might have been expected, the result was just the reverse. They had left themselves no means of retreat and on being charged by the Macedonian cohorts which were still fresh and in good order, they were so hard put to it that they had to fight with the assailants for the possession of the extreme summit. From now onwards, wherever they were forced back by the weight of their adversaries' weapons and formation, the Illyrians at once occupied the place where they had stood, while each backward step they took was on to lower ground, since they had not left themselves any room for orderly retreat or change of formation. The consequence was that very soon they had to turn and take to a flight which proved disastrous, as, for a long distance, it was over difficult and precipitous ground.

69. At this same time the cavalry action was going on, all the Achaean horsemen, and especially Philopoemen, rendering most distinguished service, as the whole struggle was for their liberty. Philopoemen's horse fell mortally wounded, and he, fighting on foot, received a serious wound through both thighs. Meanwhile the two kings at Olympus opened the battle with their light-armed troops and mercenaries, of which each had about five thousand. These, now attacking each other in detachments and now along the whole line, exhibited the greatest gallantry on both sides, all the more so as they were fighting under the eyes of the kings and their armies. Man therefore vied with man and regiment with regiment in a display of courage. Cleomenes, seeing his brother's troops in flight and the cavalry on the

πέδοις ἵππεῖς ὅσον οὕτω κλίνοντας, καταπλαγῆς ὦν
 μὴ πανταχόθεν προσδέξῃται τοὺς πολεμίους, ἥναγ-
 κάζετο διασπᾶν τὰ προτειχίσματα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν
 δύναμιν ἐξάγειν μετωπηδὸν κατὰ μίαν πλευρὰν τῆς
 7 στρατοπεδείας. ἀνακληθέντων δὲ τῶν παρ' ἑκατέ-
 ροις εὐζώνων ἐκ τοῦ μεταξὺ τόπου διὰ τῆς σάλπιγ-
 γος, συναλαλάξασαι καὶ καταβαλοῦσαι τὰς σαρί-
 8 σας συνέβαλλον αἱ φάλαγγες ἀλλήλαις. ἀγῶνος δὲ
 γενομένου κραταιοῦ, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ πόδα ποιου-
 μένων τὴν ἀναχώρησιν καὶ πιεζομένων ἐπὶ πολὺ τῶν
 Μακεδόνων ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν Λακόνων εὐψυχίας, ποτὲ
 δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐξωθουμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ βύ-
 9 ρους τῆς τῶν Μακεδόνων τάξεως, τέλος οἱ περὶ τὸν
 Ἀντίγονον συμφράξαντες τὰς σαρίσας, καὶ χρησά-
 μενοι τῷ τῆς ἐπαλλήλου φάλαγγος ἰδιώματι, βία
 προσπεσόντες ἐξέωσαν ἐκ τῶν ὀχυρωμάτων τοὺς
 10 Λακεδαιμονίους. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄλλο πλῆθος ἔφευγε
 προτροπάδην φονευόμενον· ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης ἵππεῖς
 τινὰς ἔχων περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἀπεχώρησε μετὰ τούτων
 11 ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς νυ-
 κτὸς καταβὰς εἰς Γύθιον, ἡτοιμασμένων αὐτῷ τῶν
 πρὸς τὸν πλοῦν ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου πρὸς τὸ συμ-
 βαῖνον, ἀπῆρε μετὰ τῶν φίλων εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν.
 70 Ἀντίγονος δ' ἐγκρατὴς γενόμενος ἐξ ἐφόδου τῆς
 Σπάρτης, τά τε λοιπὰ μεγαλοψύχως καὶ φιланθρώ-
 πως ἐχρήσατο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, τό τε πολίτευμα
 τὸ πάτριον αὐτοῖς ἀποκαταστήσας ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις
 ἀνέζευξε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, προσ-
 αγγελθέντος αὐτῷ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς εἰσβεβληκότας
 2 εἰς Μακεδονίαν πορθεῖν τὴν χώραν. οὕτως αἰεί
 ποθ' ἢ τύχη τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων παρὰ λό-
 3 γον εἶωθε κρίνειν. καὶ γὰρ τότε Κλεομένης, εἴτε

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level ground on the point of giving way, was afraid of being charged from all sides and was compelled to pull down part of his defences and to lead out his whole force in line from one side of the camp. Each side now recalled by bugle their light-armed troops from the space between them, and shouting their war-cry and lowering their lances, the two phalanxes met. A stubborn struggle followed. At one time the Macedonians gradually fell back facing the enemy, giving way for a long distance before the courage of the Lacedaemonians, at another the latter were pushed from their ground by the weight of the Macedonian phalanx, until, on Antigonus ordering the Macedonians to close up in the peculiar formation of the double phalanx with its serried line of pikes, they delivered a charge which finally forced the Lacedaemonians from their stronghold. The whole Spartan army now fled in rout, followed and cut down by the enemy; but Cleomenes with a few horsemen reached Sparta in safety. At nightfall he went down to Gythion, where all had been prepared some time previously for the voyage in view of contingencies, and set sail with his friends for Alexandria.

70. Antigonus having attacked and taken Sparta, treated the Lacedaemonians in all respects with great generosity and humanity, and, after restoring the ancient form of government, left the city in a few days with his whole army, as he had received news that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were ravaging the country. Thus ever is it the way of Fortune to decide the most weighty issues against rule and reason. For on this occasion Cleomenes,

τὰ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον παρείλκυσε τελέως ὀλίγας
 ἡμέρας, εἴτ' ἀναχωρήσας ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης εἰς τὴν
 πόλιν ἐπὶ βραχὺ τῶν καιρῶν ἀντεποιήσατο, δια-
 κατέσχεν ἂν τὴν ἀρχήν.

- 4 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὃ γ' Ἀντίγονος παραγενόμενος εἰς
 Τεγέαν, καὶ τούτοις ἀποδοὺς τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν,
 δευτεραῖος ἐντεῦθεν εἰς Ἄργος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἦλθε τὴν
 5 τῶν Νεμέων πανήγυριν. ἐν ᾗ τυχὼν πάντων τῶν
 πρὸς ἀθάνατον δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν ἀνηκόντων ὑπὸ τε
 τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστης
 τῶν πόλεων, ὥρμησε κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς Μακεδονίαν.
 6 καταλαβὼν δὲ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ
 συμβαλὼν ἐκ παρατάξεως, τῇ μὲν μάχῃ κατώρθωσε,
 τῇ δὲ παρακλήσει καὶ κραυγῇ τῇ κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν
 κίνδυνον ἐκθύμως χρησάμενος εἰς αἵματος ἀναγωγὴν
 καὶ τινα τοιαύτην διάθεσιν ἐμπεσὼν μετ' οὐ πολὺ
 7 νόσῳ τὸν βίον μετήλλαξε, καλὰς ἐλπίδας ὑποδείξας
 ἐν αὐτῷ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν ἐν
 τοῖς ὑπαίθροις χρεῖαν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν ὅλην
 8 αἵρεσιν καὶ καλοκάγαθίαν. τὴν δὲ Μακεδόνων
 βασιλείαν ἀπέλιπε Φιλίππῳ τῷ Δημητρίῳ.
- 71 Τίνος δὲ χάριν ἐποιησάμεθα τὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον
 2 ὑπὲρ τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου μνήμην; διότι τῶν
 καιρῶν τούτων συναπτόντων τοῖς ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἱστορεῖ-
 σθαι μέλλουσι χρήσιμον ἐδόκει, μᾶλλον δ' ἀναγ-
 καῖον εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν τὸ ποιῆσαι
 πᾶσιν ἐναργῇ καὶ γνώριμον τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν περὶ
 3 Μακεδόνας καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας τότε κατάστασιν.
 περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς καὶ Πτολεμαίου νόσῳ
 τὸν βίον μεταλλάξαντος Πτολεμαῖος ὁ κληθεὶς
 4 Φιλοπάτωρ διεδέξατο τὴν βασιλείαν. μετήλλαξε
 δὲ καὶ Σέλευκος ὁ Σελεύκου τοῦ Καλλινίκου καὶ

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had he deferred giving battle for merely a few days, or had he, on returning to Sparta after the battle, waited ever so short a time to avail himself of the turn of events, would have saved his crown.

Antigonus however, on reaching Tegea, restored the old form of government there also, and two days later arrived at Argos just in time for the Nemean festival, at which the Achaean League and each several city heaped on him every honour they could think of to immortalize his memory. He then hastily left for Macedonia, where he found the Illyrians. Engaging them in a pitched battle, he was victorious, but in the course of the fight he strained himself so much by shouting to his troops to cheer them on that from a rupture of a blood-vessel or some such accident he fell sick and died 220 B.C. shortly afterwards. He had aroused high hopes of himself throughout Greece, not so much by his success in the field as by his general high principles and excellence. He was succeeded on the throne of Macedon by Philip son of Demetrius.

71. Now to explain why I have dealt with this war at such length. As this period immediately precedes those times, the history of which I am about to write, I thought it would be of service, or rather that the original plan of this work made it necessary for me, to make clearly known to everyone the state of affairs in Macedonia and Greece at this time. Just about the same time Ptolemy Euergetes fell sick and died, being succeeded by Ptolemy surnamed Philopator. Seleucus, the son of the Seleucus surnamed Callinicus or Pogon, also died at this

- Πύργωνος ἐπικληθέντος· Ἀντίοχος δὲ διεδέξατο τὴν
 5 ἐν Συρίᾳ βασιλείαν, ἀδελφὸς ὢν αὐτοῦ. παραπλή-
 σιοι γὰρ δὴ τι συνέβη τούτοις καὶ τοῖς πρώτοις μετὰ
 τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν κατασχοῦσι τὰς ἀρχὰς
 ταύτας, λέγω δὲ Σελεύκῳ, Πτολεμαίῳ, Λυσιμάχῳ.
 6 ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ πάντες περὶ τὴν εἰκοστὴν καὶ τετάρ-
 την πρὸς ταῖς ἑκατὸν ὀλυμπιάδα μετήλλαξαν, καθά-
 περ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, οὗτοί τε περὶ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ
 τριακοστὴν.
 7 Ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἐπίστασιν καὶ προκατασκευὴν
 τῆς ὅλης ἱστορίας διεληλύθαμεν, δι' ἧς ὑποδέδεικται
 πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ δι' ἧς αἰτίας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν
 κρατήσαντες Ῥωμαῖοι πρῶτον ἐγχειρεῖν ἤρξαντο
 τοῖς ἔξω πράγμασι, καὶ πρῶτον ἐτόλμησαν ἀμφισβη-
 8 τεῖν Καρχηδονίοις τῆς θαλάττης, ἅμα δὲ τούτοις
 καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καὶ Μακεδόνας, ὁμοίως
 9 δὲ καὶ περὶ Καρχηδονίους ὑπάρχουσιν τότε κατὰ-
 στασιν δεδηλώκαμεν, καθῆκον ἂν εἶη παραγεγονότας
 ἐπὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 πρόθεσιν, ἐν οἷς ἔμελλον οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες τὸν
 συμμαχικόν, Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ τὸν Ἀννιβιακόν, οἱ δὲ
 κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν βασιλεῖς τὸν περὶ Κοίλης Συρίας
 10 ἐνίστασθαι πόλεμον, καὶ τὴν βύβλον ταύτην
 ἀφορίζειν ἀκολουθῶς τῇ τε τῶν προγεγονότων πραγ-
 μάτων περιγραφῇ καὶ τῇ τῶν κεχειρικώτων τὰ πρὸ
 τοῦ δυναστῶν καταστροφῇ.

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time, his brother Antiochus succeeding him. The same thing in fact occurred in the case of these three kings, as in that of the first successors of Alexander in the three kingdoms. Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, who all, as I stated above, died in the 124th Olympiad, while these kings died in the 139th.

284-280
B.C.
224-220
B.C.

I have thus completed this Introduction or preliminary part of my History. In it I have shown in the first place when, how, and why the Romans first entered on enterprises outside Italy and disputed the command of the sea with the Carthaginians, and next I have dealt with the state of Greece and Macedonia and with that of Carthage. So having, as was my original purpose, reached the date at which the Greeks were on the eve of the Social War, the Romans on the eve of the Hannibalic War, and the kings of Asia about to enter on the war for Coele-Syria, I must now bring this Book to its close, which coincides with the final events preceding these wars and the death of the three kings who had up to now directed affairs.

END OF BOOK II



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
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